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Abstract
The issue of information systems (IS) security has received considerable attention from both 
academics and professionals. Information systems security has become a major part of core 
business processes in companies of all sizes and types, and it has become more vital than ever 
for companies to have an organised, efficient, and proactive security approach to their IS. 
Despite this importance, a number of significant gaps exist in the academic literature. Most of 
the previous studies have dealt with IS security or information security in general, without 
particular attention to accounting information systems (AIS) security. Security research is 
fragmented, and most previous studies lack an overall and comprehensive view of AIS 
security issues. Each study has tended to deal with a particular security dimension. In 
addition, much research on IS security has been overwhelmingly focused on the technical 
aspects with limited consideration given to non-technical issues such as security policy, 
training and awareness, risk assessment or security budget.
In an attempt to fill these gaps, the current study presents an integrated view of AIS security 
in UK companies by addressing both the technical and non-technical aspects of security. The 
current study aims to investigate the AIS security level among UK companies in different 
industry sectors by investigating the sources and types of AIS security threats, the different 
types of controls implemented to prevent or reduce security threats, and the existence of a 
management framework for AIS security within UK companies in different sectors. To 
achieve the research objectives, the current study employed quantitative and qualitative 
approaches using a postal questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. The first stage 
involved sending a postal questionnaire to the IT managers of 800 UK listed companies in 
different industry sectors. A total of 104 responses were received, of which 65 responses 
were usable for statistical analysis. The second stage involved conducting nine interviews 
with IT managers of UK companies.
The results indicated that some activities and practices forming the AIS security management 
framework are well known and undertaken by the majority of UK companies regardless of the 
industry sector for example AIS security policy, security risk assessment, security incident 
handling procedures, and a business continuity plan. However, security training and 
awareness program, security budget, and the British Standard for Information Security (BS 
7799) are the most neglected security practices in the majority of companies. The results also 
showed that UK companies suffer from different types of security incidents; however, many 
incidents go unreported because of the fear of negative publicity and the majority prefer to 
maintain their brand and to deal with these incidents internally.
The results also revealed that employees are now the most common source of AIS security 
threats facing UK companies. In addition, the results suggested frequent occurrence of some 
types of security threats, for instance, employees’ errors such as unintentional destruction of 
data by employees, spamming and malware attacks, and employees’ sharing of passwords. 
Moreover, the majority of companies are paying more attention to software, hardware, input, 
and output security controls. However, more effort must be devoted to organisational and 
personnel controls.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Security has become a pervasive concern for all organisations today and continues to 
rise in importance. Companies now are more dependent upon their information 
systems (IS) and particularly their accounting information systems (AIS) than ever 
before. However, due to the higher levels o f interconnectivity among AIS both within 
and among companies, these companies face a growing risk o f their systems being 
compromised. There is also extensive evidence to suggest that IS security threats are 
now growing in number, variety and most importantly, the severity o f their impact 
(Collette and Gentile 2006). Such threats cost organisations millions o f pounds 
annually, in addition to the loss o f customers, profitability, loss o f data, loss of 
reputation and even bankruptcy (Mitchell et a l  1999).
Companies have recognised the problems and are trying to take positive steps to 
defend their IS and to increase the security controls (Romney and Steinbart 2003). 
However, information security is not doing nearly enough to keep up with the rapid 
changes in the business environment. The gap continues to widen between the 
growing threats and what is actually done to address these threats, and action is still 
required to close this gap by applying sound information security practices (Ernst & 
Young 2005).
Consequently, the current study investigates the sources and types o f AIS security 
threats, the different types o f security controls implemented to prevent or reduce these 
threats and the existence o f an AIS security management framework among UK 
companies in different industry sectors, in an attempt to highlight the common threats 
facing each particular sector as a first step for companies to implement the appropriate 
security controls.
The remainder o f this chapter provides an outline o f the current study. Section 1.2 
briefly discusses the background o f the research. Section 1.3 examines the importance 
of the research, while Section 1.4 presents the objectives, questions, and hypotheses
-  1 -
of the research. The research methodology is briefly introduced in Section 1.5. 
Section 1.6 outlines the structure o f the thesis, and the final section concludes the 
chapter.
1.2 Background of the research
The security issue has received considerable attention from both academics and 
professionals. IS security has become a part o f core business processes in companies 
of all sizes and types, and it has become more vital than ever for companies to have an 
organised, efficient, and proactive security approach to their IS (Booker 2006). In the 
UK, the priority given to security remains high across all sizes o f companies. 
According to the BERR1 Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), four 
fifths of respondents believe that information security is a high or very high priority 
for their senior management. In addition, the American Institute o f Certified Public 
Accountants’ 19th Top Technology Initiatives Survey (AICPA 2008) stated that, for 
six consecutive years, the survey identified information security as the country’s 
number one technology concern.
Moreover, the increasing dependence on and the greater complexity o f IS have 
brought companies different types of security threats (Chang and Yeh 2006). In 
addition, the literature identifies different classifications o f security threats including 
passive/active (Mitchell et al. 1999), internal/external (Rainer et al. 1991), 
human/non-human (Loch et al. 1992), intentional/non-intentional (Qureshi and Siegel 
1997), physical/logical (Abu-Musa 2003), and IT-related/non-IT-related security 
threats (Chang and Yeh 2006).
Security surveys also indicated that the number o f security breaches occurring within 
companies continues to rise. The 2006 DTI Information Security Breaches Survey 
(DTI 2006) stated that 62 percent o f UK companies had had a security incident in the 
last year and, on average, every UK company now suffers several security incidents a 
day. Consequently, the cost to UK companies is significant. The 2006 Technology, 
Media & Telecommunications Security Survey (DTT 2006b, p.3) confirms this fact
1 The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) is a UK government 
department, which was created on 28 June 2007 on the disbanding o f the Department o f  Trade and 
Industry (DTI). The BERR covers the same areas covered previously by the DTI e.g. Company Law, 
Trade, Business Growth, Economic Development, etc.
- 2 -
and indicated, “Security incidents are in the news every day and the overall risks are 
growing”. In addition, more than half of the companies surveyed said that their 
systems had been breached over the last 12 months. Even worse, both the magnitude 
and complexity o f the attacks are increasing. Despite the fact that the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) revealed that fewer companies 
had security incidents in the last year than two years before, the average seriousness 
of incidents increased.
Whitman (2003) argued that knowing the enemy that confronts information security is 
a vital component in shaping an information security defence posture. Accountants, as 
well as users, managers, and designers o f IS should be knowledgeable about security 
threats and appropriate control techniques in order to protect their own systems 
(Beard and Wen 2007).
A review o f the literature reveals that there is a great concern from academics and 
practitioners regarding security threats facing different companies. They have 
investigated the different types o f threats, the seriousness o f threats and the frequency 
of occurrence o f each threat in an attempt to assist companies to identify and employ 
the relevant security controls to prevent or reduce such threats.
Consequently, the need to understand and employ adequate information security 
controls has become an issue no company can ignore. Chang and Yeh (2006) 
indicated that a lack o f robust information security protection raises the information 
security threat level o f companies. Every company, regardless o f its size and type, 
must prepare itself for all possible security threats. However, there is no one security 
solution that is suitable for all companies (Tsohou et al. 2006). Security controls are 
increasingly complex and must be tailored to the business (Jones 2003). In addition, 
due to resource constraints, companies cannot implement unlimited controls to protect 
their systems. Instead, they should try to understand the major threats and implement 
effective controls accordingly (Lin 2006).
The literature reveals a great concern regarding the IS security controls that 
companies implement to prevent or reduce security threats facing them. In addition, 
different classifications were assigned to these security controls. For example,
security controls can be classified, among others, according to purpose into 
preventive, detective, and corrective controls (Bagranoff et al. 2005; Flowerday and 
Von Solms 2005; Lin 2006; Romney and Steinbart 2003). Controls can also be 
classified according to their association with data processing stages into input, 
processing, storing, and output security controls (Abu-Musa 2004b; Bagranoff et al. 
2005). In addition, Gerber and Von Solms (2001) classified information security 
controls according to the evolution o f the computing eras into physical, technical, and 
operational controls.
However, despite the progress made by companies in protecting their IS and the 
sensitive information stored in them, they often focus on the technical controls and 
neglect the non-technical issues o f information security such as security policy, 
training and awareness, and standards. There is a wide agreement in the literature that 
these two dimensions - technical and non-technical - have to work together to create a 
secure environment. Chang and Yeh (2006) indicated that effective information 
security should address both IT and non-IT related issues instead o f simply 
considering IT systems. More recently, Kritzinger and Smith (2008) stated that the 
technical and non-technical issues o f information security should be balanced to 
ensure that the technical issues do not overshadow the non-technical issues so that the 
human side o f information security is adequately addressed when developing a 
common body o f knowledge for information security suited to industry.
It is, therefore, necessary for companies to go beyond technical considerations and to 
adopt a structured process for managing their IS security. Eloff and Von Solms (2000) 
argued that IS security management is a stream o f management activities that aims to 
protect the IS and create a framework within which such systems operate as expected 
by the company. Pironti (2005) indicated that by introducing a structured approach to 
information security, a company could increase its security posture and reduce the 
security costs. It can also gain advantage in its efforts to ensure compliance to security 
standards and regulations. Consequently, an IS security management framework must 
exist not only to protect IS but also to ensure the continuity o f the company (Karyda 
e ta l  2005).
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However, the literature review reveals that there are various approaches to dealing 
with the IS security management issue. Some studies discussed security management 
in general, for example, Vermeulen and Von Solms (2002), while the majority o f the 
other studies focused only on one o f its activities such as security policy, security 
training and awareness, incident handling, business continuity, risk assessment, 
security budget, or security standards.
Furthermore, there is a high degree o f agreement that companies in different industry 
sectors tend to give a different role to IS (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1990) and therefore 
have different security requirements (Chang and Yeh 2006; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; 
Straub 1986). Consequently, a company’s approach to security depends on its 
industry sector.
Based on the above, the current study aims to present an integrated view o f the AIS 
security in UK companies by covering both technical and non-technical aspects of 
security, and to investigate the different sources and types o f  AIS security threats and 
the types of security controls implemented to prevent or reduce security threats among 
companies in different industry sectors in the UK. In addition, the current study aims 
to investigate the existence o f a management framework for AIS security within UK 
companies, including AIS security policy, security training and awareness program, 
risk assessment, incident response, disaster recovery, and business continuity plan, 
security budget, security standards and certification, and AIS security effectiveness.
1.3 Importance of the research
While the importance o f IS security is being increasingly recognised, a number of 
significant gaps exist in the academic literature. It can be recognised that most o f  the 
previous studies have dealt with IS security or information security in general, 
without particular attention to AIS security.
In addition, a review o f the literature underlines the fact that security research is 
fragmented and no comprehensive framework exists. Cannoy et al. (2006) stated that 
most previous security studies included diagrams, charts and tables; however, none of 
them included major constructs and their relationships, only proposing a model for a 
specific topic or clarifying a technical system, and many o f the frameworks proposed
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are extremely specific and task-related. Moreover, while a number o f major surveys 
have been conducted to investigate different security issues, they have been 
commercially oriented surveys and not formal academic studies.
The literature also reveals that most previous studies lack an overall and 
comprehensive view o f the AIS security issue. Each o f these studies tried to deal with 
a particular security dimension. Some o f them focused on threats facing AIS (Abu- 
Musa 2003; 2004a; 2006a and b; Keller et al. 2005; Loch et al. 1992; Ryan and 
Bordoloi 1997; Whitman 2004). Other studies focused on security controls (Abu- 
Musa 2004b; 2007a and b; Henry 1997; Kankanhalli et al. 2003), while others 
combined the security threats and controls in one study (Cerullo and Cerullo 2005; 
Chang and Yeh 2006; Gupta and Hammond 2005; Yeh and Chang 2007).
Moreover, the literature reveals that the majority o f previous studies focused only on 
one of the activities o f the management framework for AIS security. Doherty and 
Fulford (2005), Hong et al. (2006) and Kadam (2007) focused on the security policy. 
Kruger and Kearney (2006) and Peltier (2005) addressed the security training and 
awareness issue. Gerber and Von Solms (2005) covered risk assessment. Bhaskar
(2005) and Mitropoulos et al. (2007) addressed the incident handling issue, whereas 
Hunton (2002) and Rodetis (1999) focused on the disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans. Gordon and Loeb (2006) were concerned with the security budget, 
while Freeman (2007) and Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006) focused on the security 
standards and certification.
The literature also shows that much research on IS security has been overwhelmingly 
focused on the technical aspects with limited consideration to the non-technical issues 
such as security policy, training and awareness, and security budget. Wood (1995) 
argued that no matter how sophisticated the information security technology is, 
controls will not be sustainable unless the non-technical factor has been adequately 
addressed. Chang and Yeh (2006) also indicated that effective information security 
should address both IT and non-IT related issues instead o f simply considering IT 
aspects of the IS.
In an attempt to fill these gaps, the current study aims to present an integrated view o f 
the AIS security in UK companies by addressing both the technical and non-technical 
aspects of security. The current study investigates the sources and types o f threats 
facing AIS security, the different types o f security controls implemented to prevent or 
reduce security threats, and the existence o f a management framework for AIS 
security within UK companies in different industry sectors.
The researcher hopes that the study results may increase managers’ awareness in 
different industry sectors o f the different sources and types o f AIS security threats 
facing their companies so that they can take the appropriate precautions. In addition, 
it is hoped that the study results may highlight the various types o f security controls 
implemented in the different industry sectors investigated to increase the managers’ 
awareness of these controls. Furthermore, the current study presents a management 
framework for AIS security; if  properly implemented, it may help different 
companies to secure their AIS and their sensitive information.
1.4 Objectives, questions, and hypotheses of the research
A review o f the literature shows that most previous studies lack an overall and 
comprehensive view o f the AIS security issue. Each o f these studies tried to cover a 
particular security dimension. Some o f them focused on threats facing AIS, others 
focused on security controls, whereas others covered only one o f the activities that 
form the IS security management framework. Thus, the current study is an attempt to 
fill this gap and to present an integrated view o f AIS security. More specifically, the 
current study has six main aims. The first is to examine the existence o f an adequate 
AIS security management framework within UK companies in different industry 
sectors. The second is to investigate the different types o f AIS security threats facing 
UK companies in different industry sectors. The third is to identify the security 
controls implemented by UK companies to prevent or reduce security threats. The 
fourth is to investigate the effect o f the different types o f security controls 
implemented for the reduction o f AIS security threats facing UK companies, while 
the fifth is to examine the relationship between the AIS security effectiveness level 
and the security threats level within UK companies. Finally, the study aims to 
investigate the security perception among different industry sectors in the UK.
This study is an attempt to investigate the level o f the AIS security among UK
companies in different industry sectors. In particular, this study seeks to find answers
to the following questions:
1. Is there an adequate management framework for AIS security among UK 
companies in different industry sectors?
2. What are the most common sources and types o f security threats facing AIS o f UK 
companies in different industry sectors?
3. What types o f security controls are implemented to prevent or reduce security 
threats in different industry sectors in the UK?
4. Are there significant differences between different industry sectors in the UK 
concerning the types o f AIS security threats, AIS security controls and the existence 
of an adequate management framework for AIS security within companies?
5. What is the impact o f the security controls implemented and the AIS security 
effectiveness level achieved on the reduction o f AIS security threats facing UK 
companies in different industry sectors?
In order to achieve the objectives o f the current study and to examine the relationship
between its main variables five hypotheses will be tested:
Hi. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f a management framework for AIS security.
Hi. i: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS security policy and the frequency of 
updating this policy.
Hi.2: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS security training and awareness 
program and the security awareness level.
Hi.3: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS risk assessment program and the 
frequency o f undertaking this program.
Hi.4-. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f security incident handling procedures, disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans and the frequency o f testing and updating 
these plans.
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Hi 5 There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f a security budget and areas o f spending on AIS 
security.
Hi 6. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the awareness level of the British Standard for Information 
Security Management BS 7799 and the certification under ISO 27001.
Hi 7: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the techniques used to evaluate AIS security effectiveness, the 
success indicators o f AIS security management, and the effectiveness level o f AIS 
security management.
Hi. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the sources and types o f AIS security threats.
H i There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the types o f controls implemented to prevent or reduce security 
threats.
Hr. There is no significant relationship between the different types o f security 
controls and the reduction o f AIS security threats facing UK companies.
Hs: There is no significant relationship between AIS security effectiveness and the 
AIS security threat level in UK companies.
1.5 Methodology
To achieve the research objectives and to test the hypotheses, the current study 
employed quantitative and qualitative approaches using a postal questionnaire and 
semi-structured interviews. The first stage involved a postal questionnaire. This 
method was chosen because o f the advantages it provides compared to other research 
methods, its specific relevance to the nature o f the study, and its popularity in 
previous research in IS security for example Abu-Musa (2004a and b), Chang and Ho
(2006), Henry (1997), Huang et al. (2006), Kankanhalli et al. (2003) and Kotulic and 
Clark (2004) (see Chapter 3).
The final version o f the questionnaire was sent by post to the IT managers o f 800 UK 
listed companies in different industry sectors. A total o f 104 responses was received, 
of which 65 responses were usable for statistical analysis, resulting in a usable 
response rate o f 8.1 percent (see Chapter 4). Despite the low response rate, the
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literature reveals that it is comparable with many previous security studies given the 
very sensitive and intrusive nature of the AIS security issue. Given the nature o f the 
hypotheses (Section 1.4) and the type o f data collected (nominal, ordinal), 
nonparametric tests were employed to analyse the data collected, namely, a Kruskal- 
Wallis One-Way Analysis o f Variance, a Chi-Square Test o f Independence, and 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation. In addition, a series o f stepwise regressions were run in 
an attempt to identify the significant effect o f the different types o f security controls 
implemented by UK companies on the reduction o f AIS security threats facing the 
companies (see Chapter 4).
The second stage involved semi-structured interviews. This method has been 
increasingly recommended and utilised in recent years in IS research for instance 
Kotulic and Clark (2004) and Keller et al. (2005). The semi-structured interviews 
were conducted after the questionnaire in order to clarify and confirm the results 
obtained from the questionnaire analysis, to achieve a high degree o f validity and 
reliability, to enrich the quality o f information collected, and to fill in any gaps in data 
that might occur in the questionnaire’s results. After collecting the questionnaires, all 
the 12 respondents who agreed to participate in a follow-up face-to-face interview 
were contacted and nine interviews were conducted. The small number o f interviews 
is not surprising, given that security research is the most intrusive type o f research and 
there is undoubtedly a general mistrust o f any outsider attempting to gain data about 
the security practices within companies (Kotulic and Clark 2004). All the interviews 
were audio recorded and notes were taken. The interviews were transcribed in full and 
the qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) was used to support Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) approach in analysing interview data (see Chapter 5).
1.6 Structure of the thesis
There are six chapters in this thesis. This chapter has provided an outline o f the 
current study. It has briefly discussed the background o f the research, the importance 
of the research, and presented its objectives, questions, and hypotheses. It also briefly 
introduced the research methodology.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and presents an integrated view o f the AIS security 
issue. It describes the meanings, components and importance o f AIS and explores
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their role in organisations. It also explores the different classifications and types of 
threats facing AIS security. Moreover, this chapter describes the meanings, 
importance o f and responsibility for AIS security, focusing on the different 
dimensions o f security and paying particular attention to the security management. 
Finally, it investigates the different classifications and types o f security controls used 
and employed to prevent or reduce security threats.
Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology used in the current study. It presents the 
conceptual framework o f the research, explaining the main variables o f the current 
study, and demonstrates the research objectives, questions and hypotheses. It explains 
the research design, the data collection methods used in previous studies concerning 
AIS security and the methods employed in the current research namely a mail 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, emphasising the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method, along with justifications for their use. The chapter then 
proceeds by providing a detailed explanation o f the procedures followed in each 
method, the questionnaire design and layout, the pilot test o f the questionnaire, and 
the sampling and administration o f both methods. The chapter briefly presents the 
statistical methods applied to analyse the research data and the ethical considerations 
of the research.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the questionnaire data analysis. It begins by presenting the 
sample size and response rate o f the current study. It also provides a full discussion of 
the statistical methods employed to analyse data from the questionnaire and the 
justifications for selecting these methods. The chapter then presents the profile o f the 
participants and their companies and provides their opinions regarding AIS security 
within their companies and the main findings of the questionnaire.
In Chapter 5, a full discussion o f the interview data analysis is presented. The chapter 
begins by presenting the sample size of the interview, how interviewees were 
contacted, and the date, time and duration of each interview. It proceeds by discussing 
the approach used in analysing interview data and how the qualitative data analysis 
software (NVivo) was used to support Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach in the 
current study, with a particular emphasis on the advantages and disadvantages of 
using NVivo software in analysing interview data. The profile and opinions o f the
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interviewees and the main characteristics o f their companies are then presented with 
the main findings of the interviews.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the study. It reviews the research aims and objectives, 
and presents the data collection methods used. It also provides a summary o f the main 
findings of the research, and the recommendations drawn from these findings. The 
limitations o f the research and suggestions for future research are then presented. The 
structure of the thesis is presented in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 The structure o f the thesis
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Chapter 2 
Literature review
Chapter 3 
Methodology
Chapter 4 
Analysis of 
questionnaire results
Chapter 5 
Analysis of 
interview results
Chapter 6 
Summary and 
conclusion
1.7 Summary of the chapter
This chapter has provided an overview o f the current study. It began by discussing the 
background o f the research, and then revealed its importance. The objectives, 
questions and hypotheses o f the research were then presented, followed by a brief 
introduction to the research methodology and the structure o f the thesis.
The following chapter reviews the literature and presents an integrated view o f the 
AIS security issue. It describes the meanings, importance o f and responsibility for the 
AIS security, focusing on the different dimensions o f security and paying particular 
attention to security management. It also demonstrates the different classifications and
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types of the AIS security threats facing companies, and the different classifications 
and types of security controls used to prevent or reduce security threats in different 
countries paying particular attention to the UK.
Chapter 2 
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In today’s global society, the significance of information is widely accepted and IS 
are truly pervasive throughout organisations (ISACF 2001). The information created, 
issued, stored and transmitted by a company’s AIS is one o f its most valuable assets 
and is considered a critical resource, enabling the company to achieve its objectives 
(DTI 2004a and b; Flowerday and Von Solms 2005). Furthermore, information and 
Information Technology (IT) systems that support it are very important business 
assets. Their availability, integrity and confidentiality are essential to maintain 
competitive edge, profitability, compliance and respected company image (Von Solms 
1999).
Consequently, it seems that having the right information at the right time can make 
the difference between profit and loss, success and failure in today’s business 
environment (Gerber and Von Solms 2001).
However, with the rapid change in IT, with the development and increasing spread of 
user-friendly systems and with the great desire o f companies to acquire and 
implement up-to-date computerised systems and software, AIS are becoming more 
available to all types and sizes o f companies. This enables accounting tasks to be 
accomplished much faster and more accurately than before (Abu-Musa 2003). 
Consequently, due to the higher levels o f interconnectivity o f  AIS both within and 
among companies, these companies face the growing risk o f their systems being 
compromised. Mitchell et al. (1999) indicated that IS are subject to many forms of 
security threats. Such threats cost companies millions o f pounds annually. They can 
also result in the loss o f customers and credibility, even causing operational 
breakdown and ultimately affecting profitability. In addition, there are frequent 
reports in accounting and financial publications o f computer-related data errors, 
incorrect financial information, and violation o f internal contfols, thefts, fires and 
sabotage (Qureshi and Siegel 1997).
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There is also extensive evidence to suggest that the security threats to information and 
AIS are now growing in number, variety and most importantly, the severity o f their 
impact (Collette and Gentile 2006). Deloitte confirms this fact in its 2006 
Technology, Media & Telecommunications Security Survey by indicating that 
“security incidents are in the news every day and the overall risks are growing” (DTT 
2006b, p.3). In addition, more than half o f the companies surveyed claimed that their 
systems had been breached over the last 12 months. Even worse, both the magnitude 
and complexity of the attacks are increasing.
The DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) indicated that every UK 
company suffers several security incidents a day. More recently, the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) revealed that although fewer 
companies had security incidents in the last year than two years previously, the 
average seriousness o f incidents had increased. Consequently, the cost to UK 
companies is likely to be significant.
Because of these losses, companies are now recognising the problems and are trying 
to take positive steps to defend their IS including AIS and to increase security controls 
(Romney and Steinbart 2003). However, according to the Global Information Security 
Survey (Ernst & Young 2005), information security is not doing nearly enough to 
keep up with the rapid changes in the business environment. The gap continues to 
widen between the growing risks and what information security is actually doing to 
address these risks. Moreover, even though many companies have recognised this 
gap, action is still required to close it by applying adequate information security 
practices.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the literature and to present an integrated view 
of the AIS security issue. First, the chapter begins by describing the meanings, 
components, importance and role o f AIS. It goes on to explore the different AIS 
security threats. It then describes the meanings, importance o f and responsibility for 
AIS security, focusing on the different dimensions o f security and paying particular 
attention to security management. Finally, it investigates the different types of 
security controls employed to prevent or to reduce security threats.
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2.2 AIS and the need for security
Companies today are more dependent upon their AIS than ever before. However, the 
increasing use o f the internet and online data processing has made access to these 
systems more available and easier for many users, which has led to a corresponding 
increase in AIS security abuses. Consequently, the need to understand and to employ 
adequate systems security has become a key business management issue.
2.2.1 What is meant by AIS?
Before considering the meaning o f AIS, it is essential to examine the meaning o f each 
word of the term “accounting information systems” individually.
“Accounting” is the combined activities o f recording economic data, processing and 
analysing these data and presenting the resulting information in financial terms. 
Accounting is the information a company uses to achieve efficient operations and 
effective management. “Information” is a set o f outputs from AIS or any other IS. It 
serves as the basis for making decisions and taking actions. “System” represents a set 
of two or more interrelated components that interact to achieve a certain goal. 
However, within the accounting profession today, the term system or systems usually 
refers to “Computer Systems” (Romney and Steinbart 2003; Wilkinson 1989).
Based on the above, the term “information systems” describes the organised 
collection, processing, transmission and dissemination o f information in accordance 
with defined procedures, whether automated or manual (Poore 1999). Moreover, the 
term “accounting information systems” can be defined as “a collection o f data and 
processing procedures that creates needed information for its users” (Bagranoff et al. 
2005, p.5). In addition, an AIS is “a set of components that collect accounting data, 
store it for future uses and process it for end users” (Romney and Steinbart 2003, p.8).
It is important to note that not all AIS are computerised or even need to be, but most 
of the ones in business today are, in fact, computerised. On the other hand, AIS have 
traditionally focused on collecting, processing and communicating financial-oriented 
information to the company’s external parties for example investors, creditors and tax 
agencies, and internal parties such as management. However today, AIS are 
concerned with non-financial as well as financial data and information.
- 16-
From the above, the researcher concludes that AIS are systems concerned with 
collecting, processing and storing data and disseminating financial and non-financial 
information to interested parties.
2.2.2 Components of AIS
In performing their activities, AIS require specific components or elements. The 
nature of these components depends on the degree o f automation o f these systems. 
Wilkinson (1989) indicated that in the traditional AIS that employ manual techniques, 
the components consist o f  documents, journals, ledgers, files, reports and other 
outputs, non-computerised processing devices, methods and controls. However, with 
the increasing level o f automation, the computerised AIS consist o f five components 
(Boritz et al. 1999; Romney and Steinbart 2003) as follows:
- Personnel involved in operating and using the system;
- Procedures involved in collecting, processing and storing data about companies’ 
activities;
- Data about companies’ business processes;
- Software used to process companies’ data; and
- IT infrastructure including computers, peripheral devices and network 
communications devices.
In addition, AIS can be as simple as a personal computer-based payroll application 
with a single user, or they may be as complex as a multi-application, multi-computer 
system accessed by an unlimited number o f users inside or outside the company.
2.2.3 Factors influencing the design of AIS
According to Romney and Steinbart (2003), three main factors can have an influence 
on the AIS design in any company namely IT, organisational culture and the 
organisation’s strategy (Figure 2.1). IT can change the way that accounting and other 
business activities are performed. AIS should be designed to reflect the value of the 
company, and therefore organisational culture has an effect on its design. Moreover, 
an organisation’s strategy has a significant influence on the company as a whole.
F ig u r e  2 .1  F a c to r s  i n f lu e n c in g  d e s ig n  o f  A I S
AIS
Organisational
Culture
Organisation
Strategy
Information
Technology
(Source: Romney and Steinbart 2003, p.6)
2.2.4 Role of AIS
Reviewing the literature concerning the role o f IS in general and AIS in particular 
reveals that AIS can perform three main functions in a company (Bagranoff et al. 
2005; Romney and Steinbart 2003). These functions are:
- Collecting and storing data about the company’s activities, the resources affected 
by those activities, and those who participate in the various activities so that 
management, employees and interested outsiders can review what has happened;
- Transforming data into information that is useful for making decisions that enable 
management to plan, execute and control activities; and
- Providing adequate controls to safeguard the company’s assets, including its data, 
to ensure the availability, accuracy and reliability o f data.
2.2.5 Why do AIS fail?
However, despite the significant role o f AIS in any company and the usefulness of the 
computerised AIS, systems sometimes fail. As mentioned before, AIS consist of 
personnel, procedures, data, software and hardware; consequently, if  one o f these 
components fails, the whole system may fail. Boritz et al. (1999) suggested some 
common symptoms o f unreliable systems, namely:
- Frequent failures that deny internal and external users access to essential systems 
services;
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- Unauthorised access, making the systems vulnerable to viruses, hackers and loss 
of data confidentiality;
- Loss of data integrity, including corrupted, incomplete and fictitious data; and
- Serious maintenance problems resulting in unintended negative side-effects from 
system changes such as unavailability o f system services, loss o f data 
confidentiality or integrity.
From the above, it seems that the main characteristics o f reliable AIS are:
- Availability i.e. systems are available when needed;
- Security i.e. systems are protected against unauthorised access;
- Integrity i.e. systems processing is complete, accurate and timely; and
- Maintainability i.e. systems can be updated in a manner that provides continuous 
availability, security and integrity.
2.3 Security threats
Companies today have become increasingly dependent on AIS more than ever before. 
These systems have grown increasingly more complex to meet our escalating needs 
for information. However, as systems’ complexity and our dependence on them 
increase, companies face significant risks related to ensuring the security and integrity 
of those systems that is AIS can generate many direct and indirect benefits and as 
many direct and indirect risks. In addition, the literature reveals that companies, their 
information, AIS and networks are faced with a large number o f security threats from 
a wide range o f sources.
2.3.1 What is meant by security threats?
A review of the literature shows that there is some confusion concerning the meaning 
of threats, risks, incidents, vulnerabilities, and attacks.
A threat is any possible event or sequence o f actions that might lead to a violation of 
one or more security goals. The term “threat” is not limited to the adversary that could 
cause harm but to events that could lead to harm (Tsiakis and Stephanides 2005). 
According to Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2007, p.6), security threats can be defined as 
“circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or harm”. This loss could consist 
of the absence o f data or a resource within an information system, financial loss, or
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loss of company credibility (Mitchell et al. 1999). In addition, the DTI Information 
Security Policy Team stated, “a threat is a potential cause o f an unwanted incident 
which may result in harm to a system or organisation” (DTI 2004a, p.7). Furthermore, 
the National Information Systems Security Glossary (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.55) 
defined a threat as “any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
an IS through unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure, modification o f data and/or 
denial of service”.
It can be concluded that security threats are any event that can have an adverse impact 
on a company’s IS in general and AIS in particular. These threats can either be 
singular or form part o f a combination o f multiple threats, and they can come both 
from inside and from outside the company.
A risk represents “the possibility that a particular threat will adversely impact an IS by 
exploiting a particular vulnerability” (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.47). A risk is “the level 
of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
agency assets, or individuals resulting from the operation o f an information system 
given the potential impact o f a threat and the likelihood o f that threat occurring” 
(NIST 800-53 2005, p.26). Straub and Welke (1998) indicated that security risk is that 
the company’s information and IS are not sufficiently protected against certain kinds 
of damage or loss. A risk is the possibility that a certain threat will have a negative
effect on a company’s IS in general and AIS in particular.
The National Information Systems Security Glossary (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.62) 
defined a vulnerability as “a weakness in an IS, system security procedures, internal 
controls, or implementation that could be exploited”. A vulnerability represents a 
weakness of an asset or group o f assets that can be exploited by a threat (DTI 2004a, 
p.7). A vulnerability is a weakness in IS in general or AIS in particular that can be
exploited by a certain threat or by a group of threats.
An incident is “an assessed occurrence having actual or potentially adverse effects on 
an IS” (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.29). An information security incident is “one or more 
unwanted or unexpected events that have a significant probability o f compromising 
business operations and threatening information security” (DTI 2004a, p.7).
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Therefore, an IS security incident represents one or more unexpected events that can 
have an adverse impact on a company’s IS in general or on AIS in particular.
On the other hand, an attack is a type o f incident involving the intentional act of 
attempting to bypass one or more security controls o f IS (NSTISSI 4009 2000) in 
general and AIS in particular.
Thus, the literature supports the view that companies and their IS and AIS are subject 
to increasing numbers and types o f security threats.
2J.2 Classifications of security threats
The literature reveals that there are various classifications o f security threats. As 
mentioned, some previous studies focused on security threats in general, others 
addressed AIS security threats, others were concerned with computer security threats, 
while others presented information security threats.
Parker (1981) classified security threats according to the type o f act into natural 
disasters, errors and omissions, and intentional acts. Rainer et al. (1991) also 
classified AIS security threats under three main groups: physical threats; unauthorised 
access; and authorised users, which may be caused by internal and external sources.
Loch et al. (1992) presented a four-dimensional IS threat classification system 
including sources, perpetrators, intent and consequences. The sources o f threats can 
be inside or outside the company; the perpetrators can be human or non-human; the 
intent can be accidental or intentional; and the consequences can be disclosure, 
modification, destruction or denial o f  service. Abu-Musa (2003) added another 
dimension in which security threats can be classified into physical or logical security 
threats. Chang and Yeh (2006) also classified IS assets and the corresponding threats 
into two types: IT and non-IT-related threats. IT-related threats are those involving 
software, hardware, data and network, while, non-IT-related threats are those related 
to personnel, administration and physical/environmental facilities.
Regarding the information security threats, Icove et al. (1999) grouped information 
threats into seven categories: software, hardware, data, network, physical, personnel
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and administration, where administration includes security regulations and policies. In 
addition, Mitchell et al. (1999) classified information security threats into passive and 
active threats. The passive threats represent unpredictable natural or physical disasters 
and accidental human errors occurring completely at random, while the active threats 
represent deliberate and malicious attacks on IS, which can potentially be predicted 
and avoided, can be carried out by insiders or outsiders and may be the result o f direct 
or indirect action.
Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) presented three main sources from which business 
information risks may arise: natural risks, technical risks and human risks. Natural 
risks include events such as floods, earthquakes or fires, which can cause considerable 
damage, not only to the company’s business information assets, but also to its 
physical structures. Technical risks arise as a result o f a growing dependence on 
technology and include numerous potential hardware and software failures that can 
occur, whereas, human risks result from the deliberate or accidental acts o f human 
beings and can possibly create the greatest area o f concern regarding the protection of 
a company’s critical information assets.
In addition, Wiant (2005) presented four principal means by which sensitive 
information is exposed. Those means include intentional theft by unauthorised agents 
outside the company; theft or sabotage by former employees or disgruntled current 
staff; accidental exposure by current employees; and other various types o f 
disclosures by company members and from inappropriate use o f information among 
secondary users. Parker (1984) argued that the accidental exposure by employees is 
the most common problem, which is usually due to employees’ negligence, ignorance 
or carelessness. Manrique (2005) and Whitman (2004) confirmed that the accidental 
acts by employees remain a high priority threat to information security.
With respect to computer security threats, Qureshi and Siegel (1997) classified 
computer security risks into three major categories: destruction, modification and 
disclosure, where each may be further classified into intentional and unintentional 
acts. Threats can also come from computer criminals and disgruntled employees who 
intend to defraud, sabotage and hack, and computer users who are careless or
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negligent. In addition, threats can come from the environment in the form of natural 
disasters.
Katz (2000) indicated that a computer network can be attacked in a number o f ways 
with different degrees o f  damage, and these attacks can take different forms: a denial 
of service (an attack on the availability o f information); theft o f information (an attack 
on the ownership o f information) and the corruption o f data (an attack on the integrity 
of information). In addition, Garg et al. (2003) classified IT security incidents into 
web site defacement, denial o f  service, theft o f customer and credit card information. 
Moreover, Austin and Darby (2003) stated that threats to digital security come in 
many shapes and sizes; however, they fall into three main categories: network attacks, 
intrusions, and malicious acts.
Based on the above, it seems that security threats concerning information, IS, AIS, 
computers or IT can be classified into:
- Passive/active security threats;
- Internal/external security threats;
- Human/non-human security threats;
- Intentional/non-intentional security threats;
- Physical/logical security threats; and
- IT-related/non-IT-related threats.
2.3.3 Types of security threats
The literature reveals that companies their information, IS and networks, irrespective 
of their size and type, are faced with different security threats. However, it seems that 
some threats are more prevalent in certain locations or countries than in others.
In the UK, a study was conducted by Mitchell et al. (1999) to investigate the attitudes 
to information security among commercial organisations. The results showed that 
computer failure and fire, followed by computer viruses were considered the most 
serious security threats. One third o f companies felt that their information security 
was at risk from disgruntled employees. In comparison, 50 percent believed that 
mistakes by authorised employees threatened security. However, only 40 percent of 
companies felt that the internet was a serious threat to their information. More
- 2 3  -
recently, the majority o f companies have come to recognise the internet as one o f their 
most serious security threats. Lee et al. (2008) indicated that internet misuse has 
emerged as one o f the major concerns of managers in today’s business environment.
In addition, the DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004a) indicated that the 
following threats, among others, might cause harm, damage, or loss to the company’s 
information: system failure; disgruntled employees; unauthorised access by 
competitors; denial o f service attacks; theft o f  laptops; fraud and deception; and 
identity theft. According to the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 
2006), viruses and malicious software continue to be the most common cause of 
security incidents for UK businesses. In addition, there has been an increase in the 
number of instances o f staff misuse o f IS. Significant attempts to break into networks 
are the most reported types o f attack by an outsider. The survey also indicated that the 
most common type o f theft and fraud involving computers is the physical theft of 
computer equipment, while the accidental systems failure or data corruption is the 
second highest incident type after virus infection.
Although, it seems that computer viruses were the most common cause o f security 
incidents for UK businesses, the virus threat is not now identified as a key concern to 
the majority o f companies. The BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 
2008) indicated that companies reported few virus infections and this could be 
because corporate anti-virus defences have significantly improved.
Regarding the USA, one o f the studies was carried out by Loch et al. (1992). The 
researchers developed a list o f 12 threats, derived from the literature, and conducted a 
survey to explore the perception o f IS security executives regarding the security 
threats to their company’s IS. Respondents were asked to rank the top three of the 
following threats for microcomputers, mainframes and networks. These security 
threats are:
- Accidental entry o f bad data by employees;
- Intentional entry o f bad data by employees;
- Accidental destruction o f data by employees;
* - Intentional destruction o f data by employees;
- Unauthorised access to data/system by employees;
- 2 4 -
- Inadequate control over media (disks, tapes);
- Poor control over manual handling o f input/output;
- Access to data/system by outsiders (hackers);
- Access to data/system by outsiders (competitors);
- Entry into the system o f computer viruses, worms;
- Weak, ineffective, inadequate physical control;
- Natural disasters: fire, flood, loss o f power, communications.
The results revealed that natural disasters and employees accidental actions were 
ranked among the top threats by all three environments. The accidental destruction of 
data by employees, accidental entry o f bad data by employees and inadequate control 
over media were ranked as the top three security threats in microcomputers. 
Accidental entry o f bad data by employees, natural disasters and accidental 
destruction of data by employees received the top three ranks in mainframes, whereas 
natural disasters, access to system by hackers and weak/ineffective controls were the 
top threats in the network environment.
Since AIS security has become one o f the major concerns for companies, Davis 
(1997) conducted an important study similar to the study conducted by Loch et al. 
(1992), in which a sample o f CPAs were surveyed about AIS security threats in four 
computing environments: microcomputers, minicomputers, mainframes, and
networks. From a list o f 17 potential threats, the respondents were asked to rank the 
top three threats applicable to each o f the four computing environments. The results 
revealed that employees are a common threat for the four environments, which 
confirmed the results o f  the study conducted by Loch et al. (1992). The results 
showed that the following threats are ranked as the top three threats in the four 
computing environments:
- Microcomputers: accidental destruction o f data by employees, introduction of 
computer viruses to systems and inadequate control over storage media;
- Minicomputers: accidental entry o f bad data by employees, unauthorised access to 
data/systems by employees and poor segregation o f information systems duties 
(i.e. programming and operations);
* - Mainframes: poor segregation o f information systems duties, unauthorised access 
to data/systems by employees and natural disasters e.g. fire; and
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- Networks: introduction o f computer viruses to systems, unauthorised access to 
data/systems by outsiders and unauthorised access to data/systems by employees.
It can be concluded from both Loch et al. (1992) and Davis (1997) studies that 
different computing environments have different levels o f security risks. 
Consequently, a system o f microcomputers with connections to an external network 
such as the internet was viewed as the highest risk environment, whereas a mainframe 
environment was viewed as having the lowest threat level. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) 
argued that the increased interconnectivity among computers enabled by the internet 
raised the scale and scope o f security threats.
In another study, Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) examined the security threats associated 
with the client/server versus the mainframe environment. Respondents were asked to 
rate the seriousness o f 15 potential security threats to their company in both 
environments. The results revealed that three threats were related to major loss of 
computer resources or data: natural disasters, single point o f failure and the loss due to 
inadequate backups or log files. The results revealed also that the average ratings of 
seven security threats were significantly different for computing environments. In 
each of these seven cases, the perceived risk was rated higher in the mainframe 
environment. These significant security threats are:
- Accidental destruction o f data by employees;
- Accidental entry o f erroneous data by employees;
- Intentional destruction o f data by employees;
- Intentional entry o f erroneous data by employees;
- Loss due to inadequate backups;
- Natural disaster; and
- Single point o f failure.
The results also indicated that viruses, bombs and worms are o f paramount concern in 
the client/server environment, which confirms the results o f many previous studies.
Moreover, the IF AC International Information Technology Guidelines (IF AC 1998)
* stated that threats might arise, among others, from technical conditions, natural 
disasters, environmental conditions, human factors, unauthorised access or viruses. In
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addition, other threats, such as outsourced operations are increasing in significance. 
Romney and Steinbart (2003) confirmed these threats and indicated that companies 
face four main types o f AIS security threats, namely: natural disasters (fire, floods, 
etc.); software errors and equipment malfunctions (hardware failures, software errors, 
operating system crashes, power outages, etc.); unintentional acts (accidents caused 
by human carelessness, failure to follow procedures, poorly trained personnel, errors 
or omissions, lost data, etc.) and intentional acts i.e. computer crimes (sabotage, 
computer fraud, etc.).
In another study to identify and rank current threats to information security and to 
present current perceptions o f the level o f severity o f these threats, Whitman (2004) 
developed a list o f information security threats and asked respondents to rank these 
threats. The threat ranked most serious by respondents was deliberate software 
attacks, followed by deliberate acts o f espionage. The act o f human error or failure 
remains a high priority as a valid threat. It seems that these findings support the 
findings of Loch et al. (1992) indicating that the same threats that faced IS managers 
over 10 years earlier, were still prevalent when this study was conducted.
Furthermore, in a more recent study Kros et al. (2005) indicated that IS security 
breaches occur in many forms, including theft o f proprietary information, financial 
fraud, system penetration, denial o f service, sabotage and virus infection.
Based on the responses o f computer security practitioners in USA corporations, 
government agencies, financial institutions, medical institutions and universities, the 
Computer Crime and Security Survey (Gordon et al. 2006) revealed that the attacks 
on or misuse o f computer systems include: viruses (65 percent); laptop/mobile 
hardware theft (47 percent); insider abuse o f net access (42 percent); unauthorised 
access to information (32 percent); denial o f service (25 percent); system penetration 
(15 percent); abuse o f wireless network (14 percent); theft o f  proprietary information 
(9 percent); telecom fraud (8 percent); misuse o f public web application and website 
defacement (6 percent); and sabotage (3 percent). It is clear from the results that the 
majority of respondents suffered virus attacks. However, the results o f a recent survey 
* (Richardson 2007) revealed that the number o f companies suffering virus attacks has 
dropped and this could be because anti-virus vendors have become faster at reacting
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to new virus threats. On the other hand, insider abuse o f network access or e-mail has 
become the most prevalent security problem facing companies.
Moreover, the respondents to the DTT Global Security Survey (DTT 2006a) indicated 
that their top threats include privacy issues (62 percent), increasing sophistication of 
attacks (59 percent) and emerging technologies (47 percent). A year later, the 
respondents to the survey addressed human error (79 percent), technology (73 
percent), and third parties (46 percent) as the root causes o f failures o f their 
companies’ IS (DTT 2007).
From the above, it seems that investigating the types o f security threats has received 
much attention from USA academics and practitioners. It is clear also that the insiders 
for example employees’ accidental and intentional acts are the major threats facing 
companies. Lin (2006) argued that there would always be some risk that authorised 
employees will misuse data they have access to in the course o f their work. In 
addition, Mattsson (2007) argued that many abuses and accidents occur because 
people have access to data that they do not need to see, or do need to see but should 
not be able to alter or delete.
Furthermore, in order to investigate the security threats in developing countries, Abu- 
Musa (2006b) conducted a study to investigate security threats to computerised AIS in 
the Egyptian Banking Sector (EBS). The entire population (66 banks) was surveyed 
using a self-administered questionnaire. The results revealed that accidental entry of 
bad data by employees, accidental destruction o f data by employees, introduction of 
computer viruses to the system, natural and human-made disasters, employees’ 
sharing of passwords and misdirecting printouts are the most significant security 
threats to computerised AIS in the EBS. Furthermore, Abu-Musa (2006a) used the 
same list o f security threats in another study to investigate the perceived security 
threats to computerised AIS^ through their frequency o f occurrence, in Saudi Arabian 
organisations. The results revealed that almost half o f the responding organisations 
suffered financial losses due to security breaches. The results also revealed that 
accidental and intentional entry o f bad data, accidental destruction o f data by 
* employees, employees’ sharing o f passwords, introduction o f computer viruses, 
destruction of output, unauthorised document visibility and misdirecting printouts are
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the most significant perceived security threats to the computerised AIS in Saudi 
Arabian organisations. Thus, both studies indicated that there is strong agreement 
among respondents regarding AIS security threats, which means that the types of 
security threat are almost the same in the developing countries.
In Taiwan, Chang and Yeh (2006) conducted a study to explore the concerns of 
companies in different industries regarding IS threats facing them, and the 
countermeasures prepared to protect them from such threats using a mail 
questionnaire. The results revealed that banking businesses suffer the most significant 
IS threat, followed by technology, distribution/service, and manufacturing. The results 
showed that the manufacturing businesses considered the network to be a major threat 
while the banking businesses regarded the network and regulation as their main 
threats. The technology companies were more concerned about the network and data, 
whereas the distribution/service businesses considered the network, regulation, and 
software as their major threats. It is clear that the network was considered a major 
security threat in all the industry sectors investigated.
Based on the previous studies conducted in the UK, USA, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Taiwanese organisations, it seems that employees’ accidental and intentional acts and 
the network are the most common security threats facing companies.
The Information Security Industry Survey (Briney 2001) addressed the human factor 
in security and presented some o f the insider breaches experienced by companies. The 
results revealed that the majority o f companies (76 percent) suffered use o f 
unauthorised software, which is followed by illegal use o f company resources (63 
percent); using company resources for profit (50 percent); abuse o f  computer access 
controls (58 percent); physical theft or sabotage (42 percent); use o f unauthorised 
hardware (54 percent); electronic theft, or intentional destruction o f information (24 
percent) and fraud (13 percent). Leach (2003) argued that many companies suspect 
that their internal security threat is more pressing than their external security threat. 
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) also indicated that despite the vital role o f employees 
in a company’s success they are the weakest link when it comes to information 
* security. In addition, Keller et al. (2005) pointed out that over half o f respondents in 
their study felt that the primary threats to data came from internal personnel.
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In another study, Cerullo and Cerullo (2005) describe a hypothetical model of a 
complex IT network that points out the major access points vulnerable to threats, 
which provides accountants and IT professionals with examples o f generic network 
security threats. According to their model, the network can be vulnerable to four 
categories o f threats: human threats e.g. hackers, espionage, password crackers, 
sabotage, social engineering, cyber crime and fraud; human non-malicious threats e.g. 
data entry errors, inadequate access controls, inadequate training and policies; 
accidents e.g. destruction o f data, disks, and documents, failure o f hardware, software 
or computer programs; and natural disasters e.g. floods. It is clear that this study 
addressed a wide range o f IS and computer security threats facing companies, which 
can enhance the awareness o f accountants and IT professionals regarding these 
threats.
On the other hand, Haugen and Selin (1999), Manrique (2005) and Romney and 
Steinbart (2003) addressed computer fraud and abuse. They indicated that computer 
fraud and abuse represent intentional acts o f compromising a company’s IS and 
computers. More specifically, computer fraud includes the following:
- Unauthorised theft, use, access, modification, copying and destruction o f software 
or data;
- Theft of money by altering computer records or the theft o f computer time;
- Theft or destruction o f  computer hardware;
- Obtaining information or tangible property illegally through the use of computers.
In addition, perpetrators have devised many methods to commit these intentional acts 
including viruses, worms, bombs, Trojan horse, hacking, cracking, data leakage, 
denial of service attacks, software piracy, e-mail threats, password cracking, social 
engineering, browsing and spamming. More recently, Clarke (2007) argued that staff 
fraud is on the rise, which could hit not only the finances but also the reputation o f the 
business.
From the above, it seems that companies are facing a large number of security threats, 
and since most, if not all, companies now depend on computerised AIS in carrying out 
their activities, security threats facing them are increasingly complex, which can lead 
to extensive damage for example business interruption, financial loss, loss o f data and
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information, and even bankruptcy. Consequently, the need to understand and employ 
adequate security controls is an issue no business owner can ignore.
2.4 AIS Security
The security issue has received considerable attention from both academics and 
practitioners. It has become a major concern to all sizes and types o f organisations.
In considering the UK, the priority given to “security” remains high across all sizes of 
companies. According to the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006), 
three quarters o f  UK businesses rate “security” as a high or very high priority. More 
recently, the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) indicated 
that the majority o f respondents believed that information security is a high or very 
high priority to their senior management. In addition, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ 19th Top Technology Initiatives Survey (AICPA 2008) 
stated that, for six consecutive years, the survey identified information security as the 
country’s number one technology concern.
2.4.1 What is meant by AIS security?
Reviewing the literature concerning the security issue indicates that there is no clear 
agreement on the meaning o f security. There is some confusion among academics and 
practitioners regarding the terms “Security”, “Information Security”, “IT Security”, 
and “IS Security” . Most o f  the previous studies used them - to a great extent - as 
synonymous terms.
Security
The term “Security” means different things to different people. To some o f them, it is 
concerned with preserving data integrity, whereas to others it is concerned with 
securing privacy for proprietary and restricted information (Granat 1998). Security is 
defined as “traditional methods (security officers, fences, alarms) used to increase the 
likelihood of a crime-controlled, tranquil, and uninterrupted environment for an 
individual or organisation in pursuit o f objectives” (Purpura 2002, p.7). In more 
detail, security is “any method (e.g. security officers, safety, auditing, insurance) used 
by an individual or organisation to increase the likelihood o f preventing and
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controlling loss (e.g. o f people, money, productivity, materials) resulting from a host 
of adverse occurrences (e.g. crime, fire, accident, error, poor supervision or 
management, bad investment)” (Post et a l  1994, p. 10).
On the other hand, many security definitions focus only on information. According to 
the IF AC International Information Technology Guidelines (IFAC 1998, p.4), 
“Security relates to the protection o f valuable assets against loss, disclosure, or 
damage. In this context, valuable assets are the data or information recorded, 
processed, stored, shared, transmitted, or retrieved from an electronic medium. The 
data or information must be protected against harm from threats that will lead to its 
loss, inaccessibility, alteration or wrongful disclosure” . In addition, the KPMG 
Information Risk Management Group (KPMG 1998) stated that “Security” is the 
practices and procedures that ensure that information, generally held in electronic 
format, is safeguarded from unauthorised access, modification or accidental change 
and is readily available to authorised users on request.
Moreover, according to the International Organisation o f Standardisation (ISO/IEC 
15408-1 1999), the concept o f  “Security” refers to the capability o f a software product 
to protect data and information in order to avoid unauthorised individuals or systems 
being able to read and modify them (Villarroel et a l  2005). The Information Security 
Glossary also defined the term “Security” as “the protection o f information 
availability, integrity and confidentiality” (Abu-Musa 2002b, p. 150). Furthermore, 
Hong et a l  (2003) indicated that security is to combine systems, operations and 
internal controls to ensure the integrity and confidentiality o f a company’s data and 
operational procedures.
From the above, it is clear that there are different meanings for security; however, 
most of the definitions focus only on one dimension that is data and information 
security, which indicates the importance o f companies’ data and information in 
today’s business environment.
Information Security
Similarly, there are many definitions for information security. The Technology, Media 
& Telecommunications Security Survey (DTT 2006b) stated that information security
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is commonly considered to revolve around three fundamental principles: 
confidentially, integrity, and availability o f information and many information 
security definitions can support this fact.
Information security is defined as “all the aspects related to achieving and maintaining 
confidentially, integrity, availability, auditability (accountability), authenticity and 
reliability” (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, p .l). The Information Security Governance 
Guidance (ISACF 2001, p.9) stated that information security is “protecting the 
interests of those relying on information and the systems and communications that 
deliver the information from harm resulting from failures o f availability, 
confidentiality and integrity” . In addition, both the DTI Information Security Policy 
Team (DTI 2004a, p.6) and the National Institute o f Standards and Technology (NIST 
2005) indicated that information security involves the preservation o f confidentiality, 
integrity and availability o f  information. Moreover, Ekenberg et al. (1995, p.709) 
stated that information security includes IT security i.e. the protection o f IT systems 
(computers, communication systems, etc.) and their data. They also stated, 
“Information security is the protection o f proprietary knowledge and data against any 
accidental or deliberate compromise to their integrity, confidentiality or availability”.
However, other definitions for information security address other dimensions or 
principles. Peltier (2001, p.266) stated that “information security encompasses the use 
of physical and logical data access controls to ensure the proper use o f data and to 
prohibit unauthorised or accidental modification, destruction, disclosure, loss or 
access to automated or manual records and files as well as loss, damage or misuse of 
information assets”. Anderson (2003, p.310) proposes a definition for information 
security addressing important dimensions o f security such as assurance, risks and 
controls and refers to it as “enterprise information security” which means “a well- 
informed sense o f assurance that information risks and controls are in balance”. In 
addition, the International Organisation o f Standardisation (ISO/IEC 17799 2005) 
addresses other important dimensions, and indicated that information security is the 
protection of information from a wide range o f threats in order to ensure business 
continuity, minimise business risk, and maximise return on investments and business 
opportunities.
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It can be concluded that there is no wide agreement on the meaning o f information 
security given that it is sometimes referred to as IT security or computer security.
AIS Security
Reviewing the literature reveals that the majority o f academics and practitioners have 
used the term “IS security” equivalent to “computerised IS security” or “computer 
security”. Jenkins and Pinkney (1978, p.393) stated “security is usually defined as 
meaning that the computer facilities are available at all required times, that data is 
processed completely and accurately and that access to the data in computer systems 
is restricted to authorised people”.
According to the National Information Systems Security Glossary (NSTISSI 4009 
2000, p.30), IS security is “the protection o f information systems against unauthorised 
access to or modification o f information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and 
against the denial o f service to authorised users, including those measures necessary 
to detect, document, and counter such threats” .
Moreover, Tryfonas et al. (2001) indicated that IS security is a set o f  principles, 
regulations, methodologies, techniques and tools established for protecting an IS or 
any of its parts, from potential threat. In addition, from the definition mentioned by 
Theoharidou et al. (2005, p.473), it seems that IS security is a broader term which 
includes IT and non-IT elements as well. They stated that IS security refers to “the 
protection o f all elements constituting IS (i.e. hardware, software, information, people 
and processes)”.
From the above, the researcher concludes that IS security is a broad term that includes 
all activities - IT and non-IT - that aim to protect companies’ IS and to minimise 
exposure to risks.
However, a review o f the literature reveals that there is no agreed definition o f the 
term “AIS security” . However, since AIS is a major element o f companies’ whole IS, 
AIS security should be regarded as an integral part o f the overall IS security o f those 
companies. Consequently, the researcher suggests that the term “AIS Security” should 
refer to the protection o f all components that collect, store and process accounting 
data for end-users.
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2.4.2 The importance of security
Without doubt, security has become a pervasive concern for all companies today and 
continues to rise in importance. The proliferation o f interconnected IS and networks 
has meant that no business can afford to neglect this issue. According to recent 
surveys, the frequency o f security incidents is increasing at an alarming rate. In 
addition, as dependence on the internet grows, concerns over security and associated 
issues continue to be listed as a company’s top challenge (Garg et al. 2003).
The DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) indicated that the UK 
continues to embrace the internet, with the vast majority o f even small businesses 
enjoying the benefits o f  broadband connections. Consequently, this new business 
environment is accompanied by new security threats and the number o f companies 
affected is still twice the level seen a decade ago. The majority o f UK companies had 
a security incident in 2005 and the actual number o f reported incidents was up from 
2004. On average, every UK company suffered several security incidents a day (up 
from one a month in 2004) (DTI 2004c; 2006). Moreover, the BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) stated that the average seriousness of 
incidents had increased.
However, it seems that most o f  the previous studies dealt with information security in 
general, without particular attention to AIS security. This could be because the 
survival and success o f IS in general and AIS in particular depends largely on the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability o f their critical and sensitive information, 
and because o f the importance o f data and information in today’s business 
environment.
On the other hand, there is wide agreement among academics and practitioners 
regarding companies’ security risks, the reasons for these risks and the benefits of 
keeping their information and IS secure.
The IT Governance Institute o f the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Foundation (ISACF 2001) stated that IS can generate many direct and indirect 
* benefits, and as many direct and indirect risks. These risks have led to a gap between 
the need to protect systems and the scope of controls applied. This gap can be the
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result o f the widespread use o f technology, interconnectivity o f systems, increasing 
rate of technological change, attractiveness o f conducting electronic attacks against 
companies, and external factors such as legislative, legal and regulatory requirements 
or technological developments.
The IF AC International Information Technology Guidelines (IFAC 1998) indicated 
that security failures might result in both financial losses and/or intangible losses such 
as unauthorised disclosure o f sensitive information. In addition, IS threats may arise 
from intentional or unintentional acts and may come from internal or external sources. 
They may originate from, among others, technical conditions, human factors, 
unauthorised access, or viruses. Consequently, adequate information security controls 
help to ensure the smooth functioning o f IS and protect a company from loss caused 
by security failures. The DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004a and b) 
also stated that the protection o f a company’s information resources is vital both for 
the continued health o f the business and for compliance with legal, regulatory and 
contractual demands. In addition, the availability, integrity and confidentiality o f the 
company’s information may be critical for its continued success.
Consequently, the impact o f  an information security breach may be far greater than 
what might be expected. Not only will the loss o f sensitive or critical information 
directly affect a company’s competitiveness and cash flow, it could also damage its 
reputation and have a long-term adverse effect. It might take years for a company to 
establish its reputation and image as a trustworthy and reliable business but a security 
breach could destroy this in a matter o f hours (DTI 2004b). In addition, Posthumus 
and Von Solms (2004) argued that information security helps a company to mitigate 
the various risks to its information through the application o f relevant security 
controls. The information security assists the company in sharing its information in a 
trustworthy way in order to build trusting relationships with its customers, suppliers 
and other business partners. In turn, this will improve its cash flow and profitability.
The International Organisation o f Standardisation (ISO/IEC 17799 2005) confirms the 
above and indicates that defining, achieving, maintaining and improving information 
* security may be essential to maintain competitive edge, cash flow, profitability, legal 
compliance and commercial image.
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In addition, Nyanchama (2005) and Schneier (2001) stated that the direct losses 
caused by security incidents include loss o f productivity e.g. time spent to recover and 
restore service, downtime for personnel who depend on service availability to conduct 
their jobs, direct loss o f business if service availability is impacted and the theft of 
trade secrets and customers’ information. On the other hand, indirect losses include 
reputation-related loss e.g. loss o f customers, damage o f brand and loss o f goodwill, 
compliance penalties and potential liabilities. According to Schneier (2001), most 
European countries have strict privacy laws and companies can be held liable if they 
do not take serious steps to protect their information and customers. The USA also has 
similar laws in particular industries such as banking and health care.
Consequently, companies must keep their information confidential, available when 
needed and protected from damage, destruction and loss o f integrity, which requires 
participation of employees in all company levels and from shareholders, suppliers, 
customers, external parties, and outside specialists if needed.
2.4.3 The evolution of security
Security has moved a long way from the early days when physical security formed the 
backbone o f a company’s security controls. Today security is all about policies, 
standards, awareness programs, strategies, compliance, etc. In addition, the scope of 
security has become much wider than just directly protecting the data, information 
and software o f a business. Management has started to realise that security 
governance has become their direct responsibility, and that serious personal 
consequences, specifically legal, could flow from ignoring this security issue.
However, the literature reveals that there is little attention among academics and 
practitioners, apart from Von Solms, regarding the evolution o f security. He addressed 
the evolution o f security from different perspectives. First, Von Solms (1996) 
addressed the evolution o f security using the scope o f and responsibilities for 
information security. Regarding the scope of information security, computing started 
with central mainframe computers in the 1960s, and only the IT personnel had access 
to the facilities. From the middle 1970s, PCs, information sharing, local area 
networks, etc. were introduced. Many new non-IT personnel were introduced to 
computers, but access to IS was restricted to authorised employees within the
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company’s boundaries. Many companies engaged in inter-company electronic trading 
and linked their IT facilities. The companies linked to the internet and to the IT 
networks of business partners. Consequently, the scope o f authorised access to a 
company’s IS has expanded from within the computer room to within the company’s 
boundaries to outside these boundaries.
In addition, in the past information security was limited to physical security and the 
responsibility was mainly on the operations manager. With the move o f computing 
into business areas, away from large central mainframes, the IT manager became 
responsible for security over the business system applications on networks and 
mainframe computers. Thus, the responsibility for information security has moved 
through the years from the bottom upwards, and it has expanded to another level that 
is IT management. Top management realised that the well-being o f their company 
depends on the information security status, so they must ensure that adequate security 
is in place. However, it seems that, since Von Solms’s paper, other technological 
advancements have emerged and the scope and responsibility for security has been 
extended so that security has become the ultimate responsibility o f the top 
management. More recently, Von Solms (2005) has argued that the position o f the 
information security manager has been an established position in most UK companies. 
The Global Security Survey (DTT 2007) also indicated that the role o f  the information 
security manager is rising through the ranks to the upper levels o f the company.
On the other hand, Von Solms (2000; 2006) stated that the evolution o f information 
security could be divided into four waves. The “first wave” up to the early 1980s was 
mainly characterised by a very technical approach to information security i.e. the 
“Technical Wave”. The “second wave” from the early 1980s to middle 1990s was 
characterised by a growing management realisation o f and involvement with the 
importance o f information security, supplementing the technical wave i.e. the 
“Management Wave”. The “third wave” from the last few years o f the 1990s was 
characterised by aspects like best practices and codes o f practice for information 
security management, international information security certification, cultivating 
information security as a corporate culture, and dynamic and continuous information 
security measurement i.e. the “Institutional Wave”. The “fourth wave” from the 
beginning of 2000 until now, can be seen as the “Information Security Governance
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Wave” and is characterised by the development and crucial role o f the information 
security governance. Thus, nowadays, top management has started to become 
personally accountable for the security o f their IS on which they base their planning 
and decisions.
Furthermore, Gerber and Von Solms (2001) classified the evolution o f computers and 
related technologies and thus security into three distinct eras, namely, the computer- 
centric era, IT-centric era and information-centric era. Through these eras, the security 
controls protecting the computer and information-related assets, also evolved. 
Physical controls formed the core o f the protection controls during the computer- 
centric era. Technical controls started to play a very important role during the IT- 
centric era. However, in the information-centric era, where all companies became 
very dependent on their information resources and most users got direct access to IS, 
the operational controls such as security policies, procedures, standards and guidelines 
started to play a major role.
From the above, it seems that information has grown to become the lifeblood o f all 
companies today; therefore, they must ensure that they have sound security controls in 
place to maintain the confidentiality, availability and integrity o f their information.
2.4.4 Roles and responsibilities for security
For security to be effective, it is necessary that roles, responsibilities and authorities 
are clearly communicated and understood by everyone in the company (IFAC 1998). 
In addition, these roles and responsibilities should cover all aspects o f security, as 
well as the individual responsibilities o f all parties using the company’s IS (Hone and 
Eloff 2002). The DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004b) indicated that 
responsibilities may vary according to the company’s size and nature i.e. some 
smaller businesses may not need a full-time information security manager, while large 
companies may need to employ a team to support the role o f a full-time information 
security manager. Consequently, every company has its own unique needs and must 
assign its own security functions in the most appropriate manner to its employees.
However, the literature reveals that some academics and practitioners consider 
security as the responsibility o f employees at all levels in the company, while others
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focus only on the role o f accountants in security. The OECD Guidelines for the 
Information Systems and Networks (OECD 2002) stated that all participants who 
develop, own, provide, manage and use IS and networks are responsible for these IS 
and networks’ security. Those participants should understand their security 
responsibility and should be accountable in a manner appropriate to their individual 
roles. They should also review their own policies, practices, measures and procedures 
regularly and assess whether they are appropriate to their environment.
In addition, the DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004b) stated that all 
staff within the company should know who is nominated to fulfil the security roles 
and what their responsibilities are in this respect. For example, the CEO should 
provide management direction and support for information security and formally 
approve the company’s security policy; the information security policy owner should 
be responsible for the distribution and review of the policy; the senior management 
should support and implement the policy, and ensure staff are aware o f their 
responsibilities. In addition, the information security manager should ensure that the 
security policy is properly implemented and the users should follow the security 
policy and procedures.
The IFAC International Information Technology Guidelines (IFAC 1998) added other 
responsibilities for security. For example:
- Data owners should classify data according to their sensitivity and should 
maintain the accuracy and integrity o f the data existing in the IS;
- Process owners should ensure that appropriate security, consistent with the 
company’s security policy, is embedded in their IS;
Technology providers should assist with the implementation o f information 
security; and
- IS auditors should provide independent assurance to management on the 
appropriateness o f the security objectives, and whether security policy, standards, 
measures, practices and procedures are appropriate.
In addition, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (IS AC A 2005) 
confirms that senior management should communicate that every employee is 
accountable for information security by ensuring that expectations are clearly
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communicated in the company’s information security policies and demonstrate that 
violations will not be tolerated. Pironti (2005) also stated that the Chief Information 
Security Officer is responsible for all elements o f the information security program, 
establishing threat level for the entire company and also reporting to senior 
management.
From the above, it is clear that there are many security roles and responsibilities and 
these roles are now gaining more importance in the upper levels o f the company.
On the other hand, other studies have addressed the accountants’ security roles and 
responsibilities. Chandra and Calderson (2003) indicated that the accounting function 
is often charged with the responsibility o f securing organisational assets including 
information. Consequently, the accounting profession has developed various control 
frameworks that identify risks and security measures related to business information 
resources and other assets such as the Canadian Institute o f Chartered Accountants 
(CICA 1998), COBIT (2000) and SysTrust (AICPA 2002). These frameworks 
challenge the accounting profession to design and maintain control systems in a 
manner that safeguards a company’s IS.
From the above, it seems that the accountant’s responsibility for security extends 
beyond the accounting information to include all company information, whether 
financial or non-fmancial.
Bagranoff et al. (2005) confirmed this fact and argued that AIS now are concerned 
with non-financial as well as financial data and information. Consequently, 
accounting is a company’s primary producer and distributor o f many different types 
of information. Romney and Steinbart (2003) also stated that AIS primary objective is 
to assist management in the control o f a business organisation. Thus, the accountant 
can help achieve this objective by designing effective control systems and by auditing 
or reviewing the existing control systems to ensure their effectiveness. Consequently, 
management expects accountants to take a proactive approach in eliminating system 
threats, and to detect, correct, and recover from threats when they occur.
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From the above, it is clear that accountants play a significant role in maintaining the 
security not only o f AIS, but also for IS and the company as a whole. Accountants are 
important members o f the team that develops and modifies IS. In addition, Qureshi 
and Siegel (1997) stated that accountants must insist on security controls within their 
companies and on their recommendations to clients. Accountants should be familiar 
with security risks and advise everyone in the company about those risks. Moreover, 
Davis (1997) suggested that accountants could work with systems designers to 
develop adequate security measures as the technology evolves rather than waiting 
until the technology has been implemented. Accountants also could educate 
management and system users on all AIS security aspects.
Despite the important role o f accountants in AIS security, companies must ensure that 
employees at all levels and in every function receive an adequate security training and 
awareness, and that all parties (managers, employees and other users) understand the 
company-wide impact o f lax security.
2.4.5 Principles of security
There is a wide agreement among academics and practitioners regarding the principles 
of security. Abu-Musa (2002b), DTI (2004a and b), Fried (1994), the IFAC 
International Information Technology Committee (IFAC 2002) and Kruger and 
Kearney (2006), among others, stated that the principles o f security are most 
frequently expressed in the triad o f confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Confidentiality is “the characteristic o f information being disclosed only to authorised 
persons, entities, and processes at authorised times and in the authorised manner”. 
Integrity is “the characteristic o f information being accurate and complete and the 
information systems’ preservation o f accuracy and completeness”. Availability is “the 
characteristic o f information and supporting information systems being accessible and 
usable on a timely basis in the required manner” (Poore 1999, p.35).
In addition, the IFAC International Information Technology Committee (IFAC 2002) 
addressed three more principles for accounting information security, namely 
* authenticity, authorisation, and non-repudiation. Authenticity relates to the traceability 
of a business transaction to the individual who initiated it. Authorisation means that
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only authorised persons may access certain data, information and systems, and use the 
rights defined for this system. Non-repudiation relates to the difficulty for a person 
initiating a transaction to deny its validity given that the transaction was unintended or 
unauthorised (IFAC 2002). The National Information Systems Security Glossary 
(NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.39) also defined non-repudiation as “assurance that the sender 
of data is provided with proof o f delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of 
the sender’s identity, so neither can later deny having processed the data” .
Furthermore, Abu-Musa (2002b) mentioned three more principles o f information 
security, namely, validity, privacy and accuracy. Validity refers to the total accuracy 
and completeness o f information. Privacy can be assured by imposing rules of 
confidentiality for the use o f personal data that are safeguarded by security actions 
and functions (Parker 1981), whereas accuracy refers to the maintenance o f the data’s 
legitimate relationship to what it represents.
From the above, it can be concluded that there are main principles o f information 
security in general and accounting information security in particular upon which most 
academics and practitioners agree, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
There are supplementary principles as well that include authenticity, authorisation, 
non-repudiation, validity, privacy and accuracy.
Despite this wide agreement regarding the main group o f security principles, some 
authors, sometimes consider them as security objectives and they have presented other 
security principles. The IFAC International Information Technology Guidelines 
(IFAC 1998) indicated that the security objective is supported by eight core 
principles, namely accountability, awareness, multidisciplinary, cost effectiveness, 
integration, reassessment, timeliness and social factors. In addition, the OECD 
Guidelines for the Security o f Information Systems and Networks (OECD 2002) 
provided nine principles for IS and networks security, which are awareness, 
responsibility, response, ethics, democracy, risk assessment, security design and 
implementation, security management and reassessment.
‘ On the other hand, the International Information Security Foundation have organised 
the generally accepted system security principles into a three-level hierarchy:
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pervasive principles, broad functional principles and detailed security principles 
(Poore 1999). The pervasive principles provide general guidance to establish and 
maintain information security and include accountability, awareness, ethics, 
multidisciplinary, proportionality, integration, timeliness, assessment and equity. It is 
clear that there are some common principles for both the IFAC (1998) and the OECD 
(2002).
The broad functional principles represent the conceptual goals o f information security. 
They include information security policy, education and awareness, accountability, 
information management, environmental management, personal qualifications, system 
integrity, information systems life cycle, access control, operational continuity and 
contingency planning, risk management, network and infrastructure security, legal, 
regulatory and contractual requirements o f information security and finally, the ethical 
practices. On the other hand, the detailed security principles specifically address 
methods of achieving compliance with the broad functional principles with respect to 
existing environments and available technology.
It seems that these principles can not only provide general guidance and represent the 
conceptual goals o f information security, but can also disclose, almost all the 
information security dimensions. However, there are other important security 
dimensions mentioned in the literature which must be considered.
2.4.6 Other dimensions of security
These days, it is quite widely accepted that security has moved away from its 
technical image, and has a wide range o f other aspects that must be taken into account 
in creating a secure IT environment in a company. Tryfonas et al. (2001) indicated 
that information security is a field combining technical aspects as well as social, 
cultural and legal or regulatory aspects, whereas Schultz (2005, p.426) addressed the 
human factor in security and stated that “People are in control o f  technology, not vice 
versa”. Chang and Yeh (2006) also indicated that effective information security 
should address both IT and non-IT related issues instead o f simply considering IT 
systems.
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Ekenberg et al. (1995) presented some models that can reveal many aspects of 
security. First, security could be structured according to what is to be protected (the 
kinds of targets) into personal, physical, information, functional, environmental and 
business security. Second, is the traditional organisational-oriented approach in which 
the security field could be divided into physical, information and personnel security. 
Third, is the event/threat-oriented approach (WAECUP approach) where adverse 
events (threats) are grouped into five major categories: waste, accident, error, crime 
and unethical/unprofessional practices. Finally, the fourth is the process-oriented 
model which includes generic security functions i.e. functions that are used to carry 
out all security activities and include prevention, protection, enforcement, 
investigation, inspection, detection, reporting and deterrence.
Furthermore, in a more recent study Von Solms (2001) provides a holistic and 
comprehensive view o f security and presents many security dimensions, namely the 
strategic/corporate governance, governance/organisational, policy, best practice, 
ethical, certification, legal, insurance, personnel/human, awareness, technical, 
measurement/monitoring/metrics and audit dimensions. It is clear that Von Solms 
considered most o f the important security dimensions. By identifying these 
dimensions, realising their importance, and considering them in securing a company, 
Von Solms makes it easier to understand the complexities o f information security, and 
to approach information security in a structured way (Von Solms 2001).
2.4.7 Factors affecting security
The literature reveals that many factors can have a significant effect on security. 
Lindup (1996) stated that technology is one such factor. The changes in technology 
not only create new opportunities, but also affect the way business is done. 
Technology can have an impact on security in three ways: by introducing new 
security vulnerabilities, by changing the way business is done, and by changing the 
way the workplace is organised. If managers are to succeed in providing the security 
required by a company, they must look at the broad changes in existing technologies, 
and the security implications o f a new technology.
* Wiant (2005) provided three factors that contribute to good security measures in a 
company, namely sufficient budget, time to focus on security and staff to focus on
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security. Wang (2005) also presented some dynamic forces that interact with each 
other and have significant impacts on security. These forces include:
- Internal competition in information security i.e. the conflicts among different 
departments, since security costs money, effort and time;
- Suppliers’ power i.e. suppliers are a key element in information security strategy, 
without them, security falls apart;
- Complements i.e. internal audit department, compliance department and external 
regulatory bodies help the business focus more on information security;
- Customer power i.e. customers o f information security in the company are mainly 
senior management and business functions that deal with IT and information, 
since management controls the security budget; and
- Threats of entry relating to the information security services i.e. outsourcing.
On the other hand, Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005) stated that providing adequate IS 
security could be a challenge for the following reasons:
- The security landscape is constantly changing, since the number o f companies and 
users on the internet is ever increasing;
- Although in the past, a great deal o f technical sophistication was required to 
penetrate a computer network, now attacks are possible by much less well- 
informed attackers;
- Improving internet security is, to a great extent, hard; and
- Users are commonly known to be bad at considering risk.
In another study, Finne (1996) addressed many factors that affect a company’s 
information security. He presented these factors in the form o f 12 modules that 
together form a company’s information security. These modules include computer 
security, operation security, protection against theft, fire and water damage, electricity 
distribution, external and internal threats, communication, contingency planning, 
personnel security, incident reporting and attitudes towards information security 
issues. It is clear that some factors represent security controls that affect security 
positively and the others are security threats that affect security negatively.
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On the other hand, the ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) and Von Solms (1998) presented some 
factors that are critical to the successful implementation o f information security within 
a company. These factors are:
- Security policy, objectives, and activities that reflect business objectives;
- A framework for implementing, maintaining, monitoring, and improving security 
that is consistent with the organisational culture;
- Visible support and commitment from all levels of management;
- A good understanding o f  the information security requirements, risk assessment 
and risk management;
- Communicating the information security policy and standards to all interested 
parties;
- Providing appropriate security training and awareness;
- Establishing an effective security incident management process; and
- Implementing a measurement system for evaluating the performance regarding the 
security management.
However, despite the importance o f these factors, they are just the starting point for 
implementing security and every company should consider the factors consistent with 
its objectives and activities.
2.4.8 Security management
Information and IS security have become an important part o f  the core business 
processes in every company. Companies are faced with contradictory requirements to 
deal with open systems on the one hand and assure high protection standards on the 
other hand (Trcek 2003). The implementation and management o f information and IS 
security, therefore, required a structured and disciplined process (Vermeulen and Von 
Solms 2002).
Eloff and Von Solms (2000) indicated that IS security management is a stream of 
management activities that aim to protect the IS and create a framework within which 
such systems operate as expected by the company. Nyanchama (2005) also stated that 
information security management is a process that includes planning, execution,
. monitoring and feedback (Information Security Life Cycle). It addresses security risks 
in a company. It involves the visioning, planning and execution o f a security
- 4 7 -
management program with a view to minimising these risks. It also involves strategy, 
tactics and the operations o f a security program and is predicated upon continuous 
improvement. In addition, IS management aims not only to protect information and IS 
but aims to ensure the continuity o f the company (Karyda et al. 2005).
On the other hand, Fulford and Doherty (2003) argued that effective information 
security management depends on a number o f key factors. These factors include: the 
need for senior management commitment and support, assessment o f potential 
security risks and threats, implementation o f appropriate controls to minimise those 
risks and threats and the communication o f all security issues to information and IS 
users through relevant education and training.
On the other hand, Vermeulen and Von Solms (2002) indicated that information 
security management should be treated like any vital business function with all its 
activities based upon business needs and backed by the company’s top management, 
who carry the ultimate responsibility o f this information. They presented a framework 
for information security management as shown in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2 shows the different elements o f information security management that can 
be classified into three phases: preparation, implementation and maintenance. The 
preparation phase includes:
- Top management commitment, given that management is ultimately responsible 
for information security and their support is essential for resources allocation and 
for gaining employees support for security;
- Information security standards, given that they can provide companies with an 
approach to information security management;
- Organisational aspects o f  information security, given that an effective security 
management requires the responsibility of certain staff to implement it; and 
Security vision and strategy in order to ensure the integrated implementation of 
the information security management.
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Figure 2.2 Information security management framework 
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The implementation phase includes the company’s security requirements, the 
development o f an information security policy and risk management. The 
maintenance phase includes the follow-up element, given that the information security 
management is an ongoing process and not merely a one-off activity.
The DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004a) provided a process cycle for 
the information security management that includes four phases. First, design the 
management system, including identification of business requirements, assessments of 
risks and impacts, establishment o f information security policy and selection of 
adequate controls. Second, implement the management system, including 
implementation o f controls and procedures, allocation of resources and 
responsibilities and training and awareness. Third, monitor, review and reassess the 
management system, including effectiveness o f controls and procedures, business 
changes, incident reports and risks, threats and impacts; and finally improve and 
update the management system, including corrective or preventive actions to improve 
existing controls or to implement new controls.
From the above, it seems that information security management frameworks or cycles 
are, to a great extent, similar and they include all the necessary elements required for 
an effective information security management within a company. In addition, Karyda 
et al. (2005) agreed with these frameworks and indicated that the IS security 
management includes a planning phase, an implementation phase during which 
security plans are put into action, an assessment or audit phase and finally an
awareness phase during which tasks aiming at providing security training and 
education must be considered.
On the other hand, Nyanchama (2005) presented the information security 
management life cycle from another perspective, which includes three key 
components: strategy, tactics and operations. Information security strategy is a means 
to define, direct and control a company’s security program. It defines the scope and 
accountability o f information security within the company. Tactical components 
ensure that security requirements are built into programs and specific projects, from 
design to implementation, whereas operations include monitoring o f the security 
infrastructure and proactive assessment and response to incidents and vulnerabilities.
It is clear that, if  properly implemented, security management enables a company to 
reduce security risks to acceptable levels, to satisfy the legal, regulatory and 
contractual requirements, to take proactive action to protect information and IS across 
the entire company, to increase productivity, to enhance the overall security posture, 
and most importantly, to ensure the continuity o f the company. Thus, because o f the 
importance o f security management, it is essential to discuss some o f its main 
elements (security requirements, program, policy, training and awareness, risk 
assessment, incident handling, business continuity plans, security budget, standards 
and certification and security effectiveness) in more detail.
2.4.8.1 Security requirements
In order for companies to implement an appropriate set o f controls and manage 
security effectively, various security requirements need to be considered. Gerber and 
Von Solms (2005) indicated that security requirements are concerned with the amount 
of security required for the effective protection o f information resources. However, to 
ensure that the correct level o f security is obtained, security requirements need to be 
determined based on the unique characteristics o f each company.
The literature reveals that there is wide agreement among academics and practitioners 
concerning the main security requirements. Gerber and Von Solms (2001; 2005) and 
‘ the ISO/IEC 17799 (2005) have presented three main sets o f security requirements. 
The first is derived from assessing a company’s risks, which could lead to significant
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losses in business if  they occur. The second addresses the legal, statutory, regulatory 
and contractual requirements that a company, its partners, contractors and service 
providers have to satisfy, whereas the third includes the set o f principles, objectives, 
procedures and business requirements for information processing that a company has 
developed to support its operations.
On the other hand, Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) have indicated that security 
requirements stem from sources both internal and external to a company, where the 
external requirements include information security standards and best practices, and 
legal and regulatory issues associated with security. However, the internal 
requirements are concerned with a company’s personal internal needs for ensuring 
confidentiality, integrity and availability o f their sensitive information, and those 
requirements for protecting the critical infrastructure that forms the “information 
backbone” o f most companies today. These external and internal requirements 
therefore help to address the various important aspects o f risks that most companies 
face. In addition, these requirements together with the accepted security standards and 
other best practices form the basis o f an effective approach to information security. 
Consequently, information security requirements have become a primary force to 
determine the security controls needed to manage security effectively.
2.4.8.2 Security program
Information security has matured from a concept that is dealt with technically and is 
event-driven, to one that is approached from a business perspective and is process- 
driven (Pironti 2005). An information security program is the best approach to reach 
this goal. The existence o f a security program is the cornerstone o f an effort to 
transform security into a proactive activity driven by the business leadership, instead 
of a reactive one driven by the technologists within a company. By introducing a 
structured approach to information security, a company can increase its security 
posture and reduce security costs. It can also gain advantage in its efforts to ensure 
compliance to security standards and regulations (Pironti 2005).
The literature reveals that there is a wide agreement among academics and 
* practitioners regarding the key elements of an effective information security program. 
The USA General Accounting Office (GAO 1998; 2004) and the National Institute of
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Standards and Technology (NIST 2005) stated that an effective information security 
program should include:
- Periodic assessments o f risks, including the magnitude o f harm that could result 
from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, modification or destruction of 
information and IS that support a company’s operations and assets;
- Policies and procedures that are based on risk assessments, that reduce risks to an 
acceptable level, and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the 
life cycle o f each company’s IS;
- Subordinate plans for providing adequate security for networks, facilities or IS;
- Security training and awareness to inform personnel o f security risks associated 
with their activities and responsibilities;
- Periodic testing and evaluation o f the effectiveness o f information security 
policies, procedures, practices and security controls;
- A process for planning, implementing and evaluating corrective actions to address 
any deficiencies in policies, procedures and practices;
- Procedures for detecting, reporting and responding to security incidents; and
- Plans and procedures to ensure continuity o f the company’s IS operations.
However, there are several challenges that companies must overcome to implement 
security programs successfully (Booker 2006). They include the time and cost 
necessary to establish a database o f critical networks and information assets, and the 
lack of synergy given that separate technical teams can be responsible for the 
management o f different technical controls. In addition, although different security 
approaches are demanded by local regulatory and business requirements, the 
company’s global policies and practices must still be consistently applied.
On the other hand, Garcia (2006) argued that in order to increase the effectiveness of 
the information security program, security must be a business priority for the top 
management. Security requires a continuous improvement process that includes 
techniques to measure effectiveness, and it should be a company-wide priority with 
security responsibility and accountability established at all company levels.
* Furthermore, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA 2005, 
pp.9-10) provided two groups o f critical elements o f information security program
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success: priority and additional critical elements. The priority critical elements include 
senior management commitment to and support for information security initiatives, 
management understanding o f all security aspects, security planning prior to 
implementation o f new technologies, integration between business and information 
security, alignment o f security with a company’s objectives, and executive and line 
management ownership and accountability for implementing, monitoring and 
reporting on information security. On the other hand, the additional critical elements 
include employee training and awareness on security issues, consistent enforcement of 
security policies and standards, placing security within a company’s hierarchy, 
information security budget, ability to cost-justify security and generally accepted best 
practices for information security.
The above shows the importance o f an information security program within 
companies today. In addition, most academics and practitioners agree on the critical 
elements of these security programs and on their importance.
2.4.8.3 Security policy
There is a wide agreement within the academic and practitioner communities that a 
security policy is the basis for the dissemination and enforcement o f sound security 
practices within a company (Doherty and Fulford 2006). Security policy is at the 
heart of any information security strategy (Eveloff 2005). It is the start o f security 
management (Higgins 1999). Security policy is the first and most important layer of 
security available to a company (Whitman 2003).
According to D ’Arcy and Hovav (2007), a security policy includes statements of 
organisational goals and beliefs, existing controls and employees’ responsibilities. 
Their purpose is to provide detailed guidance to users regarding acceptable use of 
organisational IS resources in order to ensure a safe environment. Walker (1985, 
p.62) stated that a security policy is “the set o f laws, rules and practices regulating 
how an organisation manages, protects and distributes sensitive information”. It is a 
direction-giving document for security within a company, it demonstrates 
management commitment to and support for information security, as well as defining 
* the role information security has to play in reaching the company’s objectives (Hone 
and Eloff 2002). Wood (1995) argued that policies are high-level statements intended
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to provide guidance for decision makers. Further, Gaston (1996) stated that 
information security policy is a broad guiding statement o f goals to be achieved with 
regard to the security o f corporate information resources. Consequently, security 
policy is a vital part o f  a company’s strategy for achieving IS security. It explains the 
need for IS security to all the company’s information resource users.
Hong et a l (2003) indicated that an information security policy aims at planning 
security requirements, forming consensus in a company, drafting and implementing a 
policy and reviewing the policy on a regular basis in order to meet the organisational 
security requirements. Whitman (2004) also indicated that a good security policy 
should outline responsibilities, define authorised and unauthorised users o f IS, provide 
venues for employee reporting o f system threats, define penalties for violations and 
provide ways for updating the policy.
In addition, Higgins (1999) argued that without a policy, security practices would be 
developed without a clear distinction o f objectives and responsibilities. Moreover, 
Wood (1995) pointed out that security policies are important in assuring the proper 
implementation o f controls, guiding the security product selection and development 
process, demonstrating management support for information security, avoiding 
liability for inadequately addressing security matters and achieving consistent and 
complete security within a company.
However, despite the importance and the vital role that the security policy plays in a 
company, many academics and practitioners have argued that it is not always easy to 
put this document together. There are often different opinions within a company as to 
what constitutes a policy. Many questions are asked as to what should be incorporated 
into this document, what it should look like, how long it should be, who needs to 
approve it, etc.
First, it is important to know that a company’s security policy depends on various 
factors including, among others, the value and sensitivity o f information, the impact 
that the loss or misuse o f information would have on the company and its legal 
requirements (Steinke 1997). In addition, Karyda et al. (2005) provided some factors 
that affect the formulation and implementation o f security policy including the
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organisational structure, security culture within a company, management active 
participation and visible support, ongoing security training and awareness program, 
and the continuous evaluation o f the effectiveness of the security policy. It is clear 
that all these factors are important and affect the formulation, implementation and 
adoption o f a company’s security policy.
Moreover, the literature reveals that there is no clear agreement regarding the 
procedures involved in establishing a security policy. Lindup (1995) suggested seven 
steps for developing and implementing a security policy that begin with formulating a 
draft policy, followed by a period o f internal discussion, deciding the final content of 
the policy by the information security officer, formally accepting the policy by the 
CEO, disseminating the policy throughout the company, monitoring compliance by 
internal auditors and finally, taking action in case o f non compliance.
In addition, Kabay (1996) presented five procedures for establishing a security policy 
including assessing and persuading top management, analysing information security 
requirements, forming and drafting a policy, implementing and maintaining the 
policy. Furthermore, Karyda et al. (2005) argued that a security policy must combine 
technical and organisational guidelines addressing security requirements at the 
organisational level. In addition, the formation o f a security policy includes the 
process of policy formulation, implementation and adoption. However, despite all 
these steps and procedures for establishing a security policy, a question remains as to 
“what constitutes a policy?”
There is wide agreement in the literature regarding what can be included in a security 
policy. The DTI Information Security Policy Team (DTI 2004b), the IFAC 
International Information Technology Guidelines (IFAC 1998) and Trcek (2003) 
indicated that, as a minimum, a security policy should include:
- The scope, objectives and importance o f information security to the company;
- A statement indicating management support for the security goals and principles; 
Brief statements indicating minimum standards, procedures and requirements for 
specific security issues e.g. consequences o f security policy violations, legal, 
regulatory and contractual requirements; security training and awareness, security 
breach detection, and business continuity planning;
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- Definitions o f general and specific security roles and responsibilities;
- Details o f the process for reporting and responding to security incidents; and
- References to more detailed security policies, procedures, or standards.
In addition, Hone and Eloff (2002) have suggested other elements to be included in a 
security policy such as the approval o f security policy, the purpose o f security policy, 
the user declaration and acknowledgement and other general elements such as the 
authors, date o f policy and review date of this policy. Although these elements may 
not be considered the main elements o f a security policy, they can still ensure its 
official status within a company.
To achieve its objectives, certain characteristics should be considered in writing a 
security policy. It should be short and easy to read, the writing style should reflect the 
organisational culture, the policy should be clear and comprehensible to all users in a 
company, and it should be reviewed periodically after major technological changes 
and regulatory requirements to ensure that it remains current as well as relevant to the 
company’s security objectives. Above all, a policy must be realistic (Hone and Eloff 
2002).
However, despite all this concern, a security policy sometimes fails to play an 
important role in a company. Doherty and Fulford (2005) gave some reasons for such 
ineffective policy implementation, namely the difficulties o f raising employees’ 
awareness o f a policy, difficulties o f enforcing the policy, complexity o f applying the 
policy standards, insufficiency in resources available for policy enforcement and a 
failure to tailor policies as a result o f  greater reliance on international standards.
Many previous studies were also conducted to investigate the vital role o f a security 
policy from different perspectives. Fulford and Doherty (2003) conducted a study to 
investigate the uptake, content, dissemination and impact o f information security 
policies in UK companies. A questionnaire was developed in three sections. The first 
section investigated the existence, dissemination and the frequency within which a 
security policy is updated. The second section focused on the coverage o f a security 
* policy, and the third section addressed the factors affecting a policy success. In 
another study, Doherty and Fulford (2005) explored how a variety o f issues relating
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to the uptake and application o f security policies for instance existence, age, updating 
and how the scope o f a security policy impacted upon the incidence o f security 
breaches within large companies.
Wiant (2005) conducted a study to examine the effectiveness o f an information 
security policy in influencing the reporting o f both computer abuse incidents and the 
associated seriousness o f those incidents. In addition, Hong et al. (2006) investigated 
the dominant factors o f building an information security policy and the effect o f this 
policy on elevating a company’s security level. A questionnaire was developed to 
collect information about the information security policy establishment and the 
policy’s function, contents and implementation items.
It can be concluded that the information security policy is one o f the most important 
documents in a company, the heart and basis o f successful security management and a 
guideline that dictates the rules and regulations o f a company regarding all security 
aspects. Therefore, policies must be written with due care.
2.4.8.4 Security training and awareness
According to the Information Security Forum (ISF 2007), security awareness is the 
extent to which every member o f staff understands the importance o f information 
security, the levels o f security appropriate to the company, their individual security 
responsibilities and how to act accordingly. There is wide agreement in the literature 
that effective information security begins with awareness. Awareness o f the risks and 
available safeguards is the first line o f defence for IS security (OECD 2002). Von 
Solms (2000) argued that employees are in most cases the biggest threat to a 
company’s IS. Consequently, combating employees’ ignorance has motivated 
companies to start with a comprehensive security awareness program. In addition, due 
to the intensified need for improved information security, many companies have 
established security awareness programs to ensure that their employees are informed 
and aware o f security risks, thereby protecting themselves and their profitability 
(Kruger and Kearney 2006). Peltier (2005) added that an effective security program 
cannot be effected without implementing employee awareness and training program 
* to address policy, procedures and tools. Moreover, Eveloff (2005) argued that 
employee training and awareness is the most important o f all information security
- 5 7 -
measures and indicated that employees should receive ongoing training on common 
security risks encountered in the workplace, what risky activities to avoid and when 
and how to report security problems.
Given the important role o f security training and awareness programs, many studies 
have been conducted to explore this issue. Thomson and Von Solms (1998) 
highlighted the need for education in the workplace through a security awareness 
program and provided some techniques borrowed from the field o f social psychology 
that could be utilised to improve the effectiveness o f the awareness program and 
which have been largely ignored in current awareness programs. Siponen (2000) 
provided a conceptual foundation and a framework for IS security awareness. This 
study outlined the behavioural framework including selected motivation/behavioural 
theories. It also addressed how people respond to awareness activities and the 
methods available to increase awareness. In another study, Peltier (2005) identified 
the elements that make up a successful security awareness program, the role that 
employees play in this program, how to establish the scope o f awareness program, 
how to segment the audience and how to ensure that the content is effective in getting 
the message to the users.
In addition, Kruger and Kearney (2006) provided a model for measuring information 
security awareness in companies that may assist in providing feedback to the top 
management on the success o f a security awareness program, and may assist them in 
their function o f controlling and directing security strategic objectives. They argued 
that risks continuously change and consequently any awareness program needs to be 
measured and managed on an ongoing basis. Moreover, Chen et al. (2008) conducted 
an inter-cultural study to investigate if users from the USA and Taiwan exposed to the 
same situational awareness learning would have a different performance in security 
awareness outcomes. The findings revealed that American users who received 
situational security awareness training outperformed those users who received 
traditional face-to-face instructions. However, Taiwanese users did not perform 
significantly differently between these two techniques. They concluded that 
awareness o f risks and safeguards is the first line o f defence in any company;
‘ however, how risks are addressed can be dissimilar in different cultures.
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In another study, Kritzinger and Smith (2008) proposed a conceptual view o f an 
Information Security Retrieval and Awareness (ISRA) model that can be used by 
industry to enhance security awareness among employees. This model consists of 
three parts, namely the ISRA dimension (non-technical security issues, IT authority 
levels and information security documents), information security retrieval and 
awareness, and measuring and monitoring. This model focuses on non-technical 
security issues because compared to technical issues these have always been 
neglected.
Despite the importance o f employees’ security training and awareness in all 
companies today, the previous studies revealed that security training and awareness is 
the countermeasure most neglected by companies compared to other security 
practices. This is further discussed in the following chapters.
2.4.8.5 Risk assessment
The Department o f Trade and Industry (DTI 2004a, p.6) defined risk assessment as 
“the assessment o f threats to, vulnerabilities of, and impacts on information and 
information processing facilities and the likelihood o f their occurrence. Risk 
assessment includes the identification, analysis and management o f risks”. Since 
business risks arise from both internal and external sources and they evolve and 
change overtime, risk assessment provides a basis for deciding how to manage those 
risks (Amoruso et al. 2005).
Gomez and Paxmann (2006) indicated that companies are requested to perform risk 
assessment for their financial risks. In addition, to be compliant with ISO 27001, 
companies must demonstrate the establishment and use o f risk assessment 
methodology relevant to the business, considering information security, legal and 
regulatory requirements (Kouns 2007).
The literature underlines the important role o f risk assessment in organisations. Risk 
assessment allows the determination o f an acceptable level o f risk and assists in the 
selection o f appropriate controls to manage the risk o f potential harm to IS in light of 
* the nature and importance o f the information to be protected (Finne 1998; OECD 
2002). Kouns (2007) argued that if  a company has a well-structured risk assessment
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framework, it could not only minimise the negative impact from threats, but also 
maximise the positive impact from opportunities. A well-implemented control may 
provide security for a time, but a well established risk assessment methodology will 
provide the means for a company to protect the business at all times.
In addition, Poore (1999) stated that the risks to information and IS should be 
assessed periodically. Periodic assessment identifies and measures the variances from 
available and established security controls and the risk associated with such 
variances. Since threats change overtime, it is important that companies periodically 
reassess risks and reconsider the appropriateness and effectiveness o f the policies and 
controls they have selected (GAO 1999).
Given the importance o f risk assessment, many studies have been conducted to 
investigate this issue. Kotulic and Clark (2004) proposed and tested a theoretical 
model to study the process that leads to effective Security Risk Management (SRM) 
programs. The description o f the model, the methodology designed to test the model, 
and the problems faced while testing the model were presented. However, given their 
poor response rate, they concluded that information security research is one o f the 
most intrusive types o f  organisation research, and they recommended a cautious 
approach for security studies that are o f such a sensitive nature. In another study, 
Sherer and Alter (2004) pointed out that IS risk literature produced several hundred 
risk factors and many overlapping risk components that are difficult for managers to 
access and use in a meaningful way. As a result, they focused on organising these risk 
factors to make them more useful and meaningful for business managers using nine 
elements namely work practices, participants, information, technologies, products and 
services, customers, environment, infrastructure and strategies.
Gerber and Von Solms (2005) argued that the evaluation o f risk related to IT alone is 
unrealistic and a holistic view o f assessing risks should instead be adopted. 
Consequently, they suggested an alternative more comprehensive approach to risk 
analysis and investigated the factors that this alternative approach should include in 
order to manage risks holistically. Their approach proposed to analyse not only risks 
to tangible assets, but also risks to information or intangible assets, while considering 
risks posed due to cultural, legislative and other sociological issues.
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Moreover, Tsohou et al. (2006) examined the potential o f cultural theory as a tool for 
identifying patterns in the stakeholders perceptions of risk and its effect on IS risk 
management. They adopted a model for the risk management process based on 
Frosdick (1997), ISO/IEC 27001 (2005), and NIST 800-30 (2002), which includes 
three risk management stages namely initiation, risk analysis (risk identification, 
estimation and evaluation), and risk mitigation (designing, implementing and 
monitoring). In another study, Lindberg (2006) proposed a simplified risk 
management model that will provide quantitative results based on subjective human 
inputs. This model includes six steps: risk element definition (identifying risks), 
impact rating (impact on the company when a loss is experienced), likelihood rating 
(probability o f negative event), existing countermeasures rating, risk level calculation 
(based on impact, likelihood and countermeasures), and risk level reporting.
More recently, Zhou et al. (2008) presented an IS project risk checklist that aims at 
supporting risk assessment, decision making concerning risk control, and planning of 
risk mitigation strategies in the public sector. The proposed risk checklist includes 
five main risk dimensions, namely pre-project (requirement specification, contractual 
relationships, project planning and organisational environment), customer (internal 
and external environment, end-user and management), project management (human 
resources, project planning, monitoring and reporting), technological issues (IS 
infrastructure) and development (systems analysis, design, development, testing, 
installation and maintenance).
From the above, it can be concluded that security risk assessment has become a major 
concern and plays a vital role in security management within all companies today.
2.4.8.6 Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
An incident handling plan is a document that guides a company in continuing its 
operations at either full or reduced capacity following the occurrence o f disruptive 
events and in dealing with the consequences of these occurrences in the context o f its 
IS security requirements (Warigon 1999). Incidence response is the process that 
attempts to minimise the damage from security incidents and malfunctions that 
* inevitably occur in a corporate environment, monitors and learns from such incidents 
(BSI 1999). According to the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006),
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there has been a rise in the number o f UK businesses that have formal procedures to 
respond to security incidents when they arise. More recently, the BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) also revealed that more UK businesses have 
procedures to respond to security incidents than two years ago, with four fifths of 
large businesses reporting their existence.
Moreover, disaster recovery and business continuity planning is the process of 
implementing procedures to assure the availability of IS processing capabilities in the 
event o f a disaster (Ward and Smith 2002). The rapidly changing business, regulatory 
and threat environment to which most companies are exposed requires that sustained 
efforts be made to ensure the ongoing availability o f a reliable business continuity 
plan for critical business processes and services (CICA 2005). The goal o f a business 
continuity plan is to preserve and protect the essential elements o f a company and 
maintain an acceptable level o f operations throughout a disaster and afterwards as the 
company recovers (Rodetis 1999). In addition, it ensures the availability o f plans to 
counteract or minimise the impact o f interruptions to business activities caused by the 
unavailability o f IS (Ward and Smith 2002).
There is wide agreement in the literature that a disaster recovery and a business 
continuity plan must be tested and be kept current. Rodetis (1999) argued that 
business continuity plans must be “living documents”, they should be updated 
constantly and require a full time specialist. Smith (2004) indicated that a business 
continuity plan must be well documented and tested frequently. Since companies 
frequently change to keep up with new technologies, new internal and external 
policies, and new ways o f doing business, a business continuity plan must be checked 
regularly to keep pace with this change. Without testing, the adequacy of the plan 
remains unknown. Testing helps to assess the viability o f the plan, identify and correct 
any deficiencies, and evaluate the capabilities of the response teams (Landry 2006, 
Woodman 2007).
The DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) stated that UK businesses 
appear better protected against disasters than two years previously. There has been an 
increase in the number o f companies with disaster recovery plans. However, two 
fifths still do not have a disaster recovery plan in place. In addition, the BERR
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Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) revealed that although disaster 
recovery plans are increasingly common, only half o f the plans were tested in 2007. 
This leaves these companies ill prepared to respond to challenges facing them during 
a disaster.
Few studies have been conducted into the incident handling, disaster recovery and 
business continuity plan issues. Nosworthy (2000) presented a practical risk analysis 
approach as part o f the development of a structured business continuity management 
(BCM) programme. Nosworthy argued that in order to apply business continuity 
measures in a consistent, manageable and cost effective manner a company-wide 
approach to a business continuity risk analysis should be applied to the business as a 
whole and not just the IT department. Gerber and Feldman (2002) offered advice to 
companies on how to select a team and develop a plan that will ensure their ability to 
remain in business in the event o f a disaster. They indicated that the first step is to 
choose a crisis management team that includes the company’s executive, financial 
officer, human resources representative, IS or technology officer, risk management 
representative, public relations representative and internal and external legal counsel. 
The second step is to create a risk management plan that incorporates procedures 
intended to first prevent or mitigate disasters of all kinds and the third step is planning 
how to handle the crisis. Moreover, Hancock (2002) addressed the basics o f security 
crisis management and the logical steps required to ensure that a crisis does not get 
out of hand namely determining if  a crisis really exists, determining the damage and 
extent o f the crisis and managing the crisis.
The Canadian Institute o f Chartered Accountants (CICA 2005) presented the issues 
that need to be addressed as part o f a company’s overall business continuity plan in 
order to ensure the rapid recovery o f its critical IS and services. Bhaskar (2005) 
proposed an integrated framework for coordinating computer security incident 
response teams (CSIRTs) to get a company’s computer related infrastructure back to 
an operational condition as soon as possible. In another study, Smith and Jamieson 
(2006) investigated the key drivers and inhibitors for IS security and business 
continuity management in e-govemment using the data collected from a cross section 
of government organisations. The main issues that appeared relevant to a large 
number o f organisations as key drivers or inhibitors for IS security and business
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continuity management were training and awareness, management support and 
appropriate funding. In addition, Vael and Neyer (2006) addressed business continuity 
mismanagement. They presented the challenges facing companies during a disaster 
including lack o f senior management support, lack o f supporting technology with the 
potential financial, operational, reputation, and legal impacts if processes are not 
resumed in a timely manner, lack o f understanding o f risk exposures and o f the 
process o f eliminating, mitigating or accepting them, wasted investments, missing 
time frames with suppliers and customers and the inability to manage expectations of 
the board, shareholders, customers, business partners, regulators and employees.
In a recent study, Mitropoulos et a l  (2007) explored the nature o f security 
information management systems (SIMS) while proposing a set o f requirements that 
could be satisfied by these systems for the efficient and effective handling o f security 
incidents. They proposed incident response (IR) policy requirements for SIMS, a role- 
based access control approach for a corporate IR capability with the use o f the system, 
and various mechanisms that could be mandated by appropriate policies for enhancing 
the overall security o f  SIMS. Moreover, Fonseca (2007) addressed the human factor 
in business continuity plans and argued that excellent plans can fail because o f an 
often overlooked factor that is human beings.
Due to the increasing security incidents and the rapidly changing business, regulatory 
and threat environment to which most companies are exposed, it is vital for all types 
of companies to have security incident handling procedures and business continuity 
plans in place to deal with these incidents and to assure the availability o f IS in the 
case of a crisis.
2.4.8.7 Security budget
The costs associated with security activities relate to many items including hardware, 
software and personnel. The main drivers for information security expenditure are to 
protect a company’s information and its reputation (DTI 2006). However, spending 
the right amount on security continues to challenge UK businesses, since over­
expenditure reduces profitability, while under-investment can leave the business 
exposed. In addition, Willison and Backhouse (2006) indicated that security budget is 
influenced by management perception.
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A review o f the literature reveals that security is still perceived as an IT issue. Most 
companies still do not have a security budget separate from their IT budget (DTT
2007) and the security budget is expressed as a percentage o f IT budget. However, 
according to the results o f the Computer Crime and Security Survey (Richardson
2008), not all money in the security budget comes from IT. Increasingly, security is 
viewed as a problem that is far broader than technology alone. Consequently, in some 
instances part o f  the security budget comes from audit and legal departments.
However, Gordon and Loeb (2006) argued that little research had been done about the 
budgeting process used in deciding how much to spend on security. They, therefore, 
conducted a study to examine the way companies make decisions regarding security 
expenditures. They assessed whether companies approach the budgeting process for 
security expenditures in a rational economic manner based on cost-benefit analysis. 
Their results showed that some companies depend on a formal net present value 
analysis, whereas others approach these expenditures with a modified economic 
analysis that is examining the costs and benefits o f information security activities, but 
with less emphasis on formally quantifying the benefits.
2.4.8.8 Security standards, evaluation and certification
For years, the business community has been searching for an adequate approach or 
technique for evaluating the security o f information and IS, and simultaneously 
searching for a practical security standard, one that can provide a company with best 
practices and can be both cost-effective and reasonably achievable.
However, the literature reveals that the evaluation o f information and IS security is 
not an easy task and one in which there is a lot o f confusion and inconsistency. 
Conrath and Sharma (1993) in an extensive study in the IS evaluation literature 
revealed that there were no generally accepted performance measures. Von Solms 
(1996) presented a number o f evaluation and certification techniques and schemes that 
can be linked to information security. These techniques are Trusted Security 
Evaluation Criteria Schemes, ISO 9000 (BS 5750) i.e. the leading international 
quality assurance scheme, the Code o f Practice for Information Security Management 
(BS 7799) and self- evaluation.
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In addition, Abu-Musa (2002c) agreed with Von Solms (1996) and indicated that 
information security evaluation could be done against one o f the following criteria:
- Trusted Security Evaluation Criteria, which includes the Trusted Computer 
Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), the Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), and the Canadian Trusted Computer Product 
Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC);
- The ISO 9000 Series o f Standards;
- Code o f Practice for information security management (BS 7799); and
- Comparisons.
However, Conrath and Sharma (1993) stated that no single measure is adequate, so a 
combination is necessary to avoid the deficiencies of each method and to enhance the 
potential benefits through integration of these methods. Consequently, in their study, 
they combined the checklist questionnaire and the risk analysis methods in evaluating 
computer based IS.
Furthermore, the literature reveals that many organisations and standardisation bodies 
have been producing information and IS security standards, guidelines and best 
practices. The AICPAs and the CICAs developed the SysTrust: Principles and Criteria 
for Systems Reliability (AICPA/CICA 2001). Thus, a system is reliable when 
measured against four essential principles: availability, security, integrity and 
maintainability.
BSI IT Baseline Protection Manual developed by the German Federal Information 
Security Agency (BSI 2000) presented a set of recommended standard security 
controls or safeguards. Its goal is to achieve a security level for IT systems that is 
reasonable and adequate to satisfy normal protection requirements and can serve as 
the basis for IT systems and applications requiring a high degree o f protection (Hone 
and Eloff 2002).
In addition, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) technical committees produced the 
‘ GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335) Guidelines for the Management o f IT Security. The
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ISO/IEC TR 13335 consists o f five parts under the general title: Information 
Technology - Guidelines for the management o f IT Security:
Part 1: Concepts and models for IT Security (1996);
Part 2: Managing and planning IT Security (1997);
Part 3: Techniques for the management of IT Security (1998);
Part 4: Selection o f safeguards (2000); and 
Part 5: Safeguards for external connections (2003).
Moreover, the Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation developed the 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT 2000). Its 
objective is to research, develop, publicise and promote an authoritative, up-to-date, 
international set o f generally accepted IT control objectives for day-to-day use by 
business managers and auditors.
The Standard o f Good Practice developed by the Information Security Forum (ISF 
2005) provides an achievable target for companies against which they can measure 
their performance regarding information security management. It examines 
information security from a business perspective and focuses on how companies can 
keep the business risk associated with critical IS under control in today’s ever- 
changing technological environment.
In the USA, the National Institute o f Standards and Technology (NIST 800-14 1996) 
developed the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information 
Technology Systems (GAASP) to provide a baseline that companies can use to 
establish and review their security programs.
From the above, it is clear that many organisations and standardisation bodies have 
been producing security standards, guidelines, principles and evaluation techniques. 
However, most o f them are technical and therefore impractical in terms o f meeting 
business needs. Gordan (2005) argued that there was no one standard or set of best 
practices that had emerged as a generally accepted international security standard.
As the trend in information security has recently changed from technical security 
controls to a concern for overall risk management, which shifts information from a
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strictly IT focus to a business practice issue, one set of standards has come forward 
that helps organisations in successfully managing risks in this new environment: the 
British Standard on Information Security (BS 7799).
The British Standard BS 7799 (now ISO 27000) started its life as the UK Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) Code o f Practice for Information Security. It was first 
published in September 1993. In 1995, it became a British Standard and was renamed 
BS 7799 (Sweren 2006; Von Solms 1999). The original BS 7799 comprised two 
parts: a code o f practice (part 1) and a specification for an information security 
management system (part 2). In 1999, it was revised with the addition o f accreditation 
and certification components. These components comprise BS 7799 part 2 which was 
updated in 2002. In 2003, part 1 was fast-tracked through ISO and became 17799 
(ISO 17799). Then in 2005, the BS 7799 part 2 became ISO 27001.
Lineman (2005) argued that several changes to business environments and new ways 
of doing business guided the development of the revised standards. These changes 
include the growing dependence on the use of external services, changes in risks and 
threats facing businesses, emerging technologies and greater connectivity and the 
impact of this on information security, and the growing security requirements for 
regulatory compliance.
The literature reveals that the British Standard BS 7799 is widely acknowledged as an 
important framework for security in both the UK and overseas (DTI 2006; Gordan 
2005). In addition, in 2007, the ISO built on this standard to create a family of 
International Standards on Information Security (27000 series). Sweren (2006) 
presented this series as follows:
- 27000 - Vocabulary and Definitions;
- 27001 - Information Security Management System Requirements (Certification)
(replaced BS 7799 part 2);
- 27002 - Code o f Practice (replaced BS 7799 part 1);
- 27003 - Implementation Guidance;
- 27004 - Information Security Management Metrics and Measurement Standard;
*- 27005 - Information Security Risk Management Standard; and
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- 27006- Requirements for Bodies Providing Audit and Certification o f Information 
Security Management Systems.
Security professionals have claimed that ISO 17799 (part 1: Code o f Practice) was 
one o f the leading standards o f information security. It is a suitable model for 
information security management and an appropriate vehicle for addressing 
information security management in modem organisations (Ma and Pearson 2005). In 
addition, ISO 27001 (part 2: Certification) is the set o f requirements for developing an 
information security management system. This is the standard that a company will 
need to adhere to in order to receive ISO 27001 certification. Compliance with or 
certification in ISO 27001 will give the company strong IT-related controls that will 
also help satisfy the requirements o f many regulatory standards. It ensures that the 
right people, processes and technology are in place that are appropriate to the business 
and that facilitate a proactive approach to managing security and risk (Brenner 2007). 
Certification to ISO 27001 assures clients, employees, suppliers, business partners and 
future customers that a company has a continuous protection methodology allowing a 
flexible, effective and defensible approach to security compliance (Kouns 2007). This 
certification can provide third-party assurance that a company is serious about 
information security and managing associated risks (Brenner 2007).
The ISO 27001 (2005) presents a number o f controls that can be considered as a good 
starting point for implementing information security. These controls fall into two 
basic categories: legislative controls and common best practices. Legislative controls 
are considered essential to a company from a legislative point o f view and include 
data protection and privacy o f information, protection o f organisational records and 
intellectual property rights. On the other hand, the common best practice controls 
include:
- Information security policy document;
- Allocation o f information security responsibilities;
- Information security awareness, training and education;
- Business continuity management;
Management o f information security incidents and improvements;
* - Technical vulnerability management; and
- Correct processing in applications.
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In addition, the standard consists o f 15 sections, where each section provides a wide 
range o f security control measures relevant to the specific section. These sections are 
the risk management, security policy, organisation o f information security, asset 
management, human resources security, physical and environmental security, 
communications and operations management, access control, software acquisition, 
development and maintenance, incident management, business continuity 
management, and compliance.
Despite the worldwide acceptance o f this standard, the DTI Information Security 
Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) revealed that the penetration o f BS 7799 into UK 
businesses remains disappointing. Among people responsible for their companies’ 
information security, only one in ten is aware of the contents o f the standard; 
however, the adoption o f the standard continues to rise among those who are aware of 
it. The survey results revealed that there is a wide potential audience for the standard, 
but the pricing and distribution o f it are acting as barriers, in particular to small 
companies. In addition, the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR
2008) indicated that awareness o f the standard is greater among respondents who hold 
a security qualification.
The literature further reveals that a few studies have addressed the British Standard 
and its two parts. Ma and Pearson (2005) conducted an empirical investigation into 
the validity, reliability and robustness o f the international standard ISO 17799 through 
a web-based survey. Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006) proposed a quantitative survey 
method for evaluating ISO 17799 compliance. In a recent study, Saleh et al. (2007) 
examined the development o f a mathematical model that enables the investigation of 
companies’ compliance with ISO 17799 and with its associated standard ISO 27001. 
This model is based on strategy, technology, organisation, people and environment 
(STOPE).
From the above it seems that there are a large number of standardisation bodies and 
organisations, and a large number o f standards, best practices, guidelines, principles 
and evaluation techniques for information and IS security. However, ISO 27000 is the 
only standard that has gained worldwide publicity in both the UK and overseas. It 
helps companies in identifying, assessing, mitigating and monitoring information
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security risks and threats by following a rigorous process-based approach and in 
selecting and implementing appropriate controls in order to ensure that risks and 
threats are reduced to an acceptable level.
2.4.8.9 AIS security effectiveness
Scott (1995) indicated that effectiveness is related to the level o f achievement of 
objectives such as improving short-term and long-term IS performance and resource 
allocation. Measuring IS effectiveness has been an important research issue in the 
literature. DeLone and McLean (1992) conducted a comprehensive examination of 
previous research in this area. They provided six categories for IS success indicators 
namely system quality, information quality, use, user satisfaction, individual impact 
and organisational impact.
Wright (2006) indicated that measuring security effectiveness eases the process of 
monitoring the effectiveness o f security management, reduces the number of security 
incidents, motivates staff when senior management set targets and provides tangible 
evidence to auditors and assurance to senior management that a company is in control. 
In addition, security should be monitored and periodically reassessed. These 
assessments can be a valuable means of identifying areas o f non-compliance, 
reminding employees o f their responsibilities and demonstrating management 
commitment to the security program (GAO 1998).
Despite the importance o f measuring security effectiveness, a few studies have been 
conducted to cover the IS security effectiveness. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) proposed 
an integrative model o f IS security effectiveness and empirically tested this model 
through a survey distributed among IS managers from various sectors o f the economy. 
In their model, IS security effectiveness refers to the ability of IS security measures to 
protect against people’s unauthorised or deliberate misuse o f IS assets (hardware, 
software, data and computer services). IS security effectiveness was measured using 
perceptual responses to six questions: overall deterrent effect, overall preventive 
effect, effect in protecting hardware, software, data and computer services. In another 
study, Huang et al. (2006) used a balanced scorecard (BSC) framework to set up a 
‘ performance index for information security management in companies and they 
provided a list o f 35 key performance indicators. These indicators are considered as
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references for the manufacturing industry to guide the linkage o f business strategies 
and performance indicators for information security projects.
More recently, Hagen et a l  (2008) have examined the implementation of 
organisational information security measures and assessed the effectiveness o f such 
measures using data collected from the information security managers o f Norwegian 
organisations. They categorised these measures into four main groups namely security 
policy, procedures and control, non-technical tools and methods, and the creation of 
organisational and individual security training and awareness. The results revealed 
that security policies, procedures and controls are applied more often whereas training 
and awareness are applied less frequently within the companies. In addition, Fumell 
and Papadaki (2008) addressed technical and human factors in security assessment. 
They recommended companies to test security from the perspectives o f both the 
technology and the people; however, they argued that security assessment needs to be 
carefully considered and planned, given that both technical and human factors carry a 
risk that the test could compromise security.
The previous studies therefore reveal the importance o f measuring security 
effectiveness, which makes it one of the main elements o f companies’ security 
management today.
2.5 Security controls
The selection and implementation o f appropriate security controls for IS is an 
important task that can have major implications on the operations and assets o f any 
company. However, with the evolution of IS from a paper-based system to a 
mainframe-based computer system then to a client/server system and now to an 
internet-based environment, new risks and threats arise and consequently new controls 
need to be developed to help piitigate or control those risks.
2.5.1 What is meant by security controls?
There are different meanings for controls. Eloff and Von Solms (2000, p.247) stated 
that the term “control” can be defined as being “a number o f measured steps to take in 
order to realise a specific objective”. The term “general controls” is used in most
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previous studies as computer, IT or infrastructure controls (Flowerday and Von Solms 
2005) and refers to the environment within which computer-based application systems 
are developed and maintained. These general controls are, therefore, used to ensure 
that applications be properly developed and implemented (Eloff and Von Solms 
2000).
The National Information Systems Security Glossary (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.50) 
defined the term “security safeguards or controls” as “the protective measures and 
controls prescribed to meet the security requirements specified for an IS. Safeguards 
may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and 
security o f physical structures, areas and devices”. According to the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), security controls include management, 
operational and technical controls that can protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability o f systems and information (NIST 800-53 2005, p.l).
However, Parker (1991) stated that the term “information security controls” refers to 
the techniques used to reduce the likelihood that security threats will result in 
unauthorised access or disclosure o f information, loss o f systems or data integrity and 
disruption o f systems availability.
Consequently, AIS security controls are the techniques or countermeasures used to 
safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability o f AIS and information.
2.5.2 Classifications of security controls
Reviewing the literature has shown that there are diverse views regarding the 
classifications o f security controls. Security controls could be classified according to 
their purpose into: preventive, detective, and corrective controls (Bagranoff et al. 
2005; Flowerday and Von Solms 2005; Lin 2006; Romney and Steinbart 2003). Abu- 
Musa (2004b), Chang and Yeh (2006), Kankanhalli et al. (2003) and Qureshi and 
Siegel (1997) added another classification namely deterrent controls. However, it 
seems that both preventive controls and deterrent controls have the same function in 
hindering or preventing security threats. Security controls therefore could be classified 
into preventive, detective and corrective controls.
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Security controls can also be classified according to their association with data or 
transaction processing stages into input, processing, storing and output security 
controls (Abu-Musa 2004b; Bagranoff et al. 2005). On the other hand, Nota (1988) 
classified controls according to stages of data manipulation process into access, input, 
computation, output and back-up controls. Input controls ensure the validity, accuracy 
and completeness o f data entered into AIS. Processing controls focus on manipulation 
of accounting data after they have been entered into the computer. Output controls 
ensure the output’s validity, accuracy and completeness; output is directed only to 
authorised persons, whereas storing security controls ensure that all stored data and 
programs are secured against unauthorised access, manipulation, alteration and 
disclosure.
Moreover, Gerber and Von Solms (2001) categorised security controls according to 
the evolution o f computing eras - the computer-centric, IT-centric and information- 
centric era - into physical, technical and operational controls. Physical controls such 
as locked doors and cameras were used to protect the entrance to and continued 
operation o f the computing facility. Technical controls such as user identification and 
authentication, access controls, and encryption are employed given the remote access 
to IS. Operational controls are the security policies, procedures, standards and 
guidelines that contribute with both physical and technical controls to protect IS and 
information in the information-centric era.
Dhillon and Moores (2001) addressed computer crimes and classified controls into 
three categories: technical, formal and informal controls. Technical controls restrict 
access to buildings and rooms or to computer systems and programs. Formal controls 
establish rules, ensuring compliance with laws and procedures and identifying 
security roles and responsibilities, whereas informal controls address security training 
and awareness programs conducted within companies.
However, the USA National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee (NSTISSAM INFOSEC/1-99 1999) addressed the insider threats 
of IS and classified countermeasures into technical and procedural countermeasures. 
Technical countermeasures include access control, identification and authentication, 
encryption, operation system controls, system administration, event logging, audit and
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intrusion detection tools. Procedural countermeasures include personnel security 
procedures (e.g. background checks and employee responsibilities), users’ security 
procedures (e.g. segregation o f duties, accountability, audits, passwords, and 
authentication), security policies related to the protection o f IS (e.g. access controls, 
accountability, maintenance procedures, reportable incidents, contingency procedures, 
and legal issues). It is clear that those procedural countermeasures include the formal 
and informal controls mentioned before by Dhillon and Moores (2001).
Furthermore, the USA National Institute o f Standards and Technology (NIST 800-53 
2005) classified security controls into management, operational and technical 
controls. Management controls address the risk management and information security 
management and include risk assessment, planning, system and services acquisition, 
certification, accreditation, and security assessments. Operational controls are 
implemented and executed by people and include personnel security, physical and 
environmental protection, contingency planning, maintenance, system and 
information integrity, incident response, and training and awareness. In addition, 
technical controls are implemented and executed by IS through mechanisms contained 
in the system’s hardware or software and include identification and authentication, 
access controls, audit and accountability, and system and communications protection.
On the other hand, Romney and Steinbart (2003) classified controls according to the 
AIS reliability principles into availability, security, maintainability and integrity 
controls. Availability controls ensure system availability and they include minimising 
system downtime and a disaster recovery plan. Security controls ensure that the 
system is protected against unauthorised physical and logical access and include 
segregation o f duties, physical and logical access controls, protection o f computers 
and networks, and internet controls. Maintainability controls ensure that the system 
can be modified as required without affecting its availability, security and integrity 
and includes project development, acquisition controls and change management 
controls. Moreover, integrity controls ensure that system processing is complete, 
accurate, timely and authorised and include input validation, online data entry 
controls, data processing and storage controls, output controls and data transmission
4.
controls.
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In a more recent study, Yeh and Chang (2007) classified security countermeasures 
into two major categories. IT-related countermeasures include software, hardware, 
data and network security controls, whereas non-IT-related countermeasures include 
physical facilities and environment, personnel, regulation, compliance with legal 
requirements and risk transference controls.
From the above, security controls can be classified as follows:
- According to purpose, into preventive, detective, and corrective controls;
- According to their association with data processing stages, into input, processing, 
storing, and output security controls;
According to the evolution o f computing eras, into physical, technical, and 
operational controls;
According to their role in minimising crimes, into technical and procedural 
(formal and informal) controls;
According to their security function, into management, operational, and technical 
controls; and
According to AIS reliability principles, into availability, security, maintainability 
and integrity controls.
2.5.3 Types of security controls
The literature reveals that some types o f security controls are implemented by the 
majority o f companies, while the use of other controls is still in its infancy.
In the UK, Mitchell et al. (1999) conducted a study to investigate the attitudes o f UK 
companies to information security. The results revealed that although the majority of 
companies did not have a formal information security policy, they all used safeguards 
to protect their electronic information. The most common security measures used 
include physical and technical access controls to information; however, the reliance 
on technical security measures was higher than on physical measures. The results also 
revealed that the majority o f companies used remote backup and storage o f electronic 
information, followed by computer access controls; however, only 45 percent were 
protecting IS from fire. The least popular method was the marking o f equipment and 
* movable data storage. In addition, the most commonly used technical measures were 
anti-virus controls, followed by application and network access controls, however,
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only 33 percent used firewalls, followed by user identification (ID) and encryption 
techniques to secure their corporate information. In addition, only one company used 
other safeguards such as software licence monitoring, software audit alert tools and 
smart cards.
In addition, the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) revealed that 
the majority o f UK businesses are restricting access to most major computing 
facilities. Ninety seven percent o f companies are using locks, 49 percent are 
monitoring this access through logs or cameras; however, environmental controls are 
present in just under a half o f these facilities. The results also revealed that almost 
every company irrespective o f size installs anti-virus software on its computers. An 
increasing number o f companies are implementing intrusion detection or prevention 
software. UK businesses still overwhelmingly depend on user IDs and passwords to 
check the identity o f users attempting to access their systems. Strong authentication is 
becoming more common in large companies, with hardware tokens and biometrics 
seeming to give greater security benefits than software tokens. Firewalls remain the 
main defence for websites. However, over half o f all UK businesses are taking no 
steps to protect themselves against the emerging technologies that pose a potential 
security threat such as MP3 players, USB sticks, digital cameras and portable hard 
discs. The survey concluded that security awareness in the UK business community 
has never been better; however, the gap between the companies addressing 
information security and those that are not is widening.
More recently, the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) 
indicated that almost every UK business makes backups and the majority take these 
backups off-site. However, two thirds o f companies continue to rely solely on 
physical security controls to protect their computer equipment - PCs and laptops - and 
the data they contained and they do not take enough steps in encrypting their sensitive 
data. Again, two thirds o f companies seem to be either unaware o f the risks of 
emerging technologies or unwilling to spend money on protecting themselves from 
these risks. In addition, the majority o f businesses use anti-spyware scanning software 
as well as anti-virus software. UK businesses are now restricting staff access to the 
4 internet through establishing an acceptable usage policy, blocking inappropriate sites, 
monitoring usage, filtering incoming e-mail, encrypting e-mails exchanged with
- 7 7 -
business partners, and scanning outgoing e-mails as well. In addition, the growth in 
remote access is one o f the drivers for using strong (multi-factor) authentication 
controls like tokens, smart cards, or biometrics. Moreover, the survey revealed that 
the number o f companies using a wireless network is increasing, which drives UK 
companies, particularly financial services companies to implement WPA (Wi-Fi 
protected access) or stronger encryption over their wireless transmissions.
Henry (1997) conducted a survey o f 261 companies in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 
USA to determine the nature o f their accounting systems and security methods in use. 
The results revealed that the majority o f companies backed up their accounting 
systems, secured their systems with passwords but only 42.7 percent utilised 
protection from viruses. Physical security and authorisation for changes to the system 
were employed by less than 40 percent o f companies. In addition, only 15 companies 
used encryption for their accounting data, and almost 45 percent o f the sample 
conducted some sort o f audit o f their accounting data.
In a study to identify and rank current information security threats, Whitman (2004) 
investigated companies’ spending priorities to protect against these threats. The 
results revealed that the most common protection mechanism employed by all 
companies is the user name/password access control, followed by media backup and 
virus protection software, audit procedures and firewalls.
In another study, Gupta and Hammond (2005) mailed a questionnaire to 1000 small 
business owners in Lynchburg, Virginia, USA, investigating the protection 
technologies used by their companies. The results revealed that the majority of 
companies use technologies such as power surge protectors, data backup systems, 
system access controls, anti-virus software, and firewalls. In addition, Keller et al. 
(2005) focused on how small businesses are managing information security. The 
results revealed that all companies use anti-virus software and firewalls; however, less 
than two thirds o f companies utilise passwords. Although it seems that security 
controls used by small companies are similar to those of large companies, it is clear 
that small companies use limited types o f controls compared to large companies, and 
‘ this could be because o f the limited resources devoted to security.
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In another study, Cerullo and Cerullo (2005) provided guidance to accountants and IT 
professionals on identifying significant risks and implementing security measures to 
manage these risks. They were given a list of security measures to protect against 
threats. They include security measures to protect against human threats e.g. antivirus 
software, authentication/authorisation servers, biometrics, electronic scanning 
devices, firewalls, intrusion detection and penetration devices and passwords, and 
security measures to protect against human non-malicious threats such as a corporate 
code o f conduct and environmental controls. In addition, they include security 
measures to protect against accidents e.g. card activated locks, environmental 
controls, internal and external file labels, motion-detection devices and preventive 
maintenance; and security measures to protect against natural disasters and other 
unexpected disruptions such as environmental controls. Accountants and IT 
professionals therefore can select the most suitable security measures based on their 
experience and on cost-effectiveness.
On the other hand, the respondents to the Computer Crime and Security Survey 
(Gordon et al. 2006) were asked to identify the types of security technology used by 
their organisations. The results revealed that the majority of respondents used 
firewalls, followed by anti-virus software, anti-spyware, server-based access control 
lists and intrusion detection systems. On the other hand, only 20 percent of 
respondents reported the use o f biometrics with a one third increase compared to the 
2005 survey (Gordon et al. 2005). This result confirmed that the use o f biometrics in 
business and accounting was still in its infancy and many issues about its role in IS 
security were unresolved (Amoruso et al. 2005; Chandra and Calderson 2003; Down 
and Sands 2004). More recently, the results of the Computer Crime and Security 
Survey (Richardson 2008) revealed that nearly all respondents reported the use of 
anti-virus software and firewalls, followed by virtual private networks (VPN) and 
anti-spyware software. However, only 23 percent o f organisations were still using 
biometrics, only a three percent increase compared to the 2006 survey. Joyce (2008) 
argued that although the biometric technique was still not widely used, this 
technology could be found in large organisations where the security need is high such 
as financial services and government agencies.
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From the above, it seems that some security controls are well known and are used by 
the majority o f USA organisations. These include passwords, ant-virus and anti­
spyware software, firewalls, and data backups followed by intrusion prevention and 
detection systems and encryption. However, other controls are not common for instance 
biometrics.
In a parallel study, Abu-Musa (2004b) investigated the opinions o f the heads of 
internal audit departments and computer departments in the entire population of the 
Egyptian Banking Industry (EBI) regarding the computerised AIS security controls 
implemented within their banks. A checklist was developed which included security 
controls under ten main security control groups. The results revealed that the heads of 
computer departments paid relatively more attention to the technical problems o f AIS 
security controls e.g. software and electronic access security controls, data and data 
entry security controls, bypassing security controls, and user programming security 
controls. However, the heads of internal audit departments emphasised behavioural 
and organisational security controls such as segregation o f duties and output security 
controls. The results revealed that some controls are more common in the Egyptian 
business environment as well e.g. virus protection software, data encryption, and 
backups of software and data, whereas other controls such as biometrics have rarely 
been used in this country.
In a more recent study, Abu-Musa (2007b) examined the existence and adequacy of 
the CAIS security controls implemented in Saudi organisations to prevent, detect and 
correct security breaches. The results highlighted a number o f inadequately 
implemented controls and some recommendations were made to the Saudi 
organisations. For example, they were recommended to restrict access to sensitive 
data to authorised employees only. Mandatory vacations and rotation o f duties should 
be considered. Computers should be installed in locked areas, sensitive data should be 
encrypted to reduce the chance o f unauthorised exposure, and adequate output 
security controls should be put in place.
From the above, it can be concluded that some security controls are used by nearly all 
* companies irrespective o f type, size and location, whereas other controls such as 
biometrics are still uncommon despite their importance in improving the effectiveness
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of internal controls. Moreover, despite the large number and variety o f security 
controls or countermeasures available today, emerging technologies continue to 
proliferate within the business environment and therefore companies should be 
adequately prepared to address associated security challenges and risks.
2.6 Summary of the chapter
This chapter has provided a review o f the literature in the field o f AIS security. First, 
the chapter reviewed the literature concerning the meanings, main components and 
role o f AIS in organisations. The chapter then provided an overview o f the various 
classifications and types o f security threats facing companies’ information, IS, IT and 
computers, and particularly those threats facing companies in different countries. The 
chapter also highlighted the meanings of security in general and particularly the AIS 
security in previous studies, the evolution and importance o f security, the roles and 
responsibilities for security, the principles o f security and the factors affecting 
security. The chapter then examined how companies manage security and discussed 
the main elements o f security management, namely security requirements, policy, 
training and awareness, risk assessment, incident handling, business continuity plans, 
standards and certification, and evaluation techniques. The review shows that IS 
security management has become a necessity and if  properly implemented, enables 
companies to reduce security risks to acceptable levels, to satisfy the legal, regulatory 
and contractual requirements, to enhance their overall security posture and most 
importantly to ensure their continuity.
Finally, the chapter has examined the literature concerning the various classifications 
and types o f AIS security controls implemented in most companies to prevent or 
reduce their security threats. This review shows that the priority given to security has 
been translated into action, security controls have improved and the confidence in 
those controls is high. However, emerging technologies continue to proliferate and 
companies must be adequately prepared to address associated risks.
The following chapter presents the conceptual framework that has guided the 
development o f the objectives, questions and hypotheses o f the current research. It 
proceeds by explaining the research design, data collection methods available in 
previous studies concerning AIS security and those methods employed in the current
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research namely a postal questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, emphasising 
the strengths and weaknesses o f each method, along with the justification for their 
use. A detailed explanation of the procedures followed in each method will be 
provided.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter reviewed the literature and presented an integrated view o f AIS 
security issues. It began by describing the meanings, components and importance of 
AIS and exploring its role in organisations. It proceeded by exploring different AIS 
security threats. Then, it described the importance o f and responsibility for AIS 
security, focusing on the different dimensions o f security and paying particular 
attention to security management. Finally, it investigated the different types of 
security controls used to prevent or to reduce security threats.
The aim o f this chapter is to present the conceptual framework, which guides the 
development o f objectives, questions and hypotheses o f the current research. Then it 
explains the research design, the data collection methods available in previous studies 
concerning AIS security and those methods employed in the current research, a postal 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, emphasising the strengths and 
weaknesses o f each method, along with the rationale for their use.
The chapter then proceeds by providing a detailed explanation o f the procedures 
followed in each method, the questionnaire design and layout, the pilot test o f the 
questionnaire, sampling and administration o f both methods, the statistical methods 
applied to analyse the research data and the ethical considerations o f the research.
3.2 Conceptual framework of the current research
A valuable part o f the initial planning process is the development o f a conceptual 
framework for the research (Smith 2003). A conceptual framework is “a 
representation, either graphically or in narrative form of the main concepts or 
variables, and their presumed relationship with each other” (Punch 1998, p.56). 
According to Sekaran (2003, p.86) a theoretical framework is “a conceptual model of 
how one theorises or makes logical sense o f the relationships among the several 
factors that have been identified as important to the problem”.
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The conceptual framework is the foundation on which the entire research project is 
based. It elaborates the relationships among variables, explains the theory underlying 
these relations, and describes the nature and direction o f the relationships. It can bring 
clarity and focus, helping the researcher to see and organise the research questions 
more clearly. It plays a predominant role in research, implying a systematic 
organisation o f and relationships between concepts and it offers the conceptual 
foundation to proceed with the research (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002; Punch 1998; 
Sekaran 2003). The entire research should be based on the theoretical framework.
In Chapter 2, it was mentioned that the security issue has received considerable 
attention from both academics and practitioners. In the UK, the priority given to 
security remains high across all sizes and types o f companies. According to the DTI 
Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006), three quarters o f UK businesses 
rate security as a high or very high priority. In addition, the results o f the American 
Institute o f Certified Public Accountants’ 19th Top Technology Initiatives Survey 
(AICPA 2008) indicated that “security” has been the number one technology concern 
in the USA for six consecutive years.
However, despite this importance, the literature regarding IS security in general and 
AIS security in particular reveals that security research is fragmented and no 
comprehensive framework was discovered. Cannoy et a l  (2006) stated that through 
the analysis o f hypotheses, frameworks and variables, security research appears to be 
highly fragmented. Most previous studies included diagrams, charts and tables; 
however, none o f them included major constructs and their relationships, only 
proposing a model for a specific topic or clarifying a technical system, and many of 
the frameworks proposed are extremely specific and task-related.
In addition, the literature review reveals that most previous studies lack an overall and 
comprehensive view o f the AIS security issue. Each o f these studies tried to address a 
particular security aspect. Some o f them addressed AIS security threats (Abu-Musa 
2004a; 2006a and b; Keller et a l  2005; Loch et al. 1992; Ryan and Bordoloi 1997; 
Whitman 2004). Others focused on controls (Abu-Musa 2004b; 2007a and b; Henry 
* 1997; Kankanhalli et a l  2003), while others combined security threats and controls in 
one study (Chang and Yeh 2006; Gupta and Hammond 2005; Yeh and Chang 2007).
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Moreover, the majority o f the previous studies focused only on one activity of the AIS 
security management framework. Doherty and Fulford (2005), Hong et al. (2006) and 
Kadam (2007) addressed the security policy. Kruger and Kearney (2006) and Peltier 
(2005) focused on security training and awareness. Gerber and Von Solms (2005) 
covered the risk assessment. Bhaskar (2005) and Mitropoulos et al. (2007) addressed 
incident handling, whereas Hunton (2002) and Rodetis (1999) focused on disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans. Gordon and Loeb (2006) were concerned with 
security budgets, while Freeman (2007) and Karabacak and Sogukpinas (2006) 
addressed security standards and certification.
The current study is an attempt to present an integrated view o f AIS security, and a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for the research is proposed as shown in Figure 
3.1.
Figure 3.1 Conceptual framework o f the research
Industry Sector
AIS Security 
Threats
AIS Security 
Controls
AIS Security Management Framework 
Security policy
Security training and awareness 
Risk assessment
Incident handling, disaster recovery and 
business continuity plan 
Security budget
Security standards and certification 
Security effectiveness
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The conceptual framework shown in Figure 3.1 presents the relationship between the 
main variables o f the study, namely the industry sector, AIS security threats, AIS 
security controls and AIS security management framework.
Contingency theory states that in order to survive or to be effective, a company must 
fit its characteristics to contingencies that reflect its situation (Donaldson 2001; 
Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). Contingency theory attempts to establish functional 
relationships between environmental variables and organisational variables, and 
therefore, recognises and responds to these variables in order to attain organisational 
objectives effectively (Hong et al. 2003; Lee et a l  1982).
Moreover, Ashby’s law o f requisite variety states that control can be obtained only if 
the variety o f the controller is at least as great as the variety o f the situation to be 
controlled (Beer 1981, p.41). According to Lewis and Stewart (2003), the application 
of Ashby’s law to companies means that the company must generate at least as much 
variety (e.g. security controls) in order to control the variety in its environment. 
Tushman and Nadler (1978) indicated that the application o f Ashby’s law is 
consistent with the contingency concept o f fit between a company and its 
environment. If the company possesses too much variety then it is wasting resources 
and its performance is lower than it should be. However, if  the company possesses too 
little variety then it will be exposed to higher levels o f risk. Consequently, the 
maximum performance requires that the company’s variety should match that o f the 
environment.
The environment o f an organisation can be classified into the industry and the macro 
environments (Dill 1958; Grant 1998). The industry environment includes technology, 
competition, customer/market and resources sectors and tends to have a direct impact 
on the competitive situation o f individual organisations. The macro environment is 
made up o f the political/legal’ economic and social/cultural sectors and has an indirect 
influence on individual organisations (Daft et al. 1988; Dill 1958; Ducan 1972).
According to Hong et al. (2003), security levels are dynamic and contingent upon the 
* environmental variables o f a company for example technological change. Thus, with 
the rapid change in IT, with the great desire of companies to implement up-to-date
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computerised systems and software and with the higher levels o f inter-connectivity 
among systems both within and among companies, this rapidly changing technology 
has created significant risks related to AIS security. Consequently, new controls need 
to be developed to help mitigate those risks and to reduce security threats, which 
constantly adapt themselves to new environments (Abu-Musa 2003; 2004b; Chou et 
al. 1999). The technological change, therefore, leads to change in the number, type 
and severity o f AIS security threats and the number and type o f controls implemented 
to reduce those threats.
In addition, AIS security management is a stream of management activities that aim 
to protect AIS and create a framework within which such systems operate as 
expected. If properly implemented, the AIS security management framework enables 
companies to reduce security risks to acceptable levels (Eloff and Von Solms 2000). 
AIS security management is a part o f contingency management to prevent and detect 
security threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts inside and outside o f a company. 
Companies therefore should adopt security management measures such as security 
policy and risk assessment in order to meet the demands o f a fast-changing 
environment (Hong et al. 2003).
Furthermore, there is a high degree of agreement that companies in different industry 
sectors tend to have different uses for IS (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1990) and, therefore, 
different security requirements (Chang and Yeh 2006; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Straub 
1986). Consequently, a company’s approach to security depends on its industry 
sector.
3.2.1 The main variables of the research
From the above, it seems that there are some relationships between the main variables 
of the current study. These variables are discussed in more detail as follows:
3.2.1.1 AIS security threats
As mentioned Chapter 2, security threats are any event that can have an adverse 
impact on a company’s IS in general and AIS in particular. Lin (2006) argued that 
' security threats are acts or incidents that could affect a company’s IS. These threats
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can either be singular or form part of a combination of multiple threats, and they can 
come both from inside or outside the company.
A risk is the possibility that a certain threat will have a negative effect on a 
company’s IS. Tsiakis and Stephanides (2005) argued that a company has four 
alternatives to deal with its security risks: to accept it, ignore it, assign it to someone 
else, or to mitigate or reduce it through appropriate security controls or safeguards. In 
addition, Moses (1992, p.236) indicated that risk reduction could be achieved by 
avoiding or transferring a risk, reducing the likelihood o f threats, reducing possible 
impacts, detecting unwanted events, and recovering. Consequently, a company could 
reduce the likelihood o f security threats or minimise their impact through appropriate 
safeguards or controls.
Chang and Yeh (2006) argued that companies should prepare appropriate security 
measures to minimise security threats. Lin (2006) also indicated that companies 
should be well prepared for all possible security threats to protect their AIS. He 
argued that a combination o f preventive and detective controls could mitigate these 
threats. In addition, Vidalis and Kazmi (2007) pointed out that reacting is expensive 
in security; companies therefore should be proactive and prevent attacks from 
happening or minimising the impact of the threats. The frequency o f security threats 
therefore depends on the readiness o f a company by using appropriate security 
controls. “AIS security threats” is therefore one o f the main variables that depends on 
the AIS security controls implemented and on a company’s industry sector.
The literature review reveals that companies, their IS and AIS are subject to 
increasing numbers and types o f security threats. Consequently, many previous 
studies focused on this variable and covered it from different perspectives. Some 
studies focused on IS security threats (D’Arcy and Hovav 2007; Kros et al. 2005; Lin 
2006; Loch et al. 1992; Ryan and Bordoloi 1997; Yeh and Chang 2007). Other 
studies addressed AIS security threats (Abu-Musa 2002a; 2004a; 2006a and b; Beard 
and Wen 2007; Davis 1997; Rainer et al. 1991). Others again are concerned with 
information security threats (Keller et al. 2005; Mitchell et al. 1999; Whitman 2003 
* and 2004; Wiant 2005), whereas others focused on computer security threats (Haugen 
and Selin 1999; Katz 2000; Manrique 2005; Qureshi and Siegel 1997).
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On the other hand, some studies investigated the types and frequency o f the 
occurrence o f each type o f security threats (Abu-Musa 2004a; 2006a and b; Keller et 
al. 2005), while others are concerned with ranking the top security threats (Davis 
1997; Loch et al. 1992) and rating the seriousness of each threat (Ryan and Bordoloi 
1997). Abu-Musa (2006a) conducted a study to investigate the perceived threats of 
computerised AIS in Saudi Arabian organisations using a security threats checklist. 
The respondents to the questionnaire were asked to indicate the frequency of 
occurrence o f each security threat by choosing one among five available choices 
ranging from “less than once a year” to “more than once a day”.
Loch et al. (1992) investigated MIS executives’ concern about a variety of threats. 
Respondents were asked to rank the top three o f 12 threats to their organisation’s IS 
security for microcomputers, mainframes and networks. In a similar study, Ryan and 
Bordoloi (1997) examined the security threats associated with client/server versus 
mainframe environment. Using a questionnaire incorporating a list o f 15 major 
potential security threats, respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of each 
threat to their company in both environments in a scale ranging from one to ten.
Whitman (2004) conducted another study to identify and to rank threats to 
information security, to provide information on the frequency o f attacks from these 
threats and the prioritisation for expenditures companies are placing in order to 
protect against them.
From the above, it seems that there are large numbers o f security threats facing 
companies. Since most, if  not all, companies today depend on computerised IS in 
carrying out their activities, security threats facing them are increasingly complex 
which can lead to extensive damage e.g. business interruption, financial loss, loss of 
data, loss o f reputation and even bankruptcy. Consequently, there is a great concern 
from academics and practitiohers regarding security threats.
The current study investigates the most common sources and types o f AIS security 
threat among UK companies in different industry sectors and the frequency o f their 
* occurrence. Respondents were asked to rank the top three sources o f security threats 
to their company’s AIS from a range o f the most likely threats and to indicate the
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frequency o f occurrence o f each type of threat by choosing one among six choices 
(none, once a year, once a month, once a week, once a day, more than once a day). 
The current study is an attempt to discover the most common types o f security threats 
facing IS in general and their AIS in particular in order to implement appropriate 
security controls to prevent or reduce these threats and to protect their systems.
3.2.1.2 AIS security controls
The National Information Systems Security Glossary (NSTISSI 4009 2000, p.50) 
defines the term “security safeguards or controls” as “the protective measures and 
controls prescribed to meet the security requirements specified for an IS. Safeguards 
may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and 
security o f physical structures, areas and devices”. Consequently, AIS security 
controls are the countermeasures used to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability o f AIS.
The literature reveals that there is a great concern among academics and practitioners 
regarding IS security controls. Abu-Musa (2007a and b) conducted a study to 
examine the existence and adequacy of implemented computerised AIS security 
controls to prevent, detect and correct security breaches in Saudi organisations. A 
self-administered questionnaire was used incorporating an AIS security controls 
checklist which classified controls into 11 groups and used “yes” or “no” questions. 
Respondents were asked to choose one of the two choices.
Henry (1997) collected information on accounting systems and their security methods 
in Virginia. A section in the survey asked respondents about the basic security 
measures used with accounting systems. Mitchell et a l (1999) investigated the 
attitudes to information security among UK organisations.
Gupta and Hammond (2005) conducted a study to gather information about IT related 
security issues in small firms in both manufacturing and service. A questionnaire was 
mailed to business owners in Virginia to investigate the protection technologies used 
by their organisations. In another study, Keller et al. (2005) focused on how small 
* businesses are managing information security and the associated risks. Semi-
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structured interviews were conducted and interviewees were asked to indicate the 
tools used in their companies to deal with their security threats.
In addition, Chang and Yeh (2006) examined whether the security preparation of 
firms matches the severity o f IS threats they perceive in developing countries. This 
study also discussed the appropriate threat mitigation strategies for four sectors. The 
questionnaire included a section to assess the scope o f security countermeasures, 
which are divided into seven different categories: software, hardware, data, network, 
physical facilities and environment, personnel and regulations, and respondents were 
asked to choose the measures they employed under each category. In a more recent 
study, D’Arcy and Hovav (2007) used a web-based survey to elicit respondents’ IS 
misuse intentions and awareness of security countermeasures within their 
organisations. The survey items were measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
Based on the above, it seems that every company, regardless o f its size and location, 
is concerned with preparing itself for all possible types of security threats. Tsiakis and 
Stephanides (2005) indicated that security safeguards or controls limit a threat from 
becoming a reality. Kadam (2007) stated that a company should utilise all possible 
controls to be able to prevent IS security threats and maintain the customer’s 
confidence by having appropriate technical, procedural and administrative controls. 
Chang and Yeh (2006) argued that a lack of robust security controls raises a 
company’s security threats. Adequate controls help to ensure the smooth functioning 
of IS and protect the company from loss caused by security failures (IFAC 1998). 
Consequently, a company’s managers and employees should be knowledgeable of all 
types of security threats and controls to protect their systems.
AIS security controls are, therefore, one o f the main variables in the current study, 
which are implemented to reduce AIS security threats. In order to investigate the 
security controls implemented by UK companies in different industry sectors, the 
researcher developed a list o f security controls and the respondents of the 
questionnaire were asked to indicate whether they are using each control, they are 
* planning to use it or there are no plans to use it. The current study is an attempt to 
investigate the types o f controls implemented in UK companies and to examine
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whether there are significant differences among industry sectors regarding these 
different types o f controls.
3.2.1.3 AIS security management framework
A security management framework is a structured process for the implementation and 
ongoing management o f information security in a company (Vermeulen and Von 
Solms 2002). Due to new security needs that have been introduced by the advances in 
IT, IS security has become a necessity for all companies. However, the 
implementation o f integrated IS security across a company is a complex process that 
requires proper management. Consequently, a security management framework must 
exist not only to protect IS and information but to ensure the continuity o f the 
company (Karyda et al. 2005).
In addition, Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) stated that effective information 
security could have a positive impact on a company. However, in order for companies 
to manage information security effectively, various security requirements and 
guidelines need to be considered. These security requirements and guidelines stem 
from sources both internal and external to the company.
However, Hong et al. (2003) pointed out that the approach to information security 
management varies with different researchers and companies. The literature review 
reveals that there are various approaches in dealing with IS security management. 
Some studies covered IS security management in general such as Vermeulen and Von 
Solms (2002), while other studies focused only on one of the activities that form an IS 
security management framework. Doherty and Fulford (2005), Hong et al. (2006) and 
Kadam (2007) focused on security policy. Kruger and Kearney (2006) and Peltier 
(2005) covered security training and awareness. Gerber and Von Solms (2005) 
addressed risk assessment. Bhaskar (2005) and Mitropoulos et al. (2007) covered 
incident handling whereas Ftunton (2002) and Rodetis (1999) focused on disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans. Gordon and Loeb (2006) addressed the 
security budget, while Freeman (2007) and Karabacak and Sogukpinas (2006) 
focused on security standards and certification. In addition, Huang et al. (2006),
* Kankanhalli et al. (2003) and Wright (2006) addressed security effectiveness.
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According to Von Solms (2005), these activities are generally accepted as making up 
the information security management in organisations. In addition, they are essential 
in order properly to manage IS security and to avoid the potential consequences of 
any neglect o f these activities.
Based on the above, an AIS security management framework is one o f the main 
variables in the current study that depends on a company’s industry sector. If properly 
implemented, this framework enables a company to reduce security threats to 
acceptable levels, to protect information and IS and to ensure the continuity of the 
company. The security management framework includes the following activities: 
Security policy
Security training and awareness
- Risk assessment
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
- Security budget
Security standards and certification
- Security effectiveness
Security policy: The US National Security Telecommunications and Information 
Systems Security Committee (NSTISSAM INFOSEC/1-99 1999) stated that a 
security policy is a set o f laws, rules, and practices that regulate how a company 
protects its IS and the data within them. Reviewing the literature reveals that there is a 
high degree o f agreement that the security policy is at the heart o f any information 
security strategy and it is the start of security management (Eveloff 2005; Higgins 
1999). Poore (1999) argued that the lack of policy could result in a company 
subjecting its IS to undue risks and increasing the potential for unacceptable loss, 
liability or harm to the company and other relevant parties. In addition, Briney (2000) 
indicated that companies with a security policy are paying closer attention and 
therefore are better able both to detect and to react to security incidents and are more 
secure than other companies.
The literature reveals that it is not enough to establish a security policy; this policy 
* must be updated regularly (Briney 2000; Steele and Wargo 2007; Wiant 2005).
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Based on the importance of the security policy and its vital role in any company, 
many previous studies have been conducted to investigate the security policy from 
different perspectives (Section 2.4.8.3 in Chapter 2). For example, Fulford and 
Doherty (2003) conducted a study to investigate the uptake, content, dissemination 
and impact o f information security policies in UK companies. Doherty and Fulford 
(2005) explored how a variety of issues relating to the uptake and application of 
security polices e.g. existence, age, updating and scope of a security policy impacted 
upon the incidence o f security breaches within large companies. In addition, Hong et 
al. (2006) investigated the dominant factors of building an information security policy 
and the effect o f this policy on elevating a company’s security level.
Consequently, the current study investigates the existence and frequency o f updating 
AIS security policy among UK companies in different industry sectors. The 
respondents o f the questionnaire were asked whether they have a security policy 
covering AIS in their companies, and the frequency o f updating this policy.
Security training and awareness: Employees’ training and awareness is the most 
important o f all information security measures and a critical component of the 
information security program (Bowen et al. 2007; Eveloff 2005). Peltier (2005) 
argued that an effective security program cannot be implemented without 
implementing an employee awareness and a training program to address policy, 
procedures and tools. Given the vital role o f security training and awareness programs 
in companies, many studies have been conducted to explore this issue as was 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.8.4) e.g. Chen et al. (2008), Kritzinger and Smith 
(2008), Kruger and Kearney (2006), Peltier (2005), Siponen (2000) and Thomson and 
Von Solms (1998). For example, Siponen (2000) provided a conceptual foundation 
and a framework for IS security awareness. Peltier (2005) identified the elements that 
make up a successful security awareness program, and Kruger and Kearney (2006) 
provided a model for measuring information security awareness in companies.
Consequently, to explore this issue in more detail, the current study investigates the 
existence o f AIS security training and awareness programs for managers, employees 
* and other users among UK companies in different industry sectors. The respondents 
were given some statements concerning the security training and awareness activities
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and were asked to indicate their level o f agreement with these statements using a 
scale ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The researcher investigated 
the differences among industry sectors in the UK concerning the level o f attention 
paid to security training and awareness.
Risk assessment: Businesses are exposed to unlimited security risks unless they have 
a formal risk management framework in place to enable risks to be identified, 
evaluated, and managed (Shaw and Daniels 2002). Due to the increasing risks to 
which companies are exposed, many studies have been conducted to investigate this 
issue as was shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.8.5) such as Gerber and Von Solms
(2005), Kotulic and Clark (2004), Lindberg (2006), Sherer and Alter (2004), Tsohou 
et al. (2006) and Zhou et al. (2008). For example, Kotulic and Clark (2004) proposed 
and tested a theoretical model to study the process that leads to effective Security 
Risk Management (SRM) programs. Lindberg (2006) proposed a simplified risk 
management model that will provide quantitative results based on subjective human 
inputs, whereas Zhou et al. (2008) presented an IS project risk checklist that aims at 
supporting risk assessment, decision making concerning risk control, and planning of 
risk mitigation strategies in the public sector.
Consequently, to explore this security issue in more detail, the current study 
investigates the existence and frequency of updating AIS risk assessment programs 
among UK companies in different industry sectors. Respondents o f the questionnaire 
were asked whether they have an AIS risk assessment program and the frequency of 
updating this program. Respondents were also given some statements concerning the 
risk assessment activities within their companies and they were asked to indicate their 
level o f agreement with these statements using a “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree” scale.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Due to the
increasing number o f security breaches occurring within organisations and the 
constant news o f large companies and government departments suffering financial 
and non-financial losses, Williams (1995) argued that it must make better business 
* sense to take a preventive approach and to try to deal with such breaches as soon as 
possible. The sooner action is taken, the cheaper it will be for the company in the long
run. Consequently, it is vital for all types of companies to have security incident 
handling procedures in place to deal with any security incident and to react quickly to 
any disruption in normal business processes. In addition, a business continuity plan is 
a critical component o f the security management system (Smith and Jamieson 2006). 
It assures the availability o f IS in the case of a crisis or other serious disruption in 
services.
As was shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.8.6), a number of studies have been 
conducted to investigate the incident handling, disaster recovery and business 
continuity plan issues such as Bhaskar (2005), Fonseca (2007), Gerber and Feldman 
(2002), Hancock (2002), Mitropoulos et al. (2007), Nosworthy (2000), Smith and 
Jamieson (2006) and Vael and Neyer (2006). For example, Gerber and Feldman 
(2002) offered advice to companies on how to select a team and develop a plan that 
will ensure their ability to remain in business in the event o f a disaster. Smith and 
Jamieson (2006) investigated the key drivers and inhibitors for IS security and 
business continuity management in e-govemment using the data collected from a 
cross section o f government organisations. In addition, Fonseca (2007) addressed the 
human factor in business continuity plans and argued that excellent plans can fail 
because o f an often overlooked factor namely human beings.
Based on the important role o f incident handling, disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans, the current study investigates the differences among the industry 
sectors in the UK regarding the existence and the frequency o f updating incident 
handling procedures and business continuity plans. Respondents o f the questionnaire 
were asked whether their companies experienced any AIS security incidents in the 
last year, whether they have security incident handling procedures and business 
continuity plans in place, the frequency o f updating these plans, if  any, and the 
actions taken by their companies to reduce future security incidents.
Security budget: With the increasing number of security incidents in the daily news, 
companies are now uncertain about how much to spend on security and what to spend 
it on (Kleinfeld 2006). In addition, according to the DTI Information Security 
* Breaches Survey (DTI 2006), spending the right amount on security continues to 
challenge UK companies. The literature review reveals that security is still perceived
- 9 6 -
as an IT issue. Most companies still do not have a security budget separate from their 
IT budget (DTT 2007) and the security budget is expressed as a percentage of IT 
budget.
Despite the important role that the security budget plays in companies today, few 
studies have been conducted to investigate this issue as mentioned in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4.8.7) such as Gordon and Loeb (2006) and Willison and Backhouse
(2006). Consequently, in order to explore different aspects of the security budget, the 
current study investigates the differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors regarding the existence o f a security budget, its percentage and the top areas 
of spending on AIS security. Respondents of the questionnaire were asked about the 
existence of a security budget within their companies, and if any, what percentage of 
this budget is spent on AIS security. Respondents were given a list o f areas of 
spending on AIS security and were asked to rank the top three areas of spending in 
their companies.
Security standards and certification: To protect the companies’ information and IS, 
many different standards and guidelines have been proposed. The British Standard for 
Information Security Management BS 7799 (now ISO 27000) with its two parts: ISO 
17799 (Code o f Practice) and ISO 27001 (Certification), is widely acknowledged as 
an important framework for security in both the UK and overseas (DTI 2006).
Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006) argued that compliance with the standard is the 
practical process o f comparing the applied controls o f a company with those in ISO 
17799. In addition, certification to ISO 27001 assures clients, employees, suppliers, 
business partners and future customers that a company has a continuous protection 
methodology allowing a flexible, effective and defensible approach to security 
compliance (Kouns 2007). This certification can provide third-party assurance that an 
organisation is serious about information security and managing associated risks 
(Brenner 2007). Von Solms (1998) argued that the ideal would be for companies to 
follow such a complete approach to security management, but unfortunately, most 
companies do not possess the required resources to introduce and maintain such a 
‘ comprehensive security program.
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The literature review (Section 2.4.8.8 in Chapter 2) also reveals that only a few 
studies were conducted to discuss the standard and its two parts such as Karabacak 
and Sogukpinar (2006), Ma and Pearson (2005) and Saleh et al. (2007). For example, 
Ma and Pearson (2005) conducted an empirical investigation into the validity, 
reliability and robustness o f the international standard ISO 17799 through a web- 
based survey, while Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006) proposed a quantitative survey 
method for evaluating ISO 17799 compliance.
Due to the importance and popularity of the British Standard BS 7799, the current 
study investigates the awareness level o f managers and employees among UK 
companies in different industry sectors. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
awareness level o f the two parts of BS 7799, the awareness level o f managers and 
employees in their companies and whether their companies are certified or are 
planning to be certified under ISO 27001. The researcher intended to investigate the 
industry sectors that are more aware and more concerned with this standard.
AIS security effectiveness: Huang et al. (2006) argued that after any information 
security investment, companies have to assess the consequences o f business returns 
and to assess security effectiveness. Wright (2006) indicated that measuring security 
effectiveness eases the process of monitoring the effectiveness of the security 
management system, reduces the number of security incidents, motivates staff when 
senior management set targets and provides tangible evidence to auditors and 
assurance to senior management that the company is under control.
However, despite the importance of measuring security effectiveness, only a few 
studies were conducted to cover the IS security effectiveness as mentioned in Chapter 
2 (Section 2.4.8.9) including Fumell and Papadaki (2008), Hagen et a l  (2008), Huang 
et al. (2006) and Kankanhalli et al. (2003). For example, Kankanhalli et al. (2003) 
proposed an integrative model o f IS security effectiveness and empirically tested this 
model through a survey distributed among IS managers from various sectors of the 
economy. In addition, Huang et al. (2006) used a balanced scorecard (BSC) 
framework to set up performance index for information security management in 
* companies and they provided a list o f 35 key performance indicators.
Consequently, the current study has investigated the techniques used by UK 
companies in different industry sectors to evaluate the effectiveness o f AIS security 
and the success indicators o f AIS management within these companies. Respondents 
were given a list o f techniques for evaluating AIS security effectiveness and were 
asked to select those techniques used by their companies. Respondents were also 
given a list o f success indicators o f AIS security management and were asked to rank 
the top three success indicators within their companies.
3.2.1.4 Industry sector
The literature reveals that the industry sector has begun to receive greater attention in 
IS research in general and IS security research in particular. There is an agreement 
that a company’s approach to information security depends on its industry sector. 
Sectors vary in how information technologies are used. The same type of IT 
application might be applied differently across sectors (Chiasson and Davidson 2005). 
Jung et al. (2001) indicated that companies in different industries require different 
levels of information availability, confidentiality and integrity. Consequently, 
companies in different sectors tend to have different security requirements.
Kankanhalli et a l  (2003) developed an integrative model of IS security effectiveness 
in which the industry sector is one of the independent variables. They indicated that 
industry type is an important factor affecting IS security practices for several reasons. 
Financial services companies, for example, are likely to invest heavily on IS and rely 
extensively on IS for their operations compared to other companies. This industry is 
information-intensive, and therefore, the potential losses for financial services 
companies due to IS abuses can be extremely high. In addition, the reputation o f these 
organisations, in terms o f reliability and security o f financial information, is critical to 
their success but can be severely damaged by IS abuses.
Chang and Ho (2006) examined the influence of organisational factors on the 
effectiveness o f implementing BS 7799: Information Security Management Standard. 
They concluded that there are significant impacts of organisational factors including 
the industry type on the effectiveness of implementing BS 7799 and that some 
* information security related behaviours varied substantially across industry sectors.
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Chang and Yeh (2006) investigated the differences in perspective among companies, 
in different sectors, in relation to information threats to their business and the 
countermeasures they have prepared in response to these threats. They concluded that 
businesses should understand their security requirements based on their industry and 
prepare for appropriate security countermeasures to minimise IS threats. In another 
study, Yeh and Chang (2007) identified the gaps between manager perceptions of IS 
security threats and the countermeasures adopted by companies across industries. 
They also examined the impacts o f several variables including industry type on IS 
security adoption. They concluded that industry type is an important factor that affects 
the motivation o f companies to adopt security countermeasures.
Based on the above, the current study investigates the differences between industry 
sectors in the UK regarding the sources and types o f threats facing AIS security, the 
different types o f security controls implemented to prevent or reduce security threats 
and the existence o f a management framework for AIS security. The researcher aims 
to investigate the security practices among the different industry sectors in the UK.
3.2.2 The research objectives
The review o f the literature shows that most previous studies lack a comprehensive 
view of the security issue. Each of these studies tried to focus on a particular security 
aspect. Thus, the current study is an attempt to present an integrated view o f AIS 
security. More specifically, the current study intends to achieve the following 
objectives:
1. To examine the existence o f an adequate management framework o f AIS security 
within UK companies in different industry sectors.
2. To investigate the different types of AIS security threats facing UK companies in 
different industry sectors.
3. To investigate the security controls implemented by UK companies to prevent or 
reduce security threats.
4. To investigate the effect of the security controls implemented on the reduction of 
AIS security threats facing UK companies.
5. To investigate the relationship between AIS security effectiveness of UK 
companies and their AIS security threats level.
6. To examine the security perception among different industry sectors in the UK.
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3.2.3 The research questions
Based on the above discussion, and in order to investigate the AIS security level 
among UK companies in different industry sectors, the current study seeks to find 
answers to the following questions:
1. Is there an adequate management framework for AIS security among UK 
companies in different industry sectors?
2. What are the most common sources and types o f security threats facing AIS of UK 
companies in different industry sectors?
3. What types o f security controls are implemented to prevent or reduce security 
threats in different industry sectors in the UK?
4. Are there significant differences between different industry sectors in the UK 
concerning the types of AIS security threats, AIS security controls and the existence 
of an adequate management framework for AIS security within companies?
5. What is the impact o f the security controls implemented and the AIS security 
effectiveness level achieved on the reduction o f AIS security threats facing UK 
companies?
3.2.4 The research hypotheses
To achieve the objectives o f the current study and to examine the relationship between 
its main variables i.e. AIS security threats, AIS security controls, AIS security 
management framework and the industry sector, the following hypotheses were 
formulated which are tested and discussed in the following chapters:
Hi. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of a management framework for AIS security.
Hi.i There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f an AIS security policy and the frequency of 
updating this policy.
Hi.2 There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS security training and awareness 
program and the security awareness level.
Hi.3. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f an AIS risk assessment program and the 
frequency of undertaking this program.
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Hi 4. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of security incident handling procedures, disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans and the frequency o f testing and updating 
these plans.
Hi. 5 . There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence o f a security budget and areas o f spending on AIS 
security.
Hi 6. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the awareness level o f the British Standard for Information 
Security Management BS 7799 and the certification under ISO 27001.
Hi. 7: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the techniques used to evaluate AIS security effectiveness, the 
success indicators o f AIS security management, and the effectiveness level of AIS 
security management.
H2 There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the sources and types of AIS security threats.
Hr There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the types o f controls implemented to prevent or reduce security 
threats.
Hr. There is no significant relationship between the different types o f security 
controls and the reduction o f AIS security threats facing UK companies.
H5\ There is no significant relationship between AIS security effectiveness and the 
AIS security threat level in UK companies.
3.3 Research paradigm
A paradigm is a set o f beliefs or assumptions about the social world that guide a 
researcher’s inquiry (Creswell 1998; Punch 1998). It includes basic assumptions, 
important questions to be answered and research techniques to be used (Neuman 
2000). It is a set o f propositions that explain how the world is perceived, thus it may 
be best defined as a “world-view” (Sarantakos 2005).
In brief, the term “paradigm” refers to “the progress of scientific practice based on 
people’s philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature o f knowledge;
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in this context, about how research should be conducted” (Hussey and Hussey 1997, 
P-47).
There are competing approaches to social research based on different philosophical 
assumptions about the purpose of science and the nature o f social reality (Neuman
2000). Every researcher brings to his research a “set of interlocking philosophical 
assumptions and stances” (Greene and Caracelli 1997, p.6). Every paradigm includes 
three basic assumptions: the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions (Creswell 2003; Healy and Perry 2000; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Rocco 
et al. 2003; Sarantakos 2005).
The ontological assumption is concerned with the reality that the researcher 
investigates i.e. what is the nature of reality? Is it objective and external to the 
researcher, or is it constructed or subjective?
The epistemological assumption is concerned with the relationship between the 
researcher and what is being researched i.e. what kind o f knowledge is the 
researcher looking for and what is the way in which reality is known to the 
researcher?
- The methodological assumption is concerned with the nature of the research 
design and methods. It is concerned with the techniques used by the researcher to 
investigate the reality i.e. how does the researcher gain knowledge about the 
world, and how is the research constructed and conducted?
Wass and Wells (1994) indicated that the choice of research methodology should not 
be treated in isolation. Ontology, epistemology, methodology, the research 
techniques, and even the way in which the research will be presented, should be 
consistent both with each other and with the particular questions posed by the 
research. Simply, ontology informs methodology as to the nature o f reality or as to 
what social research is supposed to study. Epistemology informs methodology about 
the nature o f knowledge and where knowledge is to be sought. Methodology 
following these instructions prepares packages of appropriate research designs to be 
employed by researchers, instructing them as to where to focus their research activity 
* and how to recognise and extract knowledge (Sarantakos 2005).
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The ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of social research 
are “packaged” in paradigms, which guide everyday research. There are two main 
research paradigms which represent the two extremes o f a continuum and which have 
been subject to a long-standing debate among researchers. These paradigms are the 
positivistic and the phenomenological paradigms (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991; Hussey 
and Hussey 1997).
3.3.1 Positivistic paradigm
The positivistic paradigm is dominant in accounting research in general and in AIS 
research in particular. Ontologically, positivist researchers assume that reality is 
external and objective (Easterby-Smith et a l 1991). They assume that an 
apprehensible reality exists which is driven by immutable natural laws and 
mechanisms (Guba and Lincoln 1994). In addition, the real world exists 
independently o f subjective consciousness (Wass and Wells 1994, p.9). Turning from 
ontology to epistemology, positivist researchers view reality through a “one way 
mirror” where the researcher is removed from the object or phenomenon under study 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994). That is, reality is “out there” to be discovered objectively 
and value-free. Thus, researchers are independent from what is being researched 
(Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.48) that is researchers are detached from the phenomena 
of interest. A positivistic paradigm is characterised by quantitative scientific 
methodologies where testable hypotheses relating to relationships between variables 
are constructed.
Consequently, research based upon positivism tends towards the use o f questionnaires 
for data collection and statistical analysis (Stiles 2003). Positivism is often taken to be 
identical to quantitative methodology because it contains the ontological and 
epistemological prescriptions that show how this methodology should conduct 
research (Sarantakos 2005).
There are some strengths and weaknesses in conducting research under a positivistic 
paradigm. The methods used can provide wide coverage o f a range o f situations, they 
can be fast and economical, and when statistics are aggregated from large samples,
* they may be o f considerable relevance to policy decisions. However, they tend to be 
rather inflexible and artificial. They are not very effective in understanding the
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significance that people attach to actions and they are not very helpful in generating 
theories (Easterby-Smith et a l  1991). However, despite that paradigms are in many 
cases not explicitly addressed in the research, much AIS research reflects a 
positivistic orientation as will be discussed later in this chapter.
3.3.2 Phenomenological paradigm
The phenomenological paradigm developed as a result o f criticisms o f the positivistic 
paradigm (Hussey and Hussey 1997). Ontologically, reality is not external and 
objective but it is socially constructed, subjective and given meaning by people 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 1991; Saunders et a l 2007). Researchers interact with what is 
being researched rather than being detached from the phenomena under investigation. 
Researchers are part o f what is being observed and they bring their own interests and 
values to the research, and their values can affect the interpretation o f findings. 
Researchers try to understand what is happening, they look at the totality o f each 
situation and they develop ideas through induction from data.
Consequently, advocates o f this approach tend to draw upon methods that develop 
meaning from the point o f view of participants. They provide a way o f gathering data 
that are seen as natural rather than artificial. They depend on small samples to be 
investigated in depth or over time and generally favour a qualitative approach to data 
collection and interpretation (Easterby-Smith et a l 1991; Hussey and Hussey 1997).
The phenomenological paradigm has strengths in its ability to look at changes over 
time, to understand people’s meanings, to adjust to new issues and ideas as they 
emerge and to contribute to the evolution of new theories. However, data collection 
can take up a great deal o f time and resources, and their analysis and interpretation 
may be very difficult (Easterby-Smith et a l 1991).
The ontological and the epistemological assumptions of each paradigm influence the 
methodology and guide the choice of research designs and instruments. Before 
selecting the methodology o f the research, it is important to pay attention to the 
features of the two main paradigms mentioned above, in order to ensure that there are 
no contradictions or deficiencies in the research methodology. Table 3.1 summarises 
the main features o f the two paradigms.
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Table 3.1 Features o f the two main paradigms
Positivistic paradigm Phenomenological paradigm
Tends to produce quantitative data 
Uses large samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing 
Data are highly specific and precise 
The location is artificial 
Reliability is high 
Validity is low
Generalises from sample to population
Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses small samples 
Concerned with generating theories 
Data are rich and subjective 
The location is natural 
Reliability is low 
Validity is high
Generalises from one setting to another
(Source: Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.54)
3.3.3 Triangulation
In conducting the research, the researcher’s decision to adopt any o f the research 
paradigms will have a strong influence on the choice of research methodology and 
subsequently on the choice o f research methods.
Methodology refers to “the overall approach to the research process, from the 
theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis o f the data” ( Hussey and 
Hussey 1997, p.54). According to Sarantakos (2005), a methodology is a research 
strategy that translates the ontological and epistemological principles into guidelines 
that show how the research is to be conducted. The term “methodology” has a more 
philosophical meaning, and usually refers to the approach or paradigm that underpins 
the research (Blaxter et al. 2001, p.59). On the other hand, the term “methods” refers 
to techniques and procedures used to obtain and analyse research data (Saunders et a l 
2007, p.3).
Sarantakos (2005) indicated that methodologies are closer to research practice than 
paradigms. Researchers refer to methodologies rather than paradigms when 
describing their work. It is more common, therefore, for researchers to report 
conducting “quantitative” than “positivistic” research and/or “qualitative” than 
“phenomenological” research, where reference to the ontological and epistemological 
nature of the research is the exception rather than the rule. In social science research, 
there are two main approaches for research: quantitative and qualitative approaches.
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Quantitative research: In broad terms, quantitative research arises from the 
positivistic paradigm. Quantitative research entails the use o f scientific methods and 
the systematic measurement o f phenomena. It rests on measurement and therefore 
pre-structured data, research questions, conceptual frameworks and designs as well. 
Quantitative research is concerned with the collection and analysis o f numerical data 
and relies on hypotheses derived deductively from theory, conceptualising reality in 
terms o f the variables and relationships between them. Quantitative research tends to 
emphasise relatively large-scale and representative sets o f data, that is samples are 
larger than in qualitative research, and generalisation through sampling is usually 
important. Quantitative research has well developed and codified methods for data 
analysis. Its methods in general are more unidimensional and less variable than 
qualitative methods, and it is therefore more easily replicable. Surveys and 
experiments are probably the most common data collection methods in quantitative 
research (Blaxter et al. 2001; Bryman 1988; Bryman and Bell 2003; Hussey and 
Hussey 1997; Punch 1998).
Bums (2000) indicated that the main strengths of the quantitative approach lie in 
precision and control. Control is achieved through sampling and design, while 
precision is obtained through quantitative and reliable measurement. Standardised 
measures of variables allow the researcher to state with precision the strength and 
direction of relationships between variables (Creswell et al. 2003).
Quantitative data enable standardised, objective comparisons to be made and the 
measurements o f quantitative research permit overall description o f situations or 
phenomena in a systematic way. In addition, procedures for quantitative data analysis, 
being well developed and codified, bring “objectivity” to the research.
However, De Vaus (2002) indicated that quantitative research is sometimes portrayed 
as being sterile and unimaginative. It fails to take account o f people’s ability to 
interpret their experiences and construct their own meanings. It sometimes produces 
trivial findings o f little consequence due to the restriction on and the controlling of 
variables (Bums 2000). Hypotheses that are formed before the research commences 
‘ bias the course of the study and restrict research options. In quantitative research, 
methods are given a central position, to the extent that they dictate the parameters of
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the research. As a result, the research is limited only to what can be approached 
through existing methods. Quantitative research neutralises the researchers and their 
influence on the researched to the extent that they become disembodied abstractions, 
alienated from the world they are supposed to study (Sarantakos 2005).
Qualitative research: Qualitative research arises from the phenomenological 
paradigm. A qualitative approach focuses on the meaning, rather than the 
measurement o f social phenomenon (Hussey and Hussey 1997). It is concerned with 
collecting and analysing information in as many forms as possible (Blaxter et a l
2001). It develops theories inductively. Qualitative research stresses the principle of 
openness and enters the field with few preconceived ideas or pre-structured models or 
patterns. There are no strict designs, no hypotheses, and no limits in its focus, scope 
or operation. Design, methods, and processes are open to change. It aims for in-depth 
and holistic understanding. Samples are usually small and its sampling is guided by 
theoretical rather than probabilistic considerations. Its methods are less formalised 
than those methods in the quantitative approach (Punch 1998; Sarantakos 2005). 
According to Bryman (1988), participant observation and unstructured interviews are 
the methods most closely associated with qualitative research.
According to Bryman and Bell (2003) and Punch (1998), the qualitative approach has 
its own strengths. Qualitative methods are flexible. They can be used in a wider range 
of situations and for a wider range of purposes. Qualitative methods can be more 
easily modified as a study progresses. Qualitative data have a holism and richness and 
are well able to deal with the complexity of social phenomena. In addition, qualitative 
methods enable problems to be investigated in their natural settings.
However, qualitative research is subjective and the research structure and procedures 
do not ensure the validity and reliability o f methods. Qualitative research is unable to 
measure relationships between variables with the degree o f accuracy that is required 
to establish social trends. Qualitative research tends to be based on small samples, and 
therefore, does not produce representative results. Consequently, research findings 
cannot be generalised. In addition, the nature of qualitative research that allows close 
* contact with respondents can lead to some ethical problems. Further, one o f the major
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limitations o f qualitative research is the time required for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (Bryman and Bell 2003; Bums 2000; Sarantakos 2005).
Triangulation
Based on the above discussion, it appears that the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches have important differences. Punch (1998) indicated that the main 
differences between the two approaches lie in the nature of their data and in the 
methods used for collecting and analysing these data. However, neither approach is 
always superior to the other. According to Sieber (1973), both approaches have 
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, researchers should utilise the 
strengths o f both techniques in order to understand better social phenomena.
It is not unusual in business research to take a mixture of approaches, particularly in 
the methods o f collecting and analysing data. This allows the researcher to take a 
broader and often complementary view of the research problem or issue (Hussey and 
Hussey 1997). At a general level, the reasons for combining the quantitative and 
qualitative methods are to capitalise on the strengths of the two approaches and to 
compensate for the weaknesses o f each approach (Punch 1998). Combining 
methodologies can generate complementary data about the phenomenon under 
investigation (Wass and Wells 1994). In addition, quantitative and qualitative 
researches are combined in order to provide a general picture (Blaxter et al. 2001; 
Bryman 1988). The current study relies on both a quantitative method (postal 
questionnaire) and a qualitative method (semi-structured interviews). Thus, it adopts 
both positivistic and phenomenological paradigms.
The use o f different research approaches, methods and techniques in the same study is 
referred to as “triangulation” (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.74). Denzin (1970, p.291) 
defines triangulation as the combination o f methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon. He treats triangulation as an approach in which multiple observers, 
theoretical perspectives, sources o f data, and methodologies are combined.
There are common types o f triangulation according to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991),
* Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Ryan et al. (1992):
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Data triangulation: where data are collected at different times or from different 
sources;
Investigator triangulation: where different researchers independently collect data 
on the same phenomenon and compare results;
Methodological triangulation: where both quantitative and qualitative methods of 
data collection are used; and
Theoretical triangulation: where a theory is taken from one discipline and is used 
to explain a phenomenon in another discipline.
Sarantakos (2005) mentioned another type of triangulation, sampling triangulation, 
where two or more samples are employed within the same study. Triangulation is 
employed for many reasons. Different research methods may reveal different aspects 
of a phenomenon (Wass and Wells 1994, p. 19). This helps to gain a more complete 
understanding and a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon (Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech 2005) and often a complementary view of the research problem (Hussey and 
Hussey 1997). Triangulation raises the researcher above the personal biases that stem 
from single methodologies (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992) that is biases 
inherent in any single method could neutralise the biases o f other methods (Creswell 
2003). Because all data collection methods have limitations, triangulation can cancel 
out some o f the disadvantages o f certain methods (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003).
Through triangulation, the findings from one method can be checked against the 
findings derived from another method (Blaxter et al. 2001). In addition, consistent 
findings among different data collection methods increase the credibility of research 
findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). Triangulation improves the 
trustworthiness o f research, strengthens understanding, increases confidence and 
provides richer findings and more accurate information (Holland and Campbell 2005; 
Rocco et al. 2003). Triangulation can increase the validity and reliability of research 
(Smith 2003). Through triangulation, the researcher can overcome the deficiencies of 
single-method studies. Thus, it seems that there is wide agreement among researchers 
that mixing different types o f methods can strengthen a study.
The researcher, therefore, decided to employ both data and methodological 
triangulation in the current study, where data were collected at different times and
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where both a quantitative data collection method (postal questionnaire) and a 
qualitative data collection method (semi-structured interviews) were used.
The use of interviews to triangulate data collected by questionnaire has been 
increasingly advocated by many authors and researchers. Saunders et al. (2007, 
p. 147) indicated that semi-structured interviews might be a valuable way of 
triangulating data collected by other means such as questionnaire. Smith (2003) 
argued that semi-structured interviews could be used in conjunction with a 
questionnaire to derive the benefits o f quantitative and qualitative methods. Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) mentioned that the researcher could use two or more 
methods of data collection in order to minimise the degree o f specificity in bodies of 
knowledge for instance a questionnaire could be supplemented with interviews.
Hussey and Hussey (1997) considered that it is perfectly possible and even 
advantageous to use both qualitative and quantitative methods for collecting data for 
example a questionnaire survey providing quantitative data could be accompanied by 
a few in-depth interviews to provide qualitative insights and illuminations. Blaxter et 
al. (2001) indicated that the researcher might follow up a survey with some 
interviews in order to get a more detailed perspective on some of the issues raised.
In addition, Creswell (2003) argued that collecting diverse types o f data best provides 
an understanding o f a research problem, so that the study begins with a broad survey 
in order to generalise results to a population and then focuses, in a second phase, on 
detailed qualitative, open-ended interviews to collect detailed views from participants. 
Johnson and Turner (2003) also indicated that the combination o f questionnaires and 
interviews in a study leads to a more complete and interesting depiction of the 
differences across the samples, while the use of in-depth interviews helps researchers 
to understand the quantitative findings.
In addition, the literature review reveals that questionnaires and interviews are the 
most commonly used methods in accounting in general and in AIS security in 
particular, which are discussed in later sections in this chapter.
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3.4 Research Design
A research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for 
collecting and analysing the information needed (Zikmund 2000). It is the basic plan 
for a piece o f research. The design sits between the research questions and the data, 
showing how the research questions will be connected to the data, and what tools and 
procedures should be used in answering them. Therefore, the design needs to follow 
on from the questions and fit in with the data that will be collected (Punch 1998).
A research design should be effective in producing the required information within 
the constraints put on the researcher for example time, budgetary, and skills 
constraints (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). It helps to introduce a systematic approach 
to the research operation, thereby ensuring that all aspects of the study will be 
addressed and that they will be executed in the right sequence. Thus, it offers order 
and clarity that make replication easier and enable accurate assessment o f its validity 
and reliability (Sarantakos 2005).
There are many choices to make when developing a research design. The first choice 
is about which should come first: the theory (deduction) or the data (induction). In 
other words, this is whether the research should use the deductive approach, in which 
the researcher develops a theory and hypothesis (or hypotheses) and designs a 
research strategy to test the hypothesis, or the inductive approach, in which the 
researcher collects data and develops a theory as a result of the data analysis 
(Saunders et al. 2007).
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 13) defined deductive research as “a study in which a 
conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical 
observation, thus particular instances are deduced from general inferences”. 
Deduction is the process o f establishing logical conclusions by proceeding from 
general and abstract to specific and concrete phenomena (Sarantakos 2005).
On the other hand, inductive research is “a study in which theory is developed from 
the observation o f empirical reality, thus general inferences are induced from 
particular instances” (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 13). In other words, induction is a 
process where the researcher observes certain phenomena and on this basis arrives at
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conclusions. Thus, induction is the process of drawing conclusions by proceeding 
from the specific and concrete to the general and abstract (Sarantakos 2005). Thus, it 
seems that deduction is based on logic, while induction is based on empirical 
evidence. Table 3.2 summarises the main differences between deductive and 
inductive approaches to research.
Table 3.2 The main differences between deductive and inductive approaches
Deductive approach Inductive approach
Based on scientific principles
Moving from theory to data
The need to explain casual relationships
between variables
The collection o f quantitative data
A highly structured approach
Researcher independence o f what is being 
researched
The necessity to select samples o f  sufficient 
size in order to generalise conclusions
Based on giving an understanding o f the 
meanings humans attach to events 
Theory follows data
A close understanding of the research context
The collection o f qualitative data
A more flexible structure to permit changes
as the research progresses
The researcher is part o f the research process
Less concern with the need to generalise
(Based on Saunders et al. 2007, p. 120)
Based on the above discussion and according to the hypotheses developed in Section
3.2.4 above, the current study lends itself more to the deductive approach. The main 
advantage o f the hypothesis-testing or the deductive approach is that there is initial 
clarity about what is to be investigated, and hence, data can be collected speedily and 
efficiently (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). In addition, deduction can be a lower-risk 
strategy, although there are some risks such as the non-return of questionnaires. 
However, deduction tends to construct a rigid methodology that does not permit an 
alternative explanation o f what is going on (Saunders et al. 2007).
However, most research involves both approaches at the same time. De Vaus (2002) 
argued that in practice there is a constant interplay between constructing theories 
(induction) and testing them (deduction). In addition, the practice o f research does not 
by any means always fit neatly into these systematic approaches. Saunders et al.
* (2007) stated that not only it is perfectly possible to combine deduction and induction
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within the same piece o f research, but also it is often advantageous to do so. Thus, it 
seems that the two approaches rarely occur in isolation.
The second choice o f the research design is concerned with the purpose of research. 
The classification o f research purpose most often used in the research methods 
literature is the threefold one o f “exploratory”, “descriptive” and “explanatory”. This 
classification is based on what the researcher is trying to accomplish - explore a new 
topic, describe a social phenomenon, or explain why something occurs (Neuman 
2000). In addition, the design becomes more rigorous as we proceed from the 
exploratory stage, where we attempt to explore new areas of research, to the 
descriptive stage, where we try to describe certain characteristics o f the phenomena of 
interest, to the explanatory stage, where we examine whether or not the relationships 
have been substantiated and answers to the research questions have been obtained 
(Sekaran 2003).
Exploratory study: An exploratory study is undertaken when there are very few or 
no earlier studies to which the researcher can refer for information about the issue or 
problem at hand. An exploratory study is needed to gain a better understanding o f the 
dimensions o f an issue or problem, to find out what is happening, to seek new 
insights, to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light. The aim of this 
type o f study is to look for patterns, ideas or hypotheses, rather than testing or 
confirming a hypothesis. It addresses the “what” questions. However, it is difficult to 
conduct because there are few guidelines to follow. The steps are not well defined and 
the direction o f inquiry changes frequently (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Neuman 2000; 
Robson 1993; Zikmund 2000).
Descriptive study: A descriptive study is undertaken when the problem is structured 
and well understood. The researcher begins with a well-defined subject and conducts 
research to describe it accurately. The aim of this type o f study is to portray an 
accurate profile o f persons, events or situations. Thus, the researcher observes and 
then describes what was observed. It seeks to determine the answers to who, what, 
when, where, and how questions. It may be an extension o f a piece o f exploratory 
* research or the first step towards explanation. It does not explain the cause of 
findings. The data collected are often quantitative and statistical techniques are
- 114-
usually used to summarise the information (Babbie 1998; Hussey and Hussey 1997; 
Neuman 2000; Punch 1998; Robson 1993; Saunders et al. 2007; Zikmund 2000).
Explanatory study: An explanatory study is a continuation of a descriptive study. 
The researcher goes beyond merely describing the characteristics, to analysing and 
explaining why or how it is happening. In this study, the problem is well structured; 
however, in contrast to descriptive research the researcher is confronted with cause 
and effect problems. Thus, an explanatory study seeks an explanation o f a situation or 
a problem usually in the form o f causal relationships between variables (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug 2002; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Robson 1993).
Based on the research objectives and questions mentioned in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
above, the current study seems to fit closely with the description o f both descriptive 
and explanatory studies. The main objectives of the current study are to investigate 
the different types o f AIS security threats facing UK companies and the controls 
implemented to prevent or reduce these threats, and to examine the impact of these 
security controls and the security effectiveness level achieved on the reduction of AIS 
security threats. Thus, the current study lends itself to the category o f descriptive 
research. In addition, it can be considered as explanatory research based on the 
hypotheses developed in Section 3.2.4.
The third choice o f the research design is whether to attempt to sample across a large 
number of companies or situations or whether to focus on a small number of 
situations and attempt to investigate them over a period o f time. This is a choice 
between cross-sectional and longitudinal designs (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991).
Cross-sectional design: This entails the collection of data on more than one case and 
at a single point in time. Normally, different companies or groups o f people are 
selected and a study is conducted to ascertain how factors differ. In addition, a cross- 
sectional study employs samples from different sectors and compares them by using a 
set of criteria related to the theme of the study. In the context o f descriptive studies, 
the purpose o f cross-sectional studies is to establish differences between sections. It 
* can also produce data that will permit the establishment o f causal relationships. 
Cross-sectional study is conducted when there are constraints of time and resources.
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The data are collected just once over a short period of time before they are analysed 
and reported. A cross-sectional study has the ability to describe economically the 
features of large numbers o f people and companies.
However, some problems are associated with this design. The first is how to select a 
large enough sample to be representative of the total population. In addition, this 
design does not explain why a correlation exists; only that it does or does not exist 
(Bryman and Bell 2003; Easterby-Smith et al. 1991; Hussey and Hussey 1997; 
Sarantakos 2005).
Longitudinal design: This is a study, over time, of a variable or group o f subjects. 
Researchers using the longitudinal design examine features o f people or companies at 
more than one time that is respondents are questioned at different moments in time. 
The purpose o f the longitudinal surveys is to examine continuity o f response and to 
observe changes that occur over time. A longitudinal design can produce significant 
results from a very small number o f cases and this can reduce the problems of gaining 
access if the research is to be carried out in companies. However, it is extremely time- 
consuming and expensive to conduct. The complexity of data requires very high skills 
from the researcher. In addition, once started, the study must be continued and there is 
the problem o f losing subjects during the course of the study (Babbie 1998; Easterby- 
Smith et a l 1991; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Zikmund 2000). According to Bryman 
and Bell (2003), this design is o f relatively little use in business and management 
research, partly because o f the time and cost involved.
Based on the above discussion and due to the descriptive and explanatory nature of 
the current study, a cross-sectional design is well suited for achieving its objectives. 
The current study aims to investigate the differences among industry sectors in the 
UK regarding the types o f AIS security threats facing companies, security controls 
implemented to prevent or reduce these threats and the management framework for 
AIS security within these companies. In addition, the cross-sectional design is well 
suited when there are constraints o f time and resources. Moreover, Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (2002) argued that cross-sectional studies are the predominant form of 
* research in IS.
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3.5 Data collection methods available
Methods refer to a systematic, focused, and orderly collection o f data for obtaining 
information from them in order to solve the research problems or to answer the 
research questions (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002, p.85). Zikmund (2000) argued that 
once the research design has been formalised, the next step is the process o f gathering 
information from respondents. There are many data collection methods in social 
research. However, De Vaus (2002) indicated that it is difficult to decide which 
method is the best. The decision depends on the purpose of the study, sample size and 
distribution, time and money available, and the environment and conditions under 
which the study is conducted. The choice of the data collection method depends on 
the degree o f accuracy required and expertise of the researcher as well (Sekaran 
2003).
Blaxter et al. (2001) added other issues that must be considered in reaching the right 
decision including the literature and familiarity with the subject under study. 
Moreover, many authors and researchers agreed that the choice of a data collection 
method is also driven by the research questions (Blaxter et a l  2001; Ghauri and 
Gronhaug 2002; Punch 1998).
Three methods are recommended in the literature of IS in general and AIS security in 
particular, namely questionnaire survey, interviews and case studies. The 
characteristics, advantages and limitations of these methods are considered in the 
following section.
3.5.1 Questionnaire survey
The questionnaire survey is the most commonly used method o f data collection in the 
social sciences in general and accounting research in particular. It is the most popular 
method used in previous research on IS security (Abu-Musa 2004a and b; Chang and 
Ho 2006; Davis 1997; Henry 1997; Hitchings 1995; Hong et al. 2006; Huang et al. 
2006; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Kotulic and Clark 2004; Loch et al. 1992; Ryan and 
Bordoloi 1997; Whitman 2004; Yeh and Chang 2007).
' Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 161) stated that “a questionnaire is a list of carefully 
structured questions; chosen after considerable testing, with a view to eliciting
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reliable responses from a chosen sample”. Questionnaires are associated with both 
positivistic and phenomenological methodologies. Under a positivistic approach, 
closed questions should be used, whereas a phenomenological approach suggests 
open-ended questions.
There are a number o f different ways in which questionnaires can be administered. 
They can be either self-administered questionnaires or interviewer-administered 
questionnaires as shown in Figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2 Types of questionnaires 
Questionnaire
Self-Administered
Postal
Questionnaire
Delivery 
& Collection 
Questionnaire
i
Internet-
Mediated
Questionnaire
Interviewer-Administered
Telephone
Questionnaire
Structured
Interview
(Based on Saunders et al. 2007, p.357)
The self-administered questionnaires are completed by respondents. They can be sent 
by post to the intended respondents, who are then expected to complete and return 
them by post (postal or mail questionnaire). They can be delivered by hand to each 
respondent and collected later (delivery and collection questionnaire). They also can 
be administered electronically using the internet (internet-mediated questionnaire). 
On the other hand, responses to interviewer-administered questionnaires are recorded 
by the interviewer based on each respondent’s answer. They can be administered 
using telephone (telephone questionnaire) or face-to-face (structured interview) 
(Blaxter et al. 2001; Saunders' et a l  2007).
The choice between questionnaire methods depends on the nature of the survey, the 
sample, time and cost constraints, the importance of response rates and the types of 
‘questions (De Vaus 2002).
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Questionnaires, as with any other method, have both strengths and weaknesses, and 
hence advantages and limitations that the researcher must be aware of. Questionnaires 
are less expensive and less time-consuming than other methods, particularly when 
responses from a large, dispersed population are required (Bums 2000; Hussey and 
Hussey 1997; Sarantakos 2005). They can be completed at the respondents’ 
convenience. Thus, there is a better chance that respondents will take time to think 
about their answers, to check personal records and to consult other sources if 
necessary (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Neuman 2000; Zikmund 2000).
They offer less opportunity for interviewer bias because respondents are not 
influenced by interviewer characteristics or techniques (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1992; Oppenheim 1992). They offer greater assurance of anonymity of 
respondents, which is important, particularly when sensitive issues are involved 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Neuman 2000). Moreover, Bums (2000) 
argued that a questionnaire that can guarantee confidentiality might elicit more 
truthful responses than would be obtained from a personal interview. In addition, 
errors resulting from the recording of responses by interviewers are reduced. They are 
a stable, consistent, uniform measure and free from variation (Sarantakos 2005).
However, there are a number o f problems associated with the use of questionnaires. 
Questionnaires require simple, easily understood questions and instructions. They do 
not allow the opportunity to correct misunderstandings, to probe for additional 
information, or to offer explanations or help (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
1992; Oppenheim 1992). They do not provide opportunities for motivating the 
respondents to participate in the survey or to answer the questions (Sarantakos 2005). 
The researcher has no control over the conditions in which the questionnaire is 
completed. Researchers are not sure whether the right person has answered the 
questions and whether the order of the questions - where required - was followed 
(Neuman 2000; Wilson 1996). Incomplete questionnaires cannot be followed up 
(Bums 2000; Oppenheim 1992).
Moreover, researchers cannot visually observe the respondents’ reactions to 
* questions, physical characteristics or the setting (Neuman 2000). Respondents may be 
limited from providing free expression o f opinions particularly in the case of closed-
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ended questions (Bums 2000). Finally, and perhaps the most serious problem, is the 
low response rate, particularly with mail or postal questionnaires (Bums 2000; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Neuman 2000; Oppenheim 1992; 
Sarantakos 2003). Hussey and Hussey (1997) indicated that response rates of 10 
percent or less are common and this introduces the problem of sample biases because 
those who respond may have a particular interest in the topic and, therefore, may not 
at all represent the population from which they are drawn.
Despite the above disadvantages o f questionnaires, every effort was made to 
minimise these limitations by pre-testing them prior to distribution, which is 
presented in more detail in Section 3.6.1.2.
However, some effective techniques can be employed for improving the response 
rate. An attractive questionnaire design and question wording both help to assure a 
good response rate (Zikmund 2000). The cover letter must succeed in convincing the 
respondents to complete the questionnaire and mail it back. It should therefore 
identify the sponsor o f the study, explain its purpose, the method of sampling used 
and how the respondents are chosen, and should tell the respondents the importance 
of completing the questionnaire (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; 
Oppenheim 1992). Questionnaires could be accompanied by a self-addressed, 
freepost return envelop (Neuman 2000; Sarantakos 2005). In addition, the 
respondents’ motivation for returning a questionnaire may be increased - in certain 
cases - by offering monetary incentives or by offering them the chance to win a 
major prize if  the questionnaire is returned (Oppenheim 1992; Zikmund 2000). 
Follow-up reminder letters could be sent to those who have not returned the 
questionnaire (Neuman 2000; Zikmund 2000). Finally, and most importantly, is the 
length of the questionnaire. Hussey and Hussey (1997) argued that response rates 
could be increased by keeping the questionnaire as short as possible.
3.5.2 Interviews
Interviewing is one o f the most common methods of data collection in social research. 
Interviews have become increasingly utilised in recent years in IS research in general 
“and AIS security in particular, either as the sole data collection method (Keller et al.
2005) or combined with other methods (Mitchell et al. 1999; Straub and Welke 1998;
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Tryfonas et al. 2001). An interview is a conversation or purposeful discussion 
between two or more people (Robson 1993, p.228). It is a method o f collecting data 
in which selected participants are asked questions in order to find out what they do, 
think or feel (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p. 156).
Figure 3.3 Types o f interviews 
Interviews
Standardised
Interviewer-Administered
1
Face-To-
Face
Interviews
(Based on Saunders et al. 2007, p .313)
One-To-One
Non-Standardised
One-To-Many
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Telephone Internet Group 
Interviews Mediated Interviews 
Interviews (focus 
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1
Internet
Mediated
Interviews
(focus
groups)
Interviewing is employed as a data collection method in most research designs 
regardless of the underlying methodology (Sarantakos 2005). Interviews are 
associated with both positivistic and phenomenological methodologies. Under a 
positivistic approach they are highly formalised and structured, whereas a 
phenomenological approach suggests informal and unstructured conversations. In 
between, there are intermediate positions (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Saunders et al. 
2007). Interviews could be conducted either face-to-face or by telephone or online, 
and these forms o f interview are summarised in Figure 3.3.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of interviews used in social research: 
structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews.
Structured interviews: These are the least flexible type o f interviews. Structured 
interviews employ a structured questionnaire, which is verbally presented to
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respondents, with the answers recorded in the questionnaire by the interviewer 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Sarantakos 2005). Every respondent is 
asked the same questions with the same wording and in the same order (Wilson 
1996). There is very little flexibility in the way questions are asked or answered in the 
structured interview setting (Fontana and Frey 2000). The interviewer is expected to 
act in a neutral manner, keeping the same tone of voice across the interviews, offering 
a consistent impression to the respondents, using the same style, appearance, prompts, 
probes, etc. (Sarantakos 2005). Thus, the highest degree of objectivity and uniformity 
in procedures can be achieved and the opportunities for interviewer bias can be 
restricted (Smith 2003). All or nearly all of the questions are closed-ended and the 
respondents are forced to select their answers from a limited set of previously 
established responses (Bums 2000). The use of closed-ended questions makes coding 
of answers easier and has advantages for the subsequent analysis. Closed-ended 
questions also eliminate the opportunities for error associated with open-ended 
questions. Flowever, they sacrifice the comparative advantage of the interview 
method by failing to include the flexibility and richness of responses offered by open- 
ended questions (Smith 2003). In addition, this detachment and impersonal approach 
can prevent trust and rapport building up between the interviewer and respondents 
(Bums 2000). This form of interview can be employed in quantitative research.
Semi-structured interviews: In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer has a list 
of questions on specific topics to be covered, often referred to as an interview guide, 
but he has greater freedom in the sequencing of questions, in the exact wording and in 
the amount o f time and attention given to different topics (Bryman and Bell 2003; 
Robson 1993). Some questions can be omitted in particular interviews and additional 
questions can be asked, as the interviewer sees fit, to examine associated issues that 
arise in the interview (Saunders et al. 2007; Smith 2003). This form of interview 
allows respondents to answer more on their own terms than the standardised 
interview permits. The interviewer can seek both clarification and elaboration on the 
answers given, can have more latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus can enter 
into a dialogue with the interviewee (May 1997). This permits greater flexibility than 
the structured interview; however, the comparability of the information between 
respondents is difficult to assess and response-coding difficulties may arise (Bums
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2000). This form of interview can be employed in quantitative or qualitative research 
(Sarantakos 2005).
Unstructured interviews: These are the most flexible type o f interviews. They take 
the form of a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee (Bums 2000). 
The interviewer does not enter the interview setting with a planned sequence of 
questions to be asked, but with a series of topics for discussion (Sekaran 2003; Smith 
2003). The interviewee is then allowed to talk freely about events, behaviour and 
beliefs in relation to the topic area, so that this type of interaction is sometimes called 
non-directive (Saunders et al. 2007). The interviewer has a great deal o f freedom to 
probe various areas and to raise specific queries during the interview (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). The actual words and phrases used may therefore 
vary significantly between interviews (Smith 2003). This type o f interview is a 
powerful research tool and can provide a greater breadth of data than other methods 
(Fontana and Frey 2000; Punch 1998). However, it demands a sensitive, skilled and 
cautious interviewer in order to understand the other person’s views and, at times, to 
assist individuals to explore their own beliefs (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). The 
unstmctured interviews can take a long time, they can be difficult to interpret and 
analyse and the coding is a difficult task in spite of improved coding techniques and 
systems (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). This form of interview is mostly used in 
qualitative research.
Based on the above, it appears that these three types o f interviews have different 
strengths and weaknesses and different purposes in research. The type o f interview 
selected should be aligned with the strategy, purposes, and research questions. 
Accordingly, given the research objectives, as well as the resources and time 
constraints, semi-structured interviews were adopted in the present study and full 
details of the interview findings are presented in Chapter 5.
However, the researcher must be aware of the strengths and limitations of the 
interviews - despite their type - as a data collection method, in order to benefit from 
the strengths, minimise the limitations and maintain the quality o f research.
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Interviews allow greater flexibility in the questioning process and can be adjusted to 
meet many diverse situations (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). They result 
in a high response rate that makes the data more representative than data solicited 
through a postal questionnaire (Bums 2000). They give the interviewer the 
opportunity to observe non-verbal cues that help in understanding the verbal 
response, that can change or even, in extreme cases, reverse its meaning (Robson 
1993). The identity o f the interviewee is known, and the interviewer has an 
opportunity to control the conditions under which the questions are answered 
(Sarantakos 2005). In addition, greater length is possible in interviewing than when 
other methods are used.
On the other hand, interviews are more expensive and time-consuming than other 
methods such as questionnaires (Zikmund 2000). They offer less anonymity since the 
interviewer knows the identity o f the respondent (Sarantakos 2005). They are less 
convenient than other methods. The flexibility of interviews leaves room for the 
interviewer’s personal influence and bias (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992), 
and may generate difficulties in categorising and evaluating responses (Bums 2000).
3.5.3 Case studies
Case studies have become quite common in accounting research, especially in 
management accounting (Ryan et a l 1992). In IS research, case studies are gaining 
acceptance as an appropriate research method and increasing numbers are appearing 
in the research literature (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Gercek and Saleem 2005; 
Kotulic and Clark 2004; Onions 2006; Shih and Wen 2005; Spurling 1995; Willison
2006).
Robson (1993, p. 146) defines a case study as “a strategy for doing research which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. The basic idea is that one 
case (or perhaps a small number o f cases) will be studied in detail using whatever 
methods seem appropriate (Punch 1998). A case can be a single company, a single 
location, a person, or a single event. However, in business research, the most common 
*use of the term associates the case study with a location, such as a workplace or
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company, and the emphasis tends to be upon an intensive examination o f the setting 
(Bryman and Bell 2003).
The case study aims to understand the case in depth and in its natural setting, 
recognising its complexity and its context (Punch 1998). It involves gathering 
detailed information about the case, often over a very long period of time (Hussey and 
Hussey 1997). A case study often involves data collection through multiple sources 
such as observation (both participant and non-participant), interviews (unstructured 
and structured), and the use of documents and records (Bums 2000; Robson 1993; 
Smith 2003).
In business studies, case study research is particularly useful when the phenomenon 
under investigation is difficult to study outside its natural setting and when the 
concepts and variables under study are difficult to quantify (Ghauri and Gronhaug
2002). Case studies are intensive, generate rich subjective data, and they may bring to 
light variables, phenomena, processes and relationships that deserve more 
investigation (Bums 2000). They produce first-hand information, and employ 
methods that encourage familiarity and close contact with the informants (Sarantakos 
2005). In addition, the in-depth case studies can provide an understanding o f the 
important aspects of a new research area (Punch 1998).
However, case studies provide very little evidence for scientific generalisation (Bums 
2000). Ryan et al. (1992) indicated that authors o f accounting case studies frequently 
apologise for the fact that the size of their sample creates difficulties in generalising 
their findings. Findings entail personal impressions and biases, hence there can be no 
assurance of objectivity, validity and reliability, and the research cannot be replicated 
(Sarantakos 2005). Moreover, the process of the research can be very time-consuming 
and can result in an information overload that is sometimes difficult to analyse and to 
interpret (Blaxter et al. 2001; Bryman 1989).
Although this method has been used in previous studies of IS in general and AIS 
security in particular, it is not used in the current study due to the above 
‘disadvantages and because limited time and resources are available for the study.
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3.6 Data collection methods of the current research
The aim o f this section is to provide a detailed explanation o f the research methods 
used in the current study. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3.3, this study employed 
quantitative and qualitative approaches using a postal questionnaire and semi­
structured interviews. Miles and Huberman (1994) indicated that qualitative data 
could help quantitative analysis by confirming and illustrating quantitative findings.
The first stage involved a postal questionnaire. This method was chosen because of its 
specific relevance to the nature of this study as well as the advantages it offers 
compared to other research methods. Moreover, it is the most popular method used in 
previous research on IS security.
The second stage involved semi-structured interviews with IT managers o f large UK 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. As mentioned earlier, the use of 
qualitative interviews to triangulate data collected by questionnaire was increasingly 
advocated by many researchers. Thus, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
after completion o f the questionnaire in order to understand and confirm the results 
obtained from the questionnaire analysis, to achieve a high degree of validity and 
reliability (Smith 2003), to enrich the quality of information collected, and to fill in 
any gaps in the data that might occur in the questionnaire’s results. This section 
provides a detailed explanation o f both methods, the strengths and weaknesses of 
each, the procedures followed, and the statistical tests used.
3.6.1 Postal questionnaire
As stated above, the primary and first data collection method was the postal 
questionnaire. There are many advantages and disadvantages o f using a postal 
questionnaire. One o f its main strengths is its ability to collect data from a large 
number of companies located in a wide geographical area (Abu-Musa 2006a and b; 
Mitchell et al. 1999). It is relatively less expensive and less time-consuming 
compared with personal interviews and a telephone questionnaire (Zikmund 2000). 
The postal questionnaire provides greater anonymity to encourage respondents to give 
their true opinion rather than an acceptable answer when dealing with sensitive issues 
* (Bailey 1994; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). Respondents can complete it 
at their convenience (Bryman 2001; Sekaran 2003), they can take time to think about
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their responses and can consult personal documents or other people, if necessary 
(Zikmund 2000). Thus, the postal questionnaire was chosen as the primary and first 
data collection method for the following reasons:
The sample is relatively large;
The UK is a large country and the sample is distributed around the country;
The time and resources are relatively limited; and
The postal questionnaire enables a high degree o f anonymity and confidentiality 
that is necessary particularly when dealing with very sensitive and intrusive 
security issues.
Despite these advantages, the postal questionnaire is not without limitations (Section
3.5.1). The first and most important problem of using a postal questionnaire is the 
poor response rate as identified and experienced by many IS security researchers. 
Table 3.3 gives examples of the response rates achieved by some IS security 
researchers.
Table 3.3 Examples o f response rates achieved in some IS security research
Name of article Author(s) Journal & date of issue
Response
rate
Information systems security issues and 
decisions for small business: an 
empirical examination
AtuI Gupta and 
Rex Hammond
Information 
Management & 
Computer Security 
2005, 13:4
13.8%
Controlling corporate e-mail, PC use 
and computer security
Gayle Webb White 
and Sheila Pearson
Information 
Management & 
Computer Security 
2001,9:2/3
13.8%
An assessment o f accounting 
information security Charles Davis
The CPA Journal 
1997, 67:3 11.6%
Threats and countermeasures for 
information system security: a cross­
industry study
Quey-Jen Yeh and 
Arthur Jung-Ting 
Chang
Information & 
Management 
2007, 44:5
10.9%
Do information security policies reduce 
the incidence o f security breaches: an 
exploratory analysis
Neil Doherty and 
Heather Fulford
Information 
Resources 
Management Journal 
2005, 18:4
7.7%
The application o f information security 
policies in large UK-based , 
organisations: an exploratory analysis
Heather Fulford 
and Neil Doherty
Information 
Management & 
Computer Security 
2003, 11:2/3
7.3%
Information security policy’s impact on 
reporting security incidents Terry Wiant
Computers & Security 
2005, 24:6 5.6%
Why there aren’t more information 
security research studies
Andrew Kotulic 
and Jan Guynes 
Clark
Information & 
Management 
2004,41:5
0.6%
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However, the researcher considered the above limitations and the questionnaire was 
pilot-tested before sending it out to respondents (Section 3.6.1.2). In addition, every 
effort was made to maximise the expected response rate.
3.6.1.1 Questionnaire design and layout
According to Wass (1994), in order to generate the greatest number of high quality 
responses, researchers must pay careful attention to the design o f the questionnaire 
including its length, wording, sequence o f questions and layout.
The questionnaire o f the current study was designed after an extensive review of the 
existing literature on IS security in general and AIS security in particular. In addition, 
many security reports (GAO 1998; 2004), surveys (BERR 2008; DTI 2004 c; 2006; 
DTT 2006a and b; 2007; Ernst & Young 2005; 2006; Gordon et al. 2005; 2006; 
KPMG 1998; 2006; Richardson 2007), standards (ISO/IEC 17799 2005; ISO/IEC 
27001 2005), and guidelines (BSI 2000; CICA 1998; COBIT 2000; ISACA 2005; 
ISACF 2001; NIST 800-53 2005; OECD 2002) were examined.
Then, three main themes were identified, in addition to the background information, 
on which the main structure o f the questionnaire was based. These themes are:
The management framework o f the AIS security;
- AIS security threats; and 
AIS security controls.
These themes cover the major issues highlighted in the literature review on the AIS 
security (see Chapter 2). A list o f questions was developed under each theme and the 
questionnaire was organised into four sections covering these themes.
Section 1: The management framework of the AIS security
The questions in this section aimed at collecting the respondents’ opinions concerning 
the management framework of AIS security within their companies. The questions 
were grouped under seven sections including the AIS security policy; security 
training and awareness programs; risk assessment; incident handling, disaster 
* recovery and a business continuity plans; security budget; security standards and 
certification; and finally AIS security effectiveness.
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The questions in Section 1.1 addressed the AIS security policy and were set to 
investigate the existence o f a written AIS security policy within the company and the 
frequency of updating this security policy (if any).
The questions in Section 1.2 focused on the security training and awareness 
programs. Respondents were asked about the existence of a formal security training 
and awareness program for the managers, employees and other users and were asked 
to indicate their level o f agreement with a list o f statements concerning the security 
awareness practices within their companies, using a five-point Likert scale.
The questions in Section 1.3 aimed at evaluating the risk assessment practices within 
UK companies. Respondents were asked about the existence and frequency of 
undertaking the risk assessment within their companies, and were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with some statements regarding their companies’ risk 
assessment activities. Section 1.4 investigates the existence of incident handling 
procedures, disaster recovery and business continuity plans within UK companies, the 
frequency o f updating these plans, and the actions taken to reduce future security 
incidents.
Section 1.5 addressed the security budget. Respondents were asked about the 
existence o f a separate security budget within their companies. They were asked also 
to rank their companies top three areas of AIS security spending. Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) argued that after ranking the first three respondents might be unable to decide 
what their opinions are amongst the remainder and are likely to leave them blank.
Section 1.6 aimed to investigate the respondents’ awareness o f the British Standard 
BS 7799 (now ISO 27000) and its two parts ISO/IEC 17799 and ISO/IEC 27001, 
while Section 1.7 covered AIS security effectiveness. Respondents were asked to 
state the techniques used by their companies to evaluate AIS security effectiveness 
and to rank the top three critical success indicators o f AIS security management 
within their companies.
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Section 2: Security threats to the company’s AIS
The questions in this section aimed to investigate the most common types o f security 
threats facing the companies’ AIS and the sources of those threats. In the first 
question, respondents were given a list of common sources o f security threats and 
were asked to rank the top three, where one represents the most common source. The 
second question included 13 security threats identified from the literature review 
(Chapter 2) and respondents were asked to indicate the frequency o f occurrence of 
each type of threat in their company in the last year by ticking the appropriate box on 
a given scale.
Section 3: Security controls of the company’s AIS
This section was set to investigate the AIS security controls within UK companies 
that were implemented to reduce security threats. The respondents were given a list of 
security controls identified from the literature review (Chapter 2), that were grouped 
under the following sub-titles:
Administrative/organisational security controls 
Personnel security controls 
Software security controls 
Hardware/physical security controls
- Input/data security controls 
Output security controls
- Network security controls
Respondents were asked to indicate whether their companies are using each control, 
are planning to use it, or there were no plans to use it.
Section 4: General and background information
This section focused on the respondents’ and their companies’ background. 
Respondents were asked eight questions related to their job title, number of years of 
experience in their current job, their most recent educational qualification and their 
academic field of study. Respondents were asked also about the number of employees 
in their companies and their companies’ industry sector. The main objective of these 
‘questions was to obtain a profile o f those who participated in the study. They are also 
useful for the statistical analysis and comparisons.
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Toward the end o f the questionnaire, the respondents were provided with sufficient 
space to provide any further comments or suggestions that they thought might have 
relevance to the issues addressed in the questionnaire, and which the researcher had 
overlooked.
Finally, the respondents were asked to provide their contact details (title, name, 
address, telephone number and e-mail address), if  they were willing to be contacted, 
for arranging a follow-up face-to-face interview concerning their opinions on AIS 
security within their companies and if they wished to receive a copy o f the study 
results.
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), the major considerations 
involved in formulating the questions are as follows:
Content o f questions;
Structure (type) o f questions;
Format of questions (response categories); and 
Sequence o f questions.
Content of questions: The questions in the questionnaire can be classified into two 
general categories: questions about subjective experiences or opinions and factual 
questions. Questions about subjective experiences are designed to obtain the 
respondents’ beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, feelings and opinions (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Sekaran 2003). Most questions in Sections 1, 2, and 3 
are intended to obtain the respondents’ opinions regarding the AIS security practices 
within their companies. On the other hand, factual questions are designed to obtain 
objective information from respondents regarding their background including their 
age, gender and level o f education (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). Section 4 of the 
questionnaire asked respondents to provide information about their background and 
their companies’ characteristics.
Structure (type) of questions: The questionnaire contained both closed-ended and 
open-ended questions; however, the majority were closed-ended questions. In the 
* closed-ended questions, the respondents are asked to select an answer from among a 
list provided by the researcher (Babbie 1998). They are sometimes called forced-
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choice questions (De Vaus 2002) or fixed-alternative questions (Zikmund 2000). 
They are easy to ask and quick to answer. They require no writing by respondents 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). They provide a greater uniformity of 
responses and therefore greater reliability and comparability of answers (Bums 2000; 
Zikmund 2000). In addition, less effort is required to code, analyse and interpret 
answers (Peterson 2000). Their major drawback is that they may introduce bias, either 
by forcing respondents to choose from given alternatives or by making respondents 
select alternatives that might not have otherwise come to mind (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias 1992).
However, these weaknesses can be reduced by mixing open-ended and closed-ended 
questions in the questionnaire or by adding an “other (please specify)” category. This 
category allows respondents to fill in their answers, in their own words, in cases 
where the responses provided by the researcher are incomplete or inappropriate (De 
Vaus 2002; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Johnson and Turner 2003; Oppenheim 1992).
In contrast to the closed-ended questions, the open-ended questions are not followed 
by any kind of choice, and the answers have to be recorded in full (Oppenheim 1992). 
They are sometimes called free-answer questions (Zikmund 2000). They allow 
respondents to state their answers in the way they see appropriate, in their own way 
and in their own words (Sarantakos 2005). The chief advantage o f the open-ended 
questions is the freedom they give to the respondents (Oppenheim 1992). They permit 
an unlimited number o f possible answers. They permit creativity, self-expression, and 
richness of detail (Neuman 2000).
However, the open-ended questions take more time and effort to answer and produce 
large amounts o f information that require extensive time and effort to code, analyse 
and interpret (Peterson 2000; Sarantakos 2005). They open the possibility of 
misunderstanding and researcher bias (Babbie 1998). They do not allow accurate 
comparisons. They may deter busy respondents from replying to the questionnaire 
and they tend to be more expensive than closed-ended questions (Hussey and Hussey 
1997; Peterson 2000).
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In the current study, the researcher attempted to overcome the limitations of the 
closed-ended and open-ended questions and to gain the best o f both types, as follows:
- There were a limited number of open-ended questions in the questionnaire and the 
majority were closed-ended questions;
The researcher tried to provide the respondents with a sufficient range of 
alternatives or categories from which to choose; and
Whenever appropriate, the researcher added a category “other (please specify)” to 
allow respondents to create their own answer, in their own words, in the cases 
where the responses provided by the researcher were incomplete or inappropriate.
Format of questions (response categories): In structuring the response categories of 
the closed-ended questions, the researcher employed some of the most common 
techniques including the multiple-choice format, checklists, ranking and rating.
Multiple-choice format requires respondents to choose just one response from a list of 
alternatives (De Vaus 2002) such as asking respondents to select the industry sector 
that most closely corresponds to their companies’ line of business (see Section 4 of 
the questionnaire).
Checklists involved listing a set o f items and asking the respondents to select those 
that apply (De Vaus 2002) such as providing the respondents with a list of actions 
supposed to be undertaken after a security incident and asking them to select or tick 
all that apply (see Section 1.4 of the questionnaire).
The ranking format was used whenever we wanted to obtain information regarding 
the degree o f importance or the priorities that respondents give to a set o f items 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). For example, the respondents were given 
a list of common sources o f AIS security threats, and were asked to rank the top three 
sources (see Section 2 o f the questionnaire).
Rating scales involve a set of responses where the alternative answers are ordered 
from low to high. Respondents need to indicate where between the low and high 
* extremes their attitude lies (De Vaus 2002). One o f the more frequently used types of 
scale is the Likert scale, where respondents are asked to indicate their level of
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agreement with a statement by ticking a box. The Likert scale where a number of 
different statements can be provided in a list that does not take up 
much space has many advantages. It is simple for the respondents to complete and 
also simple for the researcher to code and analyse (Hussey and Hussey 1997). In 
Section 1 o f the questionnaire, there are many questions in which the respondents 
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a list o f statements such as risk 
assessment activities.
Sequence of questions: This refers to the order in which questions are organised 
within the context o f the questionnaire. A common requirement is that questions 
should be presented in a logical order, allowing for transition and flow, from one 
topic to the next, and avoiding distortions and problems (Hussey and Hussey 1997; 
Sarantakos 2005). In the current study, the researcher followed the funnel format, 
where the questioning moved from general to specific, from impersonal to personal, 
and from non-sensitive to sensitive questions (Sarantakos 2005). The questions 
related to each other logically and they moved from general to specific topics.
There is wide agreement among many authors that early questions should not address 
personal issues or background information like age, experience and educational level. 
Babbie (1998) stated that requests for demographic data (age, gender and the like) 
should generally be placed at the end of the questionnaire, since placing these items at 
the beginning gives the questionnaire the initial appearance of routine form, and the 
respondent may not be motivated to complete it. Dillman (2000) advised researchers 
not to begin by asking a series of demographic questions. Although they may be 
highly relevant to the study objectives and easy to answer, respondents will not see 
obvious relevance to the topic. Hussey and Hussey (1997) also indicated that it could 
be better to put classification questions at the end, so that the respondents are not 
deterred at the start. Moreover, Zikmund (2000) argued that it is not advisable to ask 
demographic questions at the beginning of the questionnaire because asking personal 
information may be embarrassing or threatening to respondents. In order to avoid 
these drawbacks, the demographic questions in this study were placed in the last 
section of the questionnaire (Section 4).
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There is also an agreement among many authors regarding the importance of the 
wording of questions. Based on Bryman (1989), De Vaus (2002), Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias (1992), Saunders et al. (2007) and Zikmund (2000), considerable 
attention was given to developing clear, unambiguous and useful questions. Thus, the 
researcher tried to keep questions as simple as possible. The questions were short 
because the shorter the question, the less confusing and ambiguous it will be. The 
content of each question related to the research topic. Each question addressed one 
point only. The researcher avoided leading questions since they are a major source of 
bias, and finally the researcher avoided negative questions since they can be 
misunderstood.
Regarding the length o f the questionnaire, there is a widespread view that long 
questionnaires should be avoided. De Vaus (2002) indicated that long questionnaires 
increase the burden on respondents and this leads to increased reluctance to 
participate and thus leads to non-response. However, a very short questionnaire may 
suggest that the research is insignificant and hence not worth bothering with 
(Saunders et al. 2007). The length of the questionnaire depends on many factors such 
as the research objective, respondents’ characteristics, methods of analysis, 
availability o f resources, and most importantly, on the number o f variables considered 
in the study (Sarantakos 2005). Therefore, the questionnaire of the current study was 
only seven pages in length and was printed as a booklet with two staples in the spine 
which looks more professional (Dillman 2000), and did not take more than 30 
minutes to be completed. However, it covered all the major aspects of the AIS 
security issue. A complete copy of the questionnaire with the covering letter is 
provided in Appendix 1.
3.6.1.2 Pilot test of the questionnaire
Once the questionnaire was developed, each question and the questionnaire as a 
whole must be pilot tested of pretested before final administration. A pilot test is a 
small-scale study to test the questionnaire, to minimise the likelihood of respondents 
having problems in answering the questions and to allow some assessment of the 
questions’ validity and the reliability o f the data that will be collected (Saunders et a l 
*2007). According to Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Sekaran (2003), it is important to 
pre-test the questionnaire as fully as possible before distributing it, to ensure that
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respondents understand the questions, there are no problems with the wording or 
sequence of questions, and to improve the reliability and validity of individual 
questions.
Piloting is also essential to ensure the suitability of the questionnaire for achieving the 
research aims and objectives, to demonstrate that the questionnaire is capable of 
generating the required responses from the target respondents and to ensure that the 
questionnaire as a whole functions well (Bryman and Bell 2003; Smith 2003). 
Moreover, piloting is essential to ensure that the sampling frame is adequate and to 
estimate the response rate o f the study. Piloting, therefore, can discover possible 
weaknesses, inadequacies, ambiguities and problems in all aspects of the research so 
they can be corrected before actual data collection takes place (Sarantakos 2005).
Consequently, in order to check the suitability of the questionnaire to the current 
study, to enrich its quality and to generate the maximum response rate, several 
development steps were taken before the final distribution.
First, after an extensive review of the existing literature on AIS security, and after 
several modifications and changes, the first draft of the questionnaire was completed 
and was submitted to the supervisors.
Second, after several discussions with the supervisors and after being satisfied with 
the content, wording and format of questions, the questionnaire was circulated for 
comments to several academics in the accounting and finance section and to some 
fellow research students within Cardiff Business School. The comments received 
were found to be very useful. Consequently, several modifications were made to the 
wording and scaling o f certain questions, some questions were omitted and others 
were included.
Third, in order to improve the quality of the questionnaire and to ensure the questions 
were relevant and could be understood by the respondents, the questionnaire was sent 
for piloting to the finance directors of 15 UK listed companies. These companies 
*were selected randomly from the list o f companies found in the London Stock 
Exchange website. A copy of the questionnaire together with a covering letter and a
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self-addressed freepost return envelope was mailed to each director. Three responses 
were received; however, none of the questionnaires had been completed either 
because of company policy or time constraints or because of the confidential nature of 
the information required. Consequently, the length of the questionnaire was 
considered and it was reduced from 16 pages to 7 pages and was printed as a booklet 
with two staples in the spine in order to look more professional (Dillman 2000). In 
addition, after several discussions with the supervisors it was decided to change the 
target respondents o f the questionnaire. A full discussion of the questionnaire 
sampling is presented in the next section.
Finally, after taking into consideration all the comments and suggestions, and after 
making all the necessary modifications, the final copy of the questionnaire was ready 
for administration.
3.6.1.3 Questionnaire sampling
After developing and pilot testing the questionnaire, the next step was to select those 
elements from which the data would be collected. One option is complete coverage of 
the population in which all units of the target population will be studied. Another 
option, and the most common, is sampling in which the target population is 
investigated by studying a small part of it, namely a sample (Sarantakos 2005).
There are many reasons for sampling. Sampling enables the researcher to study a 
relatively small part o f the target population and obtain data that are representative of 
the whole. Sampling is also economical; it saves time and produces quick results. In 
addition, if properly selected, samples can provide a high degree o f accuracy 
(Sarantakos 2005; Saunders et a l 2007; Zikmund 2000).
The first step in sampling is to identify and to define precisely the population to be 
sampled (Bums 2000). The target population of the current study were the large UK 
listed companies. The decision to target only larger companies was based on the 
premise that large companies with greater human, technological and financial 
resources were generally expected to be more sophisticated and more successful in 
rising IS (Yang et a l  2005). Kankanhalli et a l (2003) argued that large companies 
invested more in information security than small companies did in terms of systems
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software and human resources. This population was chosen because it covers a wide 
range of businesses in the UK and because large companies tend to expend the most 
effort on security, and have well developed IS security strategies.
A sampling frame o f approximately 1295 UK listed companies was drawn up from 
the London Stock Exchange website and the researcher made every effort to ensure 
that this sampling frame was unbiased, current and accurate. The target respondents 
were the IT managers o f the large UK listed companies whose titles differ among 
different companies. These titles are chief information officer (CIO), chief security 
officer (CSO), chief information security officer (CISO), IS managers/executives and 
IT executives. These managers were chosen because, as the persons in charge of IS, 
they should be familiar with all AIS security practices in their companies including 
their companies’ security policies, security controls, etc. They are assumed to have 
sufficient knowledge and relevant information regarding the issues under 
examination, which is important for achieving a high degree of reliability o f the data 
collected and strengthening the validity of the results obtained.
The next step in sampling is to decide on a suitable sample size. Bryman and Bell 
(2003) argued that the decisions about sample size represent a compromise between 
the constraints o f time and cost, and the need for precision. In addition, Sarantakos 
(2005) and Saunders et a l  (2007) have indicated that the choice o f sample size 
depends on the underlying methodology, the nature and purpose of the study, the 
nature of the data required and the types of analysis the researcher is going to 
undertake. Moreover, it depends on the degree of confidence needed in the data 
obtained, the degree of accuracy required, and the response rate expected for the 
study.
Based on the above, and after taking into consideration the limited time and resources 
and the expected low response rate for such types of studies, the sample size 
comprised 800 companies, which represented about 60 percent o f the total population. 
This sample size was limited by the time and resources constraints; however, it was 
felt to be reasonable enough to allow the researcher to conduct the required tests of 
♦the research questions.
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Having chosen a suitable sampling frame and estimated the actual sample size 
required, the next step is to select the most appropriate sampling technique that 
ensures the sample is representative of the population and, as far as possible, not 
biased in any way (Bums 2000).
In the current study, the researcher decided to use stratified random sampling. It is a 
probability sampling procedure in which the target population is divided into a 
number of strata, and a sample is drawn randomly (simple or systematic) from each 
stratum. The resulting sub-samples make up the final sample o f the study (Sarantakos 
2005). The ultimate function of stratification is to organise the population into 
homogeneous subsets and to select the appropriate number of elements from each 
(Babbie 1998). Accordingly, the companies that represent the population of the 
current study were stratified by sectors, and the researcher organised a list of 
companies for each sector or stratum. The decision to stratify the companies by 
sectors derived from the research objective that emphasised the differences between 
the industry sectors regarding the types of security threats and controls, and the 
existence of a management framework for AIS security. Within each sector, a simple 
random sample was taken. The researcher decided sometimes to use the 
disproportional stratified sampling when the number of companies in certain sectors 
was too small or too large, in order to ensure an adequate number of companies in 
every sector.
The strength of this procedure is that it allows all population groups (sectors) to be 
adequately represented in the final sample (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). 
It can give greater precision with the same sample size or, alternatively, the same 
precision with a smaller sample. It reduces the probable sampling error. It can give 
separate results for each stratum (sector), and it simplifies data collection (Babbie 
1998; Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). However, complete, accurate, and updated 
stratum information is needed.
3.6.1.4 Administration of the questionnaire
Once the questionnaire was designed, pilot tested and the sample was selected, the 
‘questionnaire was ready for administration. The final version of the questionnaire was 
sent by mail to the IT managers o f each of the 800 UK listed companies selected. The
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addresses were obtained from the FAME Database and were confirmed through the 
website of each company, whenever available.
As mentioned in Section 3.6.1, the most serious problem with the postal questionnaire 
is the poor response rate particularly when dealing with a very sensitive and intrusive 
issue such as security. Consequently, in an attempt to deal with this problem and to 
improve the response rate, the following techniques were employed:
- First, the questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter, introducing the 
researcher’s status as a PhD student at Cardiff Business School, explaining the 
primary purpose and importance of the study, how the respondents were chosen to 
participate, assuring the anonymity of respondents and the confidentiality of 
information and finally thanking the respondents in advance for their 
participation.
Second, the covering letter was addressed to the IT manager o f each company; it 
was printed on the Cardiff Business School letterhead and was signed by the 
researcher.
- Third, the questionnaire was printed as a booklet with two staples in the spine that 
gave it a professional look.
- Fourth, the respondents were offered the opportunity to receive a copy o f the 
study results.
- Fifth, a self-addressed freepost return envelope was provided with each copy of 
the questionnaire.
- Sixth, three weeks after sending the first mail, reminder letters were posted to 
those who had not responded (750 companies).
The number of questionnaires received in total was 65 resulting in a response rate of 
*8.1 percent.
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3.6.1.5 Reliability and validity
In developing the questionnaire, the researcher paid special attention to two technical 
considerations: reliability and validity. According to Hunter and Brewer (2003) and 
Neuman (2000), both qualities are most central to the assessment o f the goodness of a 
measurement and are important in establishing the truthfulness, credibility, or 
believability of findings. They are complementary concepts and are closely 
interrelated; however, in some situations they can conflict with each other. In 
addition, one cannot predict the other i.e. reliability is necessary for validity; 
however, it does not guarantee that a measure will be valid (Neuman 2000; 
Sarantakos 2005). Both terms have multiple meanings.
Reliability is “the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore yield 
consistent results” (Zikmund 2000, p.280). It applies to a measure when similar 
results are obtained over time and across situations. Reliability refers to the 
consistency of a measure. There are two main aspects of this consistency: stability (or 
external reliability) and internal consistency (or internal reliability) (Bryman 1989; 
Punch 1998).
External reliability refers to “the degree to which a measure is consistent and stable 
over time” (Bryman 1989, p.55). It is usually expressed in the question: does the 
measure deliver the same answer when applied in different times? (Neuman 2000). 
Internal reliability refers to the degree o f internal consistency of a measure or whether 
indicators that make up the scale are consistent with each other (Bryman and Bell 
2003), and all are working in the same direction (Punch 1998). It can be expressed in 
the question: does the measure yield consistent results across different indicators? 
(Neuman 2000).
There are four common ways of testing reliability: test-retest method; alternate (or 
parallel) form method; split-half method; and Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Bums 
2000; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Punch 1998; Zikmund 2000).
The test-retest method involves administering the same measuring instmment to the 
same respondents at two separate times to test for stability and the correlation 
between the two sets o f responses is computed. The obtained coefficient is the
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reliability estimate. The high stability correlation indicates a high degree o f reliability. 
However, this method has some limitations. It is difficult to persuade respondents to 
answer the same questionnaire twice, and if they do, they may think more deeply 
about the questions on the second occasion and give different answers, or may 
remember specific questions and answer the same way as on the first occasion, thus 
yielding a high but overstated reliability estimate. In addition, it is possible that 
change will occur in the measured variable during the measuring interval, thus 
lowering the estimate of reliability (De Vaus 2002; Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1992; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Saunders et al. 2007).
In the alternate (or parallel) form method, two alternative instruments are designed to 
be as equivalent as possible. Each of the two measuring instruments are then 
administered to a group of persons, and the two sets of measures (scores) are 
correlated to obtain an estimate of reliability. If there is high correlation between the 
two instruments, the researcher concludes that the measure is reliable. However, with 
this technique there is a problem of determining whether the two forms of an 
instrument are in fact parallel, in addition to the further time and effort involved in the 
construction of another form (Bums 2000; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; 
Zikmund 2000).
In the split-half method, the questionnaire is divided into two equal halves or two 
equal sets o f questions and each of the two sets is treated separately and scored 
accordingly. The two sets are then correlated and the correlation coefficient of the 
two sets is taken as an estimate of reliability. However, with this technique different 
types of items with different difficulty levels may occur in each half (Bums 2000; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992).
The most frequently used method for measuring the internal reliability or internal 
consistency among the academic researchers is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. This is 
used to assess the reliability of a measurement scale with multi-point items. It 
calculates the average o f all possible split-half reliability coefficients (Bryman and 
Bell 2003). The value o f this coefficient varies between 1 (denoting perfect internal 
reliability) and 0 (denoting no internal reliability); however, Bryman (1989) argued
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that most researchers regard 0.80 as an acceptable level of internal reliability for any 
multiple-point scale.
Based on the above discussion and due to the limitations recognised in the first three 
methods, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was used in the current study to assess the 
reliability of the questionnaire. The scales attained a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 
0.667 to 0.766, which indicates a reasonable degree of consistency o f the scales used.
As mentioned earlier, reliability is a necessary condition for validity, but a reliable 
instrument may not be valid. Thus, even though the responses to questions may turn 
out to be highly reliable, the results will be worthless if the questions do not measure 
what the researcher intended them to measure i.e. validity is low. Therefore, after 
testing the reliability of the questionnaire, the validity o f the research findings must 
be well considered by the researcher.
Validity is concerned with the question “Is one measuring what one intends to 
measure?” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, p. 158). Validity is a measure of 
precision, accuracy and relevance; it reflects the quality o f indicators and instruments; 
and it refers to the ability to produce findings that are in agreement with theoretical or 
conceptual values (Sarantakos 2005). The researcher must provide supporting 
evidence that a measuring instrument in fact measures what it appears to measure. 
Among the various approaches to the validation of instrument, three o f the main ones 
are: (1) content validity; (2) criterion-related validity; and (3) construct validity (De 
Vaus 2002; Neuman 2000; Punch 1998; Saunders et al. 2007; Zikmund 2000).
(1) Content validity refers to the extent to which the measurement device (questions 
in the questionnaire) provides adequate coverage of the investigative questions 
(Saunders et al. 2007, p.366).
(2) Criterion-related validity is an attempt by the researcher to answer the question 
“Does my measure correlate with other measures of the same construct?” (Zikmund 
2000, p.282); therefore, an indicator is compared with another measure o f the same 
construct in which the researcher has confidence. There are two types of criterion- 
related validity: concurrent validity, where the criterion variable exists in the present
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and predictive validity, where the criterion variable will not exist until later (Punch 
1998, p.101).
(3) Construct validity refers to the extent to which the measurement questions 
actually measure the presence o f those constructs the researcher intended them to 
measure (Saunders et al. 2007, p.367). It involves relating a measuring instrument 
(questionnaire) to a general theoretical framework in order to determine whether the 
instrument is tied to the concepts and theoretical assumptions that are employed 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, p. 161).
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) and Punch (1998), each of 
these three kinds of validity is concerned with a different aspect of the measurement 
situation, and each includes several kinds of evidence and has special value under 
certain conditions. In fact, there is no ideal way to establish validity and the validation 
methods used should depend on the situation.
Given the importance o f the validity of the research findings, two approaches were 
followed in the current study in order to enhance validity. First, the questionnaire was 
subject to many modifications and amendments and had passed through several steps 
before its final distribution in order to enrich its quality and to improve the validity of 
individual questions (Section 3.6.1.2). Second, the current study employed a postal 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the 
findings from one method can be checked against the findings derived from the other 
method. Consistent findings among different data collection methods increase the 
credibility of findings, improve the trustworthiness of research, and thus maximise its 
validity.
3.6.1.6 Statistical tests used
Once the questionnaires were received, the data analysis started. The researcher 
followed a systematic process that began with preparing the data for computer entry, 
that is, by checking, editing and coding the data, followed by entering the data in the 
computer, and then by data processing and analysis. In analysing the data, the 
statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 12 was used. It is one of the 
most popular statistical packages, can perform highly complex data manipulation and
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analysis with simple instructions, has a vast number of statistical and mathematical 
functions and a very flexible data handling capability, and it can read data in almost 
any format (Punch 1998).
However, before the analysis began, the type of data collected was well considered by 
the researcher. In general, data can be measured on four different scales: (1) nominal;
(2) ordinal; (3) interval; and (4) ratio. Nominal data imply no more than a labelling of 
different categories for which there is no meaningful ordering or ranking (Bowerman 
and O’Connell 2007; Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). Ordinal data can be ordered or 
ranked but the distance between the categories is unknown. Interval data can not only 
be ordered or ranked but the distance between the categories is precisely defined as 
well; however, there is no inherently defined zero value i.e. the zero point is arbitrary. 
Finally, ratio data have all the characteristics of interval data, and in addition, they 
have a meaningful zero point (Bowerman and O’Connell 2007; Fielding and Gilbert 
2000; Siegel and Castellan 1988). Saunders et a l (2007) argued that these different 
types of data dictate the range of the techniques available to the researcher for 
presentation, summary and analysis of the data collected.
In general, two main statistical techniques have been used in the current study, 
namely, descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics is the first 
step in the analysis o f data. It entails the researcher in summarising and organising 
data in an effective and meaningful way. It keeps the researcher close to the data, at 
least in the initial stages of the analysis, and helps the researcher in understanding the 
distribution o f each variable across the survey respondents (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1992; Punch 1998). Accordingly, the frequency distribution table and 
cross-tabulation were used in the current study as the first step in the data analysis. 
These methods are discussed in details in Chapter 4.
As the analysis progressed beyond the descriptive stage, the researcher applied the 
tools of inferential statistics. The function of inferential statistics is to provide an idea 
about whether the patterns described in the sample are likely to apply in the 
population from which the sample is drawn (De Vaus 2002). It involves using data 
collected from a sample to draw conclusions about a complete population (Hussey 
and Hussey 1997). In general, there are two major groups of statistical tests:
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parametric and nonparametric tests. The major distinction between these two groups 
lies in their power and the underlying assumptions about the data to be analysed 
(Burns 2000; Zikmund 2000).
In using parametric tests, a number of assumptions about the actual data need to be 
satisfied: first, the observations must be independent; second, the observations must 
be drawn from a normally distributed population (bell-shaped distribution); third, the 
populations must have the same variance. Finally, the variables must have been 
measured in at least an interval scale, so that it is possible to interpret the results 
(Siegel and Castellan 1988).
In contrast, a nonparametric test is based on a model that specifies only very general 
conditions; it neither specifies the normality condition nor requires an interval level of 
measurement. Certain assumptions are associated with most nonparametric tests for 
example the observations are independent and the variable under study has underlying 
continuity; however, these assumptions are weaker and fewer than those associated 
with the parametric tests (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Siegel and 
Castellan 1988).
Nonparametric tests have many advantages. They do not make numerous or stringent 
assumptions about the population from which the sample was drawn. The error 
caused by assuming a population is normally distributed, and when it is not, it is 
avoided. Thus, they are considered as distribution-free tests. Some nonparametric 
tests are appropriate for data measured in an ordinal scale, and others for data 
measured in a nominal scale. They often test different hypotheses rather than 
parametric tests. If the sample is small, there may be no alternative to using a 
nonparametric test unless the nature of the population distribution is known exactly. 
In addition, nonparametric tests are much easier to apply and their interpretation is 
often more direct than the interpretation of parametric tests (Siegel and Castellan 
1988; Zikmund 2000).
In general, parametric tests are more powerful than nonparametric tests when all the 
assumptions are met. The meaningfulness of their results depends on the validity of 
these assumptions. If there is any doubt about the quality of data or the underlying
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assumptions, then parametric tests may be unreliable and nonparametric tests should 
be adopted (Siegel and Castellan 1988; Smith 2003).
Based on the above discussion, and according to the hypotheses of the current study 
(Section 3.2.4) and the type of data collected (nominal and ordinal), nonparametric 
tests were employed. In particular, the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of 
Variance, Chi-Square Test o f Independence, and Spearman’s Rank Correlation were 
used in the current study to analyse the data of the questionnaire. In addition to these 
non-parametric tests, multiple regression analysis and particularly stepwise regression 
were used to investigate the effect of AIS security controls on the different types of 
AIS security threats facing UK companies. A full discussion o f these tests and the 
questionnaire findings is presented in Chapter 4.
3.6.2 Semi-structured interviews
In order to overcome the problems associated with the use o f questionnaires (Section
3.5.1), semi-structured interviews were conducted in the current study as the second 
stage of data collection. The semi-structured interviews were chosen to triangulate 
data collected by questionnaires to derive the benefits of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods; to get a more detailed perspective on some o f the issues raised; 
and to supplement, confirm, validate, explain, illuminate or reinterpret quantitative 
data gathered from questionnaires (Blaxter et al. 2001; Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Smith 2003).
The semi-structured interviews permit greater flexibility; however, the interviewer 
remains in control throughout the whole process (Bums 2000; Robson 1993). They 
allow interviewees to answer on their own terms but still provide a greater structure 
for comparability over that o f the unstructured interviews (May 1997). They permit 
the interviewer to ask more complex questions. The interviewer is more free to probe 
beyond the answers that add significance and depth to the data collected. They can 
take account o f non-verbal communications (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Saunders et 
al. 2007). They are also appropriate when the subject matter is highly confidential or 
commercially sensitive (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991) such as security practices in UK 
companies, which are defined as very intrusive, confidential and sensitive issues. 
However, semi-structured interviews are more time-consuming and expensive than
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questionnaires, in terms of travel expenses, the time required to conduct the 
interviews, and to analyse the collected data. The flexibility of interviews leaves room 
for the interviewer’s personal influence and bias, and interviews offer less anonymity 
than questionnaires (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Sarantakos 2005). 
However, every effort was made by the researcher to overcome these limitations and 
to maximise the benefits of using semi-structured interviews.
3.6.2.1 Interviews sampling
The sample of the interviews in the current study comprised a sample from large UK 
listed companies, namely, the IT managers of these companies.
At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to provide their contact 
details (title, name, address, telephone number and e-mail address), if they were 
willing to be contacted to arrange a follow-up face-to-face interview concerning their 
opinions on some AIS security issues within their companies.
The managers who agreed to participate and supplied their details were then 
contacted to arrange an appointment for the interview. In total 12 managers agreed to 
be interviewed and supplied their contact details in the returned questionnaire. An 
email was sent to these managers thanking them for completing the questionnaire and 
for their willingness to be interviewed and asking their permission to contact them 
again to arrange an appointment after analysing the questionnaire data. One month 
later, another e-mail was sent to these managers reminding them o f the study and 
arranging an appointment for the interview. Some of them expected a telephone 
interview, but another email was sent to them clarifying the benefits o f the face-to- 
face interviews for the current study. Most of the IT managers agreed and 
appointments were arranged to conduct the interviews. In total nine interviews were 
conducted with the IT managers of the UK listed companies in different industry 
sectors.
3.6.2.2 Administration of the interviews
Before conducting the interviews, an interview guide was sent to those who agreed to 
participate, along with a letter reminding them of the identity o f the researcher, the
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main objectives o f the study, assuring their anonymity and confidentiality of 
information and thanking them in advance for their participation.
An interview guide is a list of issues to be addressed or questions to be asked in the 
semi-structured interview (Bryman and Bell 2003). According to Saunders et al. 
(2007), providing participants with a list o f themes or questions before the interview 
should promote validity and reliability by enabling the interviewees to consider the 
information being requested and allowing them the opportunity to assemble 
supporting organisational documentation from their files. The interview guide of the 
current study evolved from the analysis of the questionnaire responses and the 
questions were divided into six sections as follows:
Section 1: Introductory discussion
The aim of this section was to introduce the researcher, to explain the aims of the 
research, to assure the anonymity of interviewees and the confidentiality of
information and to thank the interviewees in advance for their participation.
Section 2: General and background information
This section aimed to ask general questions about the interviewees and their 
companies’ background in order to obtain a profile of those who participated in the 
study.
Section 3: The management framework of the AIS security
This section aimed to collect the interviewees’ opinions regarding the management 
framework of the AIS security within their companies, including security policy, 
training and awareness programs, risk assessment, incident handling, disaster
recovery and a business continuity plans, security budget, security standards and
certification and AIS security effectiveness.
Section 4: Security threats to the companies’ AIS
This section aimed to investigate the most common types and frequency of
occurrence of the AIS security threats facing the companies and the sources of those 
threats.
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Section 5: Security controls of the companies’ AIS
This section aimed to investigate the most recent AIS security controls implemented 
within UK companies, the gaps between security threats and the scope of controls 
employed, the new security controls they are planning to use, and the companies’ 
security level.
Section 6: Uncovered issues
This section focused on adding any other issues the interviewees viewed as important 
for the current study which had been overlooked by the researcher, and finally, 
thanking the interviewees for their time and cooperation.
The interview guide used during the interviews with the covering letter is provided in 
Appendix 2.
After receiving the permission of the interviewees, all the interviews were audio­
recorded. The audio recording is important for the detailed analysis required in 
qualitative research and to ensure that the interviewees’ answers are captured in their 
own terms. It enables the interviewer to concentrate on the phrasing and order of 
questions rather than on note taking. It allows questions formulated at an interview to 
be accurately recorded for use in later interviews where appropriate. It provides an 
accurate and unbiased record and allows quotes to be used (Bryman and Bell 2003; 
Healey and Rawlinson 1994; Saunders et al. 2007).
However, audio recording might bias the interviewees’ answers because they know 
that their anonymity is not preserved in full. It makes interviewees anxious and less 
likely to reveal confidential information. Transcribing and analysing the interviews 
can take a considerable time. In addition, there is a risk that during audio recording 
the interviewer might cease to listen carefully, believing that all the information is 
going onto the tape which will be listened to later in a more relaxed environment 
(Blaxter et a l 2001; Sekaran 2003). Therefore, many authors for example Bums 
(2000), Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002) and Saunders et al. (2007) recommended note 
taking as the interview progresses in order to supplement the audio recording and to 
overcome its limitations. Based on their suggestion, the researcher took some notes in
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addition to audio recording the interviews in order to record non-verbal actions and to 
maintain concentration and focus.
3.6.2.3 Analysis of interview data
The analysis of the interview data is one of the most serious and central difficulties 
facing researchers. According to Robson (1993, p.370), “there is no clear and 
accepted set o f conventions for analysis corresponding to those observed with 
quantitative data”. However, in order to increase the transparency o f research, the 
methods of data analysis need to be systematic, disciplined and able to be seen and 
described (Punch 1998). Accordingly, the analysis of the interview data in the current 
study was based on Miles and Huberman’s approach for qualitative data analysis. 
Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 10-11) suggest the following main components for 
qualitative data analysis: data reduction, data display, and drawing and verifying 
conclusions. A full discussion of this approach is presented in Chapter 5.
Despite the small number of interviews conducted, and the lack o f wide agreement 
among researchers regarding the use of computers in qualitative data analysis, the 
researcher used NVivo, which is one of the best known computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software, to support Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach in 
analysing the interview data. A full discussion of the advantages and limitations of 
NVivo, the interviewees’ responses and the data analysis is presented in Chapter 5.
3.7 Research ethics
A number of ethical issues arose across the different stages and duration of the 
research that were carefully considered by the researcher. A copy of the research 
proposal, questionnaire and the interview guide with the covering letters were 
submitted to the Research Ethics Committee at Cardiff Business School. After 
permission was obtained to conduct the research, the researcher began to contact 
participants and to gain access.
According to Bryman and Bell (2003), participants should be given as much 
information as might be needed to make an informed decision about whether or not 
they wish to participate in the study. Consequently, the questionnaire was
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accompanied by a covering letter introducing the researcher’s status as a PhD student 
in Cardiff Business School, explaining the importance and objective of the study, how 
the respondents were chosen to participate, assuring the anonymity of respondents 
and the confidentiality o f data and thanking them in advance for completing the 
questionnaire.
After receiving the responses, an e-mail was sent to the managers who agreed to be 
interviewed and supplied their contact details in the questionnaire, thanking them for 
completing the questionnaire and for their willingness to take part in a follow up 
interview and seeking their permission to contact them again for arranging an 
appointment after analysing the questionnaire’s responses.
After analysing the responses of the questionnaire, another e-mail was sent to inform 
the participants about the expected duration o f the interview and to arrange a 
convenient time for each participant. An interview guide was then mailed to 
participants, accompanied by a covering letter, reminding them of the researcher’s 
status, explaining the objective of the study, assuring their anonymity, th e 
confidentiality o f data and their right to decline to answer a question or set of 
questions.
According to Neuman (2000), participants should explicitly agree to participate. At 
the beginning of the interview, the participants signed two consent forms concerning 
the confidentiality and anonymity of data, and their right to withdraw from the 
interview at any time. However, De Vaus (2002) indicated that there are some 
problems with asking participants to sign consent forms; not only does it formalise 
the interview and lead to a loss of rapport, it can also make some participants more 
suspicious about the research. Despite De Vaus’s opinion and despite the sensitive 
nature of the study, the researcher did not perceive any problem in asking participants 
to sign these forms. A copy of these forms is provided in Appendix 3. In addition, the 
researcher received the participants’ permission to audio-record the interviews.
During the interview, the researcher avoided pressing the participants for a response. 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2006), the researcher should make clear to 
participants that they have the right to decline to respond to any question. In addition,
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Saunders et al. (2007) indicated that it would be unethical to attempt to prolong the 
duration of an interview beyond that previously agreed unless the participant freely 
proposes this as an option. All the interviews conducted were, therefore, within the 
duration agreed upon, unless the participants were willing to complete the discussion. 
Furthermore, the researcher tried to collect the data accurately in this stage to fully 
maintain the validity and reliability of the research.
Saunders et a l (2007) and Zikmund (2000) indicated that the objectivity of the 
researcher is vital during the analysis stage. Lack of objectivity will clearly distort the 
conclusions. The researcher, therefore, avoided being selective in which data to 
report, and the data were analysed honestly.
During the reporting stage, the researcher maintained the anonymity of participants. 
In addition, De Vaus (2002) indicated that when reporting the study findings 
sufficient information should be provided so that the results will not be misleading. 
The researcher provided readers with all the details about data collection, sampling 
and the ways in which data were prepared for analysis, and finally represented the 
statistical significance o f the data accurately and honestly.
It is most important, according to Bryman and Bell (2003), that the researcher take all 
reasonable precautions to ensure that participants are in no way directly harmed or 
adversely affected as a result o f their participation in the study.
3.8 Summary of the chapter
This chapter has mainly been concerned with the methodology used in the current 
study. The chapter began by presenting the conceptual framework o f the research, 
explaining the main variables of the current study, linking each variable to the 
literature and demonstrating the relationships between them. It proceeded with a 
general discussion on the research paradigms, emphasised the use of both positivistic 
and phenomenological paradigms, the main strengths and weaknesses of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches in research and explained the adoption of both approaches 
in the current study. The common types of triangulation were presented together with 
the reasons o f employing data and methodological triangulation in the current study.
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The chapter then discussed the research design, explaining the descriptive and 
explanatory nature o f the current study and the main reasons for adopting the 
deductive approach and the cross-sectional design in the study.
The three methods recommended in the literature on IS security namely 
questionnaires, interviews and case studies, were then presented and the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method identified and considered. The chapter then provided the 
justification for the use of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews as the data 
collection methods of the current study. A detailed description of the questionnaire 
was provided, including questionnaire design and layout, and the major 
considerations involved in formulating the questions. How the questionnaire was 
piloted, the sampling frame, the sample size, the sampling technique and how the 
questionnaire was administered were then presented. Reliability and validity of the 
questionnaire were explained together with the reasons o f using Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha to assess the reliability of the scales and the approaches followed to 
enhance its validity. The process used by the researcher to analyse the data was 
provided.
The chapter continued with a description of the semi-structured interviews, 
interviewees’ selection, the procedures followed to contact the interviewees and to 
arrange appointments, how the interview guide was organised, how the interviews 
were conducted, and how the data were analysed. Finally, the chapter emphasised the 
ethical issues that arose across the different stages and duration of the research.
The following two chapters present and discuss the main findings of both 
questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews. Chapter 4 presents a full discussion 
of the statistical methods used to analyse data of the questionnaire, reasons of 
selecting these methods and the main findings of the questionnaire. Chapter 5 
presents a full discussion o f the interviewees’ responses and the methods used to 
analyse the interview data.
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of questionnaire results
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 was concerned with the methodology used in the current study. It provided 
the justification o f using questionnaire and semi-structured interviews as the data 
collection methods of the current study. This chapter provides a full discussion of the 
statistical methods employed to analyse the data from the questionnaire and the 
reasons for selecting these methods. It also sets out the opinions of the IT managers of 
the UK listed companies on the AIS security in their companies and the main findings 
of the questionnaire.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the sample size and 
response rate. Section 4.3 discusses the statistical methods employed in the current 
study to analyse data of the questionnaire. Section 4.4 focuses on the respondents and 
their companies’ background. Section 4.5 analyses the questions o f Section 1 of the 
questionnaire concerning the management framework o f AIS security within UK 
companies. This is followed by Section 4.6 which presents the results on the most 
common sources and types of AIS security threats facing UK companies and the 
frequency o f occurrence of each type of threat. Section 4.7 investigates the AIS 
security controls employed by UK companies to reduce security threats. Finally, 
Section 4.8 concludes the chapter with a summary of the questionnaire’s findings.
4.2 Sample size and response rate
It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the final version of the questionnaire was sent by 
post to the IT managers o f 800 randomly selected UK listed companies. A total of 104 
responses were received, of which 30 completed questionnaires were returned after 
posting reminder letters to those who had not responded. However, 39 incomplete 
responses were received which were unusable for statistical analysis. Different 
reasons were provided for not completing the questionnaire. Some respondents 
mentioned that it was against their companies’ policy to complete or to participate in 
any research studies or surveys. Others refused to participate for confidentiality 
reasons. Some explicitly stated that the information requested was either security
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sensitive or commercially sensitive, not only for them, but for their customers as well, 
and although they were provided with confidentiality assurances by the researcher, 
they did not want to take the risk that the information could become visible to a wider 
audience. The others believed that it was inappropriate to complete the questionnaire 
as third parties currently outsource the IT functions in their companies. Consequently, 
65 questionnaires were usable for statistical analysis purposes, resulting in a usable 
response rate of 8.1 percent (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Responses to the questionnaire
Responses
Initial mail Follow-up Total
no % no % no %
Usable responses 35 58.3 30 68.2 65 62.5
Unusable responses 
Blank questionnaire 15 25 9 20.4 24 23.1
E-mail 10 16.7 5 11.4 15 14.4
Total 60 100 44 100 104 100
Out of the 800 questionnaires mailed to the IT managers, 696 managers, did not 
respond at all. As was mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.1), one o f the major 
problems associated with a questionnaire is the low response rate, particularly with 
the postal questionnaire. According to Collis and Hussey (2003), this low response 
rate introduces the problem of non-response bias that is the data collected may be 
biased and thus may not be representative of the population. In addition, De Vaus 
(1996) argued that those who did respond might be significantly different from those 
who did not, and consequently, the results were biased in some way. However, 
Oppenheim (1966, p.34) stated, “Respondents who send in their questionnaire very 
late are roughly similar to non-respondents”. Consequently, in order to examine 
whether non-response bias was a major problem for the results o f the questionnaire in 
the current study, statistical tests were conducted to compare early respondents with 
late respondents in terms o f their answers to the questionnaire. The results o f the 
responses from the initial mailing (35 responses) were compared with the results of 
the responses from the follow-up mailing (30 responses) using the Kruskal-Wallis 
test. The results revealed that no significant differences were found between the early 
and late responses. The two groups did not differ significantly in their opinions 
regarding the common sources and types of AIS security threats in UK companies.
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Consequently, non-response bias does not appear to be a major problem in the current 
study.
4.3 Statistical methods used
As was mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.1.6), in analysing the questionnaire data, 
two main statistical techniques were used in the current study, namely, descriptive 
statistics (exploratory data analysis) and inferential statistics (confirmatory data 
analysis). Descriptive statistics is the first step in data analysis. This refers to the 
transformation of the raw data into a form that will make them easy to understand and 
interpret (Zikmund 2000). The calculation of averages, frequency distributions, and 
percentage distributions is the most common form of summarising data. Accordingly, 
the frequency distribution table and cross-tabulation were used in the current study as 
the first step in the data analysis. These methods are discussed in detail in Sections
4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively.
As the analysis progressed beyond the descriptive stage, the researcher applied the 
tools of inferential statistics. Inferential statistics give an idea of whether the patterns 
described in the sample are likely to apply in the population from which the sample is 
drawn (De Vaus 2002). This involves using data collected from a sample to draw 
conclusions about a complete population (Hussey and Hussey 1997).
In general, there are two major groups of statistical tests: parametric and non- 
parametric tests. As was mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.1.6), non-parametric 
tests were mainly employed in the current study for many reasons. First, the sample 
size in the current study is small (65 usable responses). According to Siegel and 
Castellan (1988, p.35), if  the sample size is small, there may be no alternative to using 
a non-parametric statistical test. Second, the data collected are nominal and ordinal. 
Pallant (2007) indicated that non-parametric techniques are ideal for use when data 
are measured on nominal (categorical) and ordinal (ranked) scales. Moreover, 
Anderson et al. (2007, p.720) stated that with nominal or ordinal data, it is 
inappropriate to compute means, variances, and standard deviations, and therefore, 
parametric methods cannot be used.
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Third, non-parametric techniques require no assumptions about the shapes of the 
sampled populations. They, therefore, can be more efficient than parametric tests 
when the underlying populations are not normally distributed (Bowerman and 
O’Connell 2007; Hollander and Wolfe 1999). Fourth, non-parametric methods often 
test different hypotheses about the population than do parametric procedures (Siegel 
and Castellan 1988, p.34). Fifth, the sample in the current study was made up of 
observations from seven industry sectors. According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), 
there are suitable non-parametric statistical tests for treating samples made up of 
observations from several different populations. Finally, non-parametric tests are 
often easier to apply and quite easy to understand.
Based on the above, the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance, Chi-Square 
Test of Independence, and Spearman’s Rank Correlation were used in the current 
study to analyse the data of the questionnaire. These tests are discussed in Sections 
4.3.3, 4.3.4, and 4.3.5 below. In addition to these non-parametric tests, multiple 
regression analysis, in particular stepwise regression, was used in the current study to 
investigate the effect of AIS security controls used in UK companies on the different 
types of AIS security threats facing the companies.
According to Allison (1999), in practice, ordinal variables are often used in regression 
analysis. Moreover, Sprent (1989) indicated that by using the techniques o f dummy 
variables, the researcher could include qualitative factors in the multiple regression 
analysis. In addition, Labovitz (1970) has suggested that almost all ordinal variables 
can and should be treated as interval variables. He argues that the amount of error that 
can happen is minimal, especially in relation to the considerable advantages to the 
researcher as a result o f using techniques of analysis like regression analysis which is 
powerful and relatively easy to interpret. Multiple regression analysis, particularly 
stepwise multiple regression, is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.6 below.
4.3.1 Frequency distribution
The starting point in descriptive analysis is the construction of a frequency 
distribution for each variable o f interest. The idea of the frequency distribution is to 
tell the researcher the number of cases in each category. The tabular form of 
representing frequency distributions can be used with any variable irrespective of its
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level of measurement (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997, p.74). In addition, 
De Vaus (2002) stated that the frequency table provides a first look at some of the 
characteristics of the sample and the sorts of responses that have been given. The 
researcher can get an idea of the shape of the distributions on key variables and can 
investigate which variables have very little variation and which categories have 
almost no cases. Sekaran (2003) indicated that the frequency distribution could be 
obtained for all the personal data or classification variables.
Based on the above, frequency distribution tables were constructed for the responses 
concerning the general and background information (Section 4 of the questionnaire) in 
order to obtain a profile of the respondents and their companies. Consequently, a 
frequency distribution table was constructed for the respondents’ job title, number of 
years of experience in their current job, their most recent educational qualification, 
their academic field o f study, and security qualifications. In addition, a frequency 
distribution table was constructed for the companies’ industry sector, age, and number 
of employees. These frequency distributions are discussed in more detail in Section 
4.4.
4.3.2 Cross-tabulation
A cross-tabulation is a tabular summary of data for two variables. It is widely used for 
examining the relationship between two variables (Anderson et al. 2007) and for 
allowing the inspection o f differences among groups (Zikmund 2000). It can be 
constructed using one qualitative variable and one quantitative variable, when both 
variables are qualitative, or when both variables are quantitative. The primary 
advantage of the cross-tabulation is its simplicity and understandability.
However, analysing either a few variables with many categories or many variables 
leads to a large number o f cells. Consequently, the tables become difficult both to 
display and to interpret. Small cell sizes reduce the reliability of the estimated 
behaviour for a given characteristic and make comparison among cells difficult and 
risky. In addition, while cross-tabulation and related statistical tests may be used to 
analyse the degree o f association between variables, they do not provide information 
about the magnitude of any effect or the strength of any relationship (Hanushek and 
Jackson 1977).
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Consequently, in order to investigate the differences among UK companies in 
different industry sectors concerning the management framework o f AIS security, 
types of AIS security threats facing the companies, and security controls used, cross­
tabulations were constructed for variables in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the questionnaire 
and the industry sectors of the companies that responded. The cross-tabulations of 
these variables are discussed in Sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
4.3.3 Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance
The Kruskal-Wallis test is the non-parametric equivalent of the one-way ANOVA, 
and is a generalisation o f the Mann-Whitney test; however, it is used when there are 
more than two groups in the analysis (Dancey and Reidy 2004). The Kruskal-Wallis 
test can be used with ordinal data and it is not based on any assumptions about 
population shape. It is based on the assumption that the groups are independent and 
that individual items are selected randomly (Black 1994, p.764). The Kruskal-Wallis 
test is an extremely useful test for deciding whether K independent samples are from 
different populations.
In the computation of the Kruskal-Wallis test, each of the observations is replaced by 
ranks. That is, all the scores from all of the K samples are combined and ranked in a 
single series. The smallest score is replaced by rank 1 and the largest score is replaced 
by rank N, where N is the total number of independent observations in the K samples. 
The sum of the ranks in each sample is then found. From these sums, the mean rank 
for each sample or group is computed. If the samples are from identical populations, 
the mean ranks will tend to be similar, while if the samples are from different 
populations, then the mean ranks should differ (Siegel and Castellan 1988).
The hypotheses for the Kruskal-Wallis test with K>3 populations can be written as 
follows:
Ho: All K populations are identical 
Hi. Not all K populations are identical
The Kruskal-Wallis statistic can be computed as follows (Siegel and Castellan 1988):
K  _ _
K W = 1 2 / N ( N +  1) ^ n j ( R j - R ) 2
7=1
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Where: K = number o f samples or groups
nj = number o f cases in the jth sample
N = number o f cases in the combined sample
Rj = sum of the ranks in the jth sample or group
R j = average of the ranks in the jth sample or group
R = (N + 1) / 2 = the average of the ranks in the combined sample
When the obtained value o f KW is significant i.e. if p-value < 0.05, it indicates that
there is a statistically significant difference in the variable across the groups.
However, it does not tell the researcher which ones are different nor does it tell the 
researcher how many of the groups are different from each other. According to 
Bowerman and O ’Connell (2007), for this test to be valid, there should be five or 
more observations in each sample.
Based on the above, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used in the current study to test 
whether there are significant differences between the industry sectors in the UK 
concerning the most common sources and types of AIS security threats. In addition, it 
was used to test whether there are significant differences between the industry sectors 
regarding security training and awareness programs, risk assessment practices, top 
areas of spending on AIS security, awareness level of the British Standard BS 7799, 
and the common success indicators of AIS security management within UK 
companies. The analysis o f the above variables using the Kruskal-Wallis test is 
discussed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.
4.3.4 The Chi-Square test of independence
The chi-square test of independence is used to explore the relationship between two 
categorical variables. Each of these variables can have two or more categories (Pallant 
2007, p.214). It is used when more than two groups need to be compared on a nominal 
variable (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997). The chi-square test is based on a 
contingency table (cross-tabulation) with cases classified according to the categories 
in each variable. This test compares the observed frequencies or proportions of cases 
that occur in each of the categories with the values that would be expected if  there
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were no association between the two variables being measured. The chi-square test 
statistic can be computed as follows:
X2 = Z  (O - E) 2 / E
Where: O = observed frequencies 
E = expected frequencies
If the observed frequencies equal the expected frequencies (no deviation), then the 
chi-square is zero which indicates that there is no association between the two 
variables. As observed frequencies begin to deviate from their expected frequencies, 
the chi-square begins to increase. The larger the deviation the larger the chi-square 
gets which indicates that there is an association between the two variables. The 
hypotheses for the chi-square test of independence can be written as follows:
Ho\ The two variables are independent 
Hi. The two variables are dependent
If the value of the chi-square statistic x2 is large, this indicates that the observed cell 
frequencies differ substantially from the expected cell frequencies. The null 
hypothesis (Ho) is rejected where x2 exceeds a critical value for a given level of 
significance (if p-value < 0.05), and for a given number of degrees of freedom f. It can 
be concluded, therefore, that the two variables are dependent. The number of degrees 
of freedom can be computed as follows:
f = ( r - l ) ( c - l )
Where: r = the number o f rows in the cross-tabulation
c = the number o f columns in the cross-tabulation
However, the chi-square test only tells us that the association between variables is 
likely to exist, but it does not tell us anything about the strength of the association or 
the relationship (Bryman and Cramer 2001). In addition, Siegel and Castellan (1988, 
p. 199) indicated that the proper application o f the chi-square test requires that the 
expected frequencies in each cell are not small. The chi-square should not be used 
when any expected frequency is smaller than one or when more than 20 percent of the
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expected frequencies are smaller than five. However, if these requirements are not 
met by the data in the form in which they were originally collected and a large sample 
cannot be obtained, the researcher should combine categories, whenever possible and 
whenever to do so makes sense. Consequently, fewer than 20 percent o f the cells have 
expected frequencies of less than five and no cell has an expected frequency of less 
than one.
Based on the above, the chi-square test of independence was used in the current study 
to test the association between the industry sectors and the nominal (categorical) 
variables in the data collected. For example, the existence of security policy, training 
and awareness programs, risk assessment programs, security budget, certification 
under ISO/IEC 27001, and the different types of AIS security controls used in UK 
companies. However, in order to avoid violating the above requirements and to ensure 
the validity of the results, the industry sectors were combined. Originally, seven 
industry sectors responded; however, in order to use the chi-square test, they were 
combined into four sectors: insurance & financial services, manufacturing & 
merchandising, technology, media & entertainment, and construction, energy & 
utilities. The results of the chi-square test are discussed in Sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
4.3.5 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
Correlation is one of the most widely used measures of association between two or 
more variables. The measures of correlation are employed to explore the presence or 
absence of a correlation. The correlation coefficient describes the direction of the 
correlation (whether it is positive or negative) and the strength of the correlation 
(whether an existing correlation is strong or weak) (Singh 2007, p. 146).
Spearman’s rank correlation is designed for use with ordinal or ranked data and is 
particularly useful when the data do not meet the criteria for Pearson’s correlation 
(Pallant 2007). Spearman’s rank correlation is used to analyse the degree of 
association of two variables. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) is computed 
as follows (Anderson et al. 2007):
rs= 1 - 6 X di2 / n (n2 - 1)
2 Pearson’s correlation is the most common measure o f association between two or more variables 
scaled on an interval level.
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Where: n = number of items or individuals being ranked 
di = Xi - yi
xi = the rank of items i with respect to one variable
yi = the rank of items i with respect to the second variable
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs) can take values from -1 to +1, so that the 
sign indicates whether there is a positive correlation or a negative correlation. The 
size of the absolute value provides an indication of the strength of the relationship. A 
perfect correlation of +1 or -1 indicates that the value of one variable can be
determined exactly by knowing the value of the other variable. On the other hand, a
correlation of zero indicates no relationship between the two variables. According to 
Singh (2007), a correlation is considered very low if the coefficient has a value under 
0.20, and is considered low if the value ranges between 0.21 and 0.40, whereas a 
coefficient value above 0.70 is considered high. The hypotheses for Spearman’s rank 
correlation can be written as follows:
Ho: There is no correlation in the ranked data of the population i.e. there is no 
association between the two variables.
Hi: There is a correlation in the ranked data of the population i.e. there is an 
association between the two variables.
The significance level obtained does not indicate how strongly the two variables are 
associated, but it indicates how much confidence the researcher should have in the 
results obtained that is whether a value produced by a measure of association does in 
fact reflect the existence of a true relationship in the population. Therefore, if  p-value 
< 0.05, the null hypothesis can be rejected which indicates that the two variables are 
associated.
Based on the above, Spearman’s rank correlation is used in the current study to 
analyse the degree of association between the different types o f AIS security threats 
and the different types o f controls used in UK companies to reduce these threats. In 
addition, Spearman’s rank correlation is used also to analyse the degree of correlation 
between the AIS security effectiveness level in UK companies and the types of
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security threats facing these companies. The results of Spearman’s rank correlation 
are discussed in Section 4.7.
4.3.6 Multiple regression analysis
Multiple regression analysis is the most commonly utilised multivariate technique. It 
examines the relationship between a single dependent variable and two or more 
independent variables (Singh 2007, p. 178). There are two major uses of multiple 
regressions: prediction and causal analysis. According to Allison (1999), in a 
prediction study, the goal is to develop a formula for making predictions about the 
dependent variable, based on the observed values of the independent variables. On the 
other hand, in a causal analysis, the aim of the study is to determine whether a 
particular independent variable really affects the dependent variable, and to estimate 
the magnitude of that effect, if any, which is our concern in the current study.
The multiple regression technique relies upon determining the linear relationship with 
the lowest sum of squared variances (Singh 2007). The general equation for the 
multiple regression models takes the following form (Black 1994, p.562):
Y = Po + pi Xi + p2 X2+ P3 X 3 + .............................................+  pk Xk +  8
Where: Y = the dependent variable
Xk = the independent variable k 
Po = the regression constant
Pi = the regression coefficient for independent variable X i 
p2 = the regression coefficient for independent variable X 2 
pk = the regression coefficient for independent variable Xk 
e = the error o f prediction
In multiple regression, the dependent and independent variables should preferably be 
measured on an interval scales, though ordinal scale measurements are also acceptable 
(Singh 2007). Allison (1999) also indicated that, in practice, ordinal variables are 
often used in regression analysis. In addition, by using the technique of “dummy 
variables”, the researcher can even include qualitative factors in the regression
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analysis (Levin and Rubin 1994, p.646). Moreover, Allison (1999) stated that dummy 
variables are perfect as independent variables in regression analysis.
According to Anderson et al. (2007), there are four variable selection procedures: 
stepwise regression, forward selection, backward elimination, and best-subsets 
regression. These procedures are used to identify which independent variables provide 
the best model. Stepwise regression is the most widely known and used by 
researchers. In stepwise regression, the researcher provides the computer program for 
example SPSS with a list o f independent variables. The stepwise regression procedure 
begins each step by determining whether any of the variables already in the model 
should be removed. If none of the independent variables can be removed from the 
model, the procedure checks to see whether any of the independent variables that are 
not currently in the model can be entered. In stepwise regression, an independent 
variable can enter the model at one step, be removed at a subsequent step, and then 
enter the model at a later step. This procedure then stops when no independent 
variables can be removed from or entered into the model. However, because the 
stepwise procedure is based on statistical considerations alone and requires no 
theoretical justification for the independent variable it includes or excludes from 
entry, the researcher knows what was and was not included but not why.
One problem that can arise in multiple regression analysis is multicollinearity. This 
problem arises when the independent variables are too highly correlated with one 
another. Allison (1999) indicated that a common way to judge the seriousness of the 
multicollinearity problem is to examine all the bivariate correlations among the 
independent variables. In addition, the tolerance value that appears in the output of 
regression analysis is very effective in diagnosing multicollinearity. Tolerance value 
ranges between 0 and 1, so that high tolerance values indicate low multicollinearity, 
whereas low tolerance values indicate high multicollinearity. Allison (1999) 
suggested that the researcher starts to get concerned if the tolerance falls below 0.40. 
In the current study, the tolerance values range between 0.7 and 0.9, which indicates 
that multicollinearity is low and that there is a low level o f correlation between 
independent variables. In addition, Black (1994) stated that stepwise regression is a 
way to prevent the problem of multicollinearity.
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In the current study, a series of stepwise regressions was run in an attempt to identify 
the significant effect of the different types of security controls implemented by UK 
companies and AIS security effectiveness level on the reduction of AIS security 
threats facing the companies. Consequently, 13 regressions were run and the 
dependent variable in each regression was one type of security threat and the 
independent variables were the different types of security controls and the security 
effectiveness level within UK companies. The results of the regression analysis are 
discussed in Section 4.7.
4.4 General and background information
Section 4 of the questionnaire (Appendix 1) focused on the respondents and their 
companies’ background. Respondents were asked eight questions concerning their 
position, experience, qualifications, and their companies’ characteristics. The main 
objective of these questions was to obtain a profile of those who participated in the 
study and were useful for statistical analysis and comparisons. The background 
information requested from respondents includes their job titles, years of experience 
in the current job, most recent educational qualification obtained, academic field of 
study, and their security qualification, if obtained. In addition, respondents were asked 
about their companies’ industry sector, age, and number of employees.
Respondents’ job title
In Question 4.1 of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state their job title. It 
was disclosed in Chapter 3 that the questionnaire was mailed to the IT managers of 
the UK listed companies. Table 4.2 below shows that 39 percent o f respondents are IT 
managers, and 10 respondents (15.6 percent) are security managers, whereas other 
titles such as risk manager, information security analyst, etc. represent small 
percentages of the respondents. It can also be seen that among the respondents, there 
are eight finance directors (12.5 percent). This could be because some companies 
depend mainly on outside service providers in most of their IT functions that is 
outsourcing most IT functions; consequently, they do not have an internal IT manager 
to complete the questionnaire. On the other hand, because of the nature o f the current 
study and its focus on AIS, the IT managers could take the view that finance directors 
are more knowledgeable o f the security of these accounting systems and they are able
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to provide the required data. This issue is further investigated in the next chapter using 
data collected in the interviews.
Table 4.2 Job title of respondents
Job title no %
Chief information officer 4 6.3
Information technology manager 25 39
Security manager 10 15.6
Head o f information systems 3 4.7
Information security analyst 1 1.6
Risk manager 2 3
Information security architecture manager 1 1.6
Infrastructure director 3 4.7
Finance director 8 12.5
Others 7 11
Total 64 100
Years of experience in the current job
Question 4.2 of the questionnaire asked respondents about the number of years of 
experience in their current job. From Table 4.3, it can be seen that just over one third 
of respondents (35.4 percent) have less than 5 years of experience in their current job, 
27 respondents (41.5 percent) have from 5 to 10 years of experience, whereas only 
one respondent has more than 20 years of experience in the current job. Regarding the 
managers who have less than 5 years of experience in their current job, they still have 
the experience and knowledge, which qualify them to complete the questionnaire, 
because according to the interviews’ data, most of these managers had more years of 
experience in the same position or in equivalent positions in other companies.
Table 4.3 Years o f experience o f respondents in the current job
Years o f experience in current job no %
Less than 5 years 23 35.4
5 -10 27 41.5
11-15 5 7.7
16-20 9 13.9
More than 20 years 1 1.5
Total 65 100
The most recent educational qualification
Question 4.3 of the questionnaire asked respondents about the most recent educational 
qualification they have obtained. Out of the 65 respondents, 11 respondents did not 
mention their most recent educational qualification. Table 4.4 shows the most recent 
educational qualification o f those who responded. The results reveal that 35.2 percent
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of respondents had obtained a bachelors degree, three respondents (5.5 percent) a 
masters degree, whereas another three respondents had obtained a PhD degree.
Table 4.4 The most recent educational qualification
Most recent educational qualification no %
Bachelors degree 19 35.2
Diploma 3 5.5
Masters degree 5.5
PhD degree 3 5.5
MBA 5 9.3
Others 21 39
Total 54 100
of respondents
The academic field of study
Question 4.4 of the questionnaire asked respondents to state the academic field of 
study of their most recent educational qualification. It can be seen from Table 4.5 that 
32 percent of respondents have a computer science degree, eight respondents have a 
business/management degree, 10 percent of respondents have an accounting/finance 
degree, while the academic field of study of the other respondents includes 
economics, mathematics/stati sties, information security, risk management, 
engineering/electronics, and biochemistry/physics.
Table 4.5 The academic field o f study of respondents
Academic field of study no %
Business/management 8 16
Accounting/finance 5 10
Economics 2 4
Mathematics/statistics 4 8
Computer science 16 32
Information security 2 4
Risk management 2
Engineering/electron ics 8
Biochemistry/physics
Others 6 12
Total 50 100
Professional security qualification
Question 4.5 of the questionnaire asked respondents to specify their professional 
security qualification if obtained. The BERR Information Security Breaches Survey 
(BERR 2008) stated that there has been an increased emphasis on security 
qualifications in the UK following the formation of the Institute o f the Information 
Security Professionals, and that nearly 98 percent of large businesses now have 
qualified staff. However, nearly 90 percent of respondents in the current study do not 
have any professional security qualification. Out of the 65 respondents, only seven
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respondents (10.8 percent) have professional security qualification. Among these 
seven respondents, three respondents are Certified Information Systems Security 
Professionals (CISSP). In addition, one respondent has a Certificate in Information 
Security Management Principles (CISMP), another respondent is a Certified 
Information Security Manager (CISM), another respondent has the Information 
Systems Security Professionals (ISSP) qualification, while the other has a 
qualification obtained from the British Computer Society (BCS).
Table 4.6 The number o f respondents having professional security qualification
Professional security qualification no %
Yes 7 10.8
No 58 89.2
Total 65 100
Industry sector
It was mentioned in Section 3.2.1.4 (Chapter 3) that there is an agreement that a 
company’s approach to information security depends on its industry sector. 
Companies in different industry sectors tend to have different security requirements. 
Based on the importance of the industry sector in the current study, Question 4.6 of 
the questionnaire asked respondents to select the industry sector, which most closely 
corresponds to their companies’ line of business. Table 4.7 demonstrates that 20 
percent of respondents are from the property & construction sector, followed by 
insurance & financial services (16.9 percent), manufacturing (15.4 percent), energy & 
utilities (13.9 percent), technology & telecommunications (12.3 percent), retail 
merchandising (10.8 percent) and media & entertainment (9.2 percent). However, 
only one respondent is from the pharmaceuticals sector, which was eliminated from 
further analysis due to statistical considerations.
Table 4.7 Distribution of respondents by industry sector
Industry sector no %
Insurance & financial services 11 16.9
Manufacturing 10 15.4
Media & entertainment 6 9.2
Property & construction 13 20
Retail merchandising 7 10.8
Technology & telecommunications 8 12.3
Energy & utilities 9 13.9
Pharmaceuticals 1 1.5
Total 65 100
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Age of company
Question 4.7 of the questionnaire asked respondents about their companies’ age. It is 
clear from Table 4.8 below that the majority of companies have been established for 
more than 20 years (89.2 percent), 9.2 percent of companies for 11 to 20 years, with 
only one company for 5 to 10 years. The results reveal that nearly all the companies 
participating in the current study have been established for at least 10 years.
Table 4.8 The age o f the companies participating in the study
Age o f company no %
5-10 1 1.5
11-20 6 9.2
More than 20 years 58 89.2
Total 65 100
Number of employees
Question 4.8 of the questionnaire asked respondents to state the approximate number 
of employees in their companies. It can be seen from Table 4.9 that 83 percent of 
companies participating in the study have at least 100 employees. The results also 
show that 15 companies (23.1 percent) have from 1001 to 5000 employees, another
23.1 percent of companies have from 100 to 500 employees, 11 companies have more 
than 10000 employees, and another 16.9 percent have fewer than 100 employees. 
Table 4.9 also shows that 10.8 percent of companies have from 501 to 1000 
employees, while 9.2 percent have from 5001 to 10000 employees. The results 
indicate that the size o f the companies participating in the study ranges from medium 
(less than 100 employees), to large (100-1000) to very large (1001 - more than 10000 
employees). This is important since companies in different sizes tend to handle 
information security differently, given that they have different levels o f resources and 
expertise (Chang and Ho 2006).
Table 4.9 The number o f employees in the companies participating in the study
Number of employees no %
Less than 100 11 16.9
100-500 15 23.1
501-1000 7 10.8
1001-5000 15 23.1
5001-10000 6 9.2
More than 10000 11 16.9
Total 65 100
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The subsequent analysis of the questionnaire findings is presented on the following 
three sections (4.5 -  4.7) based on the same sequence o f the questionnaire (Appendix 
1).
4.5 The management framework of AIS security
Companies now are faced with contradictory requirements to deal with open systems 
on the one hand and to assure high protection standards on the other hand (Trcek 
2003). Consequently, management of IS requires a structured and disciplined process 
(Vermeulen and Von Solms 2002). In addition, an IS security management framework 
must exist not only to protect IS and information, but to ensure the continuity of the 
company (Karyda et al. 2005). Section 1 of the questionnaires collected respondents’ 
opinions concerning the management framework of AIS security within their 
companies. Consequently, this section presents and analyses respondents’ opinions 
regarding this framework and it is divided into the following sections:
4.5.1 AIS security policy
4.5.2 Security training and awareness program
4.5.3 Risk assessment
4.5.4 Incident response, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
4.5.5 Security budget
4.5.6 Security standards and certification
4.5.7 AIS security effectiveness
4.5.1 AIS security policy
There is wide agreement in the literature that the security policy is the starting point of 
security management. Whitman (2003) argued that the security policy is a company’s 
first and most important layer o f security. In addition, Wiant (2005) stated that the 
first step towards achieving good information security within a company is to ensure 
that the security policy at hand is followed, maintained, and updated. David (2002) 
also indicated that only through the implementation and enforcement of policy could 
proper security be realised. Moreover, Fulford and Doherty (2003) argued that 
effective information security management is predicated on the formulation and 
utilisation of a security policy. While Poore (1999) stated that the lack o f a security 
policy could result in the company subjecting IS and information to undue risks and
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increasing the potential for unacceptable loss, liability or harm to the company and to 
other relevant parties.
Due to the importance o f the AIS security policy, this section presents the 
questionnaire results on the existence and the frequency by which this security policy 
is updated. This section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 1.1 (Section 3.2.4 in 
Chapter 3). This hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hi r. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS security policy and the frequency of 
updating this policy.
In order to test this hypothesis, respondents were asked two questions (Section 1.1 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.1.1 addressed the existence of an AIS security policy 
within the respondents’ companies, whereas Question 1.1.2 focused on the frequency 
of updating this policy. Table 4.10 demonstrates that the majority of companies (77.4 
percent) revealed that they have a security policy. This result is consistent with results 
of earlier surveys. In their study, Fulford and Doherty (2003) revealed that 76 percent 
of UK companies have a documented security policy. The results of the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) also indicated that nearly 87.5 
percent of large UK businesses have a security policy.
Table 4.10 Cross-tabulation o f existence o f an AIS security policy by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
8
16.7
72.2
5
10.4
55.6
6
12.5
100
9
18.8
69.2
5
10.4
83.3
7
14.6
87.5
8
16.7
88.9
48
No
%
Industry %
3
21.4
27.3
4
28.6
44.4
0
0
0
4
28.6
30.8
1
7.1
16.7
1
7.1
12.5
1
7.1
11.1
14
Total 11 9 6 13 6 8 9 62
Q 1.1.1 Does your company have a written security policy covering its AIS?
In addition, the analysis by industry sector reveals that 72.7 percent of the insurance 
& financial services have an AIS security policy, while only 55.6 percent of 
manufacturing companies have a security policy in place. These results are again 
consistent with the results of the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR
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2008) which revealed that over three quarters of financial services companies have a 
security policy, while the manufacturing companies are less likely to have a security 
policy in place. The results in Table 4.10 also show that all respondents from media & 
entertainment reported that their companies have a security policy; however, this 
result is not consistent with the result of the BERR survey, which indicated that 
entertainment companies are the least likely to have a security policy.
Regarding the frequency o f updating the security policy, Table 4.11 demonstrates that
58.7 percent of companies believed that they updated their AIS security policy every 
year, 12 companies updated their security policy every two years or less frequently, 
while the other companies (15.2 percent) updated their security policy every six 
months or as required. This result is consistent with the result of Fulford and Doherty 
(2003) in which nearly 46 percent of respondents updated their policy on an annual 
basis, 38 percent updated their policy every two years or less frequently, while the 
remainder updated the policy every six months or more frequently.
Table 4.11 Cross-tabulation of frequency of updating AIS security policy by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
11.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Every 2 years 
%
Industry %
1
9.1
14.3
2
18.2
40
2
18.2
33.3
2
18.2
22.2
0
0
0
2
18.2
28.6
2
18.2
25
11
Every year 
%
Industry %
4
14.8
57.1
3
11.1
60
2
7.4
33.3
5
18.5
55.6
4
14.8
100
4
14.8
57.1
5
18.5
62.5
27
Every 6 
months
%
Industry %
2
66.7
28.6
0
0
0
1
33.3
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
As required
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
16.7
1
25
11.1
0
0
0
1
25
14.3
1
25
12.5
4
Total 7 5 6 9 4 7 8 46
Q 1.1.2 If yes, approximately how often is this policy updated?
In addition, in order to test the hypothesis and to investigate the differences among 
industry sectors regarding the existence and frequency of updating their AIS security 
policies, the chi-square test of independence, and the Kruskal-Wallis tests were
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conducted. However, in order to meet the requirements of the chi-square test, the 
seven industry sectors in Table 4.10 were combined in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12 Cross-tabulation of existence of an AIS security jolicy by industry sector
Insurance & 
financial 
services
Manufacturing
&
merchandising
Technology, media & 
telecommunications
Construction, 
energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
8
16.7
72.7
10
20.8
66.7
13
27.1
92.9
17
35.4
77.3
48
No
%
Industry %
3
21.4
27.3
5
35.7
33.3
1
7.1
7.1
5
35.7
22.7
14
Total 11 15 14 22 62
Chi-square value (x2) *  3.039, d f *  3, and p-value »  0.386
Note: Industry sectors are combined for some statistical considerations in using the chi-square test 
(Section 4.3.4)
The results of the chi-square test (Table 4.12), given that the chi-square value %2 -  
3.039, df = 3, and the p-value = 0.386 (p > 0.05), reveal that there is no significant 
association between the different industry sectors that responded and the existence of 
an AIS security policy. In addition, regarding the frequency of updating AIS security 
policy, the results o f the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.13) do not provide any evidence 
of the existence of statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 level of significance, 
among the seven industry sectors, given that p-value = 0.876 (p > 0.05).
Table 4.13 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the frequency o f updating AIS security policy
Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Insurance & financial services 7 27.57
Manufacturing 5 18.40
Media & entertainment 6 25.25
Property & construction 9 21.06
Retail merchandising 4 26
Technology & telecommunications 7 23.21
Energy & utilities 8 23.56
Chi-square value (X2) ~  2.436, d f=  6, and p-value -  0.876
The above results, therefore, do not provide any evidence to suggest that the existence 
and the frequency o f updating AIS security policies are in any way related to the 
industry sectors that responded. Consequently, H u  cannot be rejected.
Overall, the results indicate that an AIS security policy has now been adopted in the 
majority of companies that responded regardless of the industry sector. However, the 
term “security policy” has different meanings to different companies. The BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) indicated that a security policy 
could vary from a one-page policy to hundreds of pages of detailed standards. This
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issue is further investigated in more details in the follow-up interviews (Chapter 5). 
However, having a security policy alone cannot improve security awareness among 
employees. The companies, therefore, should take some steps to raise employees’ 
security awareness.
4.5.2 Security training and awareness program
Employee training and awareness is the most important of all information security 
measures (Eveloff 2005). Bowen et al. (2007) argued that security training and 
awareness is a critical component of the information security program and the vehicle 
for disseminating the security information that employees need to do their jobs. It will 
ensure that employees at all levels understand their security responsibilities to 
properly use and protect information resources entrusted to them. Security training 
and awareness are also requisites for several international standards such as ISO 
27001 and COBIT.
Due to the importance noticed in the literature regarding security training and 
awareness, this section presents the questionnaire results on the existence of a formal 
security training and awareness program for managers, employees and other users in 
UK companies. This section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 1.2 (Section 3.2.4 
in Chapter 3). This hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hi.2: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS security training and awareness 
program and the security awareness level.
In order to test the hypothesis, respondents were asked two questions (Section 1.2 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.2.1 was concerned with the existence of a formal 
security training and awareness program for managers, employees, and other users in 
UK companies, while Question 1.2.2 addressed the security awareness practices in the 
companies.
The results in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 indicate that the majority of companies that 
responded do not provide enough security training for their managers, employees and 
the other users. Table 4.14 demonstrates that only 18 companies (29 percent) provide
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security training for managers. In addition, Table 4.15 shows that 25.8 percent of 
companies provide security training for employees, while Table 4.16 shows that only 
10 companies provide security training for other users such as third parties and 
contractors.
Table 4.14 Cross-tabulation o f existence o f an AIS security training for managers by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 6 2 2 2 3 1 2 18
% 33.3 111 111 111 16.7 5.6 111
Industry % 60 20 33.3 15.4 50 12.5 22.2
No 4 8 4 11 3 7 7 44
% 9.1 18.2 9.1 25 6.8 15.9 15.9
Industry % 40 80 66.7 84.6 50 87.5 77.8
Total 10 10 6 13 6 8 9 62
Q 1.2.1 Does your company have a formal AIS security awareness and training program for its 
managers?
Table 4.15 Cross-tabulation o f existence o f an AIS security training for employees by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
5
31.3
50
2
12.5
20
2
12.5
33.3
1
6.3
7.7
2
12.5
33.3
2
12.5
25
2
12.5
22.2
16
No
%
Industry %
5
10.9
50
8
17.4
80
4
8.7
66.7
12
26.1
92.3
4
8.7
66.7
6
13
75
7
15.2
77.8
46
Total 10 10 6 13 6 8 9 62
Q 1.2.1 Does your company have a formal AIS security awareness and training program for its 
employees?
Table 4.16 Cross-tabulation o f existence o f an AIS security training for other users by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
3
30
33.3
1
10
10
2
20
33.3
1
10
7.7
1
10
20
1
10
16.7
1
10
11.1
10
No
%
Industry %
6
12.5
66.7
9
18.8
90
4
8.3
66.7
12
25
92.3
4
8.3
80
5
10.4
83.3
8
16.7
88.9
48
Total 9 10 6 13 5 6 9 58
Q 1.2.1 Does your company have a formal AIS security awareness and training program for the other 
users?
These results are, to some extent, consistent with the results of the DTT Global 
Security Survey (DTT 2005) which indicated that only 37 percent o f companies had 
provided security training for their employees. However, the results are not consistent 
with the results of the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) in 
which nearly one in eight companies did nothing to educate their staff about their 
security responsibilities. The results are not consistent either with the results of the
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CSI Survey (Richardson 2007) which revealed that 80 percent o f respondents are 
training their employees about security risks and appropriate handling of sensitive 
data.
The low level of security training and awareness presented in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 
4.16 could be because the majority of companies find it difficult to justify their 
spending on security training programs. Further verification was found in the follow- 
up interviews, which is discussed in Chapter 5.
Further analysis reveals that more than half of the insurance & financial services 
companies that responded (60 percent) provide security training for their managers 
(Table 4.14), 50 percent provide security training for their employees (Table 4.15), 
whereas only one third provide security training for the other users (Table 4.16). 
Table 4.14 shows that only one in eight technology & telecommunications companies 
(12.5 percent) provide security training for their managers. Moreover, the property & 
construction companies are the least likely to provide their managers, employees and 
other users with the relevant security training. Table 4.14 shows that 15.4 percent of 
the property & construction companies provide their managers with security training, 
while only 7.7 percent provide their employees with security training (Table 4.15), 
and another 7.7 percent provide other users with security training (Table 4.16). 
According to expectations, 80 percent of manufacturing companies do nothing to train 
their managers and employees on their security responsibilities, and only 10 percent 
provide security training to other users.
These results are consistent with the literature. There is wide agreement that some 
industry sectors such as financial services companies are more concerned with 
information security, and therefore, devote more efforts to raising the security 
awareness o f their staff. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) indicated that financial services 
companies tend to invest more resources in IS and obtain more benefits from IS than 
other companies. Goodhue and Straub (1991) argued that financial services 
companies are more likely than other companies to rely extensively on IS for their 
business operations. In addition, IS generally plays a more strategic and critical role in 
finance than in other sectors (Jamvenpaa and Ives 1990), and therefore, they are more 
concerned about giving their managers, employees and other users the relevant
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security training. By contrast, manufacturing companies have more internal operations 
and transaction processes and thus may require fewer strategic IS applications (King 
1994), and therefore, these companies do not devote much effort or resources to 
giving their staff and other users the appropriate security training.
Table 4.17 Results o f chi-square test for the existence o f security training
Existence o f AIS security training t df p-value
Managers 6.343 3 0.096
Employees 4.820 3 0.185
Other users 3.324 3 0.344
Although some differences are noticed between industry sectors, the results of the chi- 
square test (Table 4.17) provide no evidence for any statistically significant 
association between the different industry sectors in the UK and the existence o f AIS 
security training programs for managers, employees and the other users, given that, %2 
= 6.343, 4.820, and 3.324, and the p-values = 0.096, 0.185, and 0.344 respectively.
Table 4.18 Cross-tabulation o f regular communication of security awareness issues by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Strongly
disagree
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
7.7
0
0
0
1
50
12.5
0
0
0
2
Disagree
%
Industry %
2
11.1
18.2
5
27.8
50
0
0
0
3
16.7
23.1
2
11.1
28.6
2
11.1
25
4
22.2
44.4
18
Neither agree 
nor disagree
%
Industry %
1
8.3
9.1
1
8.3
10
3
25
50
4
33.3
30.8
2
16.7
28.6
0
0
0
1
8.3
11.1
12
Agree
%
Industry %
7
26.9
63.6
4
15.4
40
I
3.8
16.7
4
15.4
30.8
2
7.7
28.6
4
15.4
50
4
15.4
44.4
26
Strongly agree
%
Industry %
1
16.7
9.1
0
0
0
2
33.3
33.3
1
16.7
7.7
1
16.7
14.3
1
16.7
12.5
0
0
0
6
Total 11 10 6 13 7 8 9 64
Q 1.2.2 Please indicate your level o f agreement with the following statement: Your company 
communicates security awareness issues to its managers and employees regularly.
Furthermore, in order to assess the security awareness level among UK companies, 
respondents were given four statements regarding security awareness practices within 
their companies and were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the 
four statements on a scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
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The first statement asked respondents whether their companies communicate security 
awareness issues to the employees regularly. The results in Table 4.18 show that 32 
respondents (50 percent) agreed or strongly agreed, whereas, 31.2 percent disagreed 
or strongly disagreed. Further analysis reveals that 72.7 percent of the insurance & 
financial services companies agreed or strongly agreed that there is a regular 
communication o f security awareness issues to employees, followed by technology & 
telecommunications companies (62.5 percent), whereas 50 percent of the 
manufacturing companies disagreed with the first statement. This result reflects the 
fact that financial companies are more concerned about security than the other sectors.
Table 4.19 Cross-tabulation o f communication o f security awareness issues in response to specific 
  _________   incidents by industry sector______ ________________ ________
Insurance
&
financial Manufacturing
Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
services
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Strongly
disagree
%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Industry % 0 0 0 7.7 0 0 0
Disagree
%
0
0
3
50
0
0
1
16.7
0
0
0
0
2
33.3
6
Industry % 0 30 0 7.7 0 0 22.2
Neither agree 3 0 1 0 1 0 2 7
nor disagree
% 42.9 0 14.3 0 14.3 0 28.6
Industry % 27.3 0 16.7 0 14.3 0 22.2
Agree
%
6
18.2
5
15.2
3
9.1
8
24.2
4
12.1
2
6.1
5
15.2
33
Industry % 54.5 50 50 61.5 57.1 25 55.6
Strongly agree
%
2
11.8
2
11.8
2
11.8
3
17.6
2
11.8
6
35.3
0
0
17
Industry % 18.2 20 33.3 23.1 28.6 75 0
Total 11 10 6 13 7 8 9 64
Q 1.2.2 Please indicate your level o f agreement with the following statement: Your company 
communicates security awareness issues to its managers and employees in response to specific 
incidents.
The second statement asked respondents whether their companies communicate 
security awareness issues to their employees in response to specific incidents. Table 
4.19 shows that the majority of the respondents (78.1 percent) agreed or strongly 
agreed. Further analysis reveals that all technology & telecommunications companies 
agreed or strongly agreed that security awareness issues are communicated in 
response to specific incidents, followed by retail merchandising (85.7 percent), 
property & construction (84.6 percent), and media & entertainment (83.3 percent), 
while only 55.6 percent of the energy & utilities companies agreed on the second 
statement.
- 180-
Regarding the third statement, respondents were asked to indicate whether their 
companies supply employees with security awareness materials such as staff 
handbook, brochures, and intranet pages. It can be seen from Table 4.20 that the 
majority of respondents (70.3 percent) agreed or strongly agreed, while only 20.3 
percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. In addition, the analysis by industry sector 
revealed that eight out o f nine respondents from energy & utilities companies (88.9 
percent) agreed or strongly agreed that their companies are supplying employees with 
security awareness materials, although only 44.4 percent from the same sector agreed 
with the first statement and 55.6 percent agreed with the second statement.
Table 4.20 Cross-tabulation o f frequency of supplying employees with security awareness materials by 
___________________________   industry sector_________________ _________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
S trong ly
d isagree
%
Industry  %
2
66.7
18.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
D isag ree
%
Industry  %
1
10
9.1
5
50
50
0
0
0
2
20
15.4
1
10
14.3
1
10
12.5
0
0
0
10
N eith e r agree  
n o r d isagree
%
Industry  %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
16.7
16.7
4
66.7
30.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
16.7
11.1
6
A gree
%
Industry  %
5
15.2
45.5
5
15.2
50
4
12.1
66.7
6
18.2
46.2
3
9.1
42.9
4
12.1
50
6
18.2
66.7
33
S trong ly  agree
%
Industry  %
3
25
27.3
0
0
0
1
8.3
16.7
1
8.3
7.7
2
16.7
28.6
3
25
37.5
2
16.7
22.2
12
Total 11 10 6 13 7 8 9 64
Q 1.2.2 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: Your company supplies 
its managers and employees with security awareness materials e.g. staff handbook, brochures, posters, 
intranet pages.
In addition, it can be seen from Table 4.20 that 87.5 percent of technology & 
telecommunications companies agreed or strongly agreed, followed by media & 
entertainment (83.3 percent), whereas only half of the respondents from 
manufacturing companies agreed with the third statement. The results imply that 
energy & utilities and technology & telecommunications companies are more 
concerned with supplying their employees with security awareness materials than the 
other sectors.
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T a b le  4 .2 1  C r o s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  r e g u la r  te s t in g  o f  s e c u r i ty  a w a r e n e s s  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
S trongly
d isagree
%
Industry  %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
8.3
1
33.3
14.3
0
0
0
1
33.3
11.1
3
D isagree
%
Industry  %
4
16
36.4
8
32
80
1
4
16.7
4
16
33.3
1
4
14.3
3
12
37.5
4
16
44.4
25
N either ag ree  
nor d isagree
%
Industry  %
4
23.5
36.4
0
0
0
4
23..5 
66.7
3
17.6
25
3
17.6
42.9
1
5.9
12.5
2
11.8
22.2
17
A gree
%
Industry  %
0
0
0
1
9.1
10
0
0
0
3
27.3
25
1
9.1
14.3
4
36.4
50
2
18.2
22.2
11
Strongly agree
%
Industry  %
3
42.9
27.3
1
14.3
10
1
14.3
16.7
1
14.3
8.3
1
14.3
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
Total 11 10 6 12 7 8 9 63
Q 1.2.2 Please indicate your level o f agreement with the following statement: Your company conducts 
regular testing o f security awareness.
The fourth statement asked respondents whether their companies conduct regular 
testing of security awareness. Although there is a wide agreement on the importance 
of testing security awareness, Table 4.21 shows that only 28.6 percent of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that their companies conduct regular testing of security 
awareness, while 44.4 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. This result is 
consistent with the CSI Survey (Richardson 2007) in which 35 percent of respondents 
made no effort to test security awareness or to measure the effect o f security training 
on the company.
It can be seen from Table 4.21 that four fifths of respondents from manufacturing 
companies disagreed, 55.6 percent of energy & utilities companies disagreed or 
strongly disagreed, and 37.5 percent of technology & telecommunications companies 
disagreed. This level of disagreement among all industry sectors that responded might 
be due to the limited time and resources devoted to security training and awareness. 
These results are consistent with the interviews’ results, which are investigated in 
more detail in Chapter 5.
Moreover, in order to test the hypothesis and to examine whether the security 
awareness level differs among industry sectors, the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted. The results (Table 4.22) do not indicate any statistically significant 
differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses between industry sectors
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except for the second statement. The results imply that there are significant 
differences, at the 0.05 level, among UK companies in different industry sectors 
regarding the communication of security awareness issues in response to specific 
incidents, given that p-value = 0.032 (p < 0.05). On the other hand, there are no 
significant differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses between 
industry sectors regarding the first, third, and fourth statements, given that their p- 
values are 0.546, 0.222, and 0.607 respectively.
Table 4.22 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the security awareness practices in companies
Security awareness 
practices Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Regular communication o f  
security awareness issues
Insurance & financial services 11 39.05
Manufacturing 10 26.60
Media & entertainment 6 41.33
Property & construction 13 29.65
Retail merchandising 7 32.64
Technology & telecommunications 8 33.50
Energy & utilities 9 28.28
Chi-square value (x 2)  ”  4.985, d f = 6, and p-value =  0.546
Communication o f security 
awareness issues in response 
to specific incidents
Insurance & financial services 11 30.09
Manufacturing 10 28.05
Media & entertainment 6 36
Property & construction 13 32.42
Retail merchandising 7 35.29
Technology & telecommunications 8 49.75
Energy & utilities 9 20.67
Chi-square value (x2) -  13.804, d f= 6 , and p-value =  0.032
Supplying employees 
with security awareness 
materials
Insurance & financial services 11 33.45
Manufacturing 10 22.25
Media & entertainment 6 36.50
Property & construction 13 27.50
Retail merchandising 7 33.64
Technology & telecommunications 8 41
Energy & utilities 9 38.83
Chi-square value(x2) = 8.229, d f =  6, and p-value-0 ,2 2 2
Regular testing of  
security awareness
Insurance & financial services 11 35.64
Manufacturing 10 23.90
Media & entertainment 6 37.33
Property & construction 12 32.50
Retail merchandising 7 34.29
Technology & telecommunications 8 36.13
Energy & utilities 9 26.89
Chi-square value (x2) =  4,517, d f =* 6, and p-value =  0.607
In short, from the responses to the questions in this section, it was found that some 
sectors are taking more steps to provide their employees with security training and to 
raise their awareness such as the insurance & financial services sector, whereas the 
manufacturing sector does not devote enough effort to training their employees or 
raising their security awareness.
4.5.3 Risk assessment
Risk assessment is often the basis for an information security program (Wiant 2005). 
Since the nature and degree of threats facing companies vary there needs to be a risk
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assessment of the likelihood that security will be compromised (Dutta and McCrohan 
2002). In addition, companies are requested today to perform a risk assessment for 
their financial risks (Gomez and Paxmann 2006). Furthermore, to comply with the 
security standards such as ISO 27001, companies must demonstrate the use of a risk 
assessment methodology suited to their business, considering information security, 
legal and regulatory requirements (Kouns 2007).
Due to the importance of risk assessment, this section presents the questionnaire 
results on the existence of an AIS risk assessment program, the frequency of 
undertaking this program, and the risk assessment activities in UK companies. This 
section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 1.3 (Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). The 
hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hi.3: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of an AIS risk assessment program and the 
frequency of undertaking this program.
In order to test this hypothesis, respondents were asked three questions (Section 1.3 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.3.1 was concerned with the existence of security risk 
assessment programs in UK companies, Question 1.3.2 focused on the frequency of 
undertaking this risk assessment, while Question 1.3.3 addressed the risk assessment 
activities in the companies.
Table 4.23 Cross-tabulation of existence of an AIS risk assessment program by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 7 3 6 7 4 5 6 38
% 18.4 7.2 15.8 18.4 10.5 13.2 15.8
Industry % 70 42.9 100 53.8 66.7 62.5 66.7
No 3 4 0 6 2 3 3 21
% 14.3 19 0 28.6 9.5 14.3 14.3
Industry % 30 57.1 0 46.2 33.3 37.5 33.3
Total 10 7 6 13 6 8 9 59
Q 1.3.1 Does your company have an AIS risk assessment program?
Regarding the first question, Table 4.23 demonstrates that 38 respondents (64.4 
percent) have security risk assessment programs, whereas 35.6 percent of respondents 
do not undertake any risk assessment for their AIS security. These results are
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consistent, to some extent, with the results of the BERR Information Security 
Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) in which 77 percent of large UK companies have a 
security risk assessment process.
It is clear from Table 4.23 that 35.6 percent of the companies do not undertake any 
AIS security risk assessment. This result could be because some companies do not 
have a risk assessment program especially for AIS security, but they undertake a 
security risk assessment for their companies’ IS in general. This issue is investigated 
in more detail in Chapter 5.
In addition, further analysis (Table 4.23) reveals that 70 percent o f the insurance & 
financial services companies have an AIS security risk assessment program in place. 
This result is again consistent with the results of the BERR Information Security 
Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which stated that nearly three quarters of financial 
services companies carry out a formal assessment of their security risks. On the other 
hand, the results show that all respondents from media & entertainment companies 
have an AIS risk assessment program, which is not consistent with the results of the 
BERR survey in which entertainment companies are the least likely to have any risk 
assessment procedures. These results are encouraging and indicate that the media & 
entertainment sector is beginning to be more concerned with security and is taking 
some steps in identifying threats and in assessing security risks.
Moreover, in order to test whether the existence of a risk assessment program is 
related to the companies’ industry sector, a chi-square test was conducted. The results 
provide no evidence of any statistically significant association between the different 
sectors that responded and the existence of a risk assessment program, given that %2 = 
2.265, df = 3, and p-value = 0.519 (p > 0.05).
The second question in this section (Question 1.3.2) addressed the frequency by 
which UK companies undertake risk assessment for their AIS security. Table 4.24 
shows that the majority of companies that responded (86.1 percent) undertake risk 
assessment for their AIS security every year or more frequently, while only 13.9 
percent undertake risk assessment every two years or less frequently. This result is 
consistent with the Global State of Information Security Survey (Berinato 2007) in
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which nearly four out of five companies conducted risk assessment at least 
periodically.
Table 4.24 Cross-tabulation o f frequency of undertaking an AIS risk assessment by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
livery 2 years 
%
Industry %
1
25
16.7
1
25
33.3
1
25
16.7
1
25
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
Every year 
%
Industry %
3
13
50
2
8.7
66.7
4
17.4
66.7
2
8.7
28.6
3
13
100
4
17.4
80
5
21.7
83.3
23
Every 6 
months
%
Industry %
2
25
33.3
0
0
0
1
12.5
16.7
3
37.5
42.9
0
0
0
1
12.5
20
1
12.5
16.7
8
Total 6 3 6 7 3 5 6 36
Q 1.3.2 If yes, approximately how often does your company undertake this risk assessment for its AIS 
security?
Interestingly, further analysis reveals that all retail merchandising, technology & 
telecommunications, and energy & utilities companies undertake risk assessment for 
their AIS security every year or more frequently, followed by insurance & financial 
services, and media & entertainment (83.3 percent).
Table 4.25 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the frequency o f undertaking AIS risk assessment
Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Insurance & financial services 6 19.92
Manufacturing 3 12.50
Media & entertainment 6 17.33
Property & construction 7 19.43
Retail merchandising 3 17
Technology & telecommunications 5 20.10
Energy & utilities 6 19.58
Chi-square value (%2)  =  1.992, d f *  6, and p-value =  0.920
In order to test whether the frequency with which companies undertake risk 
assessment is related to industry sector, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The 
results (Table 4.25) do not indicate any statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 
level, in the distribution of responses between sectors regarding the frequency of 
undertaking an AIS security risk assessment. This result indicates that since threats 
vary over time, companies are more concerned with assessing their security risks 
periodically and with reassessing the effectiveness of their security controls.
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Furthermore, in order to investigate the risk assessment activities within UK 
companies, respondents were given four statements in Question 1.3.3 of the 
questionnaire and were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the four 
statements on a scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The first 
statement asked respondents whether their companies assess risks and identify AIS 
security threats regularly. The results in Table 4.26 demonstrate that 57.4 percent of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their companies assess risks and identify 
security threats regularly, while 19.7 percent disagreed.
Table 4.26 Cross-tabulation o f the regular assessment of AIS security risks by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Disagree
%
Industry %
1
8.3
10
3
25
33.3
0
0
0
2
16.7
15.4
2
16.7
28.8
2
16.7
28.6
2
16.7
22.2
12
Neither agree 
nor disagree
%
Industry %
4
28.6
40
2
14.3
22.2
2
14.3
33.3
3
21.4
23.1
1
7.1
14.3
1
7.1
14.3
1
7.1
11.1
14
Agree
%
Industry %
4
13.8
40
4
13.8
44.4
2
6.9
33.3
7
24.1
53.8
3
10.3
42.9
3
10.3
42.9
6
20.7
66.7
29
Strongly agree
%
Industry %
1
16.7
10
0
0
0
2
33.3
33.3
1
16.7
7.7
1
16.7
14.3
1
16.7
14.3
0
0
0
6
Total 10 9 6 13 7 7 9 61
Q 1.3.3 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: Risks
are assessed and threats to the AIS security are identified regularly.
Interestingly, further analysis reveals that two thirds of media & entertainment and 
energy & utilities companies (66.7 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that risks are 
assessed and security threats are identified regularly, while 50 percent of insurance & 
financial services companies agreed or strongly agreed. These results are consistent 
with the results of Question 1.3.1 in which all the media & entertainment companies 
have an AIS risk assessment program. These results suggest that media & 
entertainment companies are beginning to be more concerned with assessing their 
risks and with identifying their security threats.
In the second statement, respondents were asked whether security controls identified 
within the risk assessment process provide sufficient protection against threats. It can 
be seen from Table 4.27 that 83.6 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, 
while only 6.6 percent disagreed. These results, therefore, imply that nearly four fifths
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of the companies that responded believe that they have sufficient security controls in 
place. These results are further investigated in Section 4.7.
Table 4.27 Cross-tabulation of defining controls and providing sufficient protection against threats by 
  _________   industry sector___________ ________________ _________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Disagree
%
Industry %
0
0
0
2
50
22.2
0
0
0
1
25
7.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
11.1
4
Neither agree 
nor disagree
%
Industry %
1
16.7
10
2
33.3
22.2
0
0
0
1
16.7
7.7
0
0
0
1
16.7
14.3
1
16.7
11.1
6
Agree
%
Industry %
8
21.6
80
5
13.5
55.6
4
10.8
66.7
8
21.6
61.5
3
8.1
42.9
4
10.8
57.1
5
13.5
55.6
37
Strongly agree
%
Industry %
1
7.1
10
0
0
0
2
14.3
33.3
3
21.4
23.1
4
28.6
57.1
2
14.3
28.6
2
14.3
22.2
14
Total 10 9 6 13 7 7 9 61
Q 1.3.3 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Controls are defined and provide sufficient protection against threats
Interestingly, further analysis reveals again that all respondents from media & 
entertainment companies agreed or strongly agreed that security controls identified 
within risk assessment process provide sufficient protection against threats. There are 
also high levels of agreement among retail merchandising (100 percent), and 
insurance & financial services (90 percent), while only 55.6 percent of manufacturing 
companies agreed that they have sufficient protection against security threats.
Table 4.28 Cross-tabulation o f ranking assets by their sensitivity and criticality by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
S trong ly
d isagree
%
Industry  %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
14.3
0
0
0
1
D isagree
%
Industry  %
3
25
30
2
16.7
2 2 .2
1
8.3
16.7
2
16.7
15.4
1
8.3
14.3
1
8.3
14.3
2
16.7
22.2
12
N either agree  
nor d isagree
%
Industry  %
2
15.4
20
2
15.4
22 .2
0
0
0
5
38.5
38.5
1
7.7
14.3
2
15.4
28 .6
1
7.7
11.1
13
A gree
%
Industry  %
4
15.4
4 0
3
11.5
33 .3
3
11.5
50
5
19.2
38 .5
3
11.5
4 2 .9
3
11.5
4 2 .9
5
19.2
55.6
2 6
S trong ly  agree
%
Industry  %
1
11.1
10
2
2 2 .2
2 2 .2
2
22 .2
33.3
1
11.1
7.7
2
22 .2
2 8 .6
0
0
0
1
11.1
11.1
9
Total 10 9 6 13 7 7 9 61
Q 1.3.3 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: Assets
are identified and ranked by their value, sensitivity and criticality to the company.
- 188-
Regarding the third statement, respondents were asked whether assets are identified 
and ranked by their value, sensitivity, and criticality to their companies. Table 4.28 
shows that 57.4 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed, which is the 
same percentage o f respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the first 
statement. These results, therefore, imply that the companies that assess and identify 
AIS security threats regularly identify and rank assets by their sensitivity and 
criticality to the company as well.
Further analysis reveals that again there are high levels of agreement among media & 
entertainment companies (83.3 percent) that assets are identified and ranked by their 
sensitivity and criticality, while only half of the respondents from insurance & 
financial services and 42.9 percent of technology & telecommunications companies 
agreed or strongly agreed. These results are unexpected given the nature of the 
technology & telecommunications companies. Consequently, these results are 
investigated in more detail in the interview findings.
Table 4.29 Cross-tabulation o f undertaking risk assessment after significant changes by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
D isagree
%
industry  %
0
0
0
3
42.9
33.3
0
0
0
1
14.3
7.7
1
14.3
14.3
0
0
0
2
28.6
22.2
7
N eith e r agree 
nor d isagree
%
Industry  %
2
15.4
20
2
15.4
22.2
2
15.4
33.3
2
15.4
15.4
2
15.4
28.6
1
7.7
14.3
2
15.4
22.2
13
A gree
%
Industry  %
6
18.8
60
4
12.5
44.4
2
6.3
33.3
8
25
61.5
2
6.3
28.6
5
15.6
71.4
5
15.6
55.6
32
S trong ly  agree 
%
Industry  %
2
22.2
20
0
0
0
2
22.2
33.3
2
22.2
15.4
2
22.2
28.6
1
11.1
14.3
0
0
0
9
Total 10 9 6 13 7 7 9 61
Q 1.3.3 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
company undertakes risk assessment when a significant change in the company’s environment occurs.
The fourth statement asked- respondents whether their companies undertake risk 
assessment if  a significant change in the companies’ environment occurs. The results 
in Table 4.29 reveal that nearly two thirds of companies (67.2 percent) agreed or 
strongly agreed, while only 11.5 percent disagreed. A detailed analysis by industry 
sector reveals that 85.7 percent of technology & telecommunications companies 
agreed or strongly agreed, whereas 44.4 percent of the respondents from 
manufacturing companies agreed. It is clear from Tables 4.27 and 4.29 that the
- 189-
technology & telecommunications companies who agreed with the second statement 
(85.7 percent) agreed with the fourth statement (85.7 percent). These results imply 
that the companies that undertake risk assessment in response to any significant 
change in companies’ environment also believe that security controls identified within 
the risk assessment process provide sufficient protection against threats.
Moreover, in order to test whether risk assessment activities mentioned in the four 
statements differ among the industry sectors that responded, a Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted. The analysis of responses (Table 4.30) does not indicate any significant 
differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses between the seven 
industry sectors for any of the four statements, given that their p-values are 0.809, 
0.062, 0.591, and 0.258 for statements 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
Table 4.30 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the risk assessment activities in companies
Risk assessment 
activities Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Regular assessment o f  
AIS security risks
Insurance & financial services 10 30.70
Manufacturing 9 24.72
Media & entertainment 6 39.67
Property & construction 13 32.08
Retail merchandising 7 30.57
Technology & telecommunications 7 30.57
Energy & utilities 9 30.94
Chi-square value (%a) *  2.998, d f *  6, and p-value •  0.809
Defining controls and 
providing sufficient protection 
against threats
Insurance & financial services 10 29.40
Manufacturing 9 18.33
Media & entertainment 6 37.50
Property & construction 13 31.19
Retail merchandising 7 43.57
Technology & telecommunications 7 33.21
Energy & utilities 9 29.33
Chi-square value (x2) -  12.003, d f =  6, and p-value = 0.062
Ranking assets by their sensitivity 
and criticality to the company
Insurance & financial services 10 27.75
Manufacturing 9 31.94
Media & entertainment 6 40
Property & construction 13 28.42
Retail merchandising 7 37.14
Technology & telecommunications 7 23.86
Energy & utilities 9 32.17
Chi-square value ( x 2)  =  4.640, df =  6, and p-value = 0.591
Undertaking risk assessment 
in case o f significant changes
Insurance & financial services 10 36.10
Manufacturing 9 20.67
Media & entertainment 6 35.83
Property & construction 13 33.69
Retail merchandising 7 31.29
Technology & telecommunications 7 36.21
Energy & utilities 9 24.28
Chi-square value (x2) ~  7.742, d f88 6, and p-value = 0.258
There is no evidence from the above results to indicate that significant differences 
exist among UK companies in different industry sectors concerning the existence of 
an AIS risk assessment program and the frequency of undertaking this program. These 
results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.3 and, therefore, the hypothesis can be
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accepted. These results were followed up in the interviews and further explanations 
are offered in Chapter 5.
4.5.4 Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
Recent surveys for instance the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 
2008) have revealed that fewer companies had security incidents in the last year than 
two years previously; however, the average seriousness of incidents had increased. It 
is, therefore, vital for all types of companies to have security incident handling 
procedures in place in order to deal with these incidents. Incident handling procedures 
can provide the ability to react quickly and efficiently to any disruption in normal 
business processes (Grance et al. 2003). In addition, a business continuity plan is a 
critical component of the security management system (Smith and Jamieson 2006). 
This plan defines how the continuity of the businesses processes is to be maintained in 
the event of a disaster (Nosworthy 2000). The business continuity plan assures the IS 
availability in the case of a crisis or other serious disruption in services. This 
continuity plan must be a living document (Rodetis 1999) and must be maintained up- 
to-date with the state of the company (Landry 2006).
Due to the importance of the incident handling procedures and business continuity 
plans in today’s business environment, this section presents the questionnaire results 
on the numbers and types of security incidents facing UK companies. It also presents 
the results regarding the existence of security incident handling procedures, length of 
time to restore normal business operations after a serious security incident, and the 
actions undertaken by companies to reduce future incidents. In addition, this section 
presents the results regarding the existence of a formal business continuity plan and 
the frequency of testing and reviewing this plan. This section is concerned with 
testing Hypothesis 1.4 (Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). This hypothesis can be presented 
as follows:
Hi.4: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of security incident handling procedures, disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans and the frequency of testing and updating 
these plans.
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In order to test the hypothesis, respondents were asked seven questions (Section 1.4 of 
the questionnaire). The first three questions addressed the numbers and types of 
security incidents that UK companies had faced in the previous year. Respondents 
were asked first if their companies had experienced any AIS security incidents.
Table 4.31 demonstrates that only 11 respondents (17.2 percent) stated that their 
companies had experienced AIS security incidents in the previous year, whereas 82.8 
percent of the companies claimed that they had not experienced any security 
incidents.
Table 4.31 Cross-tabulation o f occurrence o f AIS security incidents in the last year by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
2
18.2
18.2
2
18.2
20
1
9.1
16.7
1
9.1
7.7
2
18.2
28.6
2
18.2
25
1
9.1
11.1
11
No
%
Industry %
9
17
81.8
8
15.1
80
5
9.4
83.3
12
22.6
92.3
5
9.4
71.4
6
11.3
75
8
15.1
88.9
53
Total 11 10 6 13 7 8 9 64
Q 1.4.1 Has your company experienced any AIS security incidents in the last year?
This result is consistent, to some extent, with the result of the BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) in which under half of UK businesses had 
experienced security incidents in 2007. However, it stated that these figures could be 
under-estimated for several reasons. Some security incidents such as system failure 
and virus infection are no longer regarded by management as security breaches. In 
addition, many companies still lack the controls that would enable them to detect all 
incidents in certain areas such as staff misuse and system penetration. Some 
companies are also under-estimating risks posed by new technologies such as USB 
sticks, and therefore are not aware enough of the security breaches involving them. 
Moreover, many companies are under-reporting the exact number of security 
incidents. This result is further investigated in the next chapter using data collected in 
the interviews.
In addition, further analysis (Table 4.31) reveals that there are no significant 
differences between the industry sectors regarding the occurrence of security incidents 
in the previous year. The majority of property & construction companies (92.3
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percent) claimed that they had no security incidents in the previous year, followed by 
energy & utilities (88.9 percent), media & entertainment (83.3 percent), insurance & 
financial services (81.8 percent), and manufacturing (80 percent).
This question was followed-up by asking respondents about the average number of 
security incidents their companies experienced in the last year (Question 1.4.2). It can 
be seen from Table 4.32 that 9 respondents (81.8 percent) out of the 11 respondents 
who reported that they had had security incidents in the previous year, stated that their 
companies experienced from one to five security incidents, while only two companies 
(18.2 percent) had had more than 15 incidents.
Table 4.32 Cross-tabulation o f number o f security incidents in the last year by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
1 -5 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 9
% 0 22.2 111 11.1 22.2 22.2 11.1
Industry % 0 100 100 100 100 100 100
More than 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
15
% 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Industry % 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 11
Q 1.4.2 What is the average number of security incidents your company experienced in the last year?
Interestingly, further analysis reveals that the only respondents who stated that their 
companies had more than 15 security incidents in the previous year are from the 
insurance & financial services sector, while the other sectors had from one to five 
security incidents. This result is consistent with the Global State of Information 
Security Survey (Berinato 2007) which stated that over the years, respondents in the 
financial services sector have reported more security incidents without a significant 
increase in losses or downtime as a result. Consequently, financial services companies 
are attacked more but suffer less than other sectors.
The respondents were then atsked about the worst security incidents their companies 
had faced in the previous year. Table 4.33 reveals that four companies had suffered 
from financial fraud, two companies suffered from unauthorised access to data or 
systems by current employees, while 10 percent suffered from unauthorised access to 
data or systems by former employees, virus attacks, data loss or internet misuse. 
These results are consistent with the results of the CSI Survey (Richardson 2007) in
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which financial fraud was the source of the greatest financial losses to the companies. 
The CSI Survey also stated that financial fraud together with data loss account for 
nearly half o f the overall reported losses.
Table 4.33 Cross-tabulation o f the worst security incident in the last year by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy
& Total
services
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Financial fraud 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4
% 25 25 25 0 25 0 0
Industry % 100 50 100 0 50 0 0
Unauthorised 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
access to
data/systems by 
former
employees
% 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 50 0
Unauthorised 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
access to
data/systems by
current
employees
% 0 0 0 0 0 50 50
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 50 100
Virus attacks 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
% 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 50 0 0
Data Loss 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
% 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 50 0 0 0 0 0
Internet misuse 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
% 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
Total 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 10
Q 1.4.3 What was the worst security incident faced by your company in the last year?
In addition, further analysis (Table 4.33) reveals that insurance & financial services, 
manufacturing, media & entertainment, and retail merchandising are the most likely 
sectors to suffer from financial fraud. Manufacturing companies also suffer from data 
loss, while retail merchandising also suffers from virus attacks.
The results also reveal that technology & telecommunications and energy & utilities 
companies suffer from unauthorised access to data or systems by employees, while 
property & construction companies suffer from internet misuse. However, these 
results are not consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey 
(BERR 2008) in which the companies that suffer most from unauthorised access to 
data and systems are in the financial services and manufacturing sectors. These results 
are further investigated in Section 4.6.
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This question was followed up by asking respondents whether their companies have 
any formal security incident handling procedures to deal with the security incidents 
they could face. The results in Table 4.34 show that 68.3 percent o f companies have 
security incident handling procedures in place, while 31.7 percent have no procedures. 
The results indicate that most of UK companies now have formal procedures to 
respond to security incidents when they arise. This result is consistent with the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that nearly 56 
percent of businesses have procedures to respond to incidents.
Table 4.34 Cross-tabulation o f the existence o f security incident handling procedures by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 8 3 5 7 6 5 7 41
% 19.5 7.3 12.2 17.1 14.6 12.2 17.1
Industry % 80 33.3 83.3 58.3 100 62.5 77.8
No 2 6 1 5 0 3 2 19
% 10.5 31.6 5.3 26.3 0 15.8 10.5
Industry % 20 66.7 16.7 41.7 0 37.5 22.2
Total 10 9 6 12 6 8 9 60
Q 1.4.4 Does your company have formal security incident handling procedures?
Further analysis reveals that the majority of companies in most o f the sectors have 
procedures to deal with security incidents. All retail merchandising companies have 
formal procedures, followed by media & entertainment (83.3 percent), insurance & 
financial services (80 percent), energy & utilities (77.8 percent), technology & 
telecommunications (62.5 percent) and property & construction (58.3 percent). On the 
other hand, the results reveal that only 33.3 percent of manufacturing companies have 
formal procedures to deal with security incidents. These results are consistent with the 
results in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, which revealed that nearly half of the 
manufacturing companies have a security policy yet 80 percent do nothing to train 
their managers and employees on their security responsibilities. These results indicate 
that the manufacturing sector is the least concerned with AIS security.
Moreover, in order to test > whether the existence of security incident handling 
procedures is related to the companies’ industry sector, a chi-square test was 
conducted. The results provide no evidence that there are significant association 
between the different sectors that responded and the existence of security incident 
handling procedures given that %2 = 1.199, df = 3, and p-value = 0.753 (p > 0.05).
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The respondents were then asked about the length of time taken by their companies to 
restore normal business operations after the worst security incident (Question 1.4.5). 
It can be seen from Table 4.35 that 68.2 percent of companies took just one day to 
restore normal operations after the worst security incident and 22.7 percent needed 
between a day and a week. On the other hand, only 9.1 percent o f companies took 
between a week and a month to restore normal business operations.
Table 4.35 Cross-tabulation o f length o f time to restore normal business operations after the worst 
_________   incident by industry sector_____ ________________ _________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
A day
%
Industry %
1
6.7
33.3
2
13.3
66.7
1
6.7
100
4
26.7
80
3
20
75
2
13.3
100
2
13.3
50
15
Between a 
day and a 
week
%
Industry %
1
20
33.3
1
20
33.3
0
0
0
1
20
20
1
20
25
0
0
0
1
20
25
5
Between a 
week and a 
month
%
Industry %
1
50
33.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
25
2
Total 3 3 1 5 4 2 4 22
Q 1.4.5 How long did it take to restore normal business operations after the worst security incident?
Analysis by industry sector reveals that the only companies that took between a week 
and a month to restore normal business operations after the worst security incident are 
from insurance & financial services and the energy & utilities sectors. This could be 
because these two sectors are dealing with thousands of customers’ data, and 
therefore, if any security incident arises, it takes them weeks to restore normal 
business operations. On the other hand, media & entertainment and technology & 
telecommunications companies took only one day to restore normal operations after 
the worst incident.
In order to investigate whether the actions undertaken by UK companies after a 
security incident vary by industry sector, respondents were given a list of actions 
(Question 1.4.6) and were asked to select the actions undertaken by their companies. 
Table 4.36 shows that the majority of companies (69.4 percent) improve their disaster 
recovery and business continuity plan to reduce future incidents. In addition, half of 
the companies update their security policy, less than half (47.2 percent) undertake a 
security audit after suffering from a security incident, 44.4 percent improve their
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back-up systems and 41.7 percent improve security awareness and training. On the 
other hand, only 33.3 percent of companies update their detection software or allocate 
sufficient budget to security to reduce future incidents, whereas nearly one tenth of 
companies do not take any action after suffering from security incidents.
Table 4.36 Actions undertaken by companies after a security incident
Actions undertaken after a security 
incident
Action is 
undertaken
Action is not 
undertaken Total
no % no %
Updating the security policy 18 50 18 50 36
Improving security awareness and training at all levels 15 41.7 21 58.3 36
Improving the back-up system 16 44.4 20 55.6 36
Improving the disaster recovery and business continuity plan 25 69.4 11 30.6 36
Updating detection software 12 33.3 24 66.7 36
Undertaking security audit 17 47.2 19 52.8 36
Allocating sufficient budget and resources to security 12 33.3 24 66.7 36
No actions were undertaken 4 11.1 32 88.9 36
Q 1.4.6 After a security incident, what actions are undertaken by the company to reduce future 
incidents?
Further analysis (Table 4.37) reveals that property & construction companies 
undertake most of the actions to reduce future incidents. The results show that 85.7 
percent of property & construction companies improve disaster recovery and their 
business continuity plan after security incidents, 71.4 percent stated that they update 
their security policy, improve security awareness and training, improve back-up 
systems, undertake a security audit and allocate sufficient budget to security. On the 
other hand, only 42.9 percent of property & construction companies update their 
detection software. The results also reveal that all technology & telecommunications 
companies improve security awareness and training after a security incident. This 
result in conjunction with the results in Section 4.5.2 suggest that technology & 
telecommunications companies are not providing their managers and employees with 
regular security training, but they are more concerned with providing them with the 
relevant security training and awareness in response to security incidents. The results 
also reveal that none of the retail merchandising companies update their detection 
software after a security incident, but 20 percent improve security training and 
awareness, and 40 percent update their security policy, improve their back-up system, 
undertake a security audit, or allocate sufficient budget to security. These results 
indicate that retail merchandising companies do not take sufficient action after 
security incidents, although the previous results showed that they had suffered from 
financial fraud and virus attacks in the last year. These results are further discussed in 
Chapter 5.
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T a b le  4 .3 7  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  a c t io n s  u n d e r ta k e n  b y  c o m p a n ie s  a f te r  a  s e c u r i ty  in c id e n t  b y
 ____________  in d u s try  s e c to r  _______________ _____________________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Updating 
the security 
policy
4 3 2 4 2 1 5 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 36
Improving 
security 
awareness 
and training 
at all levels
3 4 0 6 1 2 5 2 1 4 4 0 1 3 36
Improving 
the back-up 
system
2 5 2 4 2 1 5 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 36
Improving 
the disaster 
recovery 
and
business
continuity
plan
5 2 3 3 1 2 6 1 4 1 3 1 3 1 36
Updating
detection
software
3 4 1 5 1 2 3 4 0 5 2 2 2 2 36
Undertaking
security
audit
3 4 1 5 1 2 5 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 36
Allocating 
sufficient 
budget and 
resources to 
security
2 5 1 5 0 3 5 2 2 3 1 3 1 3 36
No actions 
were
undertaken
1 6 1 5 0 3 1 6 0 5 0 4 1 3 36
Note: Yes = action was undertaken, and No = action was not undertaken
The respondents were then asked whether their companies have a formal business 
continuity plan in place. It is clear from Table 4.38 that the majority of companies that 
responded are now paying more attention to establishing a well-documented business 
continuity plan.
Table 4.38 Cross-tabulation o f the existence of a business continuity plan by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
10
19.2
100
5
9.6 
62.5 1
5
9.6
83.3
10
19.2
83.3
7
13.5
100
7
13.5
87.5
8
15.4
88.9
52
No
%
Industry %
0
0
0
3
37.5
37.5
1
12.5
16.7
2
25
16.7
0
0
0
1
12.5
12.5
1
12.5
11.1
8
Total 10 8 6 12 7 8 9 60
Q 1.4.7 Does your company have a formal business continuity plan?
The results show that 86.7 percent of companies have a business continuity plan, 
whereas only 13.3 percent have no plan. This result reflects the desire of most of the
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companies to be certified under the new British Standard BS 25999 (2008) that covers 
business continuity in companies. Further analysis reveals that a business continuity 
plan is most common in the insurance & financial services and retail merchandising 
sectors. All the respondents from both sectors stated that their companies have a 
business continuity plan. Table 4.38 shows that 88.9 percent of energy & utilities 
companies, 87.5 percent o f technology & telecommunications, 83.3 percent of both 
media & entertainment and property & construction, and 62.5 percent of 
manufacturing have a business continuity plan.
In order to test whether the existence of a formal business continuity plan is related to 
the companies’ industry sector, a chi-square test was conducted. There is no evidence 
from the results that there are significant association between the different industry 
sectors and the existence o f a formal business continuity plan, given that %2 = 2.143, df 
= 3, and p-value = 0.543 (p > 0.05).
Table 4.39 Cross-tabulation o f the frequency of testing and reviewing business continuity plan by 
____________________________________ industry sector___________ ________________ _______
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
10
0
0
0
1
33.3
16.7
1
33.3
12.5
3
Every 3 years 
%
Industry %
1
50
11.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Every 2 years 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Every year
%
Industry %
3
10.3
33.3
5
17.2
100
1
3.4
33.3
6
20.7
60
5
17.2
71.4
3
10.3
50
6
20.7
75
29
Every 6 
months
%
Industry %
5
38.5
55.6
0
0
0
2
15.4
66.7
2
15.4
20
1
7.7
14.3
2
15.4
33.3
1
7.7
12.5
13
Total 9 5 3 10 7 6 8 48
Q 1.4.8 If yes, approximately how often does your company test and review the business continuity 
plan?
The last question in this section (Question 1.4.8) asked respondents about the 
frequency with which their companies test and review their business continuity plan. 
Table 4.39 reveals that the majority of companies (87.5 percent) test and review their 
business continuity plan every year or more frequently, whereas 12.5 percent test their 
plan every two years or less frequently. This result is not consistent with the result of
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the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007) which indicated that regular testing of 
business continuity plans is performed by only 40 percent of respondents. This result 
indicates that UK companies are now more concerned about the regular testing of 
their business continuity plan in order to be certified under the new Standard BS 
25999.
Further analysis reveals that all manufacturing and media & entertainment companies 
that responded test and review their continuity plan every year or more frequently, 
followed by insurance & financial services (88.9 percent), energy & utilities (87.5 
percent), retail merchandising (85.7 percent), technology & telecommunications (83.3 
percent), and property & construction (80 percent). These results indicate that 
companies have become more aware of the importance of having a well-documented 
formal continuity plan and of checking it regularly and keeping it up-to-date.
Table 4.40 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the frequency of testing and reviewing the business 
________________continuity plan __________
Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Insurance & financial services 10 32.90
Manufacturing 5 21
Media & entertainment 5 41.20
Property & construction 10 21.80
Retail merchandising 7 21.64
Technology & telecommunications 7 28.36
Energy & utilities 8 21.25
Chi-square value (x2) *  12.200, d f *  6, and p-value *  0.058
Moreover, in order to examine whether the frequency by which companies test and 
review their business continuity plan differs among the seven industry sectors, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The results (Table 4.40) do not indicate any 
significant differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses among 
industry sectors, given that p-value = 0.058 (p > 0.05).
Overall, the responses to the questions in this section suggest that there are no 
significant differences among companies in different industry sectors regarding the 
existence of security incident handling procedures, disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans and the frequency of testing and reviewing these plans. However, it is 
clear that companies have become more concerned with having formal procedures to 
deal with security incidents and with having a formal, up-to-date business continuity 
plan.
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4.5.5 Security budget
According to the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006), spending 
the right amount on security continues to challenge UK companies. Some of the IT 
managers still find it difficult to justify the extra security spending to the board of 
directors. However, the rise in the number of security incidents year after year can be 
a main driver for the board o f directors to give the security budget a priority in 
business budgets. In addition, Gordon and Loeb (2006) stated that until now little is 
known about the budgeting process used in deciding how much companies have to 
spend on security.
In order to investigate the priority given to the security budget in general and to the 
AIS security budget in particular, this section presents the questionnaire results on the 
existence of a separate security budget in UK companies, the percentage of security 
budget spent on AIS security, and the top areas of spending on AIS security. This 
section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 1.5 (Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). The 
hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hi.5: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the existence of a security budget and areas of spending on AIS 
security.
In order to test the hypothesis, respondents were asked three questions (Section 1.5 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.5.1 was concerned with the existence of a separate 
security budget within UK companies. The second question asked respondents about 
the percentage of companies’ security budget allocated to AIS security. Question 
1.5.3 addressed the top areas of spending on AIS security.
Respondents were first asked whether their companies have a separate security budget 
(Question 1.5.1). It can be seen from Table 4.41 that only 29 percent of companies 
have a separate security budget, while 44 companies (71 percent) do not have a 
separate budget for security. This is not a surprising result, since the literature 
revealed that information security is still perceived to be an IT issue. According to the 
Global Security Survey (DTT 2007), most companies still do not have a security
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budget separate from their IT budget. This result is investigated in more detail in 
Chapter 5.
Table 4.41 Cross-tabulation o f the existence of a separate budget for security by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
4
22.2
36.4
0
0
0
3
16.7
50
2
11.1
16.7
1
5.6
16.7
4
22.2
50
4
22.2
44.4
18
No
%
Industry %
7
15.9
63.6
10
22.7
100
3
6.8
50
10
22.7
83.3
5
11.4
83.3
4
9.1
50
5
11.4
55.6
44
Total 11 10 6 12 6 8 9 62
Q 1.5.1 Does your company have a separate budget for security?
Further analysis reveals that 50 percent of technology & telecommunications and 
media & entertainment companies have a separate security budget, followed by 
energy & utilities (44.4 percent), insurance & financial services (36.4 percent), 
property & construction, and retail merchandising (16.7 percent). Table 4.41 also 
reveals that all the respondents from manufacturing companies stated that they do not 
have a separate security budget. This implies that the security budget is included in 
the IT budget or in other budgets for most of the manufacturing companies in the UK.
Moreover, in order to test whether the existence of a separate security budget is 
related to the companies’ industry sector, a chi-square test was conducted. However, 
the results do not reveal any significant association between the different industry 
sectors that responded and the existence of a separate security budget, given that %2 = 
7.307, df = 3, and p-value = 0.063 (p > 0.05).
This question was followed up by asking respondents, who stated that they have a 
separate security budget, about the percentage of the budget spent on AIS security in 
the last year (Question 1.5.2). Interestingly, Table 4.42 shows that one third of 
respondents stated that they do not know this percentage. This could be because these 
companies do not allocate a certain percentage of their security budget especially for 
AIS security; however, a part of their security budget is allocated to IS security in 
general. This result is also consistent with the results of the interviews and is further 
discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, the results reveal that one respondent stated that 
no allocation was made last year to AIS security, however, 38.9 percent of the
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companies allocated 5 percent or less of their security budget to AIS security, and 
22.2 percent allocated 6 percent or more of their security budget to AIS security.
Table 4.42 Cross-tabulation o f the percentage of security budget spent on AIS security 
  _________  by industry sector ________________ _________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
% 0 100 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 33.3 0 0 0 0
Less than 1% 0 0 1 0 1 1 3
% 0 0 33.3 0 33.3 33.3
Industry % 0 0 50 0 25 25
1% - 5% 1 0 0 0 1 2 4
% 25 0 0 0 25 50
Industry % 25 0 0 0 25 50
6% - 10% 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
% 0 0 50 0 50 0
Industry % 0 0 50 0 25 0
More than 20% 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
% 0 50 0 50 0 0
Industry % 0 33.3 0 100 0 0
Don’t know 3 1 0 0 1 1 6
% 50 16.7 0 0 16.7 16.7
Industry % 75 33.3 0 0 25 25
Total 4 3 2 1 4 4 18
Q 1.5.2 If yes, approximately what percentage of your company’s overall security budget was spent on 
AIS security in the last year?
Table 4.42 also reveals that 75 percent of respondents from the insurance & financial 
services sector do not know the percentage of security budget spent on AIS security in 
the last year, while only 25 percent stated that their companies spent one to five 
percent on AIS security. This is a surprising result given the nature of the insurance & 
financial services companies and their greater concern with AIS security. The results 
also show that the only respondent from retail merchandising sector stated that more 
than 20 percent of the company’s security budget was spent on AIS. On the other 
hand, respondents who reported that their companies spent less than one percent on 
AIS security are from property & construction (50 percent), technology & 
telecommunications and energy & utilities (25 percent).
The last question in this section (Question 1.5.3) provided respondents with a list of 
different areas of spending on AIS security and asked them to rank the top three areas 
of spending within their companies.
Regarding the first area of spending on AIS security, Table 4.43 shows that 39.3 
percent of respondents considered software security controls their first area of
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spending on AIS security, followed by hardware and physical security controls (23.2 
percent). On the other hand, 14.3 percent of respondents considered audit activities, 
compliance, and certification their first area of spending, followed by security staffing 
(10.7 percent) and incident response and business continuity (8.9 percent), whereas 
only 1.8 percent of companies considered security consultants and outsourcing, and 
employees’ awareness and training their first area of spending on security.
A detailed analysis by industry sector shows that technology & telecommunications 
was the only sector that considered employees’ awareness and training the first area of 
spending on security. This could be because the majority of companies find it difficult 
to justify their spending on this area or because most of the companies now are using 
their intranet to provide their employees with the relevant security training and 
awareness, which is not expensive. Table 4.43 also shows that the only respondent 
who considered security consultants and outsourcing the first area of security 
spending was from the manufacturing sector; however, software security controls, 
hardware and physical security controls were considered the first area of security 
spending by all the industry sectors that responded. This result is not surprising given 
the expensive nature of software and hardware security controls.
Table 4.44 shows the respondents’ opinions regarding the second area of AIS 
security spending within their companies. The results reveal that 20 respondents 
considered hardware and physical security controls as their second area of security 
spending, followed by software security controls (27.3 percent), incident response and 
business continuity (12.7 percent). The results also reveal that 9.1 percent of 
companies considered security staffing their second area o f security spending, 
followed by employees’ awareness and training (7.3 percent), audit activities, 
compliance and certification (5.5 percent), while security consultants and outsourcing 
was considered by only one company as a second area of security spending.
Further analysis reveals that the only company that considered security consultants 
and outsourcing a second area of security spending was from the property & 
construction sector. In addition, retail merchandising and technology & 
telecommunications were the only sectors that considered audit activities, compliance, 
and certification their second area of security spending.
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T a b le  4 .4 3  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  f irs t  a re a  o f  sp e n d in I o n  A IS  s e c u rity  b y  in d u s try  se c to r
Insurance
&
financial Manufacturing
Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
services
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Security staffing 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 6
% 33.3 0 16.7 0 0 16.7 33.3
Industry % 20 0 16.7 0 0 14.3 25
Security
consultants/outsourcing
%
0
0
1
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Industry % 0 11.1 0 0 0 0 0
Employees’
awareness/training
%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
0
0
1
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 14.3 0
Software security 
controls
3 4 2 5 1 2 5 22
% 13.6 18.2 9.1 22.7 4.5 9.1 22.7
Industry % 30 44.4 33.3 50 16.7 28.6 62.5
Hardware & physical 
security controls 
%
2
15.4
1
7.7
2
15.4
1
7.7
4
30.8
2
15.4
1
7.7
13
Industry % 20 11.1 33.3 10 66.7 28.6 12.5
Incidence response & 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 5
business continuity
% 20 20 0 60 0 0 0
Industry % 10 11.1 0 30 0 0 0
Audit activities, 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 8
compliance,
certification
% 25 25 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 0
Industry % 20 22.2 16.7 10 16.7 14.3 0
Total 10 9 6 10 6 7 8 56
Q 1.5.3 Please rank your company’s top 3 areas of spending on AIS security where 1 represents the most important.
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T a b le  4 .4 4  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  s e c o n d  a re a  o f  sp e n d in g  o n  A IS  s e c u rity  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial Manufacturing
Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
services
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Security staffing 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 5
% 40 0 0 0 40 0 20
Industry % 20 0 0 0 33.3 0 12.5
Security
consultants/outsourcing
%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Industry % 0 0 0 11.1 0 0 0
Employees’
awareness/training
%
1
25
1
25
0
0
1
25
0
0
0
0
1
25
4
Industry % 10 11.1 0 11.1 0 0 12.5
Software security 
controls
2 4 2 2 2 1 2 15
% 13.3 26.7 13.3 13.3 13.3 6.7 13.3
Industry % 20 44.4 33.3 22.2 33.3 14.3 25
Hardware & physical 3 3 3 4 0 3 4 20
security controls 
% 15 15 15 20 0 15 20
Industry % 30 33.3 50 44.4 0 42.9 50
Incidence response & 
business continuity 
%
2
28.6
1
14.3
1
14.3
1
14.3
1
14.3
1
14.3
0
0
7
Industry % 20 11.1 16.7 11.1 16.7 14.3 0
Audit activities, 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
compliance,
certification
% 0 0 0 0 33.3 66.7 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 16.7 28.6 0
Total 10 9 6 9 6 7 8 55
Q 1.5.3 Please rank your company’s top 3 areas of spending on AIS security where 1 represents the most important
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T a b le  4 .4 5  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  th ird  a re a  o f  sp e n d in g  o n  A IS  s e c u ri ty  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy &  
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Security staffing 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
16.7
0
0
0
1
33.3
16.7
0
0
0
1
33.3
12.5
3
Security
consultants/outsourcing
%
Industry %
1
25
12.5
1
25
11.1
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
4
Employees’
awareness/training
%
Industry %
1
14.3
12.5
2
28.6
22.2
1
14.3
16.7
0
0
0
2
28.6
33.3
0
0
0
1
14.3
12.5
7
Software security 
controls
%
Industry %
2
22.2
25
0
0
0
2
22.2
33.3
2
22.2
25
2
22.2
33.3
1
11.1
16.7
0
0
0
9
Hardware & physical 
security controls 
%
Industry %
4
44.4
50
4
44.4
44.4
0
0
0
1
11.1
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
Incidence response & 
business continuity 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
12.5
12.5
0
0
0
3
37.5
50
4
50
50
8
Audit activities, 
compliance, 
certification 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
2
18.2
22.2
1
9.1
16.7
4
36.4
50
1
9.1
16.7
1
9.1
16.7
2
18.2
25
11
Total 8 9 6 8 6 6 8 51
Q 1.5.3 Please rank your company’s top 3 areas of spending on AIS security where 1 represents the most important.
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Table 4.44 also shows that all sectors except retail merchandising saw hardware and 
physical security controls as their second area of spending. This could be because two 
thirds of respondents from this sector considered hardware and physical security 
controls their first area o f spending. At the same time, all sectors considered software 
security controls as a second area of spending. This result again implies that software 
security controls, hardware and physical security controls are the most expensive 
controls for almost all industry sectors that responded.
Regarding the third area of spending on AIS security, Table 4.45 shows that 21.6 
percent of respondents considered audit activities, compliance, and certification their 
third area of security spending, followed by software security controls, and hardware 
and physical security controls (17.6 percent). The results also reveal that 15.7 percent 
of respondents identified incident response and business continuity as their third area 
of security spending, followed by employees’ awareness and training (13.7 percent), 
security consultants and outsourcing (7.8 percent), and security staffing (5.9 percent).
Further analysis shows that audit activities, compliance, and certification were 
considered by all sectors as their third area of security spending except by the 
insurance & financial services. This could be because 20 percent o f insurance & 
financial services companies considered it as their first area of security spending; 
however, the other respondents from this sector did not consider it their second or 
third area of spending. The results also reveal that all sectors except manufacturing 
and energy & utilities identified software security controls as their third area of 
security spending. The reason could be because 50 percent of respondents from both 
sectors considered software security controls to be their first area of spending and the 
other 50 percent saw it as their second area of spending.
Table 4.45 also shows that all sectors except property & construction and technology 
& telecommunications considered employees’ awareness and training their third area 
of security spending. The reason is that all technology & telecommunications 
companies considered it their first area of spending, while only 11.1 percent of 
property & construction put it in second place. This is not surprising since according 
to the results in Section 4.5.2, the property & construction companies are the least
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likely to provide their managers, employees and other users with the relevant security 
training (Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16).
It is clear from the above results that the majority of companies that responded 
considered software security controls, hardware and physical security controls, and 
audit activities, compliance and certification as their top areas o f AIS security 
spending. This result is further verified by calculating the weighted score of each area 
of spending. This method was used in previous studies such as Loch et al. (1992) and 
Whitman (2003) to rank the top threats to information and IS security. The weighted 
scores were calculated by assigning 3 points for the first place ranking, 2 for the 
second place ranking, and 1 for the third. These ranks were then added for each area 
of spending.
Table 4.46 shows that software security controls took the highest weighted score 
(105) which indicate that it was considered as the first area of security spending 
within UK companies. The results also show that hardware and physical security 
controls took the next highest weighted score (88), followed by audit activities, 
compliance and certification with a weighted score of 41. On the other hand, security 
consultants and outsourcing took the lowest weighted score (9). This result suggests 
that most companies are not depending much on external security consultants or 
service providers. This issue is further investigated in Chapter 5.
Table 4.46 Weighted scores o f the number of times areas of spending on AIS security were selected by 
_________________________________  respondents_______________________ _________
Areas o f spending on 
AIS security
Number o f times 
selected Weighted
scoresFirst area o f 
spending
Second area o f  
spending
Third area o f  
spending
Security staffing 6 5 3 31
Security consultants/outsourcing 1 1 4 9
Employees’ awareness and training 1 4 7 18
Software security controls 22 15 9 105
Hardware and physical security controls 13 20 9 8 8
Incident response and business continuity 5 7 8 37
Audit activities, compliance and certification 8 3 11 41
In order to test Hypothesis 1.5 and to examine whether the top areas of spending 
differ among industry sectors, the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The results
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(Table 4.47) did not indicate any statistically significant differences, at 0.05 level, in 
the distribution of responses among the industry sectors except for the hardware and 
physical security controls.
Table 4.47 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the areas o f spending on AIS security
Areas o f  spending on 
AIS security Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Security staffing
Insurance & financial services 4 6.25
Manufacturing - -
Media & entertainment 2 8.25
Property & construction - -
Retail merchandising 3 10.33
Technology & telecommunications 1 3.50
Energy & utilities 4 7.25
Chi-square value (x2) =  3.132, d f = 4, and p-value ** 0.536
Security consultants/outsourcing
Insurance & financial services 1 4.50
Manufacturing 2 2.75
Media & entertainment 1 4.50
Property & construction 1 2
Retail merchandising - -
Technology & telecommunications 1 4.50
Energy & utilities - -
Chi*square value (% *)m  2.550, d f"  4 and p-value *  0.636
Employees’ awareness and training
Insurance & financial services 2 6.25
Manufacturing 3 7.17
Media & entertainment 1 9
Property & construction 1 3.50
Retail merchandising 2 9
Technology & telecommunications 1 1
Energy & utilities 2 6.25
Chi-square value (x2) =  5.958, df =  6, and p-value3=5 0.428
Software security controls
Insurance & financial services 7 25.50
Manufacturing 8 20.75
Media & entertainment 6 27.83
Property & construction 9 22.39
Retail merchandising 5 31.10
Technology & telecommunications 4 23.75
Energy & utilities 7 16.79
Chi-square value (x2) =  5.342, d f =  6, and p-value = 0.501
Hardware and physical security 
controls
Insurance & financial services 9 26.28
Manufacturing 8 28.69
Media & entertainment 5 16.90
Property & construction 6 23.17
Retail merchandising 4 7
Technology & telecommunications 5 16.90
Energy & utilities 5 20.20
Chi-square value (x2) =  13.214, d f =  6, and p-value = 0.040
Incident response and business 
continuity
Insurance & financial services 3 7
Manufacturing 2 6
Media & entertainment 1 9
Property & construction 5 6.90
Retail merchandising 1 9
Technology & telecommunications 4 14.63
Energy & utilities 4 16.50
Chi-square value (x2) “  11.647, d f =  6, and p-value = 0.070
Audit activities, compliance 
and certification
Insurance & financial services 2 4.50
Manufacturing 4 10.75
Media & entertainment 2 10.75
Property & construction 5 14.50
Retail merchandising 3 10.50
Technology & telecommunications 4 10.38
Energy & utilities 2 17
Chi-square value (x2) *  6.170, d f =  6, and p-value *  0.404
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This result implies that there are significant differences, at 0.05 level, in the 
distribution of responses among industry sectors regarding the hardware and physical 
security controls, given that p-value is 0.040 (p < 0.05). On the other hand, there are 
no significant differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses among 
industry sectors regarding the other areas of security spending, given that their p-
values are 0.536, 0.636, 0.428, 0.501, 0.070, and 0.404 respectively.
Overall, the responses to the questions in this section indicate that there are no 
significant differences among companies in different industry sectors regarding the 
existence of a separate budget for security, and the top areas of security spending 
except for the hardware and physical security controls. This indicates that some 
sectors that responded are depending on hardware and physical security controls and 
are spending more on them than the other sectors. This result is further investigated in 
Section 4.7.
4.5.6 Security standards and certification
The British Standard BS 7799 (ISO 27000) is now one of the most prominent 
international efforts on information security (Ma and Pearson 2005). Many authors 
claimed the importance of this standard. Dodds and Hague (2004) argued that ISO 
17799 assists in formalising an information systems security framework, which 
enables companies to take an enterprise-wide, top-down approach to IS security, thus 
aligning security and its consequent investment to the company’s needs. Saleh et al. 
(2007) stated that this standard provides a wide range of information security 
protection controls, and provides a safe environment to e-services at the internal
intranet level, the business extranet level, and the public internet level.
In addition, the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2006) indicated that 
the majority of the businesses believe that BS 7799 can raise staff awareness and can 
push security higher up the management agenda. Most recently, the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) stated that the implementation of 
the standard tends to raise the security baseline by ensuring that a minimum level of 
control is adopted in all areas of security management. It also strengthens companies’ 
processes in checking compliance with their security policies.
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Due to the importance and popularity of the British Standard BS 7799, this section is 
concerned with the respondents’ awareness level of its two parts, the awareness level 
of the other managers and employees in their companies of the standard, and the 
certification under ISO 27001. This section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 1.6 
(Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). The hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hi.6: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the awareness level of the British Standard for Information 
Security Management BS 7799 and the certification under ISO 27001.
In order to test this hypothesis, respondents were asked three questions (Section 1.6 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.6.1 asked respondents about their awareness level of 
the two parts of the British Standard BS 7799, while the second question asked 
respondents about the overall awareness level of the other managers and employees in 
their companies with the standard. In addition, Question 1.6.3 asked respondents 
whether their companies are certified under ISO 27001, are planning to be certified, or 
have no plans for certification.
Table 4.48 Cross-tabulation o f respondents’ awareness level of part 1 o f BS 7799 by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Low 4 6 2 5 3 3 2 25
% 16 24 8 20 12 12 8
Industry % 36.4 60 33.3 41.7 42.9 37.5 22.2
Moderate 1 2 1 6 3 3 1 17
% 5.9 11.8 5.9 35.3 17.6 17.6 5.9
Industry % 9.1 20 16.7 50 42.9 37.5 11.1
High 6 2 3 1 1 2 6 21
% 28.6 9.5 14.3 4.8 4.8 9.5 28.6
Industry % 54.5 20 50 8.3 14.3 25 66.7
Total 11 10 6 12 n .7 - 8 9 63
Q 1.6.1 Please indicate your awareness level of the British Standard for Information Security 
Management BS 7799: Part 1: Code o f Practice for Information Security Management.
Regarding the respondents’ awareness of the two parts of the British Standard, the 
results in Tables 4.48 and 4.49 illustrate that the respondents are not sufficiently 
aware of the two parts of BS 7799. One third of respondents (33.3 percent) stated that 
their awareness level o f part 1 of the standard is high, whereas only 23.8 percent had 
the same opinion regarding part 2. On the other hand, 39.7 percent of respondents 
reported that their awareness level is low for part 1 (Code of Practice) of the standard 
and 47.6 percent had the same opinion for part 2 (Certification). This is a surprising
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result given that the respondents are IT managers and the people responsible for 
security in their companies. However, this result is consistent with the results of the 
follow-up interviews (Chapter 5).
Table 4.49 Cross-tabulation o f respondents’ awareness level of part 2 o f BS 7799 by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Low
%
Industry %
5
16.7
45.5
9
30
90
3
10
50
5
16.7
41.7
3
10
42.9
3
10
37.5
2
6.7
22.2
30
Moderate
%
Industry %
1
5.6
9.1
0
0
0
1
5.6
16.7
6
33.3
50
3
16.7
42.9
4
22.2
50
3
16.7
33.3
18
High
%
Industry %
5
33.3
45.5
1
6.7
10
2
13.3
33.3
1
6.7
8.3
1
6.7
14.3
1
6.7
12.5
4
26.7
44.4
15
Total 11 10 6 12 7 8 9 63
Q 1.6.1 Please indicate your awareness level of the British Standard for Information Security 
Management BS 7799: Part 2: Security Techniques: Information Security Management Systems.
When the responses were analysed by industry sector, Table 4.48 shows that the 
highest percentage of respondents who have a high level of awareness of part 1 of the 
standard were from energy & utilities sector (66.7 percent), they were followed by 
insurance & financial services (54.5 percent), and media & entertainment (50 
percent), whereas the other sectors expressed a low level of awareness. Three fifths of 
respondents from the manufacturing sector, 42.9 percent from retail merchandising, 
41.7 percent from property & construction, and 37.5 percent from technology & 
telecommunications have low awareness of the first part of the standard.
Regarding part 2 of the standard, the results in Table 4.49 show that the highest 
percentage of respondents who expressed a high level of awareness o f the second part 
of the standard were from the insurance & financial services sector (45.5 percent), 
followed by energy & utilities (44.4 percent), and media & entertainment (33.3 
percent). On the other hand, the other sectors expressed a low level of awareness of 
the second part. The results show that 90 percent of respondents from the 
manufacturing sector stated that their awareness level of the second part of the 
standard is low, followed by retail merchandising (42.9 percent), property & 
construction (41.7 percent), and technology & telecommunications (37.5 percent).
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The responses to this question, therefore, suggest that the awareness level is moderate 
in the insurance & financial services, energy & utilities, and media & entertainment 
sectors, whereas it is weak in technology & telecommunications and very weak in the 
manufacturing, retail merchandising, and property & construction sectors. These 
results are consistent with the results of the DTI Information Security Breaches 
Survey (DTI 2006) which indicated that the penetration of BS 7799 into UK 
companies remains disappointing, and that among people responsible for information 
security in their companies, only one in ten is aware of its contents.
Respondents were then asked about the overall awareness of the other managers and 
employees in their companies regarding the British Standard BS 7799. Interestingly, 
the majority of the other managers and employees had only low awareness of the 
British Standard.
Table 4.50 Cross-tabulation of managers’ awareness level of the BS 7799 by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Low 6 10 4 9 5 7 5 46
% 13 21.7 8.7 19.6 10.9 15.2 10.9
Industry % 54.5 100 66.7 75 71.4 87.5 55.6
Moderate 5 0 1 3 1 0 4 14
% 35.7 0 7.1 21.4 7.1 0 28.6
Industry % 45.5 0 16.7 25 14.3 0 44.4
High 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
% 0 0 33.3 0 33.3 33.3 0
Industry % 0 0 16.7 0 14.3 12.5 0
Total 11 10 6 12 7 8 9 63
Q 1.6.2 In your opinion, what is the overall awareness level of your company’s managers regarding the 
British Standard BS 7799?
Table 4.51 Cross-tabulation o f employees’ awareness level o f the BS 7799 by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Low
%
Industry %
11
18.6
100
10
16.9
100
5
8.5
83.3
12
20.3
100
6
10.2
85.7
7
11.9
87.5
8
13.6
88.9
59
Moderate
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
1
25
14.3
1
25
12.5
1
25
11.1
4
Total 11 10 6 12 7 8 9 63
Q 1.6.2 In your opinion, what is the overall awareness level o f your company’s employees regarding 
the British Standard BS 7799?
The results in Tables 4.50 and 4.51 show that 46 of the respondents (73 percent) 
indicated that managers’ awareness level of the standard is low, while 93.7 percent
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had the same opinion regarding employees in their companies. In addition, it is clear 
from Table 4.51 that no one stated that employees’ awareness in their companies is 
high. This is not a surprising result, given that the people responsible for security have 
a low level of awareness of the standard.
Further analysis (Table 4.50) reveals that the majority of respondents stated that 
managers in their companies have low awareness of the British Standard. All 
respondents from the manufacturing sector confirmed their managers’ low awareness 
of the standard, followed by technology & telecommunications (87.5 percent), 
property & construction (75 percent), retail merchandising (71.4 percent), media & 
entertainment (66.7 percent), energy & utilities (55.6 percent), and insurance & 
financial services (54.5 percent).
Regarding the employees, it is not surprising to see from Table 4.51 that out of the 63 
respondents, no one indicated that the awareness level o f the employees is high. In 
addition, all respondents from insurance & financial services, manufacturing, and 
property & construction indicated that employees’ awareness level is low, followed 
by energy & utilities (88.9 percent), technology & telecommunications (87.5 percent), 
retail merchandising (85.7 percent), and media & entertainment (83.3 percent).
Furthermore, when these results were analysed in conjunction with the results in 
Table 4.6 (Section 4.4), given that only 10.8 percent of respondents have a 
professional security qualification, the results suggest that the awareness level of the 
British Standard is high among respondents who have a professional security 
qualification. These results are consistent with the results of the BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008).
In addition, in order to test the hypothesis and to examine whether the awareness level 
of the British Standard differs among industry sectors, the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted. The results (Table 4.52) strongly support Hypothesis 1.6, given that p- 
values are 0.286 for respondents’ awareness of part 1 of the standard, 0.177 for 
respondents’ awareness of part 2, 0.323 for managers’ awareness of the standard, and 
0.566 for employees’ awareness. The results, therefore, reveal that no statistically 
significant differences exist, at the 0.05 level, among different industry sectors
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regarding the awareness level of the British Standard among managers and employees 
of the companies that responded. These results will be investigated in more detail 
when the interviews are analysed (Chapter 5).
Table 4.52 Results of Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the awareness level o f the British Standard BS
7799
Awareness level o f the British 
Standard BS 7799 Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Respondents’ awareness level 
o f  part 1 o f BS 7799
Insurance & financial services 11 36.73
Manufacturing 10 25.20
Media & entertainment 6 36.50
Property & construction 12 26.83
Retail merchandising 7 27.71
Technology & telecommunications 8 30.88
Energy & utilities 9 42
Chi-square value (x2) *  7.394, df -  6, and p-value = 0,286
Respondents’ awareness level 
o f  part 2 o f  BS 7799
Insurance & financial services 11 36.09
Manufacturing 10 19.55
Media & entertainment 6 33
Property & construction 12 30.88
Retail merchandising 7 31.57
Technology & telecommunications 8 32.56
Energy & utilities 9 41.50
Chi-square value (x2) * 8.946, df“* 6, and p-value •*0.177
Managers’ awareness level of 
the British Standard BS 7799
Insurance & financial services 11 37.14
Manufacturing 10 23.50
Media & entertainment 6 34.92
Property & construction 12 31
Retail merchandising 7 33.29
Technology & telecommunications 8 28.31
Energy & utilities 9 36.83
Chi-square value (x2) -  6.978, df = 6, and p-value -  0,323
Employees’ awareness level of 
the British Standard BS 7799
Insurance & financial services 11 30
Manufacturing 10 30
Media & entertainment 6 35.25
Property & construction 12 30
Retail merchandising 7 34.50
Technology & telecommunications 8 33.94
Energy & utilities 9 33.50
Chi-square value (x2) “  4.827, df = 6, and p-value ® 0.566
The final question in this section asked respondents whether their companies are 
certified, are planning to be certified, or have no plans to be certified under ISO 
27001. It is not surprising to see from Table 4.53 that only two companies (3.6 
percent) are certified under ISO 27001. The results also show that 12.7 percent of 
companies are not certified, but they are planning to be so, while 83.6 percent of 
companies responding are not certified, and are not planning to be certified under ISO 
27001. This is not a surprising result, given that 76.2 percent of respondents stated 
that their awareness level o f part 2 of the standard, against which companies seek 
certification, is moderate or low (Table 4.49).
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T a b le  4 .5 3  C r o s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  c e r t i f ic a t io n  u n d e r  IS O /IE C  2 7 0 0 1  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
% 0 0 0 0 0 50 50
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 14.3 11.1
No, but 0 1 0 2 0 1 3 7
plans to
% 0 14.3 0 28.6 0 14.3 42.9
Industry % 0 10 0 20 0 14.3 33.3
No, and no 10 9 4 8 5 5 5 46
plans to
% 21.7 19.6 8.7 17.4 10.9 10.9 10.9
Industry % 100 90 100 80 100 71.4 55.6
Total 10 10 4 10 5 7 9 55
Q 1.6.3 Has your company become certified under the ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security 
Management Systems Standard?
Further analysis reveals that the only two respondents who stated that their companies 
are certified under ISO 27001 are from technology & telecommunications, and energy 
& utilities, whereas all respondents from insurance & financial services, media & 
entertainment, and retail merchandising sectors stated that their companies are not 
certified, and are not planning to do so. Despite the benefits of being certified under 
ISO 27001 (Section 2.4.8.8 in Chapter 2), these results indicate that, in practice, many 
companies believe that preparing for this certification is a comprehensive and time- 
consuming effort. In addition, even some of the companies which are already certified 
under ISO 27001 cannot see sufficient benefit from this. These opinions are further 
investigated in the interviews’ analysis.
Moreover, in order to test whether certification under ISO 27001 differs among 
different industry sectors, a chi-square test was conducted. The results do not indicate 
any significant association between the industry sectors that responded and the 
certification under ISO 27001, given that, x2 = 7.543, df = 6, and p-value = 0.274 (p > 
0.05).
Overall, the responses in this section provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.6. The 
results, therefore, indicate that there are no statistically significant differences among 
the different sectors concerning the awareness level of the British Standard and the 
certification under ISO 27001.
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4.5.7 AIS security effectiveness
It was mentioned in Section 2.4.8.9 in Chapter 2 that measuring security effectiveness 
eases the process of monitoring the effectiveness of the security management system, 
reduces the number of security incidents, and provides tangible evidence to auditors 
and assurance to senior management that a company is in control (Wright 2006). On 
the other hand, information security practitioners are facing a major problem, in that 
nothing happens when they do their jobs well. It is, therefore, necessary to quantify 
the benefits provided to the company from doing their jobs efficiently.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness level of AIS security management, this section 
presents the questionnaire results on the different techniques used by UK companies 
to evaluate AIS security effectiveness, the top success indicators of AIS security 
management, and the IT managers’ opinions regarding the effectiveness level of AIS 
security management in their companies. This section is concerned with testing 
Hypothesis 1.7 (Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). This hypothesis can be expressed as 
follows:
Hi.7: There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the techniques used to evaluate AIS security effectiveness, the 
success indicators of AIS security management, and the effectiveness level of AIS 
security management.
In order to test this hypothesis, respondents were asked three questions (Section 1.7 of 
the questionnaire). Question 1.7.1 addressed the techniques used to evaluate AIS 
security effectiveness within UK companies. The second question provided 
respondents with a list o f the success indicators of AIS security management, and 
asked them to rank the top three indicators, while in Question 1.7.3, respondents were 
asked to indicate the effectiveness level of AIS security management within their 
companies on a scale ranging from “not effective at all” to “extremely effective”.
In Question 1.7.1, respondents were given a list of techniques used to evaluate AIS 
security effectiveness, and were asked to select all the techniques used within their 
companies. Table 4.54 shows that the majority of companies that responded (81.7 
percent) are undertaking internal audits of security procedures to evaluate the
- 2 1 8 -
effectiveness of their AIS security. In addition, three fourths o f companies are 
undertaking external security audits and network monitoring in evaluating AIS 
security effectiveness, followed by penetration testing (61.7 percent), and 
vulnerability scanning (33.3 percent).
Table 4.54 Techniques used by companies to evaluate AIS security effectiveness
Techniques used to evaluate effectiveness 
of AIS security
Technique
used
Technique 
not used Total
no % no %
External security audits 45 75 15 25 60
Internal audits o f security procedures 49 81.7 11 18.3 60
Penetration testing 37 61.7 23 38.3 60
Network monitoring software 45 75 15 25 60
Vulnerability scanners 20 33.3 40 66.7 60
Q 1.7.1 Please indicate the techniques used by your company to evaluate the effectiveness of AIS 
security.
The results, therefore, suggest that the majority of companies depend on external and 
internal security audits to evaluate AIS security effectiveness. These results are 
consistent with the CSI Survey (Richardson 2007), which indicated that “security 
audits” is the most popular technique in the evaluation of security effectiveness.
Further analysis reveals that the five techniques are used by nearly all the industry 
sectors that responded. Regarding external security audits, Table 4.55 shows that 87.5 
percent of technology & telecommunications companies use this technique in 
evaluating AIS security effectiveness, followed by retail merchandising (85.7 
percent), media & entertainment (83.3 percent), manufacturing (75 percent), insurance 
& financial services (70 percent), property & construction, and energy & utilities 
(66.7 percent).
Table 4.55 Cross-tabulation o f the techniques used by companies to evaluate AIS security effectiveness 
___________    by industry sector_____________________________________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
External 
security audits 7 3 6 2 “ 5 1 8 4 6 1 7 1 6 3 60
Internal audits 
of security 
procedures
8 2 6 2 5 1 7 5 7 0 8 0 8 1 60
Penetration
testing 7 3 3 5 5 1 6 6 5 2 4 4 7 2 60
Network
monitoring
software
9 1 5 3 6 0 9 3 6 1 5 3 5 4 60
Vulnerability
scanners 5 5 1 7 2 4 2 10 5 2 3 5 2 7 60
Note: Yes = Technique used, and No = Technique not used
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Table 4.55 shows that all companies from retail merchandising and technology & 
telecommunications undertake internal audits of security procedures in evaluating AIS 
security effectiveness whereas only 58.3 percent from property & construction use the 
same technique. In addition, 83.3 percent of media & entertainment companies 
undertake penetration testing in evaluating AIS security effectiveness, followed by 
energy & utilities (77.8 percent), while only 37.5 percent of manufacturing companies 
use it.
Table 4.55 also reveals that all companies from the media & entertainment sector use 
network monitoring software to evaluate AIS security effectiveness, whereas only
55.6 percent of energy & utilities do the same. The results also reveal that 
“vulnerability scanners” is the least common technique used to evaluate AIS security 
effectiveness. Table 4.55 shows that 71.4 percent of respondents from retail 
merchandising companies use this technique, followed by insurance & financial 
services (50 percent), technology & telecommunications (37.5 percent), and media & 
entertainment (33.3 percent), with only 12.5 percent o f manufacturing companies 
using this technique.
The results, therefore, suggest that the most common technique used is “internal 
audits of security procedures”, while the least common technique used is 
“vulnerability scanners”. Moreover, in order to test whether the techniques used to 
evaluate AIS security differ among industry sectors, a chi-square test was conducted. 
The results in Table 4.56 provide no evidence of any statistically significant 
association, at the 0.05 level, between the different industry sectors and the techniques 
used to evaluate AIS security effectiveness in UK companies, given that their p-values 
are 0.579, 0.406, 0.855, 0.553, and 0.319 respectively.
Table 4.56 Results of chi-square test for the techniques used to evaluate AIS security effectiveness
Techniques used to evaluate effectiveness 
of AIS security t d f p-value
External security audits 1.968 3 0.579
Internal audits o f security procedures 2.910 3 0.406
Penetration testing 0.776 3 0.855
Network monitoring software 2.095 3 0.553
Vulnerability scanners 3.514 3 0.319
Respondents were then given a list of success indicators of AIS security management 
and were asked to rank the top three indicators from their point of view. Regarding
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the first success indicator, Table 4.57 shows that 41.8 percent of companies 
considered “successful defences against AIS security attacks” their first success 
indicator, followed by “information security assurance” (25.5 percent), and “increased 
ability to recover from disasters” (18.2 percent). On the other hand, 7.3 percent of 
companies considered “reduction in frequency of AIS security incidents” their first 
success indicator, followed by “reduction in internal policy breaking” (5.5 percent), 
and only one respondent chose “increased budget for AIS security” . The results, 
therefore, indicate that the majority of companies considered “successful defences 
against AIS security attacks” their first success indicator of AIS security management, 
while almost no companies saw “increased budget for AIS security” as a success 
indicator.
Further analysis by industry sector (Table 4.57) reveals that the only two indicators 
that were selected by respondents from all industry sectors as their first success 
indicator of security management are “information security assurance” and 
“successful defences against AIS security attacks”. On the other hand, the increased 
ability to recover from disasters was selected by respondents from all industry sectors 
except media & entertainment.
The results also reveal that respondents from only the property & construction, and 
energy & utilities sectors considered the reduction in internal policy breaking as the 
first success indicator, while the only respondent who selected the increased budget 
for AIS security as the first success indicator was from the property & construction 
sector.
The respondents’ opinions regarding the second success indicator of AIS security 
management are presented in Table 4.58. The results reveal that “increased ability to 
recover from disasters” was selected by 29.6 percent of respondents as their second 
success indicator, followed by information security assurance (20.4 percent), 
reduction in internal policy breaking, and reduction in frequency of AIS security 
incidents (16.7 percent), and successful defences against security attacks (14.8 
percent). On the other hand, only one respondent selected the increased budget for 
AIS security as the second success indicator. It is clear from the results that the
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majority of companies that responded do not consider an increased budget for AIS 
security as a success indicator of security management.
In addition, analysis by industry sector (Table 4.58) reveals that the increased ability 
to recover from disasters was selected by respondents from all industry sectors, 
reduction in internal policy breaking was considered as the second success indicator 
by all sectors except energy & utilities, while all sectors except manufacturing 
selected successful defences against security attacks. The results also show that the 
only respondent who considered an increased budget for AIS security as a second 
success indicator was from the manufacturing sector.
Regarding the third success indicator of AIS security management, Table 4.59 shows 
that 24.1 percent of companies selected the reduction in frequency of AIS security 
incidents, followed by information security assurance and increased ability to recover 
from disasters (22.2 percent). On the other hand, 16.7 percent selected the reduction 
in internal policy breaking, followed by successful defences against security attacks 
(14.8 percent). Interestingly, it can be seen from Table 4.59 that the increased budget 
for AIS security was not selected by any respondent as a third success indicator.
Further analysis by industry sector (Table 4.59) reveals that again the increased ability 
to recover from disasters was selected by companies from all industry sectors as their 
third success indicator of AIS security management, which indicates its importance as 
a success indicator for most companies. In addition, information security assurance 
was selected by respondents from all sectors except media & entertainment, and the 
reduction in internal policy breaking was not selected by property & construction.
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T a b le  4 .5 7  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  f irs t  su c c e s s  in d ic a to r  o f  A IS  s e c u rity  m a n a g e m e n t b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Information security 
assurance
%
Industry %
3
21.4
30
2
14.3
25
2
14.3
33.3
1
7.1
12.5
1
7.1
16.7
2
14.3
25
3
21.4
33.3
14
Reduction in 
internal policy 
breaking
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
66.7
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
11.1
3
Reduction of 
frequency of 
security incidents 
%
Industry %
1
25
10
2
50
25
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
Increased ability to 
recover from 
disasters 
%
Industry %
1
10
10
1
10
12.5
0
0
0
1
10
12.5
3
30
50
3
30
37.5
1
10
11.1
10
Successful defences 
against security 
attacks
%
Industry %
5
21.7
50
3
13
37.5
3
13
50
3
13
37.5
2
8.7
33.3
3
13
37.5
4
17.4
44.4
23
Increased budget for 
AIS security
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Total 10 8 6 8 6 8 9 55
Q 1.7.2 Please rank the top 3 critical success indicators of the AIS security management within your company where 1 represents the most important.
T a b le  4 .5 8  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  se c o n d  su c c e ss  in d ic a to r  o f  A IS m a n a g e m e n t
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Information security 
assurance 
%
Industry %
4
36.4
40
0
0
0
1
9.1
16.7
3
27.3
37.5
0
0
0
1
9.1
14.3
2
18.2
22.2
11
Reduction in 
internal policy 
breaking
%
Industry %
1
11.1
10
3
33.3
37.5
1
11.1
16.7
1
11.1
12.5
1
11.1
16.7
2
22.2
28.6
0
0
0
9
Reduction of 
frequency of 
security incidents
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
11.1
12.5
2
22.2
33.3
0
0
0
3
33.3
50
1
11.1
14.3
2
22.2
22.2
9
Increased ability to 
recover from 
disasters 
%
Industry %
4
25
40
3
18.8
37.5
1
6.3
16.7
3
18.8
37.5
1
6.3
16.7
1
6.3
14.3
3
18.8
33.3
16
Successful defences 
against security 
attacks
%
Industry %
1
12.5
10
0
0
0
1
12.5
16.7
1
12.5
12.5
1
12.5
16.7
2
25
28.6
2
25
22.2
8
Increased budget for 
AIS security 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
100
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Total 10 8 6 8 6 7 9 54
Q 1.7.2 Please rank the top 3 critical success indicators of the AIS security management within your company where 1 represents the most important.
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T a b le  4 .5 9  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  th ird  su c c e ss  in d ic a to r  o f  A IS  se c u rity  m a n a g e m e n t b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & 
entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Information security 
assurance
%
Industry %
1
8.3
10
2
16.7
25
0
0
0
2
16.7
25
2
16.7
33.3
2
16.7
28.6
3
25
33.3
12
Reduction in 
internal policy 
breaking
%
Industry %
2
22.2
20
1
11.1
12.5
1
11.1
16.7
0
0
0
2
22.2
33.3
1
11.1
14.3
2
22.2
22.2
9
Reduction o f  
frequency of 
security incidents 
%
Industry %
4
30.8
40
1
7.7
12.5
1
7.7
16.7
4
30.8
50
0
0
0
2
15.4
28.6
1
7.7
11.1
13
Increased ability to 
recover from 
disasters 
%
Industry %
1
8.3
10
2
16.7
25
2
16.7
33.3
1
8.3
12.5
2
16.7
33.3
2
16.7
28.6
2
16.7
22.2
12
Successful defences 
against security 
attacks
%
Industry %
2
25
20
2
25
25
2
25
33.3
1
12.5
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
12.5
11.1
8
Total 10 8 6 8 6 7 9 54
Q 1.7.2 Please rank the top 3 critica success indicators of the AIS security management within your company where 1 represents the most important.
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It is clear from the results that the most common success indicators of AIS security 
management among companies that responded are the successful defences against 
security attacks, information security assurance, and the increased ability to recover 
from disasters, whereas an increased budget for AIS security is the least common 
success indicator. These results could be because 71 percent of companies (Table 
4.41) do not have a separate security budget, and those who have, do not allocate a 
specific amount of this budget for AIS security.
Table 4.60 Weighted scores o f the number of times success indicators o f AIS security management 
___________________________ were selected by respondents_____________________________
Success indicators o f  AIS security 
management
Number o f  times 
selected Weighted
scoresFirst success 
indicator
Second success 
indicator
Third success 
indicator
Information security assurance 14 11 12
Reduction in internal policy breaking 3 9 9 36 ■
Reduction in frequency o f  AIS security incidents 4 9 13 -43.:.
Increased ability to recover from disasters 10 16 12 74
Successful defences against AIS security attacks 23 8 8 93
Increased budget for AIS security 1 1 0
This result was further verified by calculating the weighted score for each success 
indicator of AIS security management. Table 4.60 shows that successful defences 
against AIS security attacks achieved the highest weighted score (93), which indicates 
its importance as the first success indicator within UK companies. The results also 
reveal that information security assurance achieved the next highest weighted score 
(76), followed by the increased ability to recover from disasters, which achieved a 
weighted score of 74, whereas the increased budget for AIS security achieved the 
lowest score (5). These results indicate that the majority of companies that responded 
do not consider an increased AIS security budget as a success indicator of their 
security management.
Furthermore, in order to examine whether the success indicators differ among the 
industry sectors that responded, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The results 
(Table 4.61) do not indicate any statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 level, 
in the distribution of responses among industry sectors for the six success indicators 
of AIS security management, given that their p-values are 0.806, 0.369, 0.164, 0.792, 
0.991, and 0.317 respectively.
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T a b le  4 .6 1  R e s u lts  o f  K ru s k a l - W a l l i s  t e s t  re g a rd in g  th e  s u c c e s s  in d ic a to r s  o f  A IS  s e c u r ity  m a n a g e m e n t
Success indicators o f  AIS Industry sectors N Mean Ranksecurity management
Insurance & financial services 8 16.75
Manufacturing 4 19.50
Information security 
assurance
Media & entertainment 3 11.67
Property & construction 6 21.75
Retail merchandising 3 23.50
Technology & telecommunications 5 19.60
Energy & utilities 8 19.63
Chi-square value (x2) = 3.023, df = 6, and p-value = 0.806
Insurance & financial services 3 14
Manufacturing 4 10.25
Reduction in internal policy 
breaking
Media & entertainment 2 12.50
Property & construction 3 4
Retail merchandising 3 14
Technology & telecommunications 3 11
Energy & utilities 3 12
Chi-square value (x2) = 6.505, df = 6 and p-value * 0.369
Insurance & financial services 5 16.50
Manufacturing 4 8.50
Reduction in frequency of  
AIS security incidents
Media & entertainment 4 10.13
Property & construction 4 20
Retail merchandising 3 9
Technology & telecommunications 3 16.33
Energy & utilities 3 12.67
Chi-square value (x 2)  =  9.183 , df = 6, and p-value * 0.164
Insurance & financial services 6 18.67
Manufacturing 6 21
Increased ability to recover 
from disasters
Media & entertainment 3 27.83
Property & construction 5 18.70
Retail merchandising 6 16.67
Technology & telecommunications 6 16.67
Energy & utilities 6 21
Chi-square value (x2) = 3.133 df = 6, and p-value = 0.792
Insurance & financial services 8 19.81
Manufacturing 5 21.40
Successful defences against 
AIS security attacks
Media & entertainment 6 22.42
Property & construction 5 19.80
Retail merchandising 3 17.17
Technology & telecommunications 5 18.20
Energy & utilities 7 19.79
Chi-square value (x2) = 0.849, df = 6 ,  and p-value = 0.991
Insurance & financial services - -
Manufacturing 1 2
Increased budget for AIS 
security
Media & entertainment - -
Property & construction 1 1
Retail merchandising - -
Technology & telecommunications - -
Energy & utilities - -
Chi-square value (x2) = 1.000, df = 1, and p-value = 0.317
The last question in this section asked respondents about their opinions regarding the 
effectiveness level o f AIS security management within their companies. The results 
presented in Table 4.62 reveal that 60 percent of respondents believed that AIS 
security management is somewhat effective, while 23.3 percent believed that it is 
extremely effective. On the other hand, 5 percent of respondents believed that AIS 
security management is somewhat ineffective, but no respondent mentioned that it is 
not effective at all, which indicates that the AIS security level in companies is now 
improving.
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T a b le  4 .6 2  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  th e  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  le v e l o f  A IS  s e c u r i ty  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Som ew hat
ineffec tive
%
Industry  %
0
0
0
2
66.7
22.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
12.5
0
0
0
3
N either ineffective  
nor e ffec tive
%
Industry  %
1
14.3
9.1
1
14.3
11.1
0
0
0
2
28.6
18.2
2
28.6
33.3
1
14.3
12.5
0
0
0
7
Som ew hat
e ffec tive
%
Industry  %
6
.16.7
54.5
5
13.9
55.6
4
11.1
66.7
5
13.9
45.5
2
5.6
33.3
6
16.7
75
8
22.2
88.9
36
E xtrem ely
effec tive
%
Industry  %
4
28.6
36.4
1
7.1
11.1
2
14.3
33.3
4
28.6
36.4
2
14.3
33.3
0
0
0
1
7.1
11.1
14
Total 11 9 6 11 6 8 9 60
Q 1.7.3 In your opinion, how effective is the AIS security management in your company?
Further analysis by industry sector shows that respondents from all sectors except 
technology & telecommunications believed that AIS security management in their 
companies is extremely effective. Given that technology & telecommunications 
companies are more concerned with security awareness than the other sectors (Tables 
4.18 - 4.21), these companies could be more aware of the different types of security 
threats facing their systems, and therefore they are not fully confident that they have 
an extremely effective security management.
The results also reveal that respondents from all sectors believed that AIS security 
management within their companies is somewhat effective. 88.9 percent of 
respondents from energy & utilities believed so, followed by technology & 
telecommunications (75 percent), media & entertainment (66.7 percent), 
manufacturing (55.6 percent), insurance & financial services (54.5 percent), property 
& construction (45.5 percent), and retail merchandising (33.3 percent). On the other 
hand, the three respondents who believed that AIS security management in their 
companies is somewhat ineffective are from the manufacturing, and technology & 
telecommunications sectors. The results, therefore, suggest that the majority of 
companies believed that their AIS security management is somewhat effective.
Furthermore, in order to test whether the effectiveness level of AIS security 
management differs among industry sectors, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. 
However, the results (Table 4.63) do not provide any evidence that there are
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significant differences among the industry sectors that responded. The results, 
therefore, reveal that there are no significant differences, at the 0.05 level, in the 
distribution of responses between the industry sectors that responded regarding the 
effectiveness level of the AIS security management, given that p-value is 0.311 (p > 
0.05).
Table 4.63 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the effectiveness level of  AIS security management
Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Insurance & financial services 11 35.64
Manufacturing 9 23
Media & entertainment 6 36.83
Property & construction 11 33.68
Retail merchandising 6 29.67
Technology & telecommunications 8 22.50
Energy & utilities 9 31.28
Chi-square value (x3) -7.113, df 6, and p-value *  0.311
In short, the responses to the questions in this section provide a strong support to 
Hypothesis 1.7 that there are no significant differences among companies in different 
industry sectors concerning the techniques used to evaluate AIS security 
effectiveness, success indicators of security management, and the effectiveness level 
of AIS security management. These results are further investigated in the interviews’ 
analysis.
4.6 AIS security threats
Companies today have become increasingly dependent on IS more than ever before. 
However, these IS have brought companies not only enormous benefits, but also 
different types of security threats (Chang and Yeh 2006). According to Lin (2006), 
due to resource constraints, companies cannot implement unlimited controls to protect 
their systems. Instead, they need to understand the major threats, and implement 
effective controls accordingly. In addition, Whitman (2003) argued that in order to 
strengthen the protection level of IS, those responsible for these systems must begin 
with the identification of the dominant threats facing their companies’ IS security, and 
the ranking of those threats- in order to allow their companies to direct priorities 
accordingly.
In order to investigate the sources and types of AIS security threats facing companies, 
this section presents the questionnaire results on the most common sources and types 
of security threats facing UK companies, and the frequency of occurrence of each
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type of threat in the last year. This section is concerned with testing Hypothesis 2 
(Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). This hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
H r  There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the sources and types of AIS security threats.
In order to test the hypothesis, respondents were asked two questions (Section 2 of the 
questionnaire). In the first question, respondents were provided with a list of sources 
of AIS security threats and were asked to rank the top three common sources of 
threats within their companies. Question 2.2 provided respondents with a list of AIS 
security threats and they were asked to indicate the frequency of occurrence of each 
type of these threats, by choosing one among six choices (none, once a year, once a 
month, once a week, once a day, and more than once a day).
Table 4.64 Cross-tabulation o f the first common source of AIS security threats by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Authorised 
users / 
employees 
%
Industry %
8
17
72.7
9
19.1
100
4
8.5
66.7
10
21.3
90.9
5
10.6
71.4
8
17
100
3
6.4
33.3
47
Former
employees
%
Industry %
1
33.3
9.1
0
0
0
1
33.3
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
11.1
3
Suppliers of 
goods or 
services 
%
Industry %
1
25
9.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
14.3
0
0
0
2
50
22.2
4
Competitors
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
11.1
1
Computer
hackers
%
Industry %
1
16.7
9.1
0
0
0
1
16.7
16.7
1
16.7
9.1
1
16.7
14.3
0
0
0
2
33.3
22.2
6
Total 11 9 6 11 7 8 9 61
Q 2.1 Please rank the top 3 users who in your opinion represent the common sources o f security threats
to your company’s AIS where 1 represents the most common source.
Regarding the top three common sources of AIS security threats, the results in Table 
4.64 show that the majority of companies (77 percent) believed that authorised users 
or employees are their first common source of security threats. This result is 
consistent with what was claimed in the literature. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD 1992) stated that employees who have been 
granted authorised access to systems might pose a larger threat to IS. In addition,
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Loch et al. (1992) argued that employees are a greater threat than competitors. 
Moreover, Vroom and Von Solms (2004) claimed that, despite the vital role of 
employees in the success of any company, they are the weakest link when it comes to 
IS security. Most recently, the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 
2008) indicated that UK companies increasingly realise that their people, while their 
greatest asset, can be their greatest vulnerability.
On the other hand, Table 4.64 shows that only 9.8 percent of companies believed that 
computer hackers are their first common source of security threats, followed by 
suppliers of goods and services (6.6 percent), former employees (4.9 percent), and 
competitors (1.6 percent). From these results, it is clear that the majority of companies 
considered their employees the first common source of security threats facing their 
systems, whereas customers are not considered by any respondent as a first common 
source of threats.
Further analysis reveals that respondents from all sectors selected authorised users or 
employees as the first common source of security threats. In addition, all the 
respondents from manufacturing and technology & telecommunications had the same 
opinion, followed by property & construction (90.9 percent), insurance & financial 
services (72.7 percent), retail merchandising (71.4 percent), and media & 
entertainment (66.7 percent). On the other hand, only one third of energy & utilities 
companies considered employees to be their first common source of security threats. 
This result is consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 
2008) which revealed that the sector least affected by staff misuse was energy & 
utilities.
The results also show that only one respondent, from an energy & utilities company, 
believed that competitors are the first common source of security threats to a 
company’s AIS. Table 4.64 also shows that companies from all sectors except 
manufacturing and technology & telecommunications believed that computer hackers 
are their first common source of security threats.
Regarding the second common source of security threats, Table 4.65 shows that just 
over half of companies (52.6 percent) believed that former employees are their second
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common source of security threats. This result indicates that employees, whether 
current or former, are the main source of security threats to UK companies. The 
results also show that 15.8 percent of companies considered computer hackers to be 
their second common source of security threats, followed by suppliers of goods and 
services (12.3 percent), authorised users or employees (10.5 percent), and competitors 
(7 percent). However, only one respondent believed that the company’s customers are 
the second source of threats. This result is consistent with Loch et al. (1992).
Table 4.65 Cross-tabulation of the second common source of AIS security threats by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Authorised 
users / 
employees
%
Industry %
1
16.7
10
0
0
0
2
33.3
33.3
0
0
0
1
16.7
16.7
0
0
0
2
33.3
22.2
6
Former
employees
%
Industry %
4
13.3
40
6
20
66.7
3
10
50
6
20
60
3
10
50
4
13.3
57.1
4
13.3
44.4
30
Suppliers of 
goods or 
services 
%
Industry %
1
14.3
10
1
14.3
11.1
1
14.3
16.7
0
0
0
1
14.3
16.7
1
14.3
14.3
2
28.6
22.2
7
Customers
%
Industry %
1
100
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Competitors
%
Industry %
1
25
10
1
25
11.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
1
25
11.1
4
Computer
hackers
%
Industry %
2
22.2
20
1
11.1
11.1
0
0
0
4
44.4
40
0
0
0
2
22.2
28.6
0
0
0
9
Total 10 9 6 10 6 7 9 57
Q 2.1 Please rank the top 3 users who in your opinion represent the common sources o f security threats
to your company’s AIS where 1 represents the most common source.
The analysis by industry sector (Table 4.65) reveals that 66.7 percent of respondents 
from manufacturing companies believed that former employees are their second 
common source of security threats. These results are consistent with the results in 
Table 4.64 in which all the respondents from the manufacturing sector believed that 
employees are their first source of threats.
It can also be seen from Table 4.65 that 60 percent of property & construction 
companies believed that former employees are their second common source of 
security threats, followed by technology & telecommunications (57.1 percent), media 
& entertainment, and retail merchandising (50 percent), energy & utilities (44.4
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percent), and insurance & financial services (40 percent). On the other hand, only one 
respondent, who is from the insurance & financial services, selected the company’s 
customers. This result suggests that the majority of companies except for insurance & 
financial service companies do not consider customers as a common source of 
security threats. According to the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007), financial 
institutions are particularly vulnerable given the nature of the information they hold. 
In addition, since most training and awareness programs are directed towards internal 
users only, this means that the customer risk category is sometimes ignored.
Table 4.66 Cross-tabulation of the third common source of AIS security threats by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Authorised 
users / 
employees 
%
Industry %
2
33.3
28.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
16.7
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
50
33.3
6
Former
employees
%
Industry %
0
0
0
2
28.6
25
0
0
0
2
28.6
25
1
14.3
16.7
2
28.6
28.6
0
0
0
7
Suppliers of 
goods or 
services 
%
Industry %
3
37.5
42.9
1
12.5
12.5
3
37.5
50
0
0
0
1
12.5
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
Customers
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
25
12.5
1
25
16.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25
14.3
1
25
11.1
4
Competitors
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
14.3
12.5
0
0
0
1
14.3
12.5
1
14.3
16.7
1
14.3
14.3
3
42.9
33.3
7
Computer
hackers
%
Industry %
2
10.5
28.6
3
15.8
37.5
2
10.5
33.3
4
21.1
50
3
15.8
50
3
15.8
42.9
2
10.5
22.2
19
Total 7 8 6 8 6 7 9 51
Q 2.1 Please rank the top 3 users who in your opinion represent the common sources o f security threats 
to your company’s AIS where 1 represents the most common source.
It can be seen from Table 4.66 that 37.3 percent of companies believed that hackers 
are their third source of AIS security threats. This could be because only 9.8 percent 
of companies (Table 4.64) considered computer hackers to be their first source of 
security threats, while 15.8 percent (Table 4.65) believed that hackers are their second 
common source of security threats. Table 4.66 also shows that suppliers were selected 
by 15.7 percent of companies as their third common source o f security threats, 
followed by former employees, and competitors (13.7 percent), authorised users or 
employees (11.8 percent), and customers (7.8 percent).
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Further analysis reveals that half of the respondents from property & construction, and 
retail merchandising believed that computer hackers are their third common source of 
security threats; this is followed by technology & telecommunications (42.9 percent), 
manufacturing (37.5 percent), media & entertainment (33.3 percent), insurance & 
financial services (28.6 percent), and energy & utilities (22.2 percent). This result 
indicates that respondents from all sectors saw computer hackers as their third 
common source of threats. This result is consistent with the BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which stated that hackers appear more 
successful at breaking companies’ networks than before, and that larger companies 
are more likely to be penetrated than smaller ones. The results also show that 
authorised users or employees are seen as the third common source of security threats 
by only six respondents from insurance & financial services, property & construction, 
and energy & utilities. This could be because 77 percent of companies believed that 
employees are their first common source of threats (Table 4.64), and 10.5 percent 
considered them their second common source of threats (Table 4.65).
It is clear from the above results that authorised users or employees, former 
employees and computer hackers are the most common sources of AIS security 
threats facing the companies that responded, whereas competitors and customers are 
the least common. This result is consistent with the Security and Information Risk 
Survey (NCC 2007) which indicated that competitors are the least of a company’s 
worries when it comes to their security strategy. This result is further verified by 
calculating the weighted score of each source of AIS security threats.
Table 4.67 Weighted scores o f the number of times sources of AIS security threats were selected by 
_____________________ ____________ respondents_______________________________________
Common sources o f AIS 
security threats
Number o f times selected Weighted
scoresFirst common source o f security threats
Second common source 
o f security threats
Third common source 
o f  security threats
Authorised users/employees 47 6 6 159
Former employees 3 30 7 76
Suppliers o f goods/services 4 7 8 34
Customers 0 1 4 6
Competitors T " T 4 7 18
Computer hackers 6 9 19 55
Table 4.67 shows that the authorised users or employees achieved the highest 
weighted score (159), which indicates that authorised employees are believed to be 
the first common source of AIS security threats facing UK companies that responded, 
followed by former employees with a weighted score of 76, then computer hackers
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with 55. On the other hand, competitors, and customers achieved the least weighted 
scores of 18 and 6 respectively. The results provide evidence that the common source 
of security threats are now believed to come more from inside companies than from 
outside.
Moreover, in order to examine whether the most common sources of AIS security 
threats vary among different sectors, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The results 
(Table 4.68) do not indicate any statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 level, 
in the distribution of responses among the different industry sectors except for the 
authorised users or employees. This result implies that there are significant 
differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses among the different 
sectors regarding the authorised users or employees, given that p-value is 0.022 (p < 
0.05). On the other hand, there are no significant differences among the different 
sectors regarding the other five sources of threats.
Table 4.68 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the common sources o f AIS security threats
Common sources o f  
AIS security threats
Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Authorised users/employees
Insurance & financial services 11 32.32
Manufacturing 9 24
Media & entertainment 6 32.83
Property & construction 11 26.95
Retail merchandising 6 28.42
Technology & telecommunications 8 24
Energy & utilities 8 42.81
Chi-square value (x2) =  14.795, df =  6, and p-value = 0.022
Former employees
Insurance & financial services 5 15.20
Manufacturing 8 23.13
Media & entertainment 4 14.38
Property & construction 8 23.13
Retail merchandising 4 23.13
Technology & telecommunications 6 24.67
Energy & utilities 5 15.20
Chi-square value (x2) “  8.598, d f= 6 and p-value *  0.197
Suppliers o f goods/services
Insurance & financial services 5 11.40
Manufacturing 2 11.75
Media & entertainment 4 13.63
Property & construction - -
Retail merchandising 3 8.67
Technology & telecommunications 1 8
Energy & utilities 4 5.25
Chi-square value (x2) •  6.112, d f83 5, and p-value *  0.296
Customers
Insurance & financial services 1 1
Manufacturing 1 3.50
Media & entertainment 1 3.50
Property & construction - -
Retail merchandising - -
Technology & telecommunications 1 3.50
Energy & utilities 1 3.50
Chi-square value (x2)*5 4.000, d f“  4, and p-value *  0.406
Competitors Insurance & financial services 1 3.50
Manufacturing 2 6.25
Media & entertainment - -
Property & construction 1 9
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Retail merchandising 2 6.25
Technology & telecommunications 1 9
Energy & utilities 5 6.30
Chi-square value (x3) *2.195, df*5,aiuli)wvalue*0.822
Computer hackers
Insurance & financial services 5 15.10
Manufacturing 4 21.50
Media & entertainment 3 17.83
Property & construction 9 16.39
Retail merchandising 4 19.63
Technology & telecommunications 5 19.40
Energy & utilities 4 14.25
Chi-square value (x2) *  2.296, df»6,and p-value •  0,891
As mentioned before, respondents were then given a list of security threats and were 
asked to indicate the frequency of occurrence of each type of these threats. Table 4.69 
provides the frequency of occurrence reported by respondents. The results for each 
type of security threats are presented below.
Table 4.69 Frequency of occurrence of each type o f AIS security threats
None Once a year
Once a 
month
Once a 
week
Once a 
day
More than 
once 
a day Total
no % no % no % no % no % no %
Unauthorised access to 
data/systems by disgruntled 
employees
48 76.2 14 22.2 0 0 1 1.6 0 0 0 0 63
Unauthorised access to 
data/systems by hackers 55 88.7 5 8.1 .. 1 1.6 0 0 o 0 1 1.6 62
Unintentional destruction o f data 
by employees 22 36.7 20 33.3 14 23.3 4 6.7 0 0 0 0 60
Intentional destruction o f data by 
employees 49 80.3 11 18 0 0 1 1.6 0 0 0 0 61
Theft o f physical information e.g. 
printed output, computer disks, 
etc.
50 83.3 7 11.7 2 3.3 1 1.7 0 0 0 0 60
Introduction o f computer viruses, 
bombs or worms to the system 31 49.2 20 31.7 4 6.3 5 7.9 1 1.6 2 3.2 63
Spamming attacks 23 37.7 8 13.1 8 13.1 2 3.3 7 11.5 13 21.3 61
Malware (spyware, adware) 
programs 22 34.9 15 23.8 ;:3 4.8 7 11.1 7 11.1 9 14.3 63
Sharing o f passwords 16 27.1 7 11.9 20 33.9 6 10.2 7 11.9 3 5.1 59
Theft o f software 50 80.6 5 8.1 4 ; 6.5 2 3.2 0 0 1 1.6 62
Technical software failures or 
errors 10 16.1 25 40.3 19 30.6 4 6.5 2 3.2 2 3.2 62
Sabotage or intentional 
destruction o f computer 
equipment e.g. PCs and laptops
57 90.5 5 7.9 1 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
Natural disasters e.g. fire, floods, 
earthquakes, etc. 44 69.8 19 30.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
Q 2.2 Please indicate the frequency with which your company has faced each type o f the following 
threats in the last year.
Unauthorised access to the. data or systems by disgruntled employees
Table 4.69 shows that 76.2 percent of respondents claimed that this threat had never 
occurred in their companies in the last year, and 22.2 percent believed that it occurred 
only once a year. On the other hand, only one respondent believed that unauthorised 
access to data or systems by disgruntled employees happened once per week.
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Further analysis by industry sector (Table 4.70) reveals that all respondents from 
property & construction, and energy & utilities claimed that their companies did not 
face any unauthorised access to data or systems by disgruntled employees in the last 
year, followed by insurance & financial services (72.2 percent), retail merchandising 
(71.4 percent), and manufacturing (70 percent). On the other hand, only two fifths of 
media & entertainment companies believed this. In addition, the only respondent who 
believed that this threat occurred once per week in the last year was from the media & 
entertainment sector, while respondents from all industry sectors except property & 
construction and energy & utilities believed that their companies suffered from 
unauthorised access to data or systems by disgruntled employees once in the last year.
Table 4.70 Cross-tabulation o f unauthorised access to data/systems by disgruntled employees by 
__________________   industry sector ____________ ________________
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 8 7 2 13 5 4 9 48
% 16.7 14.6 4.2 27.1 10.4 8.3 18.8
Industry % 72.7 70 40 100 71.4 50 100
Once a year 3 3 2 0 2 4 0 14
% 21.4 21.4 14.3 0 14.3 28.6 0
Industry % 27.3 30 40 0 28.6 50 0
Once a week 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
% 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 20 0 0 0 0
Total 11 10 5 13 7 8 9 63
From these results, it seems that this threat rarely occurred in the property & 
construction and energy & utilities sectors, but was more likely to happen in the other 
sectors that responded. In order to avoid this threat, companies should allow their 
employees to access only the data required to perform their jobs.
Unauthorised access to the data or systems by hackers
Despite being the third common source of AIS security threats facing UK companies,
88.7 percent of companies claimed that they did not face this threat in the last year, 
while five companies (8.1 percent) believed that it had happened once in the last year. 
On the other hand, only one company suffered from unauthorised access to data or its 
systems by hackers once per month in the last year, and another respondent believed 
that it happened more than once a day.
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Further analysis (Table 4.71) reveals that all respondents from property & 
construction claimed that their companies did not face any unauthorised access to data 
or systems by hackers. This is followed by insurance & financial services (90.9 
percent), manufacturing (90 percent), energy & utilities (88.9 percent), retail 
merchandising (85.7 percent), media & entertainment (80 percent), and technology & 
telecommunications (71.4 percent). The results also show that only one respondent, 
from the insurance & financial services sector, believed that their company’s AIS was 
faced by this threat once a month in the last year, while another respondent from the 
manufacturing sector claimed that it happened more than once a day.
Table 4.71 Cross-tabulation of unauthorised access to data/systems by hackers by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None
%
Industry %
10
18.2
90.9
9
16.4
90
4
7.3
80
13
23.6
100
6
10.9
85.7
5
9.1
71.4
8
14.5
88.9
55
Once a year 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
20
20
0
0
0
1
20
14.3
2
40
28.6
1
20
11.1
5
Once a month 
%
Industry %
1
100
9.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
More than 
once 
a day 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
100
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Total 11 10 ... 5 13 :7 V 7 9 62
From these results, it seems that property & construction companies that responded 
are rarely faced with unauthorised access to data or systems by hackers, whereas the 
sector most likely to suffer from this threat is the manufacturing sector. This is a 
surprising result, given that the manufacturing sector has a lower level of 
computerisation, and is less reliant on IT than other sectors (Yeh and Chang 2007).
Unintentional destruction of data by employees
In contrast to the two previous threats, the results reveal that 36.7 percent of 
companies claimed that they did not suffer last year from any unintentional 
destruction of data by their employees (Table 4.69). The results also show that one 
third of companies believed that they had suffered from this threat once in the last 
year, 23.3 percent believed that it happened once per month, while only four 
respondents believed that it occurred once per week.
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It is not surprising that the unintentional destruction of data by employees occurred in 
more than three fifths of companies that responded, given that employees’ accidental 
actions were ranked among the top IS threats in the study conducted by Loch et al. 
(1992) and Davis (1997). In addition, Wood and Banks (1993) argued that human 
error is one of the most serious information security threats. The CSI Survey 
(Richardson 2007) also indicated that there have been too many data breaches driven 
by simple human error and carelessness.
Table 4.72 Cross-tabulation o f unintentional destruction o f data by employees by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 5 2 2 7 1 2 3 22
% 22.7 9.1 9.1 31.8 4.5 9.1 13.6
Industry % 50 22.2 40 53.8 14.3 28.6 33.3
Once a year 3 3 0 5 3 3 3 20
% 15 15 0 25 15 15 15
Industry % 30 33.3 0 38.5 42.9 42.9 33.3
Once a month 2 4 2 1 2 2 1 14
% 14.3 28.6 14.3 7.1 14.3 14.3 7.1
Industry % 20 44.4 40 7.7 28.6 28.6 11.1
Once a week 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 4
% 0 0 25 0 25 0 50
Industry % 0 0 20 0 14.3 0 22.2
Total 10 9 :: :5::: 13 7 ■ 7 9 60
Further analysis reveals that companies from all industry sectors claimed that no 
unintentional destruction of data by employees occurred last year. Table 4.72 reveals 
that 53.8 percent of the respondents from the property & construction sector reported 
the non-occurrence of this threat in the last year, followed by insurance & financial 
services (50 percent), media & entertainment (40 percent), energy & utilities (33.3 
percent). On the other hand, only 14.3 percent from retail merchandising sector held 
the same opinion. In addition, it was claimed by respondents from all the industry 
sectors except media & entertainment that unintentional destruction of data by 
employees occurred once in the last year, while respondents from all sectors believed 
that it happened once per month. On the other hand, only four respondents from 
media & entertainment, retail merchandising, and energy & utilities sectors reported 
the occurrence of this threat once per week in the last year.
From the above results, it seems that the unintentional destruction of data by 
employees had occurred in most companies responded in the last year. This result is
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consistent with what was claimed by Im and Baskerville (2005) that the major source 
of unmanaged risks to IS continues to be accidental in nature.
Intentional destruction of data by employees
The results concerning this threat (Table 4.69) reveal that the majority of companies 
responded (80.3 percent) reported the non-occurrence of any intentional destruction of 
data by their employees in the last year, and 18 percent reported the occurrence of this 
threat once in the last year. Only one company believed that it happened once per 
week. This suggests that intentional destruction of data by employees is an infrequent 
security threat in UK companies that responded. This result is consistent with the 
BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that 
intentional destruction by employees remains rare, even in large businesses.
Table 4.73 Cross-tabulation o f intentional destruction of data by employees by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 10 9 3 12 4 5 6 49
% 20.4 18.4 6.1 24.5 8.2 10.2 12.2
Industry % 90.9 90 60 100 66.7 62.5 66.7
Once a year 1 1 2 0 2 2 3 11
% 9.1 9.1 18.2 0 18.2 18.2 27.3
Industry % 9.1 10 40 0 33.3 25 33.3
Once a week 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
% 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 12.5 0
Total 11 10 12 6 8 9 61
It can be seen from Table 4.73 that all the respondents from the property & 
construction sector claimed that no intentional acts by employees occurred in the last 
year, followed by insurance & financial services (90.9), manufacturing (90 percent), 
retail merchandising, and energy & utilities (66.7 percent), technology & 
telecommunications (62.5 percent), and media & entertainment (60 percent). In 
addition, respondents from all industry sectors except property & construction 
reported the occurrence of this threat once in the last year, while only one company 
from the technology & telecommunications sector believed that intentional 
destruction of data by employees occurred once per week. The results, therefore, 
suggest the infrequent occurrence of the intentional destruction of data by employees 
in UK companies that responded.
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Theft of physical information e.g. printed output, computer disks, tapes, etc.
It can be observed from Table 4.69 that the majority of companies (83.3 percent) 
reported the non-occurrence of any theft of physical information in the last year. On 
the other hand, 11.7 percent of respondents stated that this had happened once in the 
last year, only two companies claimed its occurrence once per month, and one 
company reported its occurrence once per week. This result again suggests the 
infrequent occurrence of theft of physical information within UK companies that 
responded, which indicates that companies are beginning to implement sufficient 
access controls in place to reduce these threats. According to Lin (2006), data and 
information theft is more common when access controls are not implemented.
Table 4.74 Cross-tabulation of theft of physical information by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 9 8 4 12 3 6 8 50
% 18 16 8 24 6 12 16
Industry % 81.8 80 80 100 50 85.7 88.9
Once a year 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 7
% 14.3 28.6 0 0 28.6 14.3 14.3
Industry % 9.1 20 0 0 33.3 14.3 11.1
Once a month 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
% 50 0 0 0 50 0 0
Industry % 9.1 0 0 0 16.7 0 0
Once a week 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
% 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 20 0 0 0 0
Total 11 10 5 ■: 12 6 : 7 9 60
Further analysis (Table 4.74) reveals that all respondents from the property & 
construction sector reported the non-occurrence of any theft of physical information 
during the last year, followed by energy & utilities (88.9 percent), technology & 
telecommunications (85.7 percent), insurance & financial services (81.8 percent), 
manufacturing and media & entertainment (80 percent). On the other hand, half of the 
retail merchandising companies believed there had been no theft of physical 
information in the last year.
Table 4.74 also reveals that respondents from all sectors except media & 
entertainment and property & construction reported that their companies suffered 
from theft of information once in the last year. At the same time, two respondents 
from insurance & financial services and retail merchandising companies believed that 
it had happened once per month. On the other hand, only one respondent, from media
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& entertainment believed it occurred once per week. These results again reflect the 
infrequent occurrence of this threat in UK companies that responded.
Introduction of computer viruses, bombs, or worms to the system
In the past few years, there has been extensive publicity about the damage viruses can 
cause, and a large number of viruses has been identified. However, it can be seen 
from Table 4.69 that 49.2 percent of the companies claimed that they did not suffer 
from any virus attacks in the last year. This is not a surprising result since almost all 
companies, regardless of their size or sector, are using anti-virus software. This result 
is further investigated in Section 4.7. The BERR Information Security Breaches 
Survey (BERR 2008) indicated that the fewer virus infections reported by companies 
could be because corporate anti-virus defences have significantly improved. In 
addition, according to the CSI Survey (Richardson 2007), anti-virus vendors have 
become faster at reacting to new virus threats.
Table 4.75 Cross-tabulation of the introduction of computer viruses to the system by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 7 5 2 6 3 4 4 31
% 22.6 16.1 6.5 19.4 9.7 12.9 12.9
Industry % 63.6 50 40 46.2 42.9 50 44.4
Once a year 3 5 1 5 1 4 1 20
% 15 25 5 25 5 20 5
Industry % 27.3 50 20 38.5 14.3 50 11.1
Once a month 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 4
% 25 0 0 0 50 0 25
Industry % 9.1 0 0 0 28.6 0 11.1
Once a week 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 5
% 0 0 0 20 20 0 60
Industry % 0 0 0 7.7 14.3 0 33.3
Once a day 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
% 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 20 0 0 0 0
More than 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
once
a day
% 0 0 50 50 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 20 7.7 0 0 0
Total 11 10 ■ 5. 13 7 8 9 63
The results also show that 31.7 percent of companies believed that their systems were 
faced by virus infection once in the last year, while only four companies stated that it 
happened once a month and five companies indicated that the virus infection occurred 
one per week. On the other hand, one respondent believed that it happened once a day 
and another two respondents reported that their companies’ systems suffered from 
virus attacks more than once per day.
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Further analysis (Table 4.75) reveals that respondents from all industry sectors that 
responded reported the non-occurrence of any virus attacks on their companies’ 
systems in the last year. It can be seen that 63.6 percent of insurance & financial 
services companies agreed, followed by manufacturing, and technology & 
telecommunications (50 percent), property & construction (46.2 percent), energy & 
utilities (44.4 percent), retail merchandising (42.9 percent), and media & 
entertainment (40 percent).
It can also be seen from Table 4.75 that respondents from all sectors claimed that their 
systems had a virus infection once in the last year. On the other hand, one respondent 
from media & entertainment believed that systems were infected once a day, and 
another two respondents from media & entertainment, and property & construction 
reported the occurrence of virus infection more than once a day. This result is 
consistent with the result of the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 
2008), which indicated that financial services, and technology & telecommunications 
providers are the most rigorous at keeping their anti-virus software up-to-date, 
however, property & construction and leisure companies appear more relaxed.
The above results, therefore, suggest that viruses are no longer a big issue for UK 
companies that responded. Perhaps the media attention given to viruses has increased 
the awareness level of this particular threat.
Spamming attacks
The new business environment is accompanied by new security threats like spamming 
or e-mail attacks. Hicks (2004) argued that, although spam is not harmful for systems, 
it is considered a prime cause of productivity losses for companies. The results in 
Table 4.69 reveal that 62.3 percent of companies reported the occurrence of these 
attacks in the last year, while only 37.7 percent of companies reported their non­
occurrence. This result indicates the frequent occurrence of the spamming attacks on 
UK companies that responded compared to other threats. It can also be seen from 
Table 4.69 that 13.1 percent of companies believed that they suffered from spamming 
attacks only once in the last year, and another 13.1 percent believed this occurred 
once per month, while two respondents reported their occurrence once per week. 
However, in contrast to most of the previous threats, 11.5 percent of respondents
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reported the daily occurrence of spamming attacks, and more than one fifth declared 
that their companies suffered from these attacks several times per day in the last year, 
which underlines their frequent occurrence.
Table 4.76 Cross-tabulation of spamming attacks by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None
%
Industry %
3
13
27.3
5
21.7
55.6
1
4.3
20
7
30.4
53.8
3
13
42.9
3
13
42.9
1
4.3
11.1
23
Once a year 
%
Industry %
3
37.5
27.3
1
12.5
11.1
0
0
0
1
12.5
7.7
2
25
28.6
0
0
0
1
12.5
11.1
8
Once a month 
%
Industry %
3
37.5
27.3
1
12.5
11.1
0
0
0
2
25
15.4
0
0
0
1
12.5
14.3
1
12.5
11.1
8
Once a week 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
20
0
0
0
1
50
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Once a day 
%
Industry %
1
14.3
9.1
0
0
0
2
28.6
40
1
14.3
7.7
1
14.3
14.3
0
0
0
2
28.6
22.2
7
More than 
once 
a day
%
Industry %
1
7.7
9.1
2
15.4
22.2
1
7.7
20
2
15.4
15.4
0
0
0
3
23.1
42.9
4
30.8
44.4
13
Total 11 9 5 13 7 7 9 61
Furthermore, the analysis by industry sector (Table 4.76) indicates that 55.6 percent of 
the manufacturing companies reported the non-occurrence of these attacks. This is not 
a surprising result, given the low level of computerisation of manufacturing 
companies (Yeh and Chang 2007). The results also reveal that 53.8 percent of 
property & construction companies claimed the non-occurrence of any spamming 
attacks in the last year, followed by retail merchandising, and technology & 
telecommunications (42.9 percent), and insurance & financial services (27.3 percent). 
However, only a single respondent from both media & entertainment, and energy & 
utilities claimed such attacks did not occur. In addition, it can be seen from Table 4.76 
that respondents from all sectors except media & entertainment, and retail 
merchandising believed spamming attacks occurred once per month in the last year, 
whereas respondents from these two sectors reported an occurrence of once per week. 
Moreover, companies from all sectors except manufacturing, and technology & 
telecommunications reported the daily occurrence of such attacks to their systems, 
whereas companies from all sectors except retail merchandising revealed the frequent 
attacks each day.
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The above results indicate the frequent occurrence of spamming or e-mail attacks 
within UK companies that responded. These results are consistent with the Global 
Security Survey (DTT 2007), which indicated that e-mail attacks are among the top 
security threats that were repeated the greatest number of times by respondents.
Malware (spyware, adware) programs
Malware attacks represent a clearly understood threat. It can be seen from Table 4.69 
that 25.4 percent of respondents reported the frequent occurrence of these attacks, 
either once a day, or several times per day. The results also show that 34.9 percent of 
respondents reported the non-occurrence of any malware attacks in the last year, while
23.8 percent of respondents believed that malware attacks rarely happened within 
their companies, as they had occurred only once in the last year. On the other hand, 
three companies reported their occurrence once per month, while 11.1 percent 
reported their occurrence once per week.
Table 4.77 Cross-tabulation of malware programs by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None
%
Industry %
3
13.6
27.3
5
22.7
50
1
4.5
20
6
27.3
46.2
2
9.1
28.6
2
9.1
25
3
13.6
33.3
22
Once a year 
%
Industry %
6
40
54.5
4
26.7
40
1
6.7
20
2
13.3
15.4
2
13.3
28.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
Once a month 
%
Industry %
1
33.3
9.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
33.3
14.3
1
33.3
12.5
0
0
0
3
Once a week 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
28.6
40
1
14.3
7.7
1
14.3
14.3
2
28.6
25
1
14.3
11.1
7
Once a day 
%
Industry %
1
14.3
9.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
28.6
15.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
57.1
44.4
7
More than 
once 
a day
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
11.1
10
1
11.1
20
2
22.2
15.4
1
11.1
14.3
3
33.3
37.5
1
11.1
11.1
9
Total 11 10 5 13 7 8 9 63
These results suggest the frequent occurrence of malware attacks in UK companies 
that responded, although the majority of companies are now using malware detection 
tools (Section 4.7). This could be because new malware is emerging at a frightening 
rate (BERR 2008). In addition, the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007) indicated that 
spyware are at the top of the list of attacks, with more than half of the companies (52 
percent) reporting them.
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Further analysis (Table 4.77) reveals that half of the manufacturing companies 
claimed the non-occurrence of any malware attacks in the last year, followed by 
property & construction (46.2 percent), and energy & utilities (33.3 percent). In 
addition, 28.6 percent of retail merchandising agreed, followed by insurance & 
financial services (27.3 percent), technology & telecommunications (25 percent), and 
media & entertainment (20 percent). This result could be because manufacturing 
companies have a lower level of computerisation, compared to other sectors, and 
therefore they are the companies to be affected least by malware attacks. In contrast, 
55.6 percent of energy & utilities companies reported the frequent occurrence of 
malware attacks either once a day or more. This result is again consistent with the 
BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that 
energy companies are least likely to be protected against spyware.
Table 4.77 also reveals that 37.5 percent of technology & telecommunications 
companies believed malware attacks took place more than once per day, with none of 
the respondents from insurance & financial services reporting this. This could be 
because financial services providers are the most rigorous at keeping their anti­
malware software up-to-date. The results, therefore, suggest that manufacturing 
companies are the least affected by malware attacks, whereas energy & utilities and 
technology & telecommunications are the most affected companies.
Sharing of passwords
There have been too many security breaches driven by simple human error and 
carelessness, especially the sharing of passwords. The results (Table 4.69) show that
72.9 percent of respondents reported that employees in their companies shared their 
passwords in the last year, with only 27.1 percent of respondents reporting the non­
occurrence of this threat, which indicates its frequent occurrence in UK companies 
that responded. Table 4.69 also shows that 11.9 percent of companies claimed that 
sharing passwords happened only once in the last year, 33.9 percent reported its 
occurrence once per month, and 10.2 percent once per week. On the other hand, seven 
companies believed that the sharing of passwords took place once per day, and 5.1 
percent reported its occurrence several times per day.
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T a b le  4 .7 8  C ro ss - ta b u l a tio n  o f  s h a r in g  o f  p a s s w o rd s  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None
%
Industry %
3
18.8
33.3
1
6.3
11.1
1
6.3
20
7
43.8
53.8
0
0
0
3
18.8
42.9
1
6.3
11.1
16
Once a year 
%
Industry %
1
14.3
11.1
3
42.9
33.3
0
0
0
1
14.3
7.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
28.6
22.2
7
Once a month 
%
Industry %
3
15
33.3
4
20
44.4
3
15
60
4
20
30.8
1
5
14.3
1
5
14.3
4
20
44.4
20
Once a week 
%
Industry %
1
16.7
11.1
1
16.7
11.1
0
0
0
1
16.7
7.7
0
0
0
2
33.3
28.6
1
16.7
11.1
6
Once a day
%
Industry %
1
14.3
11.1
0
0
0
1
14.3
20
0
0
0
3
42.9
42.9
1
14.3
14.3
1
14.3
11.1
7
More than 
once 
a day
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
100
42.9
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Total 9 9 5 13 7 7 9 59
Further analysis (Table 4.78) shows that respondents from all sectors except retail 
merchandising reported the non-occurrence of password sharing among employees in 
the last year. In addition, 53.8 percent of the property & construction companies held 
the same opinion, followed by technology & telecommunications (42.9 percent), 
insurance & financial services (33.3 percent), and media & entertainment (20 
percent), with only 11.1 percent from manufacturing, and energy & utilities. It was 
also observed that companies from all sectors believed that employees’ sharing of 
passwords happened once per month, while companies from all sectors except media 
& entertainment, and retail merchandising believed its occurrence was once per week. 
On the other hand, companies from all sectors except manufacturing and property & 
construction reported its occurrence once per day. In addition, only respondents from 
the retail merchandising sector believed that employees’ sharing of passwords had 
happened several times per day in the last year. The results, therefore, suggest the 
high level of occurrence of employees’ sharing of passwords in the retail 
merchandising companies that responded.
Theft of software
In contrast to other AIS security threats, the results in Table 4.69 suggest the 
infrequent occurrence of software theft in UK companies. The results reveal that 80.6 
percent of companies claimed the non-occurrence of any software theft in the last
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year, and another five companies believed that it happened once in the last year, while
6.5 percent reported its occurrence once per month. On the other hand, only two 
companies believed the theft of software occurred once per week, and only one 
company believed that it happened more than once a day.
Table 4.79 Cross-tabulation of theft of software by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 10 9 3 12 5 4 7 50
% 20 18 6 24 10 8 14
Industry % 90.9 90 60 92.3 83.3 50 77.8
Once a year 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 5
% 20 0 0 0 20 20 40
Industry % 9.1 0 0 0 16.7 12.5 22.2
Once a month 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
% 0 25 25 25 0 25 0
Industry % 0 10 20 7.7 0 12.5 0
Once a week 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
% 0 0 50 0 0 50 0
Industry % 0 0 20 0 0 12.5 0
More than 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
once
a day
% 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 12.5 0
Total 11 10 5 , 13 6 8 9 62
In addition, the analysis by sectors (Table 4.79) reveals that some respondents from 
all sectors reported the non-occurrence of any software theft within their companies in 
the last year. The results show that 92.3 percent of respondents from property & 
construction agreed, followed by insurance & financial services (90.9 percent), and 
manufacturing (90 percent), while only half the respondents from technology & 
telecommunications reported the non-occurrence of software theft in the last year. In 
addition, respondents from all sectors except insurance & financial services, retail 
merchandising, and energy & utilities believed it occurred once a month, with 
respondents from only media & entertainment, and technology & telecommunications 
sectors reporting its occurrence once a week.
Interestingly, one respondent only from technology & telecommunications believed 
software theft occurred several times per day. This could be because, despite the 
significant spending on IS security, technology companies are inadequately 
implementing personnel-related controls (Chang and Yeh 2006), which could give 
employees the opportunity to steal companies’ software. However, the above results 
suggest the low level of occurrence of software theft in UK companies that responded.
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Technical software failures or errors
Technical software errors are one of the major and most serious threats to AIS 
security. The results in Table 4.69 show that 83.9 percent of companies reported that 
they suffered from technical software failures in the last year, while only 16.1 percent 
of companies reported their non-occurrence. The results also reveal that 40.3 percent 
of companies reported the occurrence of software failures once in the last year, 30.6 
percent once per month, and 6.5 percent once per week. On the other hand, two 
companies believed that they suffered from software failures once a day in the last 
year, and another two companies reported their occurrence several times per day.
These results give an indication that software failures or errors are happening in most 
UK companies that responded, but their occurrence is infrequent, since only 10 
companies reported their non-occurrence. However, two fifths of companies reported 
their occurrence only once in the last year.
Table 4.80 Cross-tabulation o f technical software failures or errors by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None
%
Industry %
2
20
18.2
1
10
10
0
0
0
1
10
7.7
1
10
14.3
2
20
28.6
3
30
33.3
10
Once a year 
%
Industry %
6
24
54.5
7
28
70
3
12
60
4
16
30.8
1
4
14.3
3
12
42.9
1
4
11.1
25
Once a month 
%
Industry %
1
5.3
9.1
1
5.3
10
1
5.3
20
6
31.6
46.2
4
21.1
57.1
1
5.3
14.3
5
26.3
55.6
19
Once a week
%
Industry %
2
50
18.2
1
25
10
0
0
0
1
25
7.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
Once a day 
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
7.7
0
0
0
1
50
14.3
0
0
0
2
More than 
once 
a day
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
50
20
0
0
0
1
50
14.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Total 11 10 5 13 7 7 9 62
Further analysis (Table 4.80).reveals that respondents from all sectors except media & 
entertainment reported the non-occurrence of any software failures in the last year. In 
addition, respondents from all sectors believed that their companies suffered from 
software failures once in the last year, given that 70 percent of respondents from 
manufacturing sector agreed, while only 11.1 percent from energy & utilities reported 
their occurrence once a year. It can also be observed from Table 4.80 that only two
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companies from property & construction, and technology & telecommunications 
reported the occurrence of software failures once per day, and another two companies 
from media & entertainment, and retail merchandising sectors reported their 
occurrence several times a day in the last year.
The above results indicate that the majority of UK companies that responded suffered 
from software failures in the last year; however, the figures indicate their infrequent 
occurrence, since the majority of respondents claimed that they happened no more 
often than once per month.
Sabotage or intentional destruction of computing equipment
The results in Table 4.69 show that the intentional destruction of computing 
equipment remains rare in UK companies. The results reveal that 90.5 percent of 
respondents reported the non-occurrence of any sabotage acts within their companies 
in the last year, while the remaining 9.5 percent reported only infrequent occurrence 
of sabotage. The figures show that five respondents reported its occurrence once in 
the last year, while only one respondent believed that the company suffered from 
sabotage once per month.
The analysis by industry sector (Table 4.81) reveals that all respondents from media 
& entertainment, property & construction, and retail merchandising claimed that 
sabotage never happened within their companies in the last year, which is followed by 
insurance & financial services (90.9 percent), manufacturing (90 percent), energy & 
utilities (77.8 percent), and technology & telecommunications (75 percent).
Table 4.81 Cross-tabulation o f sabotage or intentional destruction of computing equipment by industry
sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 10 9 * 5 13 7 6 7 57
% 17.5 15.8 8.8 22.8 12.3 10.5 12.3
Industry % 90.9 90 100 100 100 75 77.8
Once a year 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 5
% 20 20 0 0 0 20 40
Industry % 9.1 10 0 0 0 12.5 22.2
Once a month 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
% 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 12.5 0
Total 11 10 :-5' .. 13 -7 8 9 63
- 2 5 0 -
Table 4.81 also shows that the five respondents who reported the occurrence of 
sabotage once in the last year are from insurance & financial services, manufacturing, 
technology & telecommunications, and energy & utilities sectors. On the other hand, 
only one respondent, who is from technology & telecommunications, believed 
sabotage occurred once per month. The results, therefore, indicate the rare occurrence 
of sabotage in media & entertainment, property & construction, and retail 
merchandising, and its infrequent occurrence in the other sectors that responded.
Natural disasters e.g. fire, floods, earthquakes, etc.
Despite the severe floods that hit many places in the UK last year, the results in Table 
4.69 show that 69.8 percent of companies reported the non-occurrence of any natural 
disasters in the last year, whereas 30.2 percent of companies reported their occurrence 
once in the last year. These results indicate the infrequent occurrence of natural 
disasters that have a significant effect on the computing equipment and systems in UK 
companies.
Table 4.82 Cross-tabulation of natural disasters by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
None 9 7 2 10 5 6 5 44
% 20.5 15.9 4.5 22.7 11.4 13.6 11.4
Industry % 81.8 70 40 76.9 71.4 75 55.6
Once a year 2 3 3 3 2 2 4 19
% 10.5 15.8 15.8 15.8 10.5 10.5 21.1
Industry % 18.2 30 60 23.1 28.6 25 44.4
Total m n 10 9 63
Further analysis (Table 4.82) reveals that 81.8 percent of insurance & financial 
services companies claimed that no natural disasters had occurred in the last year, 
followed by property & construction (76.9 percent), technology & 
telecommunications (75 percent), retail merchandising (71.4 percent), manufacturing 
(70 percent), and energy & utilities (55.6 percent). On the other hand, only 40 percent 
of media & entertainment companies maintained this. The results also show that 18.2 
percent of insurance & financial services companies believed that they had been 
affected by natural disasters in the last year, while 60 percent of respondents from 
media & entertainment had the same idea. The results, therefore, suggest the low level 
of occurrence of natural disasters in UK companies that responded.
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Table 4.83 Results o f Kruskal-Wallis test regarding the frequency of occurrence o f each type of AIS 
___________________________  security threats___________________________
Types o f AIS security 
threats Industry sectors N Mean Rank
Insurance & financial services 11 32.95
Manufacturing 10 33.80
Unauthorised access to data/systems 
by disgruntled employees
Media & entertainment 5 44.60
Property & construction 13 24.50
Retail merchandising 7 33.36
Technology & telecommunications 8 40
Energy & utilities 9 24.50
Chi>square value (x2) * 14.142, df = 6 and p-value = 0.028
Insurance & financial services 11 31
Manufacturing 10 31.40
Unauthorised access to data/systems 
by hackers
Media & entertainment 5 34
Property & construction 13 28
Retail merchandising 7 32.29
Technology & telecommunications 7 36.57
Energy & utilities 9 31.33
Chi-square value (x2)® 3.852, df = 6, and p-value *0.697
Insurance & financial services 10 25.40
Manufacturing 9 35.39
Unintentional destruction o f  data 
by employees
Media & entertainment 5 36.10
Property & construction 13 22.50
Retail merchandising 7 38.07
Technology & telecommunications 7 31.36
Energy & utilities 9 33.17
Chi-square value (x2) *  7.040, df = 6, and p-value = 0.317
Insurance & financial services 11 27.73
Manufacturing 10 28
Intentional destruction o f data by 
employees
Media & entertainment 5 37
Property & construction 12 25
Retail merchandising 6 35
Technology & telecommunications 8 37
Energy & utilities 9 35
Chi-square value (x2) *  8.985, df = 6, and p-value *0.174
Insurance & financial services 11 31.09
Manufacturing 10 31.20
Theft o f  physical information Media & entertainment 5 32.40
e.g. printed output, computer disks, Property & construction 12 25.50
etc. Retail merchandising 6 40.50
Technology & telecommunications 7 29.57
Energy & utilities 9 28.67
Chi-square value (x2) = 7.522, df *  6, and p-vaiue = 0.275
Insurance & financial services 11 26.36
Manufacturing 10 28.75
Introduction o f computer viruses, 
bombs or worms to the system
Media & entertainment 5 39.40
Property & construction 13 32.62
Retail merchandising 7 36.36
Technology & telecommunications 8 28.75
Energy & utilities 9 37
Chi-square value (x2) = 4.127, df= 6, and p-value = 0.660
Insurance & financial services 11 29.55
Manufacturing 9 25.89
Media & entertainment 5 39.50
Spamming attacks Property & construction 13 25.96
Retail merchandising 7 25.21
Technology & telecommunications 7 33.79
Energy & utilities 9 42.78
Chi-square value (x2) ® 8.476, df = 6, and p-value = 0.205
Insurance & financial services 11 27.68
Manufacturing 10 23.65
Malware (spyware, adware) 
programs
Media & entertainment 5 37.70
Property & construction 13 30.23
Retail merchandising 7 32.14
Technology & telecommunications 8 40.88
Energy & utilities 9 37.94
Chi-square value (x2) ^ 6.514, df= 6, and p-vhlue=0.368
Sharing o f passwords Insurance & financial services 9 27.28
Manufacturing 9 27.67
Media & entertainment 5 32.40
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Property & construction 13 20
Retail merchandising 7 52.36
Technology & telecommunications 7 29.29
Energy & utilities 9 31.33
Chi-square value (xa) = 17.958, df * 6 and p-value *» 0.006
Theft o f software
Insurance & financial services 11 28
Manufacturing 10 28.70
Media & entertainment 5 38.90
Property & construction 13 27.96
Retail merchandising 6 30.08
Technology & telecommunications 8 41.88
Energy & utilities 9 31.61
Chi-square value (x2) *  9.854, df “  6, and p-value * 0.131
Technical software failures 
or errors
Insurance & financial services 11 27.91
Manufacturing 10 26.80
Media & entertainment 5 35.10
Property & construction 13 37.19
Retail merchandising 7 38.57
Technology & telecommunications 7 26.36
Energy & utilities 9 29.39
Chi-square value (x*) * 4.854, df *  6, and p-value “ 0.563
Sabotage or intentional destruction 
o f computer equipment
Insurance & financial services 11 31.82
Manufacturing 10 32.10
Media & entertainment 5 29
Property & construction 13 29
Retail merchandising 7 29
Technology & telecommunications 8 37.13
Energy & utilities 9 35.89
Chi-square value (xa) •  6.571, df * 6, and p-value * 0.362
Natural disasters e.g. fire, 
floods, earthquakes, etc.
Insurance & financial services 11 28.23
Manufacturing 10 31.95
Media & entertainment 5 41.40
Property & construction 13 29.77
Retail merchandising 7 31.50
Technology & telecommunications 8 30.38
Energy & utilities 9 36.50
In order to test the hypothesis and to examine whether the different types of AIS 
security threats and their frequency of occurrence vary among industry sectors, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The results (Table 4.83) do not indicate any 
statistically significant differences, at the 0.05 level, in the distribution of responses 
among the different industry sectors except for the unauthorised access to data or 
systems by disgruntled employees, and employees’ sharing of passwords. The results, 
therefore, indicate that there are significant differences in the distribution of responses 
among the different industry sectors regarding these two threats, given that their p- 
values are 0.028 and 0.006 respectively. On the other hand, there are no significant 
differences in the distribution of responses among the different sectors regarding types 
and frequency of occurrence for the other AIS security threats, given that their p- 
values are greater than 0.05.
Overall, the results of this section suggest that employees are now the most common 
source of AIS security threats facing UK companies that responded. The common 
sources of security threats are now believed to come more from inside companies than
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from outside, given that the majority of respondents consider authorised users or 
employees to be the most common source of security threats to their companies, with 
competitors and customers being the least common sources of threats.
The results also indicate the infrequent occurrence of some types of security threats in 
these companies such as the intentional destruction of data by employees, theft of 
physical information, theft of software, sabotage, and natural disasters. The results 
highlight the frequent occurrence of employees’ errors that is unintentional 
destruction of data by employees, spamming and malware attacks, and employees’ 
sharing of passwords. Consequently, companies must pay more attention to those 
threats and should implement effective controls accordingly.
4.7 AIS security controls
Having identified the most common sources and types of AIS security threats facing 
UK companies, the next step is to investigate the different types of AIS security 
controls that companies are currently using, or are planning to use in order to reduce 
their security threats.
According to Whitman (2003), knowing the ‘enemy’ that faces information security is 
a vital component to shaping a security defence posture. Accountants, as well as 
users, managers, and designers of AIS should be knowledgeable about security threats 
and appropriate control techniques in order to protect their own systems (Beard and 
Wen 2007). In addition, Chang and Yeh (2006) have argued that a lack of robust 
security protection raises the information security threat to companies. Consequently, 
companies need to understand the security requirements most relevant to their 
industry sector and should prepare appropriate security countermeasures to minimise 
threats.
In order to investigate AIS security controls, this section presents the questionnaire 
results on the different types of AIS security controls that UK companies in different 
sectors are using or are planning to use (Section 3 of the questionnaire). In addition, 
the questionnaire results of both Sections 2 and 3 are used to analyse the degree of 
correlation between different types of AIS security threats facing UK companies, and
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the different types of security controls used to reduce such threats. This section also 
examines the effect of these controls on the reduction of companies’ security threats. 
This section also investigates the degree of correlation between an AIS security 
effectiveness level (Section 1.7 of the questionnaire) and the different types of threats, 
and the effect of this on the reduction of these threats. Consequently, this section is 
concerned with testing Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 (Section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). These 
three hypotheses can be expressed as follows:
Hr. There are no significant differences among UK companies in different industry 
sectors concerning the types of controls implemented to prevent or reduce security 
threats.
H r  There is no significant relationship between the different types of security 
controls and the reduction of AIS security threats facing UK companies.
Hs: There is no significant relationship between AIS security effectiveness and the 
AIS security threat level in UK companies.
In order to test the first hypothesis, respondents were asked one question (Section 3 of 
the questionnaire). Respondents were provided with a list of AIS security controls, 
which were grouped under seven sub-titles, and they were asked to indicate whether 
their companies are currently using each of these controls, are planning to use them, 
or have no plans to use them.
Administrative/organisational security controls
The results in Table 4.84 show that only 38.3 percent of companies believed that they 
have reorganised AIS security functions and 20 percent reported that they are 
planning to do so. On the other hand, 41.7 percent of respondents confirmed the non­
existence of reorganised AIS security functions within their companies. The results 
indicate that the majority of respondents are not concerned with reorganising their 
security functions.
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T a b le  4 .8 4  O rg a n is a t io n a l  s e c u ri ty  c o n tro ls  u se d  in  U K  c o m p a n ie s
Organisational security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % no
Reorganised AIS security functions 23 38.3 12 20 25 41.7 60
Continuous auditing techniques 33 52.4 9 14.3 21 33.3 63
Real time security awareness/incident response 24 38.7 14 22.6 24 38.7 62
Disaster recovery and business continuity plan 53 84.1 8 12.7 2 3.2 63
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it.
Further analysis (Table 4.85) reveals that retail merchandising appears to be the most 
likely sector to be concerned with this control, since two thirds of companies reported 
the existence of reorganised AIS security functions. On the other hand, only 10 
percent of respondents from the manufacturing sector reported this. The results also 
show that 55.6 percent of the energy & utilities companies confirmed that they are not 
planning to reorganise their security functions and half the companies in each of the 
following sectors - insurance & financial services, manufacturing, and property & 
construction - held a similar view.
Table 4.85 Cross-tabulation of reorganised AIS security functions by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 4 1 3 4 4 4 3 23
% 17.4 4.3 13 17.4 17.4 17.4 13
Industry % 40 10 50 33.3 66.7 57.1 33.3
No, but 1 4 1 2 0 3 1 12
plans to
% 8.3 33.3 8.3 16.7 0 25 8.3
Industry % 10 40 16.7 16.7 0 42.9 11.1
No, and no 5 5 2 6 2 0 5 25
plans to
% 20 20 8 24 8 0 20
Industry % 50 50 33.3 50 33.3 0 55.6
Total 10 6 12 6 7 9 60
Table 4.84 also reveals that 52.4 percent of the companies claimed that they have 
continuous auditing techniques, whereas one third of companies have no plans to have 
them. This result is consistent with the result in Section 4.5.4 in which nearly half the 
companies (47.2 percent) reported that they are undertaking a security audit after 
suffering from a security incident. In addition, the majority of companies that 
responded (Section 4.5.7) claimed that they depend mainly on internal and external 
audits to evaluate AIS security effectiveness.
Further analysis (Table 4.86) reveals that two thirds of media & entertainment 
companies confirmed the existence of continuous auditing techniques, while only 40
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percent of manufacturing companies confirmed their existence. Interestingly, only
45.5 percent of insurance & financial services companies reported the existence of 
these auditing techniques, despite being the most likely sector to be concerned with 
security. On the other hand, half the respondents from the manufacturing sector stated 
that they are not planning to undertake continuous auditing, while only one 
respondent from energy & utilities claimed that they were. The results, therefore, 
indicate that manufacturing companies need to be more concerned than they appear to 
be with auditing techniques.
Table 4.86 Cross-tabulation o f continuous auditing techniques by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
5
15.2
45.5
4
12.1
40
4
12.1
66.7
7
21.2
53.8
4
12.1
57.1
4
12.1
57.1
5
15.2
55.6
33
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
2
22.2
18.2
1
11.1
10
1
11.1
16.7
1
11.1
7.7
0
0
0
1
11.1
14.3
3
33.3
33.3
9
No, and no 
plans to
%
Industry %
4
19
36.4
5
23.8
50
1
4.8
16.7
5
23.8
38.5
3
14.3
42.9
2
9.5
28.6
1
4.8
11.1
21
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
Table 4.87 Cross-tabulation of real time security awareness/incident response by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 6 2 3 5 3 2 3 24
% 25 8.3 12.5 20.8 12.5 8.3 12.5
Industry % 54.5 22.2 50 38.5 42.9 28.6 33.3
No, but 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 14
plans to
% 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
Industry % 18.2 22.2 33.3 15.4 28.6 28.6 22.2
No, and no 3 5 1 6 2 3 4 24
plans to
% 12.5 20.8 4.2 25 8.3 12.5 16.7
Industry % 27.3 55.6 16.7 46.2 28.6 42.9 44.4
Total 11 9 6 13 7 7 9 62
From Table 4.84 it can be seen that 38.7 percent of companies reported the existence 
of real time security awareness and incident response; 22.6 percent claimed that they 
are planning to do this; whereas another 38.7 percent have no plans to do so. Further 
analysis (Table 4.87) reveals that 55.6 percent of the manufacturing companies 
reported that they do not undertake real time security awareness and incident 
response, and they have no plans to do so, while only one respondent from media & 
entertainment held this opinion. The results, therefore, suggest that manufacturing
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companies are less concerned about real time security awareness, which is consistent 
with the results presented in Section 4.5.2, in which manufacturing companies appear 
to devote less effort to raising security awareness compared to the other sectors.
Table 4.84 reveals that 84.1 percent of companies reported the existence of disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans. This result is consistent with that in Section 
4.5.4. On the other hand, only 3.2 percent of companies do not have and are not 
planning to have disaster recovery and business continuity plans. This suggests that 
UK companies that responded are aware of the importance of having a current disaster 
recovery plan. In addition, the analysis by sectors (Table 4.88) reveals that all 
respondents from retail merchandising, and technology & telecommunications 
believed that they have a disaster recovery plan in place. On the other hand, only two 
companies from the insurance & financial services and manufacturing sectors 
reported that they have no disaster recovery plans, and they are not planning to have 
any.
Table 4.88 Cross-tabulation of disaster recovery and business continuity plan by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 10 6 5 10 7 7 8 53
% 18.9 11.3 9.4 18.9 13.2 13.2 15.1
Industry % 90.9 60 83.3 76.9 100 100 88.9
No, but 0 3 1 3 0 0 1 8
plans to
% 0 37.5 12.5 37.5 0 0 12.5
Industry % 0 30 16.7 23.1 0 0 11.1
No, and no 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
plans to
% 50 50 0 0 0 0 0
Industry % 9.1 10 0 0 0 0 0
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
Based on the above results, it can be concluded that the manufacturing sector is the 
least likely to be concerned with organisational security controls and should pay more 
attention to this type of security control.
Personnel security controls
Since employees are a major threat to their companies’ systems, respondents were 
asked about the existence of five personnel security controls within their companies.
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T a b le  4 .8 9  P e rs o n n e l  s e c u ri ty  c o n tro ls  u se d  in  U K  c o m p a n ie s
Personnel security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % no
Background investigation/reference checks 46 75.4 4 6.6 11 18 61
Signing o f confidentiality agreement by employees 53 84.1 2 3.2 8 12.7 63
Security training and awareness programs 26 41.3 16 25.4 21 33.3 63
Segregation o f duties 49 77.8 4 6.3 10 15.9 63
Mandatory vacations 15 24.2 1 1.6 46 74.2 62
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it
Table 4.89 shows that 75.4 percent of companies indicated that they are doing 
background investigations for their employees, while 24.6 percent of companies 
reported the non-existence of these controls. In addition, Table 4.90 reveals that all 
media & entertainment companies confirmed that they are undertaking background 
checks, followed by insurance & financial services (90.9 percent), whereas 44.4 
percent of the manufacturing companies we re doing this. However, another 44.4 
percent of manufacturing companies reported that they are not undertaking 
background checks and are not planning to do so. The results, therefore, indicate that 
media & entertainment is the sector most concerned with undertaking reference 
checks for its employees, while manufacturing is the least concerned.
Table 4.90 Cross-tabulation of background investigations/reference checks by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
10
21.7
90.9
4
8.7
44.4
5
10.9
100
11
23.9
84.6
3
6.5
50
7
15.2
87.5
6
13
66.7
46
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
0
0
0
1
25
11.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
50
33.3
0
0
0
1
25
11.1
4
No, and no 
plans to
%
Industry %
1
9.1
9.1
4
36.4
44.4
0
0
0
2
18.2
15.4
1
9.1
16.7
1
9.1
12.5
2
18.2
22.2
11
Total 11 9 13 6 8 9 61
Regarding a confidentiality agreement, Table 4.89 shows that 84.1 percent of 
companies require their employees to sign a confidentiality agreement before joining 
the company, while only 15.9 percent of companies do not do so. Further analysis 
(Table 4.91) reveals that all media & entertainment and technology & 
telecommunications companies reported that employees sign a confidentiality 
agreement before joining, followed by insurance & financial services (90.9 percent).
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T a b le  4 .91  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  sign ing  o f  confidentiality  agreem ent by em ployees b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 10 8 5 10 6 8 6 53
% 18.9 15.1 9.4 18.9 11.3 15.1 11.3
Industry % 90.9 80 100 76.9 85.7 100 66.7
No, but 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
plans to
% 0 0 0 50 0 0 50
Industry % 0 0 0 7.7 0 0 11.1
No, and no 1 2 0 2 1 0 2 8
plans to
% 12.5 25 0 25 12.5 0 25
Industry % 9.1 20 0 15.4 14.3 0 22.2
Total 11 10 5 13 8 9 63
On the other hand, 22.2 percent of respondents from energy & utilities claimed that 
employees do not sign a confidentiality agreement and their companies are not 
planning to oblige them to do so. These results indicate that media & entertainment 
and technology & telecommunications sectors are more concerned with this control 
than the other sectors that responded.
Table 4.89 also shows that 41.3 percent of companies reported the existence of 
security training and awareness programs, while 58.7 percent of companies claimed 
the non-existence of these programs. This result is consistent with the result in Section 
4.5.2, which revealed that UK companies that responded do not pay much attention to 
security training and awareness programs.
Table 4.92 Cross-tabulation of security training and awareness programs by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 7 2 3 3 4 4 3 26
% 26.9 7.7 11.5 11.5 15.4 15.4 11.5
Industry % 63.6 20 50 23.1 57.1 57.1 33.3
No, but 1 2 3 4 1 1 4 16
plans to
% 6.3 12.5 18.8 25 6.3 6.3 25
Industry % 9.1 20 50 30.8 14.3 14.3 44.4
No, and no 3 6 0 6 2 2 2 21
plans to
% 14.3 28.6 0 28.6 9.5 9.5 9.5
Industry % 27.3 60 0 46.2 28.6 28.6 22.2
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
Moreover, Table 4.92 reveals that the insurance & financial services sector is most 
concerned with training its employees and with raising their security awareness. The 
results show that 63.6 percent of companies reported the existence of security training 
and awareness programs, but only 20 percent of companies from the manufacturing
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sector had the same opinion. On the other hand, three fifths o f manufacturing 
companies reported that they do not have these training programs, and they are not 
planning to have them.
From Table 4.89, it can be seen that 77.8 percent of companies confirmed that they 
are segregating employees’ duties, while only 22.2 percent reported the non-existence 
of this security control. Further analysis (Table 4.93) reveals that all respondents from 
retail merchandising reported the segregation of duties within their companies, 
followed by insurance & financial services with 90.9 percent. On the other hand, 38.5 
percent of property & construction companies do not segregate employees’ duties. 
The results, therefore, indicate that the retail merchandising sector pays more attention 
to the segregation of duties than other sectors.
Table 4.93 Cross-tabulation of segregation of duties by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 10 7 4 8 7 6 7 49
% 20.4 14.3 8.2 16.3 14.3 12.2 14.3
Industry % 90.9 70 66.7 61.5 100 85.7 77.8
No, but 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 4
plans to
% 0 50 0 0 0 25 25
Industry % 0 20 0 0 0 14.3 11.1
No, and no 1 1 2 5 0 0 1 10
plans to
% 10 10 20 50 0 0 10
Industry % 9.1 10 33.3 38.5 0 0 11.1
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
It can also be seen from Table 4.89 that the majority of companies that responded are 
not concerned about giving their employees mandatory vacations. The results reveal 
that 24.2 percent of companies acknowledged the existence of mandatory vacations, 
whereas 75.8 percent of respondents claimed that they did not take these vacations. In 
addition, Table 4.94 shows that 54.5 percent of the insurance & financial services 
companies claimed that they are applying mandatory vacations, followed by energy & 
utilities (33.3 percent). On the other hand, 85.7 percent of technology & 
telecommunications companies reported that they do not apply these safeguards, and 
they are not planning to do so, followed by property & construction (84.6 percent), 
media & entertainment, retail merchandising (83.3 percent) and manufacturing (80 
percent). It is clear that the majority of UK companies that responded do not consider 
mandatory vacations as an important AIS security control.
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T a b le  4 .9 4  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  m a n d a to ry  v a c a tio n s  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
6
40
54.5
2
13.3
20
1
6.7
16.7
2
13.3
15.4
1
6.7
16.7
0
0
0
3
20
33.3
15
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
100
14.3
0
0
0
1
No, and no 
plans to
%
Industry %
5
10.9
45.5
8
17.4
80
5
10.9
83.3
11
23.9
84.6
5
10.9
83.3
6
13
85.7
6
13
66.7
46
Total 11 10 6 13 6 7 9 62
Based on the above, it seems that the majority of UK companies that responded are 
more concerned with undertaking background checks for their employees, they 
require their employees to sign confidentiality agreement before joining, and they pay 
great attention to the segregation of duties. Thus, more attention should be given to 
security training and awareness and to the mandatory vacations.
Software security controls
The results in Table 4.95 reveal that the vast majority of companies responded (98.4 
percent) test software before using it, while only one company does not do so. The 
results reveal that this company is from the insurance & financial services sector. This 
is a surprising result given the nature of financial services companies.
Table 4.95 Software security controls used in UK companies
Software security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % no
Testing software before use 61 98.4 0 0 1 1.6 62
Off-site storage o f original software 45 71.4 4 6.3 14 22.2 63
Safeguards against unauthorised access to software 62 98.4 0 0 1 1.6 63
Software audit alert tools 37 58.7 11 17.5 15 23.8 63
Virus protection software 64 100 0 0 0 0 64
Cancelling passwords for terminated employees 64 100 0 0 0 0 64
Intrusion prevention/detection software 42 65.6 15 23.4 7 10.9 64
Insurance coverage for software 26 41.9 1 1.6 35 56.5 62
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it
It can also be seen from Table 4.95 that 71.4 percent of companies reported that they 
store their original software off-site, whereas 22.2 percent do not do so, and are not 
planning to do so.
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Moreover, Table 4.96 shows that all respondents from media & entertainment 
confirmed that their companies store the original software off-site, followed by 
insurance & financial services with 90.9 percent. On the other hand, 46.2 percent of 
the property & construction companies do not do this. The results, therefore, suggest 
that the media & entertainment and insurance & financial services are more concerned 
than the other sectors about their software, and store it off-site.
Table 4.96 Cross-tabulation o f off-site storage of original software by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 10 6 6 7 5 5 6 45
% 22.2 13.3 13.3 15.6 11.1 11.1 13.3
Industry  % 90.9 60 100 53.8 71.4 71.4 66.7
No, but 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4
plans to
% 25 25 0 0 25 25 0
Industry % 9.1 10 0 0 14.3 14.3 0
No, and no 0 3 0 6 1 1 3 14
plans to
% 0 21.4 0 42.9 7.1 7.1 21.4
Industry % 0 30 0 46.2 14.3 14.3 33.3
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
The results in Table 4.95 show that the vast majority of UK companies that responded 
(98.4 percent) use safeguards against unauthorised access to their software, while only 
one company reported the non-existence of these controls. The results reveal that this 
company is from the property & construction sector. The results highlight the 
attention given by UK companies towards their software.
Table 4.97 Cross-tabulation of software audit alert tools by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 7 5 6 7 4 4 4 37
% 18.9 13.5 16.2 18.9 10.8 10.8 10.8
Industry % 63.6 50 100 53.8 57.1 57.1 44.4
No, but 2 2 0 1 1 2 3 11
plans to
% 18.2 18.2 0 9.1 9.1 18.2 27.3
Industry % 18.2 20 0 7.7 14.3 28.6 33.3
No, and no 2 3 0 5 2 1 2 15
plans to
% 13.3 20 0 33.3 13.3 6.7 13.3
Industry % 18.2 30. 0 38.5 28.6 14.3 22.2
Total 11 10 6 13 7 9 63
It can also be seen from Table 4.95 that 58.7 percent of companies claimed that they 
use software audit alert tools, while 23.8 percent of companies do not use them and 
have no plans to do so.
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Further analysis (Table 4.97) reveals that all media & entertainment companies 
confirmed that they use software audit alert tools, followed by insurance & financial 
services (63.6 percent), but only 44.4 percent of energy & utilities companies claimed 
to do so. On the other hand, the results show that 38.5 percent of the property & 
construction companies reported that they are not planning to use these alert tools, 
followed by manufacturing (30 percent). The results indicate that media & 
entertainment companies are more concerned with this security control than the other 
companies.
The BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) indicated that “anti­
virus control” is one of the areas where almost all companies, irrespective of size, 
sector, or location agree on the need for controls. This can be seen from Table 4.95 in 
which all respondents from all industry sectors reported that their companies had 
installed virus protection software. At the same time, the results show that all 
respondents from all industry sectors claimed that their companies are cancelling 
passwords for terminated employees, which is a very important security control to 
avoid unauthorised access to companies’ important software.
It can also be seen from Table 4.95 that 65.5 percent of companies use intrusion 
prevention or detection software, while 10.9 percent of companies do not use this 
software, and are not planning to do so. This result is consistent with the CSI Survey 
(Richardson 2007) in which 69 percent of companies reported the existence of 
intrusion detection systems and 47 percent reported the existence of intrusion 
prevention systems. Furthermore, the results in Table 4.98 reveal that all respondents 
from media & entertainment reported that intrusion prevention or detection software 
is installed within their companies, followed by retail merchandising (85.7 percent), 
while only 37.5 percent of technology & telecommunications companies reported that 
they had installed intrusion prevention or detection software. However, 30 percent of 
manufacturing companies do not have this software, and they are not planning to 
install it. The results indicate that media & entertainment companies that responded 
are also more concerned with installing this software.
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T a b le  4 .9 8  C r o s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  in tru s io n  p re v e n t io n /d e te c tio n  s o f tw a re  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 9 4 6 9 6 3 5 42
% 21.4 9.5 14.3 21.4 14.3 7.1 11.9
Industry % 81.8 40 100 69.2 85.7 37.5 55.6
No, but 1 3 0 2 1 4 4 15
plans to
% 6.7 20 0 13.3 6.7 26.7 26.7
Industry % 9.1 30 0 15.4 14.3 50 44.4
No, and no 1 3 0 2 0 1 0 7
plans to
% 14.3 42.9 0 28.6 0 14.3 0
Industry % 9.1 30 0 15.4 0 12.5 0
Total 11 10 6 13 8 9 64
Table 4.99 Cross-tabulation of insurance coverage for software by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology &  
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 6 3 3 9 2 3 0 26
% 23.1 11.5 11.5 34.6 7.7 11.5 0
Industry % 54.5 30 50 69.2 33.3 42.9 0
No, but 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
plans to
% 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
Industry % 0 0 16.7 0 0 0 0
No, and no 5 7 2 4 4 4 9 35
plans to
% 14.3 20 5.7 11.4 11.4 11.4 25.7
Industry % 45.5 70 33.3 30.8 66.7 57.1 100
Total 11 10 13 6 : 9 62
Table 4.95 reveals that 41.9 percent of companies are concerned about having 
insurance coverage for their software, while 56.5 percent of the companies do not 
have software insurance coverage, and they have no plans to introduce it. This could 
be because the majority of UK companies that responded do not have a sufficient 
security budget, and therefore they cannot justify the spending on insurance coverage. 
It can also be seen from Table 4.99 that 69.2 percent of property & construction 
companies reported the existence of insurance coverage for their software, followed 
by insurance & financial services (54.5 percent), with only 30 percent of 
manufacturing companies reporting this. However, no energy & utilities companies 
have software insurance coverage, nor does 70 percent of the manufacturing sector.
Based on the above, it is clear that almost all UK companies that responded agree on 
the importance of certain controls such as virus protection software, cancellation of 
passwords for terminated employees, testing their software before its use, and 
safeguards against unauthorised access to software. On the other hand, more attention 
must be paid to software insurance coverage, and software audit alert tools.
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Hardware/physical security controls
It is not surprising to see from Table 4.100 that all respondents from all industry 
sectors reported that their companies make back-ups for their hard disks, and use 
firewalls. This result is consistent with most previous studies. The BERR Information 
Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) indicated that almost every UK company 
makes back-ups, and that firewalls appear to be the basic pre-requisite for other 
security mechanisms. The CSI Survey (Richardson 2007) also stated that all 
companies reported the use of firewalls.
Table 4.100 Hardware/physical security controls used in UK companies
Hardware/physical security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % no
Back-up for hard disks 64 100 0 0 0 0 64
Firewalls 64 100 0 0 0 0 64
Penetration testing 45 71.4 8 12.7 10 15.9 63
Restricting access to the main computing facilities 61 95.3 1 1.6 2 3.1 64
Security alarm system 59 93.7 1 1.6 3 4.8 63
Biometric techniques 9 14.5 6 9.7 47 75.8 62
Storing unused laptops in secure/locked cabinets 43 68.3 4 6.3 16 25.4 63
Placement of authorisation/database/accounting servers in secure location 59 93.7 0 0 4 6.3 63
Protecting computers from natural disasters e.g. air conditioners, etc. 59 92.2 1 1.6 4 6.3 64
Insurance coverage for hardware/computer devices 49 77.8 1 1.6 13 20.6 63
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it
Table 4.101 Cross-tabulation of penetration testing by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
7
15.6
63.6
6
13.3
60
6
13.3
100
7
15.6
53.8
5
11.1
71.4
6
13.3
85.7
8
17.8
88.9
45
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
1
12.5
9.1
1
12.5
10
0
0
0
3
37.5
23.1
2
25
28.6
0
0
0
1
12.5
11.1
8
No, and no 
plans to
%
Industry %
3
30
27.3
3
30
30
0
0
0
3
30
23.1
0
0
0
1
10
14.3
0
0
0
10
Total 11 10 :■ 6 13 7 : ' 7 9 63
Table 4.100 also reveals that 71.4 percent of companies undertake penetration testing, 
whereas 15.9 percent of companies are not planning to do so. Further analysis (Table 
4.101) reveals that all media & entertainment companies claimed the usage of 
penetration testing, followed by energy & utilities (88.9 percent). This result is 
consistent with that in Section 4.5.7 in which the majority of companies from media 
& entertainment claimed the usage of penetration testing in evaluating AIS security
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effectiveness. On the other hand, 30 percent of manufacturing companies stated that 
they do not undertake penetration testing and are not planning to do so.
The results in Table 4.100 show that 95.3 percent of companies restrict access to their 
main computing facilities, while only two companies do not, and have no plans to do 
so. This result is consistent with the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 
2006), in which nearly 97 percent of companies restricted access to computing 
facilities through locks. Interestingly, the results shows that all respondents from 
media & entertainment, property & construction, retail merchandising, and 
technology & telecommunications sectors reported that their companies restrict access 
to their main computing facilities. On the other hand, the two companies who claimed 
that they do not do so are from the insurance & financial services and manufacturing 
sectors.
Table 4.100 also shows that the majority of companies that responded (93.7 percent) 
use security alarm systems, while 6.3 percent reported the non-existence of this 
control. Further analysis reveals that all respondents from insurance & financial 
services, media & entertainment, and retail merchandising reported the existence of 
security alarm system within their companies; whereas only three companies from 
manufacturing, property & construction, and technology & telecommunications 
sectors claimed that they do not have and are not planning to have security alarm 
systems.
Regarding biometrics, Table 4.100 shows that 75.8 percent of companies have no 
plans to use biometric techniques, whereas only 14.5 percent of companies claimed 
the existence of these techniques. This result is consistent with most previous studies. 
Amoruso et al. (2005) and Chandra and Calderson (2005) argued that the use of 
biometric technologies in business and accounting is still in its infancy. The Global 
Security Survey (DTT 2006) confirmed their opinion and indicated that 11 percent of 
companies deployed biometrics, while 21 percent stated that they would be piloting or 
deploying biometric techniques over the next 18 months. In addition, the Security and 
Information Risk Survey (NCC 2007) stated that over 62 percent of companies have 
no plans at all for introducing biometrics.
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T a b le  4 .1 0 2  C ro s s - ta b u la t io n  o f  b io m e tr ic  te c h n iq u e s  b y  in d u s try  s e c to r
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
2
22.2
18.2
0
0
0
2
22.2
40
2
22.2
15.4
2
22.2
28.6
1
11.1
14.3
0
0
0
9
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
2
33.3
18.2
0
0
0
1
16.7
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
16.7
14.3
2
33.3
22.2
6
No, and no 
plans to
%
Industry %
7
14.9
63.6
10
21.3
100
2
4.3
40
11
23.4
84.6
5
10.6
71.4
5
10.6
71.4
7
14.9
77.8
47
Total 11 10 5 : 13 7 7 9 62
Further analysis (Table 4.102) reveals that no manufacturing companies use 
biometrics, and are not planning to do so, followed by property & construction (84.6 
percent), energy & utilities (77.8 percent), retail merchandising and technology & 
telecommunications (71.4 percent). The results, therefore, indicate that the majority of 
UK companies that responded do not use and are not planning to use biometric 
techniques.
Table 4.103 Cross-tabulation of storing unused laptops in secure/locked cabinets by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 9 6 5 9 4 6 4 43
% 20.9 14 11.6 20.9 9.3 14 9.3
Industry % 90 60 83.3 69.2 57.1 75 44.4
No, but 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 4
plans to
% 0 25 0 0 25 0 50
Industry % 0 10 0 0 14.3 0 22.2
No, and no 1 3 1 4 2 2 3 16
plans to
% 6.3 18.8 6.3 25 12.5 12.5 18.8
Industry % 10 30 16.7 30.8 28.6 25 33.3
Total 10 10 6 13 7 8 9 63
The results in Table 4.100 show that 68.3 percent of companies store unused laptops 
in locked cabinets, whereas 25.4 percent of companies do not, and have no plans to do 
so. Table 4.103 reveals that insurance & financial services companies are more 
concerned about their laptops, given the sensitive nature of financial data stored in 
them, with 90 percent of respondents reporting that unused laptops are stored in 
secured cabinets, followed by media & entertainment (83.3 percent), and technology 
& telecommunications (75 percent). On the other hand, the results show that one third 
of energy & utilities companies do not store unused laptops in locked cabinets, and
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are not planning to do so, followed by property & construction (30.8 percent) and 
manufacturing (30 percent).
It can be seen from Table 4.100 that 93.7 percent of the companies place 
authorisation, database and accounting servers in secure locations, while only 6.3 
percent of companies do not. It is encouraging to see from the results that all 
companies from media & entertainment, property & construction, retail 
merchandising and technology & telecommunications reported that they place 
authorisation and accounting servers in secure locations. Four respondents from the 
insurance & financial services, manufacturing, and energy & utilities sectors claimed 
not to do this.
Regarding the protection from natural disasters, Table 4.100 reveals that 92.2 percent 
of companies installed air conditioners, fireproofing, smoke detectors, etc. to protect 
their computers from natural disasters, with only 6.3 percent o f companies having no 
plans to do so. The results reveal that all companies from the media & entertainment, 
technology & telecommunications and energy & utilities sectors protect their 
computers from natural disasters. On the other hand, only one respondent from each 
of the other four sectors claimed that their companies do not protect computers from 
natural disasters, and are not planning to install protection devices.
Table 4.104 Cross-tabulation of insurance coverage for hardware/computer devices by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 11 6 4 12 5 6 5 49
% 22.4 12.2 8.2 24.5 10.2 12.2 10.2
Industry % 100 60 80 92.3 71.4 75 55.6
No, but 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
plans to
% 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Industry % 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.1
No, and no 0 4 1 1 2 2 3 13
plans to
% 0 30.8 7.7 7.7 15.4 15.4 23.1
Industry % 0 40 20 7.7 28.6 25 33.3
Total 11 10 ' 5 13 7 8 9 63
Although 41.9 percent of companies reported that they have insurance coverage for 
their software, it can be seen from Table 4.100 that 77.8 percent of companies that 
responded reported the existence of insurance coverage for their hardware and 
computer devices. On the other hand, 20.6 percent are not planning to introduce this.
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Further analysis (Table 4.104) reveals that all the insurance & financial services 
companies agreed on the existence of insurance for their hardware and computer 
devices, followed by property & construction (92.3 percent), and media & 
entertainment (80 percent). On the other hand, 40 percent of manufacturing 
companies had no plans to introduce such insurance coverage.
Based on the above, it can be seen that all companies that responded make back-ups 
for their hard disks and use firewalls. In addition, the majority of companies restrict 
access to main computing facilities, have security alarm systems, place their 
accounting servers in secure locations, and protect their computers from natural 
disasters. On the other hand, the majority of companies do not use and have no plans 
to use biometrics.
Input/data security controls
It is encouraging to see from Table 4.105 that 96.9 percent of companies are 
concerned about their data, and store data back-ups off-site, while only one 
respondent claimed that data back-ups are not stored outside company, and there are 
no plans to do so. The results reveal that this respondent is from the energy & utilities 
sector. This result suggests that UK companies that responded are more concerned 
with data security than their software. According to previous results, 22.2 percent of 
companies reported that they do not store original software off-site, and are not 
planning to do so.
Table 4.105 Input/data security controls used in UK companies
Input/data security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no %
Off-site storage o f data back-ups 62 96.9 1 1.6 1 1.6 64
Encryption o f sensitive data 26 41.9 15 24.2 21 33.9 62
User access controls/authorisation 64 100 0 0 0 0 64
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it
On the other hand, it can be seen from Table 4.105 that 41.9 percent of companies 
encrypt their sensitive data, while 33.9 percent of companies have no plans to do so. 
This result indicates that UK companies that responded do not seem much concerned 
about encrypting their sensitive data. This result is consistent with the CSI Survey 
(Richardson 2007), which indicated that only 47 percent of companies are encrypting 
data in storage. However, this is a surprising result, given that recent press coverage
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has highlighted how confidential data can become exposed when computers and 
laptops are stolen (BERR 2008).
Further analysis (Table 4.106) reveals that media & entertainment companies are 
more concerned about encrypting their sensitive data than the other sectors. The 
results show that two thirds of media & entertainment companies reported the 
encryption of sensitive data, followed by retail merchandising (57.1 percent) and 
insurance & financial services (54.5 percent), while only 14.3 percent from 
technology & telecommunications claimed to do so. On the other hand, half the 
manufacturing companies do not encrypt their sensitive data, and are not planning to 
do so. This result is not consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches 
Survey (BERR 2008), which indicated that the entertainment sectors are least likely to 
have taken steps to protect data held on PCs and laptops, while financial services and 
telecommunications had taken more steps.
Table 4.106 Cross-tabulation of the encryption of sensitive data by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes
%
Industry %
6
23.1
54.5
3
11.5
30
4
15.4
66.7
6
23.1
46.2
4
15.4
57.1
1
3.8
14.3
2
7.7
25
26
No, but 
plans to
%
Industry %
1
6.7
9.1
2
13.3
20
1
6.7
16.7
1
6.7
7.7
2
13.3
28.6
4
26.7
57.1
4
26.7
50
15
No, and no 
plans to 
%
Industry %
4
19
36.4
5
23.8
50
1
4.8
16.7
6
28.6
46.2
1
4.8
14.3
2
9.5
28.6
2
9.5
25
21
Total 11 10 ■x&t 13 7 7 8 62
Regarding user access controls and authorisations within UK companies, it is 
encouraging to see from Table 4.105 that all companies from all sectors that 
responded have user access controls. This result is consistent with the results of 
Whitman (2004), who indicated that access controls are the most common protection 
mechanisms employed, with 100 percent of respondents indicating their usage.
The above results indicate that UK companies that responded are giving a great deal 
of attention to access controls and to their data back-ups; however, more attention 
should be given to the encryption of sensitive data.
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Output security controls
Table 4.107 shows that 96.9 percent of companies are restricting access to their 
sensitive information, while only one company claimed that it is not doing so nor 
planning to do so. The results show that this company is from the property & 
construction sector.
Table 4.107 Output security controls used in UK companies
Output security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % vft'nd; '
Restricting access to sensitive information for authorised users 62 96.9 1 1.6 1 1.6 64
Storing sensitive output in secure/locked cabinets 54 84.4 2 3.1 8 12.5 64
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it
The results in Table 4.107 also show that 84.4 percent of respondents believed that 
sensitive information is stored in secured cabinets within their companies, with 15.6 
percent of companies not doing so. Further analysis reveals that all companies from 
the media & entertainment and energy & utilities sectors store sensitive output in 
secured cabinets. This result is surprising since the previous results revealed that one 
third of energy & utilities companies do not store unused laptops in locked cabinets.
Network security controls
In order to be more efficient, effective, and responsive, companies are increasingly 
using networks and computer-based IS (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000). Companies, 
therefore, are faced with many security threats, and must prepare for the appropriate 
controls for these networks.
Table 4.108 Network security controls used in UK companies
Network security controls Yes
No, but 
plans to
No, and no 
plans to Total
no % no % no % no
Network encryption 32 50.8 11 17.5 20 31.7
Content and e-mail filtering software 57 90.5 2 3.2 4 6.3 63
Malware (spyware, adware) detection tools 61 95.3 1 1.6 2 3.1 64
Spam filtering software 62 96.9 1 1.6 1 1.6 64
Q 3.1 For each of the following security controls, please indicate whether your company is currently 
using it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it.
It can be seen from Table 4.108 that 50.8 percent of the companies have implemented 
network encryption, while only 31.7 percent of companies are not planning to do so. 
The results in Table 4.109 reveal that retail merchandising is the sector most 
concerned with network encryption, with 85.7 percent of companies doing so,
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followed by insurance & financial services (63.6 percent) and technology & 
telecommunications (57.1 percent). On the other hand, half o f the manufacturing 
companies do not encrypt their network and have no plans to do so, followed by 
energy & utilities (44.4 percent).
Table 4.109 Cross-tabulation of network encryption by industry sector
Insurance
&
financial
services
Manufacturing Media & entertainment
Property & 
construction
Retail
merchandising
Technology & 
telecommunications
Energy & 
utilities Total
no % no % no % no % no % no % no % no
Yes 7 5 3 5 6 4 2 32
% 21.9 15.6 9.4 15.6 18.8 12.5 6.3
Industry % 63.6 50 50 38.5 85.7 57.1 22.2
No, but 2 0 1 3 1 1 3 11
plans to
% 18.2 0 9.1 27.3 9.1 9.1 27.3
Industry % 18.2 0 16.7 23.1 14.3 14.3 33.3
No, and no 2 5 2 5 0 2 4 20
plans to
% 10 25 10 25 0 10 20
Industry % 18.2 50 33.3 38.5 0 28.6 44.4
Total 11 10 6 13 7 7 9 63
It is encouraging to see from Table 4.108 that the majority of companies that 
responded (90.5 percent) claimed the existence of content and e-mail filtering 
software, while onl y 6.3 percent of companies do not filter e-mails and are not 
planning to do so. This result is consistent with the BERR Information Security 
Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), which indicated that the number of companies 
filtering incoming e-mails and scanning outgoing e-mails has gone up. Further 
analysis reveals that all companies from the manufacturing, media & entertainment, 
and retail merchandising sectors are filtering their e-mail content. On the other hand, 
four respondents from insurance & financial services, property & construction and 
energy & utilities sectors claimed that their companies do not have e-mail filtering 
software, and are not planning to have it. The results indicate that manufacturing 
companies are more concerned with this security control than the other security 
controls.
It can also be seen from Table 4.108 that 95.3 percent of companies reported the 
existence of malware detection tools, while only 3.1 percent of companies are not 
planning to use these tools. The results reveal that all companies from insurance & 
financial services, media & entertainment, property & construction and retail 
merchandising sectors use malware detection tools. On the other hand, only two 
respondents, from the manufacturing and energy & utilities sectors, claimed that there
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are no plans to use these tools. This result is again consistent with the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), which indicated that the 
majority of businesses now use anti-spyware scanning software, with the energy 
companies the least likely to be protected against spyware.
Regarding the existence of spam filtering software in UK companies, Table 4.108 
reveals that 96.9 percent of companies claimed to use this software, while only one 
company reported that there are no plans to use it. This company was from property & 
construction sector. The result suggests that UK companies that responded pay more 
attention to spamming attacks, and they have prepared themselves well to reduce such 
attacks, since the results from Table 4.69 revealed that 62.3 percent of companies 
reported the occurrence of spamming attacks in the last year.
Overall, the above results indicate that the majority of UK companies that responded 
are now paying, relatively, more attention to software, hardware, input and output 
security controls than the other security controls. Consequently, these companies 
should devote more effort in the areas of organisational and personnel security 
controls, especially reorganising AIS security functions, incident response, security 
training and awareness, and mandatory vacations. In addition, more attention must be 
given to software insurance coverage, biometric techniques, data and network 
encryption.
Table 4.110 Results o f the chi-square test for the AIS security controls used in UK companies
AIS security controls t df p-value
Organisational security controls
Reorganised AIS security functions 1.897 3 0,594
Continuous auditing techniques 0.883 3 0.830
Real time security awareness/incident response 1.589 3 0.662
Disaster recovery and business continuity plan 1.865 3 0.601
Background investigation/reference checks 10.151 3 0.017
Signing o f confidentiality agreement by employees 5.013 3 0.171
Security training and awareness programs 5.147 3 0.161
Segregation o f duties 2.481 3 0.479
Mandatory vacations 7.740 3 0.052
Software security controls
Testing software before use 4.712 3 0.194
Off-site storage o f original software 5.171 3 0.160
Safeguards against unauthorised access to software 1.894 3 0.595
Software audit alert tools 2.811 3 0.422
Virus protection software - - ' ■
Cancelling passwords for terminated employees - - -
Intrusion prevention/detection software 1.677 3 0.642
Insurance coverage for software 1.573 3 0.665
Hardwarc/ohvsical security controls
Back-up for hard disks - -
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Firewalls - -
Penetration testing 3.594 3 0.309
Restrict access to the main computing facilities 1.221 3 0.748
Security alarm system 1.070 3 0.784
Biometric techniques 1.808 3 0.613
Storing unused laptops in secure/locked cabinets 4.420 3 0.219
Placement o f  authorisation/database/accounting servers in secure location 2.227 3 0.527
Protecting computers from natural disasters e.g. air conditioners, etc. 3.820 3 0.282
Insurance coverage for hardware/computer devices 4.832 3 0.184
InDut/data security controls
Off-site storage o f  data back-ups 1.380 3 0.710
Encryption o f sensitive data 0.914 3 0.822
User access controls/authorisation - -
OutDut security controls
Restricting access to sensitive information for authorised users 2.440 3 0.486
Storing sensitive output in secure/locked cabinets 0.192 3 0.979
Network security controls
Network encryption 5.260 3 0.154
Content and e-mail filtering software 3.229 3 0.358
Malware (spyware, adware) detection tools 0.785 3 0.853
Spam filtering software 1.796 3 0.616
Moreover, in order to test Hypothesis 3 and to examine whether the types of AIS 
security controls differ among industry sectors, a chi-square test was conducted. 
Despite the differences noticed from the above results, the results of the chi-square 
tests presented in Table 4.110 provide no evidence of any statistically significant 
association, at the 0.05 level, between the industry sectors and the different types of 
AIS security controls, except for the background investigations or reference checks, 
given that its p-value is 0.017 (p < 0.05). On the other hand, the p-values of the other 
AIS security controls are greater than 0.05, which indicates that there are significant 
association between the different industry sectors and the existence of background 
investigations or reference checks for their employees, which in turn indicates that 
some sectors that responded are concerned with these controls more than the other 
sectors.
Moreover, in order to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 and to examine the degree of 
correlation and the effect of the different types of AIS security controls and AIS 
security effectiveness on the reduction of the different types of security threats facing 
UK companies, Spearman’s rank correlation and multiple regression analysis were 
used. Spearman’s rank correlation was used to give an indication of both the direction 
and strength of the relationship. Then, 13 regressions were run, and the dependent 
variable in each regression was one type of AIS security threat, and the independent 
variables were the different types of security controls and security effectiveness 
within UK companies.
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Table 4.111 The significant relationships between types o f AIS security threats and types o f AIS security controls using Spearman’s rank correlation
Unauthorised 
access to 
data/systems 
by
disgruntled
employees
Unauthorised
access
to
data/systems
by
hackers
Intentional
destruction
of
data
by
employees
Introduction 
of computer 
viruses, 
bombs or 
worms 
to the 
system
Spamming
attacks
Malware
(spyware,
adware)
programs
Sharing
of
passwords
Theft of 
software
Technical
software
failures
Sabotage
Natural
disasters
Reorganised AIS 
security functions
-0.340**
(0.009)
-0.375**
(0.003)
-0.255*
(0.050)
-0.257*
(0.047)
Continuous auditing 
techniques
-0.312*
(0.014)
Real time security 
awareness/incident 
response
-0.307*
(0.015)
-0.281*
(0.030)
Signing of 
confidentiality 
agreement by 
employees
-0.271*
(0.033)
Security training 
and awareness 
programs
-0.261* 
(0.039)
-0.299*
(0.019)
-0.349**
(0.006)
Mandatory
vacations
-0.270*
(0.037)
Off-site storage of 
original software
-0.279*
(0.027)
Software audit alert 
tools
-0.258*
(0.041)
-0.292*
(0.021)
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Intrusion
prevention/detection
software
-0.252*
(0.048)
Penetration testing
-0.291*
(0.023)
-0.387**
(0.002)
-0.386**
(0.002)
-0.344**
(0.008)
Security alarm 
system
-0.249*
(0.049)
-0.260*
(0.043)
Biometric
techniques
-0.280*
(0.026)
Protecting 
computers from 
natural disasters 
e.g. air conditioners, 
etc.
-0.334**
(0.008)
-0.341**
(0.006)
Insurance coverage 
for
hardware/computer
devices
0.302*
(0.017)
0.470**
(0.000)
Off-site storage o f  
data back-ups
-0.278*
(0.027)
Encryption of 
sensitive data
-0.304*
(0.018)
-0.340**
(0.007)
Malware (spyware, 
adware) detection 
tools
-0.265*
(0.036)
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Table 4.111 only presents the statistically significant correlations between the 
different types of AIS security threats and security controls, in which correlation 
coefficients (r-values) appear on the first line, and the p-values appear between 
brackets in the next line.
In page 276, it can be seen from Table 4.111 that there are statistically significant 
negative correlations, at the 0.05 level, between unauthorised access to data or 
systems by disgruntled employees, and each of the security training and awareness 
programs (p-value = 0.039), off-site storage of original software (p-value = 0.027), 
and software audit alert tools (p-value = 0.041). However, the results reveal that the 
correlations are weak, given that their r-values are -0.261, -0.279, and -0.258 
respectively. This result indicates that if UK companies that responded paid more 
attention to these security controls, they could reduce the unauthorised access to data 
or systems by disgruntled employees.
Table 4.111 also shows that there is a statistically significant correlation, at the 0.05 
level, between the unauthorised access to data or systems by hackers and the 
insurance coverage for hardware and computer devices, where p-value is 0.017 (p < 
0.05); however, a positive sign was found (r = +0.302), which is different from the 
expected sign. This result could be because hackers are now more successful at 
breaking into the companies’ network than before; at the same time companies now 
have more insurance coverage for their computer devices.
The results in Table 4.111 reveal that there are statistically significant negative 
correlations, at the 0.05 level, between intentional destruction of data by employees 
and each of the security training and awareness programs (p-value = 0.019), and 
penetration testing (p-value = 0.023), given that their r-values are -0.299, and -0.291 
respectively. Despite the observed weak correlations, these results indicate that UK 
companies that responded must make more effort in training their employees, and in 
raising their security awareness in order to reduce the above threat, since employees 
are considered the companies’ first common source of security threats.
Table 4.111 also reveals that there are statistically significant negative correlations, at 
the 0.05 level, between the viruses attacks on companies’ systems, and both real time
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security awareness and incidence response (p-value = 0.015), and the existence of 
security alarm systems within companies (p-value = 0.049), given that their r-values 
are -0.307 and -0.249 respectively. This result indicates that if companies paid more 
attention to security awareness and incident response, and if they installed security 
alarm systems, the effect of virus attacks could be minimised.
The results in Table 4.111 reveal that there are statistically significant negative 
correlations, at the 0.01 level, between spamming attacks and each of the reorganised 
AIS security functions (p-value = 0.009; r-value = -0.340); training and awareness 
programs (p-value = 0.006; r-value = -0.349); penetration testing (p-value = 0.002; r- 
value = -0.387); and protection of computers from natural disasters (p-value = 0.008; 
r-value = -0.334). In addition, there are statistically significant negative correlations, 
at the 0.05 level, between the spamming attacks and the following security controls: 
continuous auditing techniques (p-value = 0.014; r-value = -0.312); real time security 
awareness and incident response (p-value = 0.030; r-value = -0.281); signing of 
confidentiality agreement by employees (p-value = 0.033; r-value = - 0.271); 
mandatory vacations (p-value = 0.037; r-value = -0.270); intrusion prevention or 
detection (p-value = 0.048; r-value = -0.252); security alarm systems (p-value = 
0.043; r-value = -0.260); and encryption of sensitive data (p-value = 0.018; r-value = - 
0.304). Despite these weak correlations, each company should consider these security 
controls as a means to minimising the effect of spamming attacks facing them.
The results in Table 4.111 show that there are statistically significant negative 
correlations, at the 0.01 level, between malware attacks, and each of the reorganised 
AIS security functions (p-value = 0.003), penetration testing (p-value = 0.002), and 
the protection of computers from natural disasters (p-value = 0.006), given that their 
r-values are -0.375, -0.386, and -0.341 respectively. This result suggests that malware 
attacks could be minimised if UK companies that responded had reorganised 
functions for their AIS security, and if they paid more attention to penetration testing.
From the results in Table 4.111, it can be seen that there is a significant negative 
correlation, at the 0.01 level, between employees’ sharing of passwords, and 
penetration testing undertaken by companies, given that p-value is 0.008, and the r- 
value is -0.344. This result is further verified in the regression analysis results.
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Table 4.111 also reveals that there is a statistically significant negative correlation, at 
the 0.05 level, between the theft of software, and software audit alert tools, given that 
p-value is 0.021, and r-value is -0.292. However, there is a significant positive 
correlation, at the 0.01 level, between the theft of software, and the insurance 
coverage for hardware and computer devices, with r-value of +0.470, and p-value of 
0.000 (p < 0.001). Although this positive sign is unexpected, this could indicate that 
the more the companies suffer from software theft, the more concerned they are to 
have insurance coverage for their computer devices.
The results also reveal the existence of significant negative correlations between 
technical failures or errors, and each of the off-site storage of data back-ups, and 
malware detection tools, at the 0.05 level, and encryption of sensitive data, at the 0.01 
level, given that their p-values are 0.027, 0.036, and 0.007, and r-values are -0.278, - 
0.265, and -0.340 respectively. Consequently, if companies consider these controls, 
they could minimise the effect o f  any software failure.
In addition, Table 4.111 reveals that there is a significant negative correlation, at the 
0.05 level, between sabotage, and the existence of organised AIS security functions 
within companies, given that p-value is 0.050, and r-value is -0.255. Moreover, the 
results reveal the existence o f significant negative correlations, at the 0.05 level, 
between the occurrence of natural disasters and the existence of organised AIS 
security functions (p-value = 0.047), and the existence of biometric techniques within 
companies (p-value = 0.026), given that r-values are -0.257 and -0.280 respectively.
On the other hand, the results in  Table 4.112 provide no evidence of any statistically 
significant correlations between effectiveness level of AIS security in UK companies 
and each type of AIS security threat. This result indicates that, irrespective of the 
effectiveness level of their AIS security, companies still face different types of 
security threats. This result is further investigated in the regression analysis.
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Table 4.112 Relationships between each type of AIS security threat and the effectiveness level of AIS 
_______________security management using Spearman’s rank correlation __________
AIS security threats
Correlation
coefficient
Significance
level
(p-value)
Unauthorised access to data/systems by disgruntled employees 0.076 0.566
Unauthorised access to data/systems by hackers 0.059 0.659
Unintentional destruction of data by employees 0.027 0.844
Intentional destruction of data by employees -0.079 0.557
Theft of physical information e.g. printed output, computer disks, etc. 0.032 0.815
Introduction of computer viruses, bombs or worms to the system -0.147 0.263
Spamming attacks 0.202 0.128
Malware (spyware, adware) programs 0.098 0.456
Sharing of passwords -0.147 0.277
Theft of software -0.030 0.821
Technical software failures or errors 0.123 0.354
Sabotage or intentional destruction of computer equipment e.g. PCs and laptops -0.033 0.801
Natural disasters e.g. fire, floods, earthquakes, etc. 0.244 0.060
In order to examine the effect of AIS security controls and the effectiveness level on 
the reduction of the different types of threats facing UK companies that responded, 
regression analysis was employed. The results in Table 4.113 show that off-site 
storage of original software has a significant effect on the unauthorised access to data 
or systems by disgruntled employees, with adjusted R2 of 0.074, f-value of 5.724, and 
p-value of 0.020 i.e. if companies store their software off-site, they can restore normal 
business operations if disgruntled employees access their software or cause them any 
harm. However, the results indicate that only 7.4 percent of the variation in the above 
security threat can be explained by this control. It can be concluded that although the 
off-site storage of original software has a statistically significant coefficient, it 
accounts for only a small portion of the variation in the dependent variable i.e. 
unauthorised access to data or system by disgruntled employees.
Table 4.113 also reveals that insurance coverage for hardware and computer devices 
has a significant effect on the unauthorised access to data or systems by hackers, 
given that adjusted R2 = 0.053, f-value = 4.250, and p-value = 0.044 i.e. if companies 
have insurance coverage for their computer devices, they can reduce the damage 
caused by hackers on these devices. However, the above control can explain only 5.3 
percent of the variation of the dependent variable. Therefore, the results suggest that 
the insurance coverage for hardware and computer devices has a small effect on 
minimising the unauthorised access to data or system by hackers.
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Table 4.113 The results o f  the multiple regression analysis
Dependent variable 
(AIS security threats)
Independent variables
Adjusted
R*
ANOVA
Beta t-value
Significant
levelF-
value
Significance
level
Unauthorised access to 
data/systems by 
disgruntled employees
OfF-site storage of original 
software
0.074 5.724 0.020 0.300 2.393 0.020
Unauthorised access to 
data/systems by hackers
Insurance coverage for 
hardware/computer devices
0.053 4.250 0.044 -0.263 -2.061 0.044
Unintentional destruction 
of data 
by employees
Signing of confidentiality 
agreement by employees
0.055 4.246 0.044 0.268 2.061 0.044
Intentional destruction 
of
data by employees
Penetration testing 0.061
6.861 0.000
0.365 3.546 0.001
Intrusion prevention or 
detection software 0.143 -0.231 -2.091
0.042
Security training and 
awareness programs 0.196 0.431
3.629 0.001
Effectiveness level of AIS 
Security management 0.275 -0.417 -3.607
0.001
Disaster recovery and 
business continuity plan 0.326 0.254 2.341 0.023
Storing unused laptops in 
secure/locked cabinets 0.364 0.208 2.053 0.046
Continuous auditing 
techniques 0.413 -0.408 -3.459 0.001
Insurance coverage for 
hardware/computer devices 0.447 -0.264 -2.430 0.019
Reorganised AIS security 
functions 0.481 0.218 2.038 0.047
Theft of physical 
information e.g. printed 
output, computer disks, 
etc.
Restricting access to 
sensitive information for 
authorised users
0.137 10.638 0.000 -0.410 -3.551 0.001
Biometric techniques 0.256 0.361 3.132 0.003
Introduction of computer 
viruses, bombs or worms 
to the system
Mandatory vacations 0.065
5.559 0.002
0.330 2.760 0.008
Segregation of duties 0.137 -0.351 -2.877 0.006
Biometric techniques 0.190 0.261 2.173 0.034
Spamming attacks
Reorganised AIS security 
functions 0.132 10.743 0.000 0.373 3.264 0.002
Penetration testing 0.255 0.366 3.201 0.002
Malware (spyware, 
adware) programs
Reorganised AIS security 
functions 0.157 11.838 0.000 0.409 3.669 0.001
Penetration testing 0.269 0.350 3.141 0.003
Sharing of passwords Penetration testing 0.082 5.972 0.018 0.313 2.444 0.018
Theft o f software
Insurance coverage for 
hardware/computer devices 0.104 6.601 0.003 -0.349 -2.904 0.005
Biometric techniques 0.162 0.268 2.227 0.030
Technical software 
failures or errors
.
Encryption of sensitive 
data 0.097
5.814 0.002
0.429 3.451 0.001
Off-site storage of data 
back-ups 0.148 0.288 2.429 0.018
Background investigation 
or reference checks 0.199 -0.269 -2.149 0.036
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Sabotage or intentional 
destruction of computer 
equipment e.g. PCs and 
laptops
Restricting access to 
sensitive information for 
authorised users
0.081
5.857 0.001
-0.339 -2.974 0.004
Intrusion prevention or 
detection software 0.135 -0424 -3.417 0.001
Penetration testing 0.203 0.326 2.704 0.009
Biometric techniques 0.248 0.243 2.079 0.042
Natural disasters e.g. fire, 
floods, earthquakes, etc.
Biometric techniques 0.098
5.965 0.000
0.327 2.734 0.008
Intrusion prevention or 
detection software 0.153 -0.347 -0.826 0.007
Effectiveness level of AIS 
Security management 0.205 0.310 2.445 0.018
Insurance coverage for 
software 0.252 -0.243 -2.129 0.038
It can also be seen from Table 4.113 that there is a statistically significant effect of 
signing confidentiality agreements before joining the company, and the unintentional 
destruction of data by employees, given that adjusted R2 = 0.055, f-value = 4.246, and 
p-value = 0.044 i.e. if employees sign confidentiality agreements before joining, they 
could be more cautious in dealing with sensitive data. Again, even though the 
independent variable. AIS security control has a statistically significant coefficient, it 
accounts for only a small portion of the variation of the above dependent variable.
The results in Table 4.113 also show that there are statistically significant effects of 
nine independent variables on the intentional destruction of data by employees. These 
variables include penetration testing, intrusion prevention or detection software, 
security training and awareness programs, disaster recovery and business continuity 
plans, storage of sensitive output in secured cabinets, continuous auditing techniques, 
insurances coverage for hardware and computer devices, reorganised AIS security 
functions, and the security effectiveness level. For example, if employees know the 
companies are not checking upon them through penetration testing, intrusion 
prevention or detection software, or continuous auditing techniques, they can 
intentionally make actions that can destruct companies’ sensitive data. In addition, 
companies can reduce the effect of destructing sensitive data by employees if they 
have disaster recovery and business continuity plans to contain such incidents before 
affecting their reputation. This result suggests that these nine variables together can 
explain nearly 48.1 percent of the variation of the dependent variable, given that f- 
value = 6.861, and p-value = 0.000 (p < 0.001). It can be concluded that UK
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companies that responded could minimise the occurrence of the intentional 
destruction of data by employees if they considered the above controls together.
It can also be seen from Table 4.113 that there are statistically significant effects of 
restricting access to sensitive information for authorised users, and the use of 
biometrics on the theft of companies’ physical information i.e. if companies use 
biometrics and restrict access to sensitive data for authorised users, they can reduce 
the theft of their information. The result indicates that these two controls together can 
explain nearly 26 percent of the variation of the above security threat, given that 
adjusted R2 = 0.256, f-value = 10.638, and p-value = 0.000 (p < 0.001). This result, 
therefore, suggest that if companies considered these two security controls together, 
they could minimise the occurrence of theft of companies’ physical information.
The results in Table 4.113 also show that there are statistically significant effects of 
mandatory vacations, segregation of duties, and the use of biometrics on the 
introduction of computer viruses to a system. The result reveals that these three 
controls together can explain nearly 19 percent of the variation of the above security 
threat, given that f-value = 5.559 and p-value = 0.002. Despite the small value of the 
adjusted R2, still there is an effect of these security controls together on minimising 
virus attacks facing companies.
In addition, statistically significant effects of the existence of reorganised security 
functions and penetration testing on spamming attacks can be seen in Table 4.113 i.e. 
if companies are monitoring their networks using penetration testing, they can 
discover the spamming attacks quickly before causing any downtime. These two 
controls together can explain nearly 26 percent of the variation of the spamming 
attacks, given that adjusted R2 = 0.255, f-value = 10.743, and p-value = 0.000 (p < 
0.001). The results also show that there are statistically significant effects by the same 
two controls on malware attacks, where adjusted R2 is 0.269 i.e. if companies are 
monitoring their networks using penetration testing, they can discover the malware 
attacks quickly before causing any harm to their systems. This result indicates that the 
existence of reorganised security functions, and penetration testing can explain nearly 
27 percent of the variation of the malware attacks, given that f-value = 11.838, and p- 
value = 0.000 (p < 0.001). It can be concluded that companies should consider using
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the above two controls together in order to minimise the spamming and malware 
attacks facing them.
Penetration testing also has a statistically significant effect on the sharing of 
passwords by companies’ employees, where adjusted R2 = 0.082, f-value = 5.972, and 
p-value = 0.018 (p < 0.05) i.e. if employees know that companies are monitoring 
networks using penetration testing, they can avoid sharing their passwords, and 
consequently, the security incidents related to this threat can be reduced. Despite the 
small value of adjusted R2, still there is evidence from the results of the effect of 
penetration testing on the reduction of this threat.
Regarding the theft of software, the results show that there are statistically significant 
effects of each of the existence of insurance coverage for hardware and computer 
devices, and biometrics on reducing the occurrence of this security threat, given that 
adjusted R2 = 0.162, f-value = 6.601, and p-value = 0.003 i.e. if companies use 
biometric techniques on the computer rooms, they can reduce the theft of their 
software. Although the results show that these two controls together can explain only 
16 percent of the variation of the dependent variable i.e. theft of software, the results 
still provide evidence of the importance of biometrics. However, few companies have 
implemented them.
It can also be seen from Table 4.113 that there are statistically significant effects of 
sensitive data encryption, off-site storage of data back-ups, and employees’ 
background checks on minimising the effects of technical software failures within 
companies, given that adjusted R2 = 0.199, f-value = 5.814, and p-value = 0.002. For 
example, if companies encrypt their sensitive data, and if technical software failures 
or errors occur, and these data fall in the wrong hands, encryption can limit the 
damage of losing these sensitive data. The results, therefore, suggest that these three 
security controls together can explain nearly 20 percent of the variation of this threat.
Regarding the intentional destruction of computing equipment, it can be seen from 
Table 4.113 that there are statistically significant effects of restricting the access to 
sensitive information for authorised users, intrusion prevention or detection software, 
penetration testing, and biometrics on the above security threat, given that adjusted R2
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= 0.248, f-value = 5.857, and p-value = 0.001. For example, if  companies use 
biometric techniques and restrict access to computer rooms, they can prevent 
intentional destruction of computing equipment. It can be concluded that these four 
controls together can explain nearly 25 percent of the variation of the intentional 
destruction of companies’ computing equipment. Consequently, companies must 
consider using these controls together in an attempt to minimise the effect of the 
above security threat.
Moreover, the results show that there are statistically significant effects of the 
existence of biometrics, intrusion prevention or detection software, insurance 
coverage for software, and the effectiveness level of AIS security on minimising the 
effect of natural disasters within companies, given that adjusted R2 = 0.252, f-value = 
5.965, and p-value = 0.000 (p < 0.001). These results indicate that companies can 
reduce the effects of natural disasters if the above controls are considered together, 
and if the effectiveness level of security management is high.
Overall, the above results indicate the relative importance o f some types of AIS 
security controls, compared to the others, given that these controls have a significant 
effect on many types of security threats. On the other hand, the regression analysis 
results did not reveal the effect of some security controls on any type of AIS security 
threat. For example, the results show that penetration testing has a significant effect 
on the intentional destruction of data by employees, spamming and malware attacks, 
sharing of passwords, and the intentional destruction of computing equipment. In 
addition, although only 14.5 percent of companies reported the use of biometrics 
(Table 4.102), the regression analysis shows that these techniques have an effect on 
many security threats such as theft of physical information and software, virus attacks, 
sabotage, and natural disasters. Consequently, companies should consider biometric 
techniques, and must try to gradually implement these tools.
On the other hand, the results of the regression analysis provide no evidence of any 
effect of some AIS security controls on any type of security threats such as software 
audit alert tools, back-up of hard disks, security alarm systems, users’ access controls, 
network encryption, and spam filtering software.
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From the above results, it can be concluded that some types of security controls have 
a significant effect on the reduction of AIS security threats facing UK companies that 
responded. In addition, AIS security effectiveness level impacts significantly on two 
types of security threats namely intentional destruction of data by employees and 
natural disasters. However, Spearman’s test provides no evidence of any significant 
correlation between the effectiveness level of AIS security and the different types of 
security threats. These results suggest that despite the high level of security 
effectiveness achieved by companies, they are still faced with an increasing number of 
threats, and as long as there are more technological advancements, more threats will 
arise. Consequently, companies need to be ready to face these increasing numbers and 
types of security threat.
4.8 Summary of the chapter
This chapter began by presenting the sample size and response rate of the current 
study. It proceeded with a general discussion on the statistical methods employed to 
analyse data of the questionnaire and the reasons for selecting each method. The 
chapter then presented the main findings of the questionnaire. The profile of those 
who participated in the study and of their companies was discussed.
The chapter then examined the main findings regarding the elements of AIS security 
management framework within companies. The results indicated the existence of AIS 
security policy in the majority of UK companies that responded regardless of the 
industry sector. In addition, some sectors are taking steps to provide their employees 
with security training and to raise their security awareness for example the insurance 
& financial services, whereas other sectors such as the manufacturing sector do not 
pay enough attention to security training and awareness.
The results also showed that most companies do undertake a security risk assessment; 
however, there are no association between the different industry sectors that 
responded and the existence and frequency of undertaking this risk assessment.
According to the interviews’ findings (Chapter 5), many companies under-reported 
the exact number of security incidents, and the majority of companies claimed that
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they did not experience any incidents in the last year. The results also showed that 
there are no association between the different industry sectors that responded and the 
existence of security incident handling procedures, disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans, and the frequency of testing and reviewing these plans. The results 
indicated that companies have become more concerned with having formal 
procedures to respond quickly to the different security incidents, and having a formal 
up-to-date business continuity plan.
However, the results revealed that the majority of UK companies that responded do 
not have a separate budget for security. This could be because security is still 
perceived as an IT issue, and therefore, its budget is a part of the IT budget. In 
addition, the results indicated that software security controls was ranked first in the 
top three areas of spending on AIS security, followed by hardware and physical 
security controls, and audit activities, compliance and certification. However, the 
results indicated that there are no significant differences among the different sectors 
regarding the top areas of security spending except for hardware and physical security 
controls, which indicated that some sectors spend more on these controls than the 
others.
The results also revealed that the awareness level of the British Standard BS 7799 is 
high in some sectors such as the insurance & financial services, energy & utilities, and 
media & entertainment sectors, whereas it is weak in the technology & 
telecommunications sector, and very weak in the manufacturing, retail merchandising, 
and property & construction sectors. However, the results revealed that no statistically 
significant differences exist among different industry sectors concerning the 
awareness level of this standard among managers and employees of UK companies. 
Moreover, the majority of companies that responded are not certified under ISO 
27001 and are not planning to be certified.
In addition, the results revealed that the most common technique used to evaluate AIS 
security effectiveness was the internal audit of security procedures, whereas 
vulnerability scanners were the least common technique used. Moreover, the results 
showed that the most common success indicator of security management was the 
successful defence against AIS security attacks, followed by information security
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assurance. It is encouraging that the majority of companies that responded believed 
that their security management is somewhat or extremely effective.
The chapter then presented the most common sources and types of security threats 
facing UK companies. The results revealed that companies’ employees are now the 
most common source of security threats, given that authorised users or employees 
were ranked the first common source of security threats. The results indicated the 
infrequent occurrence of some types of security threats such as intentional destruction 
of data by employees, theft of physical information and software, sabotage, and 
natural disasters. On the other hand, the results revealed the frequent occurrence of 
employees’ errors i.e. unintentional destruction of data by employees, spamming and 
malware attacks, and sharing of passwords.
The final section of this chapter presented the results concerning the different types of 
AIS security controls used within UK companies. The results indicated that the 
majority of companies that responded are paying, relatively, more attention to 
software, hardware, input, output, and network security controls, than the other 
controls. Consequently, they must put more effort into the organisational and 
personnel security controls to protect their systems from different security threats.
The results of the regression analysis revealed the relative importance of some AIS 
security controls compared to the other controls given their significant effects on 
many types of threats such as penetration testing and biometrics. On the other hand, 
the results provided no evidence that some controls had any effect on any type of 
security threats such as software audit alert tools, security alarm systems, users access 
controls, network encryption, and spam filtering software despite their importance.
The results of this chapter raise further security issues, which were discussed in the 
interviews. The following chapter presents a full discussion of the results of the 
interviews and the methods used in data analysis.
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of interview results
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 discussed the main findings derived from the questionnaire. In order to 
understand and confirm the results obtained from the questionnaire analysis, to 
explore some issues in more depth, to enrich the quality of the information collected, 
and to fill in any gaps in data that might occur in the questionnaire results, some semi­
structured interviews were conducted for the current study.
This chapter provides a full discussion of the interview findings. It presents the 
sample size, and the data analysis methods of the interviews. It also provides the 
opinions of the interviewees on the AIS security within their companies.
This chapter comprises 14 sections. Section 5.2 presents the sample size of the 
interviews. Section 5.3 explains the methods used in analysing the interviews. The 
interviewees’ and their companies’ background information are provided in Section 
5.4. Sections 5.5 - 5.13 present the main findings of each of the nine interviews 
conducted. Each section is divided into four sub-sections. The interviewees’ opinions 
on the management framework of AIS security within their companies are discussed 
in the first sub-section which addresses AIS security policy, training and awareness 
programs, risk assessment, incident response, disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans, security budget, security standards and certification, and AIS 
security effectiveness. The second sub-section investigates the most common sources 
and types of AIS security threats, and the third sub-section explores the most recent 
security controls employed within their companies to reduce security threats, and the 
security controls they are planning to use in the future. Section 5.14 concludes the 
chapter with a summary of the main findings of the interviews.
5.2 Selection of interviewees
As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.2.1), at the end of the questionnaire, the 
respondents were asked to provide their contact details if they were willing to
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participate in a follow-up face-to-face interview to discuss some security matters in 
more depth.
In total, 12 managers agreed to participate and provided their contact details in the 
returned questionnaire. An e-mail was then sent to these managers thanking them for 
completing the questionnaire and for their willingness to be interviewed, and for 
giving their permission to be contacted again to arrange an appointment after 
analysing the questionnaire data. One month later, another e-mail was sent to the 
managers reminding them of the study and arranging an appointment for the 
interview. Nine managers responded and appointments were arranged to conduct the 
interviews. In total, nine interviews were conducted with managers of nine UK listed 
companies in different industry sectors. The sample size seems small, but it is not 
surprising that only nine respondents were willing to participate in the study. 
According to Kotulic and Clark (2004), security investigation research is the most 
intrusive type of research, and there is undoubtedly a general mistrust of any outsider 
attempting to gain data about the actions of the security practitioner community.
Moreover, Corbetta (2003, p.284) has argued that the qualitative interview plays a 
supporting role for quantitative data collection. The main empirical base is made up of 
the questionnaire, and the qualitative phase only serves to pave the way for the 
quantitative procedure, to add illustrative support to its findings, or to clarify some 
aspects that the quantitative data have not brought to light. In addition, since the 
interview was the second stage of the data collection, and its aim was to confirm the 
results obtained from the questionnaire, the researcher considers that the opinions 
provided by the nine managers are, to a great extent, sufficient to confirm the general 
patterns appearing in the questionnaire results. Bryman and Bell (2007) argued that 
interviewing managers often raises specific issues since the status and power held, 
particularly at a senior level, means that gaining access to this group of people and 
arranging a mutually convenient time to conduct an interview can be extremely 
difficult.
The interviews were conducted between February and April 2008. Interviews lasted 
between one and three hours. The date, time, location and duration of the interviews 
are shown in Table 5.1.
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T a b le  5.1 T h e  in te rv ie w s  d a te s  a n d  lo c a tio n s
Interview
number
Interviewee
code Date Time
Location Duration
1 A 11/02/2008 10:00 am Cardiff 2 hours
2 B 14/02/2008 11:00 am London 2 hours
3 C 14/02/2008 2:30 pm London 1.5 hours
4 D 26/02/2008 3:30 pm London 1.5 hours
5 E 04/03/2008 2:00 pm Huntingdon 3 hours
6 F 17/03/2008 1:30 pm London 2 hours
7 G 19/03/2008 4:00 pm Maidenhead 1 hour
8 H 07/04/2008 3:00 pm Bradford 2 hours
9 I 22/04/2008 11:00 am Reading 2 hours
All the interviews were audio-recorded after obtaining the permission of the 
interviewees. The audio recording was very important. It allowed the researcher to 
concentrate on the conversation, to maintain a more natural relationship with the 
interviewees, and to capture their actual quotations. The audio recording also 
permitted more thorough and repeated examinations of what the interviewees said 
(Bryman and Bell 2007; Corbetta 2003; Patton 1990). However, the audio recording 
did not eliminate the need for taking notes. Patton (1990) indicated that taking notes 
becomes a kind of non-verbal feedback to the interviewee when something is 
sufficiently important to be written down. On the other hand, the failure to take notes 
will often indicate that nothing of particular importance is being said. Consequently, 
the researcher took some notes in addition to audio-recording the interviews.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.2.2), the interview guide used in the 
interviews was based on a number of themes, including the background of 
interviewees and their companies, the management framework of AIS security, AIS 
security threats and controls. A copy of the interview guide used during the interviews 
is presented in Appendix 2.
5.3 Interview data analysis
After conducting and audio recording the interviews, the researcher transcribed the 
interviews in full. Patton (1990) argued that since the raw data of interviews are 
quotations, full transcriptions are the most desirable data to obtain. The researcher 
listened to the recorded interviews several times in order to check the accuracy of the 
transcriptions. However, transcribing the interviews was a very time consuming 
process. It took the researcher about six hours to transcribe one hour of speech.
292
Once the interviews had been transcribed, they were ready for analysis. However, 
there is no agreement in the literature as to how qualitative analysis should proceed, or 
what makes an acceptable analysis. Patton (1990) argued that there are no simple 
formulae or clear-cut rules about how to do a credible, high quality analysis. The 
challenge is to do one’s best to make sense of a massive amount of data, in order to 
fairly represent and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study. 
Punch (1998) also stated that there is no single methodological framework for 
qualitative data analysis. In addition, Bryman and Bell (2007) indicated that unlike a 
quantitative data analysis, there are few well established and widely accepted rules for 
the analysis of qualitative data.
On the other hand, there is an agreement in the literature that the ways in which 
qualitative data are analysed have to be clear to the reader of the research. Patton 
(1990) argued that the qualitative researcher has an obligation to be methodical in 
reporting sufficient details of data collection and the processes of analysis to permit 
others to judge the quality of the findings. In addition, Punch (1998) stated that the 
methods for data analysis needed to be systematic, disciplined, and be capable of 
being seen and described. If the method of analysis cannot be described and 
scrutinised, it is difficult to have confidence in the findings put forward.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6.2.3), Miles and Huberman’s approach to 
qualitative data analysis has been utilised in the current study. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) suggest the following main components for qualitative data analysis: data 
reduction, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions.
Data reduction is the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and 
transforming the data that appear in transcriptions (Miles and Huberman 1994). Punch 
(1998) indicated that data reduction occurs continually throughout the analysis. In the 
early stages, this happens through editing, segmenting, and summarising the data. In 
the middle stages, it happens through coding, and finding themes and patterns and in 
the last stages, through conceptualising and explaining. The objective here is to 
reduce the data without significant loss of information.
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Data display is an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing. Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that better displays are a 
major avenue to valid qualitative data analysis. They indicated that there are many 
different ways of displaying data such as matrices, graphs, charts, and networks. 
Sarantakos (2005) also stated that these different ways present visual information that 
allows the researcher to make sense of the collected information and to draw relevant 
conclusions.
Conclusions follow the data reduction and display. Conclusions will be in the form of 
propositions, and once they have been drawn, they need to be verified.
Despite the small number of interviews conducted, and the lack of broad agreement 
about the use of computers in qualitative data analysis, the researcher used NVivo, 
which is one of the best known computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software. 
There are many benefits to be gained from using software like NVivo. Flick (2002) 
indicated that qualitative data analysis software is a pragmatic tool to support 
qualitative research. Bazeley (2007) also stated that using a computer in analysing 
qualitative data simply ensures that the researcher is working more methodically, 
more thoroughly, and more attentively. In addition, Kelle et al. (1995) argued that the 
use of computers would make qualitative analysis more systematic and transparent, 
thus enhancing its trustworthiness.
The use of software like NVivo will make the process more robust, easier to control, 
and more enjoyable (Gibbs 2002). NVivo removes most of the clerical tasks 
associated with the manual coding and retrieval of data (Bryman and Bell 2007). It 
allows the researcher to keep interviews, codes, memos, diagrams, and audio 
recordings in one place, which can be a powerful support to the analysis process 
(Weitzman 2003). The qualitative data analysis software allows the researcher to look 
at data in different ways, and therefore, it increases creativity in dealing with data 
(Fielding and Lee 1998). In addition, one of the main advantages of the software is its 
data management capabilities.
Despite the above advantages, there are many concerns about using the software in 
qualitative data analysis. There is wide agreement in the literature that the use of
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computers in analysing qualitative data can distance the researcher from the data. 
Gibbs (2002) argued that researchers using paper-based analysis felt they were closer 
to the words of their respondents than if they used computers. Fielding and Lee (1998) 
indicated that computer methods discourage involvement and engagement with data. 
However, Lewins and Silver (2007) state that software increases the access 
researchers have to the whole data files. They stated that whatever tools are used, 
“live” contact to data is always easy, increasing the researchers’ closeness to data.
There is another fear that the attention attracted by the computer and software will 
distract the researcher from the real analytic work (Flick 2002). In addition, 
computers would affect creativity and reduce variety as coding and retrieval became 
the dominant process in working with data, which may lead to the neglect of extensive 
memoing, linking of ideas, holistic viewing of the text and visualising techniques. In 
fact, it is the opposite - using computers can improve the consistency of analysis of a 
block of data.
Gibbs (2002, p.65) stated, “Even with a computer program to help, there is no 
substitute, in the end, for close reading of and a thorough familiarity with the text”. 
The researcher, then, began the first stage of data analysis - data reduction - by 
reading the interview transcripts several times attempting to find, refine, and elaborate 
the important concepts and themes that will help in coding the interviews. The codes 
developed were based mainly on the questions asked in the interviews, which were 
found in the interview guide, in addition to other codes that were developed after 
reading the transcripts. Gibbs (2002) argued that there is often much to be gained 
from approaching the data with an open mind, with no preconceptions about what 
analytic framework might be appropriate. In this case, codes were developed through 
the close reading of the transcripts. On the other hand, the concepts that the codes 
represent may come from the literature and previous studies. Gibbs (2002) indicated 
that most researchers move between both approaches during their analysis, and 
suggested that researchers do not have to become too tied to the initial codes they 
construct.
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The researcher then imported the transcripts from Microsoft Word, after converting 
them to rich text format (RTF), to NVivo 2 software3. The researcher then entered the 
developed codes into NVivo, as a first step in coding the interviews’ transcripts. 
Coding is the process of establishing a connection between a code - known in NVivo 
as node - and one or more passages of text. Coding brings together passages of text 
that are about the same issue or indicate similar ideas, concepts, actions, and 
descriptions (Gibbs 2002).
Once the codes were entered into NVivo, the researcher went through the interview 
transcripts and coded them one by one. The researcher checked the codes and the 
coded passages several times to ensure their accuracy, given that coding is the basis of 
the subsequent analysis.
Once the transcripts were coded, NVivo allowed the researcher to sort the data by 
grouping all data units with the same code into a single computer file. Bryman and 
Bell (2007) indicated that NVivo allows the researchers very rapidly to travel through 
all documents so that they will end up with all text that was coded at a particular code 
in all of their documents. NVivo helped the researcher in retrieving what all the 
interviewees had said about the identified concepts, themes, and events. The 
researcher printed these files and went through them several times. A few codes were 
removed since they occurred infrequently. The researcher then explored the data 
searching for similarities, differences, patterns and relationships between different 
interviews on the same concept, theme or event.
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.91) stated that the second stage of qualitative data 
analysis is data display. They indicated that data display is a visual format that 
presents information systematically, so that the researcher can draw valid conclusions. 
Sarantakos (2005) also stated that tables and graphs are useful tools of presentation in 
qualitative research, but the structure of the presentation does not seem to adhere to 
any strict rules, given that tables and graphs in qualitative research are always tailored 
to serve the needs of each particular study. Consequently, the researcher constructed a 
number of tables representing different codes in order to summarise the most
3 There is a new version now of NVivo software - NVivo 8, which can import documents in both rich 
text format and word formats.
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important text and quotations of different interviewees that would help in drawing 
conclusions and answering the research questions.
Given the small number of interviews conducted and the long time that would be 
taken for the researcher to learn the complex functions of the NVivo software, all the 
tables were constructed manually. Bazeley (2007, p.2) recommended that those using 
NVivo for a small project or for small number of interviews can work without having 
to learn the complex procedures.
The final stage of qualitative data analysis is the drawing and verification of 
conclusions. The aim of this stage is to integrate what has been done into a 
meaningful and coherent picture of the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested 
some methods for drawing conclusions from interview data such as noting patterns, 
making contrasts, comparisons, clustering and counting. Consequently, in order to 
draw conclusions and to support the questionnaire results presented in the previous 
chapter, the researcher counted, compared, and contrasted the responses of all 
interviewees associated with each code. The following sections presenting the main 
findings of each interview based on the same sequence of the sections of the interview 
guide as shown in Appendix 2.
5.4 General and background information
After an introductory discussion with the interviewees, introducing the researcher, 
thanking the interviewees for their participation in the study, and explaining the aims 
and importance of the current study, Section 2 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) 
sought information concerning the interviewees and their companies’ background.
Interviewees were asked seven questions regarding their company name, industry 
sector, number of employees in the company, their current position and years of 
experience in this position, and their professional security qualification, if applicable. 
The interviewees were also asked about the existence of a separate department for 
security within their companies, number of employees in this department, and to 
whom they report. These questions provided the researcher with a profile of those 
who participated in the study, and they were useful in the subsequent analysis of the
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interview data. Table 5.2 demonstrates the general and background information of the 
interviewees and their companies.
Table 5.2 General and background information of the interviewees and their companies
Interviewee
code
Industry
sector
Number
of
employees
Gender Position of interviewee
Years o f  
experience 
in 
current 
position
Professional
security
qualification
A Insurance & financial services 2300 Male
Information
security
manager
3 Yes
B Media & entertainment 4000 Male
Technology risk 
manager 7 N o
C Property & construction 12000 Male
Group IT 
director 11 No
D Property & construction 24 Male
Group 
accountant 
(looking after 
IT)
15 No
E Energy & utilities 3500 Female Security risk manager 6-7 Yes
F Insurance & financial services 3000 Male
Information
security
manager
10 Yes
G Media & entertainment 6500 Male
Chief
technology
officer
1 N o
H Energy & utilities 2200 Male IT architecture manager 6 N o
I Technology & telecommunications 20000 Male
Information risk 
& security 
manager
5 Yes
Industry sector
Table 5.2 showed that the interviewees who participated in the study were from five 
industry sectors. From the table, it can be seen that one out of the nine interviewees 
was from the technology & telecommunications sector, whereas two interviewees 
from each of the insurance & financial services, media & entertainment, property & 
construction, and energy & utilities sectors participated in the study. It may not be 
surprising that no respondent from the manufacturing sector was willing to conduct a 
follow-up interview, given that the questionnaire findings (Chapter 4) showed that 
manufacturing companies do not devote much effort or resources to information 
security and consequently they are not concerned too much about discussing the 
different security aspects.
Number of employees
Table 5.2 demonstrated that six out of nine interviewees stated that their companies 
have more than 2000 employees, whereas two companies have more than 10000
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employees. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) argued that larger companies spend more time 
and money on security than smaller companies do, and therefore, such companies 
have an interest in taking part in the study. On the other hand, one interviewee from 
the property & construction sector stated that his company has only 24 employees, 
however the turnover of his company is high. Interviewee D commented:
“There are only 24 employees working here, but our turnover is more than £300 million.
We are a property company and we are dealing with high value and large buildings, so 
turnover is quite big
Position of interviewee
Interviewees were then asked about their current position in the company. Table 5.2 
showed that the position of five out of nine interviewees (55.5 percent) related to the 
IT function in the company, their positions are technology risk manager, group IT 
director, chief technology officer, IT architecture manager, and group accountant 
looking after IT. This is consistent with the Security and Information Risk Survey 
(NCC 2007) which indicated that in almost two thirds of companies, the person 
responsible for information security is someone who sits within the IT function. It can 
also be seen from Table 5.2 that two interviewees are information security managers, 
another interviewee is a security risk manager, and the other is an information risk and 
security manager. Von Solms (2005) argued that the position of the information 
security manager has been an established position in most UK companies. The Global 
Security Survey (DTT 2007) also indicated that the role of the information security 
leader is rising through the ranks to the company’s upper levels. This trend will 
continue in response to the changing nature of threats and growing customer and 
employee demands.
Years of experience in the current position
Table 5.2 revealed that the majority of employees had more than five years of 
experience in the current position, whereas, only two interviewees had less than five 
years of experience; however, they had more years of experience in the same position 
or in equivalent positions in other companies. All the interviewees, therefore, had 
sufficient experience and knowledge of all security practices within their companies, 
which were reflected in the quality of information provided to the researcher that 
helped in enriching the research.
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Professional security qualification
It can be seen from Table 5.2 that four out of nine interviewees had professional 
security qualification. These four interviewees were from insurance & financial 
services, energy & utilities, and technology & telecommunications sectors. The BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) stated that security qualifications 
are commonest in the technology sector. In addition, given that the insurance & 
financial services, and the energy & utilities sectors are dealing with millions of 
customer data, they tend to have a better understanding of security and, therefore, they 
employ security qualified staff. The results showed that all the interviewees who had 
professional security qualifications were Certified Information Systems Security 
Professionals (CISSP). In addition, one of the interviewees was a Certified 
Information Security Manager (CISM) and was studying to be a Certified Information 
Systems Auditor (CISA), whereas other interviewees had the Information Systems 
Security Professionals qualification (ISSP), and the qualification obtained from the 
British Computer Society (BCS).
Security department
Hitchings (1995) argued that companies with a security department take the problem 
of security seriously and, at the very least, can take the first step in making a company 
more secure. Dutta and McCrohan (2002) also indicated that if  there is no structural 
unit that is specifically responsible for security, the implementation of security 
initiatives will be fragmented and may therefore be ineffective. Consequently, 
interviewees were asked whether they have a separate department for security within 
their companies, the number of employees in this department, and to whom this 
department reports.
The results in Table 5.3 showed that only two interviewees (G and H) believed that 
they had a security department, whereas four interviewees (A, E, F and I) stated that 
they had a small security team of three to five persons. Table 5.3 also showed that 
three interviewees (A, E and I) believed that the security team were included in the IT 
department within their companies and reported directly to the IT director, whereas 
interviewee F had the information security team within the group risk management 
department and this team reports to the head of risk management.
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T a b le  5 .3  T h e  e x is te n c e  o f  a  s e p a ra te  s e c u rity  d e p a r tm e n t  w ith in  th e  in te r v ie w e e s ’ c o m p a n ie s
Interviewee
code
Industry
sector
Existence of 
security department
Number of 
employees Reporting
A Insurance & financial services
A security team within IT 
department 3 Head of IT
B Media & entertainment
A solutions management 
department within IT for the 
technical part of security
- -
C Property & construction
IT team & 
a security risk management 
team
4 in each 
team Chief executive
D
Property & 
construction
No security department or 
team - -
E Energy & utilities A security team within IT department - IT director
F
Insurance & financial 
services
An information security team 
within the group risk 
management department
3
Head of risk 
management
G Media & entertainment
A security department, not 
specific for information 
security
3 0
Head of 
security
H Energy & utilities A security department 4 Operationsdepartment
I Technology & telecommunications
An information security team 
within the IT department 5 CIO
One of the interviewees (D) stated that there was no security department or team 
within his company. However, this was not surprising given that his company had 
only 24 employees. The interviewee commented:
“ We do not have a separate department for security or even an IT department, but we use 
an IT consultant who comes in two or three times a week or as required. One o f the aspects 
of security is to delegate the authority to a number ofpeople, but we cannot do that, we are 
very few people; we cannot break down the responsibility. This is a drawback, but we still 
have the controls in place ”.
Table 5.3 also showed that interviewee B believed that his company did not have 
specific information security department, but there was a solutions management 
department within the IT department, particularly for the technical part of security. 
Another interviewee (C) stated that there were two departments in his company, one 
for the security of IT and for anything to do with computing i.e. technical issues, and 
the other was the risk management department. He also stated that this department 
took a much broader view of security, particularly in undertaking security risk 
assessment for anything that might have an impact on the company, not just the 
technology risks.
The above results, therefore, indicate that security is still recognised as an IT issue by 
the majority of companies and consequently security management is often left to the
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IT department. Interviewee F provided a reason for the non-existence of a separate 
security department within many companies. He commented:
“There is no separate security department because it might cause overlap. What we do is 
similar to some other departments. The people in the company do many security practices 
as a part o f their jobs e.g. fraud team, financial risk team, etc. There is too much overlap ”.
However, Dodds and Hague (2004) argued that, regardless of the existence or non­
existence of a separate security department, the most important issue is that each 
department understands their security roles and responsibilities, and perform their 
jobs as dictated by the policies.
The subsequent analysis of the interview findings is presented in the following 
sections (5.5 - 5.13) based on the same sequence of the sections and questions of the 
interview guide (Appendix 2).
5.5 Interview 1
5.5.1 General information
The first interview was conducted in an insurance company located in Cardiff. The 
company was established more than 10 years ago. The company was registered in the 
London Stock Exchange and there were around 2300 employees in it. The company 
had a small security team of three persons, which was included in the IT department 
and reported directly to the head of IT. On the other hand, interviewee A was an 
information security manager, who had three years of experience in his current 
position. The interviewee had two professional security qualifications - Certified 
Information Systems Security Professionals (CISSP), Certified Information Security 
Manager (CISM), and he was studying to be a Certified Information Systems Auditor 
(CISA).
5.5.2 The management framework of AIS security
Business environments today have become increasingly more severe, complex, and 
interdependent at the domestic and global level (Whitten 2008). Organisations have 
become more dependent upon their IS than ever before. Consequently, with this 
increasing usage of IS, with the amount of information stored on them, and with all 
the increased media attention about security related incidents and the effects that
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might have (Mouratidis et al. 2008), it is necessary for companies to go beyond 
technical considerations and to adopt structured process for maintaining their AIS 
security. Consequently, Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the 
interviewee’s opinions regarding the management framework of AIS security within 
his company.
AIS security policy: As mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5.1), there is wide 
agreement in the literature that the security policy is the start of security management 
in a company. Eveloff (2005) argued that a security policy is at the heart of any 
security strategy, representing the objectives from which all security procedures are 
derived. Interviewee A confirmed that they had a formal security policy, which was 
written by the security manager in 2002, and was updated annually. According to 
Briney (2000), a security policy should be evaluated and updated on a regular basis to 
reflect changing business, regulatory, technological and personnel environments.
The policy was distributed via the company’s intranet. They could not distribute 
hardcopies to a large number of employees. Interviewee A commented:
“We don't have a hardcopy to distribute among all those employees. On our intranet, we 
can make people aware o f security. We have an electronic copy o f the policy. We also have 
our information security team pages. On our intranet, there is all relevant information 
about security, not just the policy ”.
He believed that it is not sufficient to write a policy, it is most important to educate 
people about what they should and should not do. Consequently, staff training and 
awareness were the most important elements of the security policy. He expressed the 
following opinion:
“Training and awareness is the most important part. With information security, it is not 
enough to write a policy. What we have to do is to train people. We have to let them know 
what is the acceptable behaviour and what is the unacceptable behaviour, only then, we 
can discipline people because o f security responsibilities. It is a part o f  my responsibility as 
a security manager to get people and all the company security aware ”.
Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) argued that there is no use in having a perfect 
security policy if it is not possible to monitor and enforce compliance to such policies. 
Interviewee A claimed that his company was checking compliance to the security
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policy through the security tests undertaken by the employees every year. Moreover, he 
believed that the security policy is effective given that his company did not experience 
major security incidents in the last year, and all the people passed the test. He stated:
“There are many ways to see how well the policy is working. If there were a number of 
security incidents, this would indicate that there is a problem. We have very few minor 
incidents. However, it is not a matter o f how big or small the incident is, it is still has to be 
reported, handled, managed, and communicated, and that is what we are doing. If many 
people fail the security test, this might indicate that either they do not listen or the training 
material is rubbish. However, if we get no incidents or few incidents, and all people are 
passing the test, there is no problem with the policy”.
Security training and awareness program: As mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.5.2), employee training and awareness is the most important of all security measures 
(Eveloff 2005). Interviewee A stated that his company had a formal security training 
and awareness program. However, he believed that it is not practical to have an 
annual classroom training for all current employees due to time and cost constraints, 
and consequently, they depend on computer-based training. He expressed the 
following opinion:
“Every new employee must have a classroom security training, however, every year after 
that, it is not practical to have 2300 employees in a classroom. We are using the intranet.
We have a Learning Management System managed by our HR department, an online 
course. We put together an online information security-training package for all employees, 
it is compulsory, and they have to do an exam every year. It is an internet-based learning 
system for employees ”.
In addition, he highlighted the importance of the training and awareness program in the 
following quotation:
‘‘We are planning to have a formal training and awareness program for all employees. 
Everyone will be given training. User awareness is very important in information security.
If we cannot make people aware, then we are going to have incidents. We may have all 
technical controls in place, but still we have to enable people to work. No matter how many 
regulations we have, we still have to enable them to do their jobs perfectly. We can have 
regulations, but people still may do something that contravenes regulations and they are 
not aware. The most important is the training and awareness o f employees ”.
Moreover, interviewee A believed that the security awareness level in his company is 
very good or quite high; however, it could always be done much better. He stated:
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“Security awareness level is very good, but always it should be better, since 70 percent o f 
our problems are from people, human beings ".
Risk assessment: Businesses are exposed to unlimited security risks unless they have 
a formal risk management framework to enable risks to be identified, evaluated, and 
managed (Shaw and Daniels 2002). Interviewee A believed that his company was 
undertaking security risk assessment for the whole company and not just for AIS 
security. He stated:
“We have a very well developed risk management process for the company as a whole”
Freeman (2007) argued that a regular comprehensive risk assessment should always 
be the guiding light for achieving organisational security goals. Interviewee A stated 
that his company undertakes risk assessment on a quarterly basis; however, he 
believed that it must be undertaken on a continuous basis and with the use of any new 
technology. He commented:
“Risk assessment is undertaken every 3 months, however, it is an ongoing process. I think 
we will have many changes in technology. So, if  any new technology gets through, if  there 
are new processes, there must be a risk assessment”.
This result is not surprising, given that insurance & financial services companies are 
regulated by the FSA, so they have to report their security risks regularly.
Moreover, risk assessment is the responsibility of the risk management team within the 
company. Interviewee A commented:
“The risk management team is responsible for undertaking the risk assessment with the 
internal audit team. They work in the compliance department, outside the IT”.
He indicated that although the risk level in his company is quite low, there is no 
absolute security or zero risk. He stated:
“We are quite a low risk organisation, but the security problem is relating to someone who 
does not follow the procedures, or we haven’t checked whether they follow the procedures, 
then there is a potential risk. There is no absolute security. There is no zero risk ”.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Kieke (2006) 
has pointed out that the number of security breaches continues to rise. Interviewee A
305
believed that his company had had only two minor security incidents in the last two 
years, which they contained before any damage was caused. He commented:
“Yes, we had 2 minor security incidents. I found a couple o f years ago, a USB on the 
back o f one o f our training Pcs, somebody forgot it, and they are not allowed to use 
USBs. I found the USB and the information on it, and I knew whose USB it was. It was an 
external company, who came in and tried to demonstrate the controls, but they were 
unable to get any information from our network. There was no damage from this incident, 
but it is a security incident that must be reported".
He believed that it could be catastrophic if his company lost customer information, 
given that this incident could affect their reputation, customer confidence, etc. He 
stated:
“There are 2 situations which can be catastrophic; if  we were to have a major data 
protection violation or to lose customer information. Customer information is our most 
sensitive asset, such as names, addresses, bank details, financial information, etc. We are a 
public company; it will be catastrophic if we lose customer information. It will cause 
reputation damage, and the share price and customer confidence will be affected. We have 
numerous controls in place to prevent this from happening. Another situation is o f a non- 
compliance issue ”.
Regarding the security incident handling procedures in his company, interviewee A 
indicated that there is an incident management team to respond to any incident. He 
pointed out:
“We have an incident management team, if there is a problem, this team would be able to 
respond to it. The right people can deal with any situation and they can make sure that they 
are doing the right things. They make different scenarios and see what will happen. These 
procedures are reviewed annually, at least once a year or as required. I have to verify them 
and get management to sign and republish them. However, they depend very much on the 
size and type o f the problem ”.
Moreover, he stated that they have different authorities and regulatory bodies to 
whom they could report security incidents depending on the size and nature of 
incidents including the FSA (Financial Services Authority) and the ICO (Information 
Commissioner’s Office). He commented:
“It depends on its relevance. Internal incident like a USB incident is not a problem, but if  
there is an incident related to data protection, we will have to report it to the ICO. 
According to law, we have to report. If it is supposed to be a violation o f FSA regulations, 
we have to report it to the FSA. I f  it is relevant to the payment card industry scheme, we
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have to report it to the Payment Card Industry Scheme. Part o f our procedures is the 
communication. If  we have a security breach and we did not report it to the external 
authorities, they can fine us, but if  we speak to them straight away, they can try to work 
with us and help us. For example, if  I am in the situation o f the Nationwide Society4 and I 
lose a laptop with a quarter a million o f customer records, and this only got reported a 
month later, that is why they were fined about million o f pounds. What they have to do is to 
demonstrate that they have encrypted their laptop. They did wrong, if  they went 
straightaway and reported that they lost a laptop with customer information, the authorities 
could have helped them. It will be more damaging for companies not to report”.
He also believed that after a security incident, they could improve their procedures, 
change their policy, if necessary, check the controls, and learn from the incident. He 
commented:
‘‘As a part o f the security incident handling process, we have to manage, handle, and 
communicate the situation. We have a reporting process. We can learn lessons from the 
incident. We can change our procedure and policy, if  necessary. After managing an 
incident, we would then check our controls, maybe there is a control failure, or a human 
issue. But in case o f an incident, we always have the opportunity to improve our procedures 
and to learn from that event, a continuous learning process ”.
Nosworthy (2000) argued that a business continuity plan involves not only the IT 
department, but also other areas of the business and should be incorporated into the 
overall business process and not just focus on IT. Interviewee A confirmed this 
opinion and stated:
“Yes, we have a business continuity plan, not just for the IT, but for the business as well.
Each team within the company has a business continuity plan. We have a business 
continuity forum, we meet every 3 months to discuss different issues and to do scenario 
testing, but not only for IT, it is for business and IT together”.
He also stated that they are constantly testing and updating their business continuity 
plan, particularly when any technology changes, and that the disaster recovery staff is 
responsible for this plan. He presented the following opinion:
“Constantly, we are testing and updating the plan. As an IT department, we do periodic 
tests once every quarter. We simulate a system failure, we have a disaster recovery test, and
4 The UK regulator, the FSA, fined Nationwide £980000 for failing to manage IT security risks 
following the theft of a laptop from an employee in 2007. The FSA found that Nationwide did not 
know the laptop contained sensitive data and did not launch an investigation until three weeks after the 
computer was stolen (Anonymous 2008 a).
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if anything happened, we learn lessons from it. Every time technology changes, there must 
be reviews and updates o f the plan. We must continually test the plans and procedures ”.
Security budget: With the increase in the number of security incidents, companies 
are now confused about how much to spend on security and what to spend it on 
(Kleinfeld 2006). Interviewee A believed that there is a budget for the security team 
within his company; however, it is just a percentage of the IT budget. He expressed 
the following opinion:
“Every year in October, we start to make the budget. I look at the requirements and put the 
budget for the next year. Although my funding is from the IT, I have a security budget. 
There is a budget for the security team. The money is just for security, but within the IT 
budget. My budget is for information system security, for information, people, hardware, 
software, processes, etc. However, I don’t know the percentage spent on AIS security. 
Security budget is a percentage o f IT budget. We have an IT budget which the whole 
company benefits from. We don’t have that granularity o f controls. I f  the accounting 
department need something for security, they can ask the IT. But every year there is no 
separate budget for the accounting. We have a security budget for the whole organisation ”.
In addition, the results reveal that there is no separate budget specifically for AIS 
security. Interviewee A highlighted this opinion in the following quotation:
“We have a very large system which runs the whole business for us, a part o f that is the 
accounting system. There is no separate budget for AIS security. It is just an overall 
information security budget. There is nothing specifically for accounting. Our accounting 
system, finance system, and customer database contain very sensitive information ”.
He believed that the decision on security spending depends on the requirements of 
each department, and illustrated his opinion with an example from the accounting 
department. He stated:
“If we have to spend money on the accounting systems, there would be a recommendation 
from the accounting manager. The accounting department decided what they required. We 
have a project team, I am part o f that team, and I look for the security aspect. The 
accounting department make the decision, but they are supported by the IT department ”.
He claimed that they spend a lot of money on security testing, physical and 
application security controls, and on salaries of the security team. He stated:
“Physical security controls and logical security controls in order to secure our network and 
traffic going through our network are quite high. We spend a lot o f  money on testing, and
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on security applications as well; physical, testing, and application security for the whole 
organisation. Obviously, the human part, salaries o f people in the security team takes a big 
part o f the security budget ”.
However, he believed that his company’s security spending is not enough and the 
budget needs to increase.
Security standards and certification: Thorp (2004) indicated that the British 
Standard BS 7799 (ISO 27000) provides a good guidance and a framework for 
building an information security system. Interviewee A believed that although his 
management does not know exactly what BS 7799 is, they know everything about the 
policy and procedures, which are all based on it, and therefore they have very good 
security awareness. He commented:
“My policy and procedures are all based on BS 7799. My management does not know 
exactly what BS 7799 is, but they know what the policy says, what the procedures are and 
they still have very good security awareness. We make our reviews and audit work with 
different teams and departments, and we make it very relevant to each team. We make risk 
assessment and security awareness training; we make it relevant to each individual team as 
well. However, the overall security awareness package based on BS 7799 is very general.
We did not train them on BS 7799. It is very much based on the documentation o f 
procedures. We just give them what is relevant to their job, only what they need to know ”.
Although the literature suggests many benefits for companies from being certified 
under ISO 27001, interviewee A stated that his company is not certified and has no 
plans of certification. He believed that it is not important to be certified given that 
they undertake all the necessary internal and external audits, which assure them that 
all necessary security controls are in place. He presented his opinion in the following 
quotation:
“No, and we have no intention o f certification. We are externally audited each year, and 
internally audited continually. We have quarterly BCI5 compliance checks. It is really not 
important for us. We are not looking for certification right now. We know that w e’ve got all 
controls in place and that is enough. The BCI says that we are secure. It needs too many 
processes to do; we must go through several stages. According to the industry, if  more 
companies were certified, we can have it. We are a very complex environment with complex
5 BCI refers to the Business Continuity Institute, which provides internationally recognised status to 
members, as professional membership of the BCI demonstrates the members’ competence to carry out 
business continuity management (BCM) to a consistent high standard.
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network among different and remote sites. All processes and procedures must be 
documented in order to be certified. I can’t see any direct benefit from it ”.
AIS security effectiveness: No doubt, after any information security investment, 
companies have to assess the consequences of business returns (Huang et al. 2006), 
and to assess security effectiveness. Interviewee A confirmed the use of security 
awareness level among employees, feedback of security tests, and the number of 
security incidents to measure his company’s security effectiveness. He expressed the 
following opinion:
“Yes according to the number o f incidents. For example, if  in a certain month we have four 
security incidents, there must be a problem. If there is no security incident, that is ok. 
According to the general level o f security awareness among employees as well. Regarding 
the test, everybody has to do the course and the test or read the policy and do the test 
online. Everybody must do this test including management and me ”.
This opinion confirmed the questionnaire findings (Section 4.5.2 in Chapter 4) which 
indicated that insurance & financial services companies that responded devote more 
effort to security training and awareness, than the other sectors.
Interviewee A also believed that the number of incidents and the feedback of security 
tests are the company’s most important success indicators of security management.
On the other hand, he claimed that people are not following the procedures and 
therefore they are the main obstacle of effective security within his company. He 
expressed the following opinion:
“People are not following the procedures. You can put computerised controls in place and 
they are great, computers do what you tell them to do, and systems do what the programs 
tell them to do. We have to test controls in place on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. I 
must check whether IT department are doing their job  according to procedures. Any 
changes in systems must be automatically reported to me, so I know what is going on. For 
example, I must check the antivirus in the server, whether it is working, effective, etc. The 
important point is that people are part of the problem. We have technical processes in 
place; people are responsible for these processes. People are always in a hurry; they do not 
want to do the right thing. The weakest link is always the people
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This opinion supported Dhillon (1999) who argued that in many security abuses 
technology is not causing the problems; it is the people using the technology who tend 
to subvert the controls in a system. In addition, according to the Security and 
Information Risk Survey (NCC 2007), the most prevalent risk to information security 
is the people involved in the development, deployment, and use of IS.
Moreover, interviewee A believed that the overall effectiveness level of AIS security 
management within his company is very high; however, risks are always changing. 
He pointed out:
“I think the overall security management process is very high. We have good 
communications, we have good policy and processes that are reviewed, and we have 
internal and external review processes. We spend thousands o f pounds every year hiring 
people to break our website. We make sure the controls are working. It is not enough to 
have controls in place, we must constantly test them, reappraise them, review them, assess 
risks, etc. and we do that. We are very high security aware company, and we have all the 
security controls in place, but we must never stop and say we are secure. Everything is 
changing and risks are changing. It is an ongoing process ”.
5.5.3 AIS security threats
AIS today are accessible through the internet, they become much more complex, and 
they are likely to have more vulnerabilities that can be exploited (Jones 2008). 
Consequently, security professionals need to address an ever increasing number of 
internal and external threats to their systems’ security, while maintaining access to 
critical IS (Myler and Broadbent 2006). Interviewee A believed that the protection of 
his company’s database, credit card information and identity theft are the most serious 
security threats facing his company. He pointed out:
“Every organisation has its own threats. For me, my biggest threat is the protection o f  my 
database, credit cards, not violating the Data Protection Act. The biggest threat in the 
financial sector is the identity theft, the computer crime right now. People are stealing 
using others ’ identity, so I will be very concerned if  I see any personal information leaving 
my company. Identity theft is a very real risk ”.
The above opinion is consistent with the Global Security Survey (DTT 2006) which 
indicated that identity theft is emerging as one of the crimes o f the 21st century, 
particularly in the financial services sector. The Global Information Security Survey 
(Ernst & Young 2007) also stated that media news about privacy breaches, identity
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theft, and loss of personal information have not only raised consumer awareness, but 
have motivated a sense of the leadership’s personal accountability and the absolute 
need to give priority to privacy and data protection.
In addition, interviewee A cited, not only people inside the company, but also 
competitors as his company’s most frequent threats. He believed that although 
systems are doing exactly what they should do, people are not always doing the right 
thing. He expressed his opinion as follows:
‘‘The most frequent threat is always people, to get them to do the right thing. Systems are 
doing exactly what they should do. From my personal point o f view, we have a website 
presence, 90 percent o f my business comes initially from the web. We are a highly 
competitive industry, and people are constantly trying to steal our pricing information. It is 
all about competitors, they are trying to understand how our pricing policy works. They are 
other companies; they are trying to make their prices less to attract more customers. This is 
a most frequent issue, but we have controls in place to identify i t”.
This opinion supported Dhillon (1999) who argued that in many security abuses, it is 
not technology causing problems, but the people using it who tend to subvert the 
controls in a system. However, in terms of competitors, the Security and Information 
Risk Survey (NCC 2007) indicated that competitors are one of the least of companies’ 
worries when it comes to their security strategy.
Interviewee A also believed that the most common source of security threats is the 
people given that 70 percent of his company’s risks are internal, whereas only 30 
percent of risks are external. He stated:
“In the accounting area, we occasionally have instances where people are trying to hide 
money from their company and make illegitimate gain. In all insurance companies, people 
steal credit cards, and buy insurance, and we identify this. It is a common threat. Generally 
speaking, the most common source o f security threat is the people factor, people are not 
following procedures. Only 30 percent o f my risk is external and 70 percent o f my threats 
are internal”.
Whitman (2004) pointed out that employees’ mistakes and failures to follow policy 
and procedures represent a dominant threat requiring the implementation of controls 
to reduce the frequency and severity of such attacks. In addition, Leach (2003) argued 
that many companies suspect that their internal security threat, which is
312
predominantly the result of poor user security behaviour, is more pressing than their 
external threat. Schultz (2005) also indicated that people would not use controls and 
features that are too difficult to use. They will instead do everything they can to avoid 
or get around them.
Interviewee A believed that people are always the weakest link in security, and 
therefore they are the most likely threat his company will be concerned about over the 
next two years. He commented:
‘‘The weakest link is always the human beings, people failing to follow procedures and 
practices. For example, we have a policy for use o f the e-mail. E-mail is a very dangerous 
thing; it is the route for information to get outside my organisation. I f  I find someone is 
misusing the technology, somebody is using the e-mail inappropriately, it is violating 
certain policy, then I have to report that. With good controls in place, we have to keep 
checking, but the weakest link is always the human factor”.
This opinion is consistent with Mitnick (2003) who argued that, although companies 
are more security conscious than ever, some companies are still neglecting their 
weakest link - their employees. Fumell and Papadaki (2008, p.9) also indicated that 
people are often the weakest link in the security context, and therefore, even if the 
technical safeguards are at full strength, the actions of staff within a company could 
still serve to put things at risk. Moreover, in terms of the inappropriate use of e-mail, 
Webb (2000) stated that e-mail is probably the most widespread means of changing 
information; however, it is one of the most vulnerable tools. Britt (2008) also argued 
that, although e-mail has become the preferred communication tool in business, 
providing not only a medium for short correspondence but also for sending 
documents, invoices, etc., it has become a security threat given that sensitive 
information can be leaked from a company.
5.5.4 AIS security controls
There is no one security solution that is suitable for all companies (Tsohou et al. 
2006). Security controls are increasingly complex and must be tailored to the business 
(Jones 2003). Interviewee A indicated that, most recently, his company reviewed the 
policy of using USB sticks, implemented more audit controls for call recording, 
detection controls, and controls for monitoring the internet activities and for checking 
system access. He remarked:
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“The most recent security control is the review of our USB controls to make it more 
manageable. We have audit controls in place for call recording. Information on a telephone 
call is very important e.g. customer information, so we put controls in place to check who is 
listening to which call. We put some additional detection controls in place. We are revising 
our internet activity reporting tools. We are monitoring the internet activities, checking e- 
mails in and out, internet browsing, computer system usage, and system access. We are not 
checking all e-mails, we do samples. If there is a problem, we send it to managers. We must 
not only write the policy, but we must enforce it".
This opinion indicates that most security controls implemented within the company 
attempt to avoid or reduce employees’ errors or their malicious activities. This is not 
surprising given that 70 percent of this company’s risks are internal and the people or 
employees are its most common source of security threats. Green (2003) argued that 
company security starts with its own staff given that employees are the company’s 
first line of defence. Interviewee A also stated that his company implemented 
additional controls for monitoring internet activities. This is consistent with the 
Global Security Survey (DTT 2007) in which 76 percent of financial institutions 
monitor employee use of the internet and IS for unauthorised or inappropriate access. 
Steele and Wargo (2007) also stated that a sophisticated monitoring tool could protect 
the company from employee error, laziness, or malicious actions. According to the 
BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), an acceptable internet 
usage policy is almost a prerequisite to the implementation of other controls to 
prevent or detect staff misuse of the internet.
Interviewee A also reported that his company had reviewed the usage policy of USBs. 
Steele and Wargo (2007) argued that although employees enjoy a wealth of 
technology enabling remote connectivity with powerful processing and enormous 
storage capabilities such as laptops and USBs, this technology has increased 
productivity, but by extending the mobile edge of a company, new security risks arise. 
It is, therefore, important to determine exactly who is authorised to use these devices, 
what specific devices are acceptable, and how these devices are used.
In addition, he believed that there is no sizable gap between security threats and 
controls within his company; however, people are always looking for better systems. 
He expressed his opinion as follows:
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“Constantly, we review security controls and vulnerabilities. There is no sizable gap, but 
we always want to be better. People are always thinking o f better systems, so we have to 
look at every new system, evaluate it and, if  necessary, we buy it in the following year. We 
have an active security department, and I think some companies do not have that sort of 
concern about information security. We take ours very seriously. We like to see that 
controls we have in place are adequate and constantly reassessed. We are constantly 
looking to find those gaps. In our risk assessment process, we record all risks in all areas, 
and report them quarterly to the risk management committee, but we should always think of 
better systems. New systems are coming in all the time and we are constantly appraising 
what is available, what is not available, and if  there is any perceived benefit from it ”.
He believed that it is important to have a security control to protect confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information altogether. He stated:
“The main aim o f information security is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability o f information. If yo u ’ve got any control that cannot cover at least one of them, 
you are not doing the right thing. We constantly show an increase in security for those 
three, all o f them are important together. We have some controls which cover one or two of 
them; we need a control to cover them all”.
This opinion is consistent with Wiant (2005) who stated that UK companies regard 
information as the lifeblood of business and therefore they are increasingly reliant on 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of their data. A study undertaken by Rainer 
et al. (2007) also showed that both business management and security professionals 
agreed on the importance of systems that provide information confidentiality, 
availability and integrity.
In addition, the company is planning to implement new physical access controls on 
the computer room e.g. biometrics and new internet reporting system over the next 
year. He commented:
“New physical controls for our computer room will be used. We have already controls to 
prevent people from going, in. No one can enter the computer room, even IT people, not all 
of them can enter this room, just who needs to, like the one who takes back-up tapes and 
puts new ones. In the past, we used ID cards. We have a new system coming in this year, 
which is biometric technique (fingerprint). I am investing in a new internet reporting system 
as well. I would like also to increase my general security to give me assurance o f my 
people’s activities. We allow our people to use the internet in work, but they cannot use 
commercial games, gambling sites, eBay, etc. We need to identify which sites they tried to 
go through and they are blocked. I can get reports on that and then give the feedback to the
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management team. We want an assurance that employees are not wasting their time. There 
are now few sites which they can go through to. There is software to check internet activity.
We’ve got one which is not great, so we are getting a quicker one
The interviewee’s opinion regarding biometric technique is consistent with 
questionnaire findings (Table 4.102 in Chapter 4) where six companies stated that 
they are planning to use biometrics in the next year, in which two of these companies 
were from the insurance & financial services sector. Biometrics is an emerging 
technology that has the potential to improve the effectiveness of internal controls by 
strengthening access control to assets and IS, improving reliability of financial data 
and ensuring greater compliance with regulations (Amoruso et al. 2005). Joyce (2008) 
argued that although biometrics is still not widely used, this technology is typically 
found in large organisations where the security need is high such as financial services, 
and government agencies. Moreover, their plan to invest in a new internet reporting 
system emphasised again that the people are their most common source of security 
threat. This opinion is consistent with the interviewee’s opinion in which he believed 
that 70 percent of his company’s risks are internal, and people are always the weakest 
link in security given that they fail to follow procedures.
Moreover, interviewee A believed that his company is a technology-laden company, 
and therefore it is hard to find a technology that is not used. He presented the security 
controls used in his company as follows:
“We probably use quite a range o f different controls. We have an internet presence, so we 
have many controls protecting our networks. We are a very complex environment; there are 
many controls in place. We have encryption; we always give people access to only what 
they need for their job. All those controls are in place to minimise risks o f  losing data and 
getting ourselves in trouble. We have firewalls, penetration testing, etc. It is hard to find a 
control we don’t use. This does not mean that we are not looking at what is around us. I am 
constantly reading information security literature to identify any new technologies and 
informing managers about any new control. We are a very technology-laden company. I 
really cannot think about any mainstream technology we are not taking advantage of. We 
are already employing the relevant technology for us. We have everything we need”.
This opinion supported the questionnaire findings, which indicated that insurance & 
financial services companies that responded are more concerned about information 
security than the other sectors, and therefore they have all the relevant controls in
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place. According to the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007), financial institutions are 
particularly vulnerable given the nature of information they hold. Consequently, as 
they race to meet customers’ expectations and to survive in today’s business 
environment, it is crucial that security controls keep pace.
Finally, interviewee A believed that the security level within his company would 
improve; however, there is no ‘Zero Risk’. He expressed his opinion as follows:
“I think it will be better. New risks will emerge and new controls will come in place. 
Security is one o f the largest areas for the IT right now. I think we will progress. I don 7 
know what will be the main areas o f spending, but I think our security will improve. There 
is nothing called ‘Zero Risk’. We can always be exposed to more and different risks and our 
job is to identify and control them before they become a problem
To conclude, this insurance company has a structured process for maintaining their 
AIS security. However, there is no separate budget specifically for AIS security, 
management does not know exactly what the British Standard BS 7799 is, and they 
are not certified and have no plans of certification under ISO 27001. The protection of 
the company’s database, credit card information and identity theft are their most 
serious security threats. Their most common source of security threats is the people 
given that 70 percent of their risks are internal, whereas only 30 percent of risks are 
external. Most recently, the company reviewed the policy of using USB sticks, 
implemented more audit controls for call recording, detection controls, and controls 
for monitoring the internet activities and for checking system access. In addition, they 
are planning to implement new physical access controls on the computer room e.g. 
biometrics and new internet reporting system over the next year. Interviewee A 
believed that his company is a technology-laden company, and therefore it is hard to 
find a technology that is not used.
5.6 Interview 2
5.6.1 General information
The second interview was conducted in a media company located in London. The 
company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London 
Stock Exchange and there were approximately 4000 employees working in it. Table
5.3 showed that the company did not have specific information security department,
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but there was a solutions management department within the IT department, 
particularly for the technical part of security. On the other hand, interviewee B was a 
technology risk manager, who had seven years of experience in his current position. 
The interviewee had no professional security qualification; however, he was a 
member of the Institute of Risk Management6. Interviewee B believed that it would 
take him too much time to get the CISSP certification.
5.6.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding the management framework of AIS security within the company.
AIS security policy: Interviewee B confirmed that they had a formal written security 
policy, which was produced by the corporate risk assurance department, and was 
updated every two years.
Regarding the distribution of the security policy, he indicated that in their induction, 
new employees were given information about security, and what was necessary for 
their jobs. In addition, the security policy should be on the central intranet, but at the 
same time, the business unit managers can distribute it as required. He pointed out:
“The risk assurance department distribute the policy to the managing directors in each 
area, who push it down to the business units. The business units ’ managers distribute the 
security policy to their employees, and then go through it with them. It should be on the 
central intranet, but it depends on each manager to distribute it according to the needs ”.
He believed that staff training and awareness are the most important elements of the 
security policy, as it is not sufficient to write a policy, it is most important to educate 
people about what they should and should not do. He also stated that as a security test 
takes a lot of time and money, his company checks employees’ compliance with the 
policy through auditing. He expressed the following opinion:
“Employees have security training, but we will not force them to take an exam, it will cost a 
lot o f time and money. We tailored training for employees according to their needs, and 
when we do the audit, we understand whether the people are enacting the policy ”.
6 The Institute of Risk Management is a risk management’s leading international professional education 
and training body. It is a not-for profit organisation owned and governed by its members, who are all 
practising risk professionals.
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Moreover, he believed that, from a technical point of view, the company’s security 
policy works well; however, it is not effective from the employees’ side. He presented 
his opinion in the following quotation:
“From a technical point o f view, it is very effective because we introduce the technology 
that enables people to work; we do not introduce something so secure, they cannot work. In 
that way, it is very effective. However, from the employees’ side, we recognised the 
importance o f increased awareness. We need to focus on information security training and 
to make sure it is relevant as well".
Security training and awareness program: Whitman (2003) argued that the 
implementation of a security training and awareness program is a fundamental part of a 
company’s security function. Interviewee B stated that for the moment, there is no 
formal training and awareness program for all employees; however, if employees need 
any specific training, their managers can arrange it for them, it is provided online, and 
then they are scored.
On the other hand, he believed that the security awareness level in his company is very 
good or quite high, although his company has no formal security training and awareness 
program. He presented the following opinion:
“Security awareness level is quite high, given what is happening recently in some 
companies e.g. loss o f customers ’ data, etc. People now are more aware; they know what 
they should do, and what they should not do. Although there is no formal training and 
awareness program, their awareness is quite high
Risk assessment: Once a company has the ability to measure its security risks, it has 
the power to identify and implement appropriate controls based on its real business 
needs (Kleinfeld 2006). Interviewee B believed that his company is undertaking 
security risk assessment on a monthly basis; however, this risk assessment is 
undertaken for the whole company and not just for AIS security. He stated:
“We have a risk assessment program. We ensure that any system including accounting 
conforms to the regulations that are appropriate for the system. There is nothing specific 
for accounting or AIS. Basic security can be applied to all systems ” .
He believed that although the overall risk level in his company is low to medium, some 
risks would change with time. He commented:
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“We predict some risks; we choose to live with predictable risks. The overall risk level is 
low to medium. It is in the low area. However, some risks will change because of the 
circumstances and because o f our awareness. The awareness level o f some areas will 
change with time. As a general comment: our overall risk level is very predictable
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee B 
claimed that his company had not experienced any incidents in the last two years. 
However, he believed that not working according to the PCI DSS7 (Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard) was the worst security incident that could happen, 
which could have a huge impact on his company.
Williams (1995) has argued that any type or size of security breach could become 
disruptive and expensive, so it must make better business sense to take a preventive 
approach and to try to deal with such a breach as soon as possible. The sooner action 
is taken; the cheaper it will be for the company in the long run. Interviewee B 
believed that in responding to any incident, risks have to be assessed first, and then 
mitigated; however, there is no regulatory body to which the incident can be reported. 
The incidents are reported to the security technicians, who then report them to their 
line manager, and send a report to the CIO. Then the CIO sends a report to the 
managing director of the company. He commented:
“We would assess the risks o f the incident. Then, we will decide on how we can mitigate the 
risks and take steps to mitigate it. For example, some of the employees carry personal data 
on their laptops, so we will give them direct training on how to protect the data and keep 
them secure. We assess the risks and act accordingly, but we did not have a regulatory 
body to report to. Even if  there is a significant security incident, we are not going to report 
it. It is not necessary”.
This opinion suggests that the company considers employee training as an important 
action after security incidents. This is consistent with the BERR Information Security 
Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that companies in the media & 
entertainment sector are more likely to invest in additional staff training after 
incidents.
7 PSI DSS is a security standard, which applies to merchants, payment service providers, as well as 
banks, and requires concerned entities to implement more than 220 technical, procedural and skills 
transfer controls. These are grouped into 12 high-level requirements ranging from implementing 
security policies to providing employees with security training and collecting audit logs for specific 
system components (Gorge 2008).
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Interviewee B also stated that his company has a formal business continuity plan, 
which was established by the disaster recovery committee. He pointed out:
“The disaster recovery committee is responsible for establishing this plan. They are 
constantly updating the plan to reflect new events and new changes. This committee meet 
once a month and are constantly aware of the system requirements, and change this plan 
according to these requirements. It is not something we produce and put in the cupboard”.
Moreover, he believed that his company’s effectiveness in detecting and responding 
to security incidents is high. He commented:
“From insiders, we may be quite aware of every incident. We cannot go on policing the 
employees or bring them any harm. From the outside, we have a proxy service managed by 
an outside company, which constantly protects the environment from outside threats. So the 
company’s effectiveness in detecting and responding to security threats is high ”.
Security budget: Interviewee B believed that his company does not have a separate 
security budget; however, there is a security budget with each new system, in addition 
to the ongoing operational requirements for security. He expressed the following 
opinion:
“Each new system has a budget, so we have an information security budget within each 
new system for its security and for its compliance with the standards. We also have ongoing 
operational requirements for security and we have to budget it. However, we don ’t have a 
separate security budget. Any budget for handling operational requirements is to be held 
under the solutions management area”.
In addition, he claimed that security spending is based either on employees’ 
requirements or on the standards or regulations, whatever is higher, and the board of 
directors approves it. He commented:
“It is approved by the board o f directors. We budget the information security in two ways, 
based on our employees requirements and on the relevant regulations that we apply. If we 
have regulations or standards, and we want to meet these standards, and if  they exceed the 
employees ’ requirements, the standards will be out o f budget. I f  employees want more than 
standards, then we make the budget according to their requirements. So it is based on 
employees' requirements or the standards; whatever is the higher ”.
However, he cannot predict next year’s budget. He stated:
“We spend according to our needs. From the technical side, we do whatever we want. I 
cannot decide that is enough or not. We can work with a new set o f requirements, and then
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in order to satisfy the requirements, we need to spend much money; we cannot dictate our 
usage or what should be spent. We can have a high spend one year and low spend in the 
next year. There is no typical spend. We have operational requirements, so we cannot know 
exactly how much we spend year after year. For the ongoing operational requirements it is 
reasonable, we do not need anymore. It satisfies all the requirements. However, the budget 
for the next year is unexpected”.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee B believed that the overall 
awareness level of his company’s managers and employees regarding the British 
Standard BS 7799 is high among IT people, whereas it is very low within the business 
unit. He justified this low level of awareness as follows:
“ Within the IT area, the awareness level is very high, while within the business unit, it is 
very low. It could be because it is not promoted as a business level standard, it is promoted 
as an IT standard. If it is promoted as a business level standard, I think the awareness level 
will be greater ”.
He stated that it is not necessary for his company to be certified under ISO 27001; 
however, he emphasised the importance of being compliant with the standard. He 
believed that compliance could provide the company with sound information security. 
He stated:
“Yes absolutely, I think compliance gives us sound information security, but certification 
no. We comply and that should be enough ”.
This opinion supported Trcek (2003) who argued that many companies go only for 
compliance, without certification.
AIS security effectiveness: There is a strong argument that security must be tested in 
order to ensure that it actually works as expected (Fumell and Papadaki 2008). 
Interviewee B cited the use of audit in addition to the risk assessment for measuring 
security effectiveness. He presented his opinion as follows:
“Yes, from a technology point o f view, effectiveness is measured through the risk 
assessment that we perform against the standards. From the users or employees point of 
view, the measurement is done through the audit”.
He also reported employees’ awareness as the most important success indicator of 
security management within his company. He remarked:
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“The most important success indicator is the employees’ awareness, not ‘zero incidents’, 
because there may be some incidents, that the employees are not aware of. There is no 
absolute security fo r  any company. I am sure that people are always doing something they 
are not aware o f ’.
5.6.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee B indicated that people are his company’s most serious threat given that 
in some instances they unintentionally or intentionally bypass the system. He stated:
“People or employees are the most serious threat. Someone is doing something without 
thinking, someone is deliberately bypassing the system, or someone is writing down 
something when he should not write it down ”.
He also believed that the biggest and most frequent threat is the people misusing the 
systems. He commented:
“People are the most serious and most frequent threat facing the company’s systems. I am 
not saying that they do it; I am saying that the biggest threat is misusing the system. It is not 
something external trying to get into the system. We have to be sure that we teach people 
how to use the system properly and I think it is the biggest threat ”.
Mouratidis et al. (2008) pointed out that the human user was the single greatest threat 
to the stability and security of a system. However, this threat is not always malicious. 
Most often, users who were uninformed of how a system operates could create 
negative outcomes just from a failure to adhere to policy or to follow procedures.
In addition, interviewee B stated that his company would be concerned about 
employees’ security training and awareness in the next year given that employees’ 
awareness could mitigate security risks. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) indicated that 
since human error rather than flawed technology is the root cause of most security 
breaches, the solution would be to create a security aware culture.
5.6.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee B cited the vulnerability testing as the most recent security control 
employed in his company. Nyanchama (2005) indicated that vulnerability 
management is concerned with minimising risks associated with vulnerabilities. 
Companies without sound vulnerability management processes risk both direct and 
indirect losses in productivity, service outage, and reputation, among others.
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Interviewee B believed that according to the risk assessment, the risk level within his 
company is low to medium, and they are using all security controls relevant to their 
businesses; consequently, there is no huge gap between security threats and controls 
and there is no need at the moment for new controls. However, he stated that they are 
planning to employ remote access controls on their network. He commented:
“Access to our network from outside is the most important control we are looking for. 
Employees have access from their homes and from remote offices that are actually on the 
network. This is a very important control and we are planning to employ it in the next two 
years, because we have companies abroad that need to have access to the system. They 
need to be sure that we are secure; they need to use the network securely and get into the 
system. So, access controls are something very important for the next two years
According to the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), 
enabling remote access opens up the core network to unauthorised users. Ewing et al. 
(2007) also argued that security is the number one reservation employers have about 
enabling remote access. Consequently, secure remote access has become an essential 
business requirement.
Finally, interviewee B believed that the security level within his company would 
improve given that new access controls to systems would be employed by the next 
year.
To conclude, this media company has a framework for managing their AIS security. 
However, for the moment, there is no formal training and awareness program for all 
employees, the company does not have a separate security budget; however, there is a 
security budget with each new system, in addition to the ongoing operational 
requirements for security. The overall awareness level of the company’s managers 
and employees regarding the British Standard BS 7799 is high among IT people, 
whereas it is very low within the business unit, and it is not necessary to be certified 
under ISO 27001. The biggest and most frequent threat is the people misusing the 
systems. The company would be concerned about employees’ security training and 
awareness in the next year given that employees’ awareness could mitigate security 
risks. In addition, the vulnerability testing is the most recent security control 
employed, and they are planning to employ remote access controls on their network.
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5.7 Interview 3
5.7.1 General information
The third interview was conducted in a property (real estate) company located in 
London. The company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in 
the London Stock Exchange and it had approximately 12000 employees worldwide. 
There were two departments in the company, one for the security of IT and for 
anything to do with computing i.e. technical issues, and the other was the risk 
management department. This department took a much broader view of security, 
particularly in undertaking security risk assessment for anything that might have an 
impact on the company, not just the technology risks. On the other hand, interviewee 
C was a group IT director, who had 11 years of experience in his current position, and 
he was one of the board of directors of the company.
5.7.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding the management framework of AIS security within his company.
AIS security policy: Interviewee C confirmed that they had a written security policy, 
which had been created nearly 10 years ago and was changing all the time or as 
required. In addition, he cited the user responsibility or accountability - employees 
and outsiders - as the most important element of their security policy.
Hinde (1998) indicated that it does not matter how brilliant a policy is, without the 
active commitment of employees and management it will fail. Interviewee C indicated 
that most of his company’s applications and software could audit and check whether 
processes are done correctly.
However, he believed that the security policy in his company is not effective since 
people are always breaking the rules. He expressed the following opinion:
“The policy contains rules, but most o f the people break the rules every day. Our policy is 
not effective. We make employees aware o f the policy but we cannot spend a lot o f time and 
money checking whether people comply with it”.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee C reported the non­
existence of a formal security training and awareness program within his company;
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however, he believed that employees receive the relevant training for getting their 
work done. He also claimed that he had received security training in other companies 
more than 11 years ago. 
Interestingly, despite the wide agreement regarding online security training and 
awareness, interviewee C indicated that sometimes the employees complain that there is 
no time even for online training, given that they have many training courses covering 
different security issues. He stated:
“With computer-based training, we can know whether people have been online, and 
whether they have done it. We can put a questionnaire into it, and we can put an exam at 
the end. But you have to understand that people will always say ‘do you want me to bring 
some money for the company or to sit there, filling some forms, reading all this stuff. And 
our answer is always ‘really ’ to go out and earn some money for the company”.
He believed that even if companies send brochures to all employees, there is no 
guarantee that they read them. He commented:
“We can send out a very nice brochure with useful information, but we cannot guarantee 
people will read it. We get a small percentage who always read it, we get a small 
percentage who will never read it, and we get some in the middle, sometimes they read it, 
and sometimes they do not”.
He also believed that employees in his company did understand the need for security; 
however, they had acquired this awareness from their personal experience. He 
commented:
“They have a reasonable grasp, not that much from the company, but from personal 
experience at home from their own computers. Being hit by viruses and phishing attacks 
and losing much information, this makes them more aware and they became much more 
careful about what they are doing. They buy anti-virus software; they learn it through 
personal experience and apply it to work. They say: now we understand why we have to 
change our passwords, why we have an anti-virus system, and why we block some websites 
so they cannot go through. This is something that will live with them for life, but if  we give 
them these things in training, they will forget everything about it”.
Risk assessment: Interviewee C believed that risk assessment is undertaken for the 
whole company and not just for AIS security. He commented:
“Risk assessment is not focusing on IS or AIS, but on anything that affect the company and 
its customers
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He stated that a formal risk assessment is done within his company once a year; 
however, he believed that risk assessment is a running process undertaken throughout 
the year. He commented:
“It is formally done once a year, but there is a review process, because if  we recognise a 
risk, we have to put actions in place to do something about it, or we have to make a 
judgement that says this risk is so small that we cannot do anything about it. The process is 
running. Once risks are listed, we must have an action plan. This is an ongoing process 
driven by internal team that moves on through the whole year until the whole thing is run 
again in the following year. Formally, it is done once a year, but actually it is ongoing”.
He also indicated that risk assessment is delivered through the risk management team 
within his company with the help of third parties such as external auditors, experts, 
and consultants. They tend to look at a scale ranging from red to green. He explained 
the risk assessment process as follows:
“Risk assessment is a part o f the external audit process and is delivered through our risk 
management team. It looks at the risks that were recognised last year, what the action plan 
was to address them, what the result was after the plan, and then the whole process will be 
repeated. We will take this year’s risks; see what we are going to do about them. Many 
risks tend to revolve around processes more than technology. These days we have back-ups, 
we put data on tapes, send it to other sites, we have disaster recovery plans, so it tends to 
be much more related to issues that damage the company, its brand, its reputation, leakage 
of information, etc. We tend to look at a certain scale ranging from red to amber to green, 
where red are things that are really serious, and green is ok. At the moment, all the risks of 
our information systems are green or amber ”.
Interviewee C believed that although the risk level in his company is quite low, some 
risks would change with time. He pointed out:
“We have not had any specific security failures in the last 12 years. O f course, something 
can happen tomorrow. Now I am confident that the rules are appropriate. I don't think I 
can overdo security, unless there is enough money or if  it is really worth it. However, 
somebody can always find a way o f breaking in and doing something. For example, there is 
an incentive to damage a bank because there is a chance to steal a large amount o f money, 
or to do significant damage to the reputation. But in a company like ours, if  you break into 
our accounting systems, there are no millions there, so people do not tend to attack our 
company or come to us to steal money. That does not mean we should take security easy, it 
means we are not the highest risk type o f company. Now, all risks o f our IS are green or 
amber, so they are ok. We have to accept that somebody might break into our network, we 
spend a lot o f money on protecting systems, but it is still possible, so it cannot be green, but
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it is not red. We do have protection here, and it is adequate, but there is no guarantee all 
the time that it will be green. It is an acceptable level o f risk”.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee C 
claimed that his company had not experienced any incidents in the last two years; 
however, he thought the loss or leakage of client data would be the worst incident that 
could damage his company’s brand. He presented the following opinion:
‘‘The loss or leakage o f  client data will be very embarrassing, the worst if  it goes out to 
somebody that is not supposed to have it, either intentionally or by mistake. The leakage of 
client data is the biggest fear, not like the loss o f financial information, but very 
specifically, the client information that we hold in trust for people, so we have to be careful.
That could be the absolute worst incident that could happen to us, because it could damage 
our brand, then customers will not do business with us, and we will never recover ”.
He stated that the HR department is responsible for the security incident handling 
procedures within his company. He commented:
‘‘They are part o f the HR department. It is a part o f the disciplinary procedures, which 
collect information on incidents, the behaviour of persons involved, how they comply with 
our general behaviour requirements o f employees. It is handled by a senior manager who 
goes through that to decide whether we have done something inappropriate, and if 
necessary we bring a lawyer or the police, depending exactly on the nature o f the incident”.
Moreover, he believed that after a security incident, they collect data, take actions 
based on these data, learn from incidents, and they can change their procedures and 
policy to avoid the incident happening again. He stated:
“We collect data, then we take actions based on the information we collected. If  
information goes to the public about clients, we will have to work with them to see how we 
could address the situation. It will take steps to either discipline or possibly involve the 
police if the rules are broken intentionally. We may have to take steps to protect our image, 
so we tend to redevelop our procedures and change the policy if  there was an error. We 
have to learn from it, and hopefully, we can avoid it in the future ”.
However, they do not have regulatory bodies or outside authorities to whom they can 
report security incidents. Interviewee C believed that it is more important to maintain 
their brand than the financial loss of any security incident, and therefore, if they are 
able to cover the incident internally, they do not report to the police. He expressed his 
opinion as follows:
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“If somebody is breaking the law and gives information when he should not, you find most 
companies will not report it to the police because they want to protect their brand image.
So, the answer is ‘yes o f course we would report’, but in reality I doubt we actually would.
If we could cover the situation, if it had not damaged a client, if we could cover the money, 
we could get rid o f the employee and we would not take him to court. Our brand is more 
important than money, and more important than taking an employee to court, and the time 
and effort to do it is painful. We would hope we only employ honest people, but who can 
tell?
He also believed that there are individual business continuity plans for each location 
and a national plan for the whole company and there is a specific director responsible 
for this plan. He stated:
“We have a specialist director responsible for business continuity, because it is not just 
about IT and getting the IT back. In terms o f business continuity, you might lose a building, 
it is about what you do with staff, how you handle communications to the press, how you get 
in touch with relatives, etc. There is a director responsible for that, there are individual 
plans for each location, and there is a national plan. That is something that has become 
very important over the last 4 years. Many o f our clients that deal with us on an ongoing 
basis want to see this plan before signing up to a contract. It can be because terrorist 
activities have been raised in people’s minds, so buildings can be damaged. Now rather 
than just saying 'we know you are a good company’, they asked ‘What would happen if 
there are problems? How could you cope? Who would take over? Who are the other people 
if we lost the team?, etc. ’. Our clients are much more demanding about our processes and 
procedures, particularly in relation to a business continuity plan ”.
On the other hand, he believed that, despite being adequate in detecting and responding 
to security incidents, there is no guarantee that nothing can happen tomorrow. He 
commented:
“We consider it adequate, but nobody can be 100 percent perfect. I cannot say everything is 
good, anything can happen tomorrow. If something happens tomorrow, we could say that it 
is completely inadequate. Now, I can say that everything is all right”.
Security budget: Interviewee C believed that the budget within his company includes
three major elements: the strategic element, maintenance, and technical
enhancements. He pointed out:
“We have strategic goals for the business. We have a strategic business plan. We get some 
IT budget driven out o f the business plan. We get budget allocation to update all our 
products. In security terms, if  we get firewalls today, we decide that we need a new version
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of it; we get some sort o f maintenance. There are different elements: it is the strategic 
decision, maintenance, and the enhancements, which are related to specific applications or 
additional functions. We also need to find how the company is changing and to add to the 
budget. Now we have broadband everywhere, all users get access to the applications. We 
must have bigger network links, faster firewalls to cope with more traffic, etc. So the budget 
includes three major parts: strategic part, maintenance, and technical enhancements ”.
He stated that disaster recovery and continuity planning take a big part of the 
company’s security budget, in addition to the anti-virus, anti-phishing, anti-spam 
software, and the firewalls. However, he believed that his company’s overall security 
spending level is not enough and the budget needs to increase. Interviewee C justified 
the low level of security spending by the lack of understanding at the executive level. 
He commented:
“In truth it is less than we would like, and the problem here is the lack o f understanding at 
the executive level, they haven’t got an example o f what happens if  it goes wrong, if  there is 
a major security incident. Because we have done it recently well and we haven’t had a 
problem for years; they say: why do we need to spend all this money on new firewalls? The 
old ones are still working. It is difficult to convince them with a good justification ”.
On the other hand, he claimed that the security budget would be a bit higher next year. 
He believed that the budget is expected to increase by nearly 15 percent given that the 
company is bigger than last year.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee C believed that there is no idea at 
all within his company about the British Standard BS 7799. He commented:
“The business has no understanding o f what is BS 7799 at all anywhere within the 
company. They have no understanding o f it and there is no interest in i t”.
He also believed that there is no benefit from being certified under ISO 27001. He 
stated:
“Will it bring the company more money or more clients? For the moment, there is no 
recognised benefit to the business in being certified. It will cost time and money to do it.
There is nothing driving us. We just see it as a cost, not a benefit. It is not necessary. In the 
commercial world, it is not about benefits, it is about balancing what is my return on 
investment, and the time, money and resources spent. So, what will I get back?
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He claimed that there are no benefits for his company from compliance with the 
standard, given that it costs too much time and effort, and the clients do not require it. 
He provided an example of complying with the ISO 9001, to justify his opinion:
“Years ago we spent a lot o f money complying with the quality standard ISO 9001. We 
spent a lot o f money getting all our departments ISO 9001 compliant, we had external 
auditors and evidence with huge filing systems were set up, and we got it. For a little while, 
there is a business benefit. At the bottom of our letterhead, we could put ‘ISO Compliant’, 
then everybody got it and it did not make any difference anymore. For the moment, clients 
are not asking us whether we are doing anything with the BS 7799, so there is no 
recognised benefit in being compliant. It will cost time and money to do i t”.
AIS security effectiveness: According to Wright (2006), measuring security 
effectiveness eases the process of monitoring the effectiveness of a security 
management system, and provides tangible evidence to auditors and assurances to 
management that the company is in control. Interviewee C stated that his company 
brings specialist teams who do penetration testing and try to break in to evaluate 
security effectiveness. In addition, he believed that the non-occurrence of security 
incidents is the most important success indicator of security management within his 
company.
5.7.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee C cited the loss of client information as his company’s most serious 
threat, and attributed this loss to the misbehaviour of employees. He commented:
“It comes back to the people, and specifically it is the loss o f clients ’ information which 
leads to brand damage. With the best security systems in place, you still have got the issue 
that users can look at the information, can make a copy o f it, can e-mail it, and can also 
take a screen copy, and that’s what a lot of people do. They know that they can get another 
job, they can accept the job, and they can spend sometime copying all the stuff they want, 
take them home, then put in a resignation, you cannot really stop that”.
This opinion is consistent with Lin (2006) who indicated that there would always be 
some risk that authorised employees will misuse data they have access to in the course 
of their work. Gerard et al.' (2004) also stated that a dishonest employee could steal 
vast amounts of a company’s information and move on to a new company, before the 
theft is discovered. In addition, Mattsson (2007) argued that many abuses and
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accidents occur because people have access to data that they do not need to see, or do 
need to see but should not be able to alter or delete.
Interviewee C believed that people are the most common source of security threats 
facing his company and that employees are his company’s biggest threat over the next 
few years.
5.7.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee C indicated that, most recently, his company had improved the firewalls. 
However, he believed that his company’s security controls are enough, and therefore, 
no gaps exist between security threats and security controls used; consequently, there 
is no need for new controls. On the other hand, he believed that it is better to bring 
new versions of all security controls implemented in his company. He commented: 
“There is nothing I could think we are not using. Just, the qualities o f the products or 
controls we are using are o f lesser standard than the products banks and other financial 
institutions are putting in
To conclude, this property company has a framework for managing their AIS security. 
However, there is no formal security training and awareness program within the 
company, and employees receive the relevant training for getting their work done. 
The risk assessment is undertaken for the whole company and not just for AIS 
security. There is no idea at all within the company about the British Standard BS 
7799, and they believed that there is no benefit from being certified under ISO 27001. 
The loss of client information is the company’s most serious threat, and people are the 
most common source of threats. Most recently, the company had improved the 
firewalls. They believed that there is no need for new controls; however, it is better to 
bring new versions of all security controls implemented in the company.
5.8 Interview 4
5.8.1 General information
The fourth interview was conducted in a property (real estate) company located in 
London. The company was established more than 20 years ago. The company was 
registered in the London Stock Exchange, and there were approximately 24 
employees working in it; however, the company’s turnover was more than £300
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million. There was no security department or team within the company, given that it 
had only 24 employees. On the other hand, interviewee D was a group accountant 
(looking after IT), who has 15 years of experience in his current position.
5.8.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 o f the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding his company’s management framework of AIS security.
AIS security policy: Interviewee D believed that there is no written security policy 
within his company. He provided a justification for the non-existence of a policy in 
the following quotation:
“We have a security policy, but it is not an official document and it is not written down. 
Since there is small number o f persons in the company, we discuss security informally all 
the time. There is no need of a formal document”.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee D indicated that his 
company provides training for new employees on a one-to-one basis, and then they 
can interact with other people in the company. He also believed that employees could 
get additional training if a major change to the system takes place. However, he stated 
that his company is not measuring or monitoring employees’ security awareness.
Risk assessment: Interviewee C believed that his company is undertaking security 
risk assessment at least once a year with the help of third parties such as external 
auditors, experts, consultants, and assessors, and they are assessing their risks using a 
specific agenda, which he identified as follows:
“We have an agenda. We would have the last year assessment to see where we are in this 
year, where we are from the last year, what is new in this risk assessment, what are the new 
challenges, etc. It is a part of a wider business continuity plan ”.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee D 
believed that his company had experienced some minor security incidents in which 
loss of data was one of them, and they contained them very quickly and effectively. 
He commented:
“There are no significant incidents. Obviously, they are minor ones. We had an incident 
where data had been lost, but we were able to recover quickly and prevent it from becoming
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a bigger incident. Obviously, we have incidents, but because they are contained quickly, 
they do not develop into major incidents ”.
He cited some serious incidents that could have a significant effect on his company 
including loss or corruption of data, accidental damage to IS and disgruntled 
employees. He stated:
“The thing that we can think o f it is the disgruntled employees, or the corruption o f data.
We are quite a small team, and if  an employee was unhappy, for any reason, we either solve 
the problem or force him to leave. So we could take action before the incident can cause 
damage, and we are proactive in this respect”.
He believed that although his company has some procedures to handle any security 
incidents they could face, they are not formal ones. However, there is a business 
continuity plan within the company, which he believed is formally reviewed once a 
year and is informally reviewed all the time. He also emphasised the importance of 
this business continuity plan and presented the following opinion:
“A business continuity plan is very important to us. We need to make sure if  there is an 
incident, we can recover and continue with our business very quickly, not only here, but in 
other parts o f our business which may be outsourced. For example, the internet connection 
is outsourced, so we have to make sure that it can recover quickly if  there is an incident. So 
we have a written business continuity plan ".
Security budget: Interviewee D believed that his company does not have a separate 
security budget; however, it is just a percentage of the IT budget. He stated that they 
could not delegate security to anyone in the company; consequently, there is no 
specific budget for security. In addition, he claimed that security spending in his 
company is a need-driven not a budget-driven. If they need anything, then they can 
buy it regardless there is a budget for it or not. He also stated that if a small amount of 
money is needed, he could approve it; however, if it is large, the board of directors 
approves it. Moreover, he believed that physical access controls are the top areas of 
spending on security within his company. Consequently, he believed that the security 
spending level is moderate or adequate.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee D believed that there is no idea at 
all within his company about the British Standard BS 7799. In addition, despite 
believing that certification under ISO 27001 can maintain the company’s public
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image; he believed that the company has to spend a lot of time and money on 
documenting all procedures before being certified and consequently it is not necessary 
to be certified.
AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee D believed that they are not measuring or 
evaluating their AIS security effectiveness. However, he claimed that the non­
occurrence of security incidents is the most important success indicator of security 
management. He believed that the occurrence of major or even minor incidents 
indicates that there is a problem in their system. He pointed out:
“If there are no major incidents it is good. If there are even small or minor incidents, there 
is a problem. If there are any incidents, I would think there is a problem in our systems and 
in this case we have to review these systems ”.
On the other hand, he believed that the lack of support of senior management is their 
top obstacle of effective security. He commented:
“The big obstacle is that the staff want to bring in changes, but they are not able to get the 
board support. Without this support, they cannot implement the changes they need. Security 
issues are not being a top priority for the board; the board have other things to think about.
They do not give sufficient time to the problems they do not understand. These problems are 
more technical, so they tend not to take decisions on them. I think the ignorance o f the 
board o f directors is the obstacle because there is no one pushing for change”.
This opinion is consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey 
(BERR 2008) which indicated that in some cases, senior management might not 
understand the security issues their business is facing.
5.8.3 AIS security threats
Although the virus threat is no longer been identified as a key concern to the majority 
of companies, and the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) 
addressed the decline in the reported virus attacks, interviewee D cited a virus attack 
as his company’s most serious security threat. Lin (2006) argued that it is almost 
impossible to protect a network completely from virus attacks. On the other hand, 
interviewee D cited the theft or loss of customer data as his company’s most likely 
security threat over the next few years.
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5.8.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee D indicated that, most recently, his company had employed more controls 
over access to the building and to some of its parts i.e. physical access controls. He 
believed that his company’s security controls are enough; they were using all security 
controls relevant to their businesses and therefore, no gaps exist between security 
threats and security controls used. Consequently, there are no plans for any new 
security controls in the next year. He believed that too much security control could 
disrupt employees. He stated:
“We would not change anything substantially. We’ve got what we need, and I think too 
many controls will disrupt the work o f the group, so they cannot do their work efficiently. If 
there are too many controls, they will be seen as ‘controls just for the sake o f controls ’. We 
need the right amount o f controls to do our work and to run our business efficiently”.
This opinion is consistent with Rainer et al. (2007) who argued that excessively 
rigorous security controls could reduce employee productivity and could even 
decrease security. In addition, Post and Kagan (2007) argued that tightening security 
by making systems more inaccessible could hinder employees and make them less 
productive. This indicates that a security level would not necessarily improve merely 
by using more controls. Moreover, Hunt (2006) indicated that being an effective 
security manager is not merely a matter of buying another layer of technology; it is a 
matter of seeking value in finding better ways to use what you already have.
To conclude, this property (real estate) company has no framework for managing their 
AIS security. Given that there were approximately 24 employees working in it, there 
is no written security policy, there are no formal procedures to handle security 
incidents they could face, they could not delegate security to anyone in the company; 
consequently, there is no specific budget for security. There is no idea at all within the 
company about the British Standard BS 7799. The virus attacks are the company’s 
most serious security threat, and the theft or loss of customer data is the most likely 
security threat over the next few years. Most recently, the company had employed 
more controls over access to the building and to some of its parts i.e. physical access 
controls. However, the interviewee believed that too much security controls could 
disrupt employees.
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5.9 Interview 5
5.9.1 General information
The fifth interview was conducted in a utilities company located in Huntingdon. The 
company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London 
Stock Exchange and there were approximately 3500 employees in it. The company 
had a new security team, which was included in the IT department within the 
company and reported directly to the IT director. On the other hand, interviewee E 
was a security risk manager, who had 6-7 years of experience in her current position; 
however, she had a total of 14 years of experience in the company. She had the 
Information Systems Security Professionals qualification (ISSP), and the qualification 
obtained from the British Computer Society (BCS).
5.9.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding the management framework of AIS security within her company.
AIS security policy: Interviewee E confirmed that they had a small written security 
policy, which was established and reviewed by a team within her company. This team 
included the finance director, IT director, risk management committee, internal 
auditors, and the corporate risk manager. However, the finance director had to sign 
this security policy. She believed that her company had not updated the security 
policy for nearly five years; however, they aim to update it once a year. She 
emphasised the importance of updating the policy annually in the following opinion: 
“If we say we update the policy every year, it will be unfair because we didn’t do it for 5 
years, but our aim is to review the policy once a year and I think this will be a good 
discipline for us. It is better to make a simple review, just to think about what happened last 
year, find any difficulties, and any other improvements we could make in the policy. I think 
it is wise to do it once a year, even if  we are not going to change it, we are confirming we 
have reviewed it, because it helps to think about how the risks are changing”.
She stated that in their induction, employees were given either a hardcopy of the 
policy or the information security booklet. On the other hand, she emphasised the 
importance of monitoring employees to check their compliance with the security 
policy. She remarked:
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“We have campaigns and posters for using the e-mail and internet saying: ‘Use it but not 
abuse i t ’. They can use the internet for personal reasons, but they must not abuse it. We are 
monitoring this. We must tell people that we are monitoring them. If people come in and 
want to use the system, they get it briefed in a document called ‘10 Steps to IT Security ’. We 
do not want to depend heavily on saying ‘If you do this, this will happen to yo u ’. We are 
just trying to put a spot o f light on things ”.
This opinion is consistent with Wood (1997) who argued that if employees know 
management is not going to check upon them, there would be no motivation to comply.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee E claimed that every 
employee in her company - new and current - had security training. She believed that 
the classroom is the most effective technique for making staff aware of security issues; 
however, due to cost and time constraints, her company is providing employees with 
security awareness materials online. She also stated that although they measure and 
monitor staff awareness, the awareness level in her company is not high given the 
feedback of the security tests. She expressed the following opinion:
“Yes, we measure employees ’ awareness. It is a bit ad hoc. With the help o f the corporate 
communications, we made a little test, and we sent it to our employees to complete it. 
However, we found that people are not aware where to look at the policy. Some o f them had 
never read it; some o f them had read it but could not remember what was in it. We learned 
a lot from that, it helped us to get the next poster campaign
Risk assessment: Interviewee E confirmed that her company is undertaking security 
risk assessment on a continuous basis or as required. She presented her opinion as 
follows:
“We do series o f things during the year such as penetration tests, vulnerability tests, etc.
We also review projects, do business continuity exercise, taking-up tapes and try to install 
them. It is an as required process. It is also continuous with respect to those systems that 
have been established”.
They use a 5*5 matrix in assessing their risks. She illustrated this matrix in Figure 5.1 
and stated:
“We have got a number o f tools to help us. One o f the important tools is a 5*5 matrix.
There is 8 steps guide called ‘Personal Guide to Managing Risks ’. This guide helps people 
to think about impacts and probabilities. It is very generic. We use it to think about risks in 
terms o f probability and impacts. What does that really mean to us? Does it mean potential
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loss o f income or perhaps some illegal activities or perhaps we fail to comply, etc. We try to 
get people to think about how to manage risks and to know the processes
Almost
certain
Probable
Likelihood o f  „
Possibleimpact 
(frequency) Rare
Unlikely
(Source: A leaflet was given to the researcher during the interview)
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee E 
believed that her company experienced a serious security incident in the last two 
years, in which they had lost a whole day’s data. She considered it a serious problem, 
given that the company could not recover these data. This is not a surprising opinion, 
given that utilities companies are dealing with millions of customers; consequently, 
any downtime or any loss of customer data might be a disaster for such companies. In 
addition, she reported the occurrence of computer abuse, containing inappropriate 
material, which is not consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches 
Survey (BERR 2008) in which the companies least affected by staff misuse are the 
utilities companies. She also considered the failure to recover from a disaster, given 
the loss of records and back-up tapes, as a worst security incident.
However, interviewee E indicated that there is a difference between dealing with an 
IT incident and a security incident. She stated:
“We have formal procedures. It is quite different when you have an IT incident than when 
you have a security incident. I f  you get an outage, or ifpeople cannot work for some reason 
because there is an issue that will be dealt with very quickly, the help desk will respond to 
that very quickly. That is the service management. Security incident handling is slightly 
different. I f  you got the service down, and people cannot work, it is an incident, and if  it is 
particularly severe, we call it ‘category one ’, and we go down to ‘category 3 ’. In this case, 
somebody must look at that incident to make sure there is no contributed effect and nothing 
there caused that outage to do with security. Sometimes this outage was caused by an 
individual pressing the button and doing wrong thing at the wrong time, which is a security 
incident because somebody has too much access to the system without training. The rule 
here is that every major incident must be investigated to make sure it is not a security- 
related incident, and if  it is a security-related one, we must know why it happened”.
Figure 5.1 Risk assessment matrix
Highest risk 
level
Lowest risk 
level
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Business impact (consequence)
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On the other hand, she did not mention any authority to whom they can report security 
incidents; however, she indicated that it depends on the incident, whether to let the 
police get involved or not. She pointed out:
“If we identified any fraudulent activity, a decision would be made whether or not we 
prosecute. In the past, we had prosecuted somebody and he went to prison. If it is a low 
level fraud, we may not get the police involved. Getting the police involved is not 
automatically asked, we investigate, recommend, then we go to the HR ”.
This opinion, therefore, suggests that utilities companies are not obligated to report 
security incidents to specific authorities despite having different authorities such as 
the DWI (Drinking Water Inspectorate) and the EA (Environment Agency).
Moreover, interviewee E stated that after a security incident, they could amend 
practices and standards, but not the policies. She remarked:
“It depends on the severity o f the incident. If  w e’ve got a fraudulent activity, then we must 
document what we have got on the risk. I f  it is a high risk, we may choose to do or not to do 
anything about it. I f  it is a very low risk happening very often, it is not cost effective to do 
something about it. We could amend the practices and standards, not the policy. If w e’ve 
got a certain incident, we must investigate how this happened. We have an investigation 
and a report o f recommendations ”.
She emphasised the importance of having a business continuity plan and back-ups in 
place. She commented:
“Yes we have a business continuity plan. It is easy but quite comprehensive. It is 
important to document what the business continuity requirements are. We need to know 
day by day whether there are back-ups and to make sure that everything is backed-up ”.
She reported that this plan is a joint responsibility between the internal service 
manager within her company and an external service manager. However, although the 
business continuity plan is tested annually, it is not tested in full. She explained the 
process of testing the plan in the following quotation:
“We test the plan annually, but not in full. We have a comprehensive written plan. Every 
year around June we decide what we need to test. It is a formal testing; we take one or two 
back-up tapes and try to restore them, etc. Last year I asked the vulnerability testing people 
just to have a look at the plan and they highlighted some issues, then we update it. We find  
that systems change over time, hardware changes overtime, network configuration changes 
overtime. So a business continuity plan helps us to know what is important to do ”.
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According to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA 2005), as data, 
technologies, systems, and processes evolve; a company must continually update its 
business continuity plan to ensure that it remains current.
Security budget: Interestingly, interviewee E, who believed her company has a 
separate security budget, emphasised the difficulty of asking management for this 
budget. She commented:
“We’ve got a security budget within the information security department. However, when 
you actually want to go and get the full funding, this is another hoop that you have to go 
through ”.
This opinion supported Lindup (1996) who emphasised the great difficulty the IT 
professionals face in convincing management to invest in security projects.
On the other hand, she indicated that security spending decision is made within her 
company’s five year plan, and the budget is approved by the IT director, and 
ultimately by the company’s strategy manager. She pointed out:
“I draw up a 5 year plan, with every small detail around year 1 and year 2 and less around 
years 3, 4 and 5 because it tends to be more strategic. For this year, I have to estimate how 
much the security solutions products will cost. We have to do a business case for each one, 
and then we make a decision on what we want to spend the money on. The budget is 
approved by the IT director and by the company’s strategy manager. The IT director has to 
go to the strategy manager to get his budget”.
She also indicated that outsourcing i.e. external service providers, identity 
management and encryption technology on laptops are the biggest part of their 
security budget. This reflects the reaction of some companies to encrypt their laptops 
after the increasing incidents of organisations losing laptops containing unencrypted 
sensitive information. However, she cannot predict next year’s budget.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee E believed that the awareness 
level of the security team and of some project managers regarding the British 
Standard BS 7799 is high; however, there is no general awareness of the standard. In 
addition, they are not certified under ISO 27001; however, they are planning to be 
certified.
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On the other hand, although she believed that there are no business benefits from this 
standard, she pointed out that it provides her company with an excellent reference 
point, and provides customers with a certain level of assurance. This opinion 
supported Buzzard (1999) who indicated that BS 7799 is a reference for managers and 
employees who are responsible for initiating, implementing, and maintaining security 
within their companies. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) also argued that this standard takes 
the form of guidance and recommendations and is intended to serve as a single 
reference point for identifying the range of controls needed for most situations where 
IS are used.
AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee E believed that her company is undertaking 
internal and external security audits to evaluate security effectiveness; however, it is 
difficult to measure everything and it is useful to focus on small important areas to 
measure. She stated:
“At the beginning o f the last year, we had PricewaterhouseCoopers to do some pre-audit 
work, and they were able to identify some areas for improvement. According to their 
recommendations, our baselines needed to improve. I personally look at how we comply, 
but standard is covering the best practice for everything, and we don’t have the money to 
do all these best practices. I think it is quite useful to take one small area and to say this is 
really important to us, but you cannot measure everything”.
She also believed that the effectiveness level of security management within her 
company is moderate or reasonable.
5.9.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee E believed that contractors and inappropriate access are her company’s 
most common sources of security threats. She commented:
“Contractors, actually bringing their laptops and attaching them to our networks, this is a 
kind o f internal threat. I think the other threat is to be around inappropriate access. We can 
break that down into two: inappropriate access which means that managers do not 
understand what the employees really got access to. Inappropriate use is generally about 
websites, internally and externally, and we blocked now many websites having problems 
with gambling, dating, sports, etc. it is a security issue more than productivity ”.
Frolick (2003) argued that as more companies develop websites, there is a 
corresponding increase in attacks to maliciously damage a company’s reputation or
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steal its resources. In addition, Lee et al. (2008) indicated that employees’ internet 
misuse has emerged as one of the major concerns that managers deal with in today’s 
business environment. Internet misuse has exposed companies’ IS to different threats 
that put companies at risk (Mitchell and Jones 2002). Lee and Lee (2002) remarked 
that internet misuse problems tend to increase as employees become more skilled in 
new technologies.
Moreover, interviewee E believed that internal fraud is her company’s most likely 
threat over the next years. Haugen and Selin (1999) stated that companies now are 
more susceptible to computer crime and employee fraud than ever before. As 
companies struggle to remain competitive in a global marketplace, systems are left 
open to employees’ manipulation and the opportunity for significant loss is always 
present. Consequently, if management pays little attention to their employees, fraud 
will be perpetrated by those insiders in a company who have access to accounting 
systems. Onions (2006) also indicated that the levels of fraud in the UK are massive 
and the risks are not countered by sufficient controls. In addition, Clarke (2007) 
viewed that staff fraud is on the rise, which could hit not only the finance but also the 
reputation of a business.
5.9.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee E stated that, most recently, her company implemented a perimeter 
security system for controlling the internet and for monitoring the access. She 
presented the following opinion:
“It is a perimeter security system, looking at network security, who is trying to hack in, put 
it in control and monitoring the access. It is not just access, any kind o f malicious and 
viruses as well. We must make sure that our perimeter is hard. Can you imagine if  
somebody can hack to our system with about 6 million customers records, bank accounts 
details, names, addresses, salaries, etc.?. We do not have a proper intrusion detection 
system. But we do monitor that through a number o f ad hoc tools rather than intrusion 
detection or prevention systems ”.
Von Solms (1998) argued that as companies link their computer networks to the 
internet, control over their systems and users and thus information security can be lost 
to a large extent. In addition, companies that manage personal information of 
individuals, find themselves increasingly confronted with the issue of privacy,
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whether through legislation, industry self-regulation or customer expectations (DTT
2007). Consequently, hardening companies’ defences from hackers and other 
unauthorised users should be a high priority for all businesses (Sherstobitoff and 
Bustamante 2007). Moreover, according to the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007), a 
layered approach to security, one that combines governance, strong perimeter 
protection, with other forms of access control, logging and monitoring and data 
protection techniques, is the right prescription for any company. Swartz (2007) also 
argued that monitoring user access to critical information and detecting unauthorised 
access to high risk data are critical steps all companies should take to better protect 
their sensitive information.
On the other hand, interviewee E believed that there is a gap between her company’s 
security threats and controls because of the security budget. She stated:
“Yes, there is a gap because o f the funding. Regarding the network security, in an ideal 
network design, we will segregate all our applications, firewalls, etc. Here, we have got a 
very flat structure, we have more than 150 sites, some o f them could be small, and some 
sites run with only two or three people, so there is always a risk ”.
This opinion is consistent with her previous opinion regarding the existence of 
security budget within the company. However, she emphasised the difficulty of asking 
for this security budget.
Interviewee E addressed the importance of having a risk register for her company to 
record risks, impacts, and the likelihood of the risk occurring. She remarked:
“There would be a record for recording the risks and impacts as well (risk register). We 
could put in place some ad hoc monitoring, something cheap and effective. Monitoring 
would be based on the potential impact and the likelihood o f that risk occurring. For 
example, we should be monitoring the internal use o f e-mail and internet, but we have a 
lack o f resources, and no time to do that. We do it monthly now, we are just picking out a 
number o f accounts and monitoring them. All the time people have to make risk decisions, 
because they never get all the money they want to spend on security ”.
She stated before that her company is using a 5*5 matrix and eight steps guide for 
assessing and managing security risks and here she addressed the importance of 
having a risk register to record all risks, which indicate the importance given to the 
risk assessment within the company.
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Moreover, she believed that her company is planning to use a new access control 
called ‘provisioning control’ in the next year. She presented the benefits of this new 
control as follows:
"There is a big control we are planning to put in, which is called provisioning. Without 
provisioning different system ’ administrators have to assign users to systems. We have got 
about 6000 systems, some o f them are access databases, which means that different people 
have to put any new person on to these systems. Now with provisioning, if  you have an HR 
system within the organisational structure, you can build on that. A particular job role will 
have access to certain systems. I f  the line managers bring somebody in, they could just 
authorise the individual’s level o f  access without actually doing more than that. When 
somebody leaves, you can press a button and remove his access, or if  somebody moves from 
one job to another jo b  role, you can move the access. Provisioning can help in a lot o f that.
It can cut down the level o f  system administration work because it can automatically set up 
the accounts in systems. You just need one authorisation, which is in the HR, once you get 
that, you could control and manage access in that way. It defines not only what systems, but 
the level o f access, then you can tie it into physical security controls, to manage who has 
access to the building, and make sure you get that up to date. So, I will propose to do it in 
kind o f baby steps, it is going to make a big difference in the company
This opinion regarding the user provisioning is consistent with Aldhizer (2008) who 
indicated that the biggest problem with manual access management controls is 
keeping up with modifications to user access due to new assignments. It may take the 
help desk from one day to few weeks to change an existing employee’s database 
access. However, automating new employee database access and subsequent 
modifications based on the individual’s unique job responsibilities or roles with the 
company through user provisioning can substantially reduce security risks. In 
addition, the KPMG European Identity and Access Management Survey (KPMG
2008) emphasised the importance of the automated provisioning, or the role-based 
access control in regulating access to IT resources based on employee’s role within a 
company. However, the survey revealed that many companies would not engage in 
the I AM (Identity Access Management) projects, including automated provisioning 
unless there was an external force driving them to do so.
To conclude, this utilities company has a structured process for maintaining their AIS 
security. However, they had not updated the security policy for nearly five years, and 
although they measure and monitor staff awareness, the security awareness level is
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not high given the feedback of the security tests. Although the company has a separate 
security budget, the interviewee emphasised the difficulty of asking management for 
this budget. Although the awareness level of the security team and of some project 
managers regarding the British Standard BS 7799 is high, there is no general 
awareness of the standard. In addition, they are not certified under ISO 27001; 
however, they are planning to be certified. Contractors and inappropriate access are 
the company’s most common sources of security threats, and internal fraud is the 
most likely threat over the next years. Most recently, the company implemented a 
perimeter security system for controlling the internet and for monitoring the access. 
Moreover, they are planning to use a new access control called ‘provisioning control’ 
in the next year.
5.10 Interview 6
5.10.1 General information
This interview was conducted in a financial services company located in London. The 
company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London 
Stock Exchange and there were approximately 3000 full-time employees in it. The 
company had a small information security team of three persons within the group risk 
management department and this team reports to the head of risk management (the 
interviewee). On the other hand, interviewee F was the head of risk management, who 
had 10 years of experience in his current position, and had a professional security 
qualification - Certified Information Systems Security Professionals (CISSP).
5.10.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding his company’s management framework of AIS security.
AIS security policy: Interviewee F confirmed that they had a formal written security 
policy, which had been created nearly 10 years ago by the security manager, and was 
updated annually. He stated that the group risk committee, with a group of the board 
members and the chief executive were responsible for the policy. In addition, 
although, the ultimate responsibility was with the board, the board delegated this 
responsibility to the information security team.
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He believed that they could not distribute hardcopies of the policy to a large number 
of employees; however, it was distributed via the company’s intranet. He indicated 
that they are monitoring login incidents and security breaches and are reporting on 
this on a monthly basis to check compliance with the security policy. In addition, 
despite the high cost of security training and awareness, his company is checking 
awareness of policy through security tests and the achieved scores. He pointed out:
“We are using a number o f indicators to check whether the policy is complied with. There 
is a training package on the intranet. At the end of this training, there is a policy awareness 
test. There are scores and employees can fail or pass the test, according to their awareness 
o f the policy ”.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee F confirmed the existence of 
a formal security training and awareness program within his company, he stated:
“Yes, we have security training for managers, employees, and for contractors as well’’.
He indicated that the training he received focused on system security, management, 
responsibilities and security policy. In addition, he believed that the classroom is the 
most effective technique for making staff aware of security issues; however, due to 
cost and time constraints, his company is providing employees with security 
awareness materials online. He expressed the following opinion:
“The classroom training is the most effective technique, it works better, but we cannot do it 
with all employees. Even with new employees, it is very difficult, we are quite busy and 
continuously there are new staff being brought in. There is very little classroom training for 
a few people e.g. people selling financial products, mortgages, etc. They must have formal 
classroom training, but we are unable to do that for all the company, it costs a lot, and it is 
time consuming”.
Interestingly, despite the wide agreement regarding online security training and 
awareness, interviewee F indicated that sometimes the employees complain that there is 
no time even for online training, given that they have many training courses covering 
different security issues.
Moreover, he confirmed that his company depends on the feedback on the security 
tests, which are conducted on an annual basis, in addition to monitoring the employees’ 
performance to measure and monitor staff awareness. However, he revealed that the 
security awareness level in his company is not high. He stated:
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“Everyone should go through training once a year. There is a quiz at the end o f the 
training, and we can get the feedback based on that. We also monitor staff awareness, 
particularly through talking to their managers and looking at their performance. In my 
view, being a bank, it is reasonable to get staff more aware o f confidentiality”.
Risk assessment: Interviewee F stated that his company does not undertake a specific 
AIS risk assessment. However, there is a broad risk assessment program for all 
operational risks, which is undertaken on a quarterly basis. This result is not 
surprising, given that financial services companies are regulated by the FSA, so they 
have to report their security risks regularly.
He also stated that the operational risk team in his company is responsible for 
undertaking this risk assessment. He pointed out:
“Under the risk management team o f the company, there are information security, 
operational risk, financial risk, fraud and insurance, and business compliance. The 
operational risk team is responsible for risk assessment, and are looking at balancing the 
operational risks o f the company and the security risks, people risks, etc. ”.
Moreover, he believed that the overall security risk level within his company is 
medium to low.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interestingly, 
interviewee F believed that the average number of security incidents experienced by 
his company between 2005 and 2007 was nearly 50 incidents per year. Although most 
of these incidents were minor ones, still there were major incidents. This result 
confirmed the questionnaire finding where the only respondent to state that his 
company had more than 15 incidents during the last year was from the insurance & 
financial services sector.
He indicated that they suffered from a minor phishing attack, which was discovered 
and dealt with very quickly: He commented:
“Two weeks ago we had a phishing incident, a minor one. Somebody had set up a website 
in the United States, copied our company’s website, and tried to attract customers. 
Somebody in the United States discovered it and reported it to us. These people are trying 
through our website to get customer information and steal through this information; it is a 
financial fraud. We got this site shut down within 24 hours o f it being discovered”.
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In addition, he believed that the loss or theft of customer information is the worst 
security incident that could happen, not only because of its direct cost, but also 
because of its reputation damage. He considered financial fraud to be a serious 
security incident given the high financial impact on his company. This opinion 
suggests that financial services companies that responded consider the loss of 
customer information as the worst security incident that could have a significant effect 
on their reputation, customer confidence and share price.
Interviewee F also believed that there are standard procedures based on the CERT 
(Computer Emergency Response Team) to deal with security incidents. He presented 
these procedures as follows:
“We have got standard procedures based on the CERT. There are six stages in this 
process: first notification (to know that an incident had happened); second analysis; third 
containment (managing what is going on); fourth investigation; fifth response, and six 
follow up (lessons learned) ”.
Moreover, he stated that they have different authorities and regulatory bodies to 
whom they could report depending on the size and nature of incidents including the 
FSA (Financial Services Authority), ICO (Information Commissioner’s Office), BBA 
(British Bankers Association), and the Payment Card Industry Scheme. He indicated 
that they report major incidents only to the FSA, while they can report to the BAA 
(British Bankers Association) in case of any kind of unexpected risks within the bank 
such as a loss of a database. In addition, they can report to the police if there is a 
crime.
He believed that his company is better prepared to recover from predicted incidents 
than from new ones. He presented the following opinion:
“Yes we can recover from the incidents that we can predict. We have insurance; we retain 
reserves, etc., so we are able to recover from any incident. Banks have to hold a level o f 
capital as a reserve agairist any kind o f losses. Our reserves have to be big enough to deal 
with major incidents. According to regulations, we have to be ready to respond to anything 
that can happen. As an information security team, we have practised many responses to 
incidents in many different sizes, and sorted how we can deal with them. I f  we cannot 
predict the incident, that is the issue. Until the first phishing attack happened, no one knows 
that it could happen. That is what the security is always worried about, because ‘company 
cannot respond well to any new incident ’. But we learnt a lot from the incident, and we
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respond very quickly to any incident we saw before. But every now and then, something nerw 
happens, and I think our response process can deal with any kind o f incident ”.
He reported that his company improves the controls after a security incident. He
presented the following example:
“After the phishing attack was discovered by an external party in the United States, we try 
to improve our security. We look at improving our monitoring capability to be able to 
detect the incident by ourselves. We can improve our controls to prevent future incidents ”.
He also stated that the facilities business continuity management team is responsible 
for establishing the plan and his security team is responsible for running it; however, 
the whole company has a plan, and a part of it is concerned with security incidents. 
He identified role of the facilities business continuity management team as follows:
“We’ve got a facilities business continuity management team. A major part o f the role of 
this team is about building recovery. They make sure in case o f any incident, there is 
another building available for work”.
In addition, they do annual tests for the business continuity plan on different sizes and 
types of incidents. He commented:
“We do annual tests o f different scenarios because we have to consider different sizes and 
types of security incidents and we do annual tests on different sites across the country”.
Security budget: Interviewee F believed that there is no separate security budget 
within his company; however, IT spend nearly 5 percent of their budget on security 
activities and around 2 percent on information security, which ends up as nearly 7 
percent of the IT budget. He pointed out:
“We do have a security budget for IT, but there is no single security budget. The two 
percentages we tend to be looking at are the percentage o f the IT budget, and the 
percentage o f the overall business budget. We are probably spending around 2 percent of 
the IT budget on information security, specifically my team’s information security, and less 
than 1 percent o f the whole group’s budget. On the other side, in a very broad sense, the IT 
probably spend 5 percent o f their budget in security activities in terms o f systems, services, 
the whole things that go with security, so 5 percent of their budget is directly used in 
security matters. So, we are talking about a total of 7 percent o f the IT budget”.
On the other hand, he stated that security spending is a part of his company’s annual 
business plan, which is drawn up based on their understanding of risks and on their
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responsibilities. He believed that the financial director approves the security budget 
and he provided a justification in the following quotation:
“Our annual business plan has to be approved by the financial director and the board on 
an annual basis. The finance director approves the security budget, because ultimately, the 
IT report to finance. This is because the finance director is responsible for the risk 
department in general. The whole budget is the board’s responsibility, while the finance 
director will decide the part o f the information security”.
In addition, he stated that a big part of their security budget is spent on security testing 
such as penetration testing and staff, in addition to other IT services in which the IT 
brings in new security systems into the company.
He revealed that his company’s security spending level is moderate or adequate but it 
is nearly the same compared to other companies in the same industry sector. He 
remarked:
“It is moderate and safe. We do comparisons with other banks and other organisations. We 
spend about the same proportion. It is the main question the finance director is always 
asking me: 'How much is everybody else spending? ’ when I ask him for money ”.
This opinion supported Ross and Weill (2002) who pointed out that many executives 
look to industry benchmarks as a way of determining appropriate spending levels.
Moreover, interviewee F believed that the security budget would be a bit higher next 
year. He cited the current focus on confidentiality requirements as a justification for 
the increase in security spending. He ended the discussion of this issue with an 
interesting comment. He stated:
“Everybody is always arguing for the budget, to get more spending. But the most important 
thing is to spend the right amount on the right things ”.
This opinion supported Tsiakis and Stephanides (2005) who pointed out that a key 
factor in getting value from security is to ensure that security investments protect the 
right things.
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Security standards and certification: Interviewee F stated that although he is aware 
of the British Standard BS 7799, and it is used as the basis of their security processes, 
he did not believe that many average business people are aware of it. He commented:
“Yes 1 do, and we use BS 7799 as the basis of our processes to security. Regarding the 
other managers and employees, it is difficult to say because it is a very detailed standard. If 
you mention BS 7799 to any one o f our staff, I think IT people, probably, could recognise 
what it is but I don’t think many average business people are aware o f i t”.
On the other hand, he stated that his company is not certified under ISO 27001, given 
that certification is still not mandatory, and therefore there is no pressure on 
companies to be certified. He believed that the companies that already have it are 
those companies providing business-to-business services. He stated:
“We are not certified at the moment, we do not have current plans, but we keep an eye on 
it. It is not mandatory, and it costs money if  the company is involved in certification. For 
those organisations that were certified, I am not sure it proves the benefits o f certification.
They have done it, but they did not show people their level o f awareness. The organisations 
that already have it are those organisations that provide business-to-business services.
They are the kind o f customers who can ask for certification e.g. if  we buy internet services 
from BT, we can get assurance from BT that they are certified under ISO 27001. Perhaps 
there is not quite a market for it now, except for business-to-business services. It costs a lot; 
it needs much time unless we have to do this kind o f certification, if  we have a banking 
code. But till now we don’t have any pressure to do that”.
The above opinion supported Buzzard (1999) who indicated that compliance with the 
standard facilitates the inter-company trading by providing confidence in the security 
of shared information. In addition, Freeman (2007) argued that certification under ISO 
27001 could make the company more appealing to potential customers; it could help 
assure business partners that a company is serious about security; however, 
certification is still optional.
On the other hand, interviewee F saw compatibility as a key benefit from complying 
with the standard. He pointed out:
“Yes, the biggest benefit is compatibility so that we can all have a common language for 
information security. When I talk to other banks or other organisations, we can talk in the 
same terms about security. It is very valuable and makes sense ”.
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AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee F indicated that his company measures 
security effectiveness through the risk assessment, in addition to the feedback of 
security tests, and through other key performance indicators within the company, 
which help them to see if controls are working.
In addition, he reported the number of incidents, the results of security tests, in 
addition to the vulnerability level as his company’s most important success indicators 
of security management. He presented the following opinion:
“The number o f incidents, test results, and what we find from vulnerabilities. I f  there are 
many minor incidents, it indicated that there is a problem. For example, if there are ten 
minor incidents such as internet misuse, e-mail misuse, etc., we look at them, and if there is 
a trend, it means that we have many people who don't know how to use the internet or e- 
mail appropriately. So we must train them to use the internet appropriately. If  there are 
many minor incidents, this indicates that there is a problem with our security processes ”.
On the other hand, he highlighted the lack of management support, awareness and 
commitment as his company’s top obstacles of effective security. He stated:
“Quite often security takes a secondary role. Management prefer to do a lot o f business, do 
it quickly and effectively at a low cost, and worry about security after that. It is a very 
common problem, because it is not the core requirements o f management to do that. The 
top obstacle to effective security is the lack o f management support, and awareness, and it 
is more about management commitment. They are quite happy to do things about security 
particularly if an incident happened, but they cannot plan security in their basic thinking, 
when they are doing business work”.
This opinion is consistent with Kwok and Longley (1999) who indicated that one of 
the problems commonly faced by security officers is the lack of full commitment 
from senior management. Smith and Jamieson (2006) also argued that management 
awareness is the top issue identified as an inhibitor to successful IS security 
processes. Moreover, Knapp et al. (2006) stated that gaining top management support 
is the most critical issue of an information security program.
Moreover, he believed that his bank’s AIS security management is quite effective 
given that the security awareness level is very high. He commented:
“It is quite effective because we have got pretty wide security awareness in the company. 
Many managers know about our team. Everyone knows what is good and bad and what is
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right and wrong. We have got a good reputation; we have a lot o f power in terms o f our 
ability to stop things happening, etc. ”.
5.10.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee F believed that the complexity of IS and the sharing of information with 
an unlimited number of other companies are his company’s most serious threats. He 
expressed his opinion as follows:
“I think it is something to do with the complexity o f IS. There are many interactions 
between our IS and other companies ’ IS. There are many information flows out now, they 
are rapid, sometimes hidden, and sometimes difficult to monitor. I think that is a big 
challenge to the information security. Every day we share information with lots o f different 
organisations for good business reasons. We need to think harder about the processes 
needed to control that. It is always happening. It is a day-to-day fa c t”.
This opinion supported Barnard and Von Solms (1998) who indicated that threats are 
growing because of the high levels of interconnectivity both within and between 
organisations. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) also stated that the increased interconnectivity 
among computers enabled by the internet raised the scale and scope of information- 
related crimes. In addition, Schneier (2001) argued that companies now have no 
choice but to connect their networks to the rest of the world i.e. to link with 
customers, suppliers, partners, and their own employees. However, with this 
interconnectivity come new threats such as hackers and criminals. Moreover, Gansler 
and Lucyshyn (2005) pointed out that the complexity of IS is growing faster than our 
ability to understand their vulnerabilities and to protect them. Managers are now 
discovering that sharing information with other companies increases the risk that 
critical data will be misused (Aldhizer 2008).
On the other hand, interviewee F believed that financial fraud such as phishing and 
spamming attacks, and data leakage are the most frequent threats facing his company. 
Trites and Lavigne (2006) argued that identity theft and phishing attacks are growing 
threats. They also stated that many companies simply have not implemented adequate 
controls for e-mail messages; leaving e-mail management to the preferences of their 
employees, which is an inadequate approach, given the growing volume of spamming 
attacks. In addition, according to the Financial Crime Sector Report (FSA 2004), 
phishing attacks are increasing and are growing to include the smaller banks as well
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as the major ones. Moreover, the Global Security Survey (DTT 2007) addressed the 
problem of data leakage and indicated that 14 percent of internal breaches of 
companies were due to theft or leakage of intellectual property. In addition, the 
Annual Global Security Survey (Greenemeier 2006) stated that data leakage and theft 
breaches are on the rise. Data is the central commodity for attackers who want to 
commit fraud or profit from identity theft.
Moreover, he reported that there are external and internal sources of security threats 
facing his company, in terms of criminals, customers, and staff. He commented:
“It is a combination, the source o f external threat is criminals, sometimes organised, 
sometimes not. Sometimes customers deal with dangerous things. Sometimes it is 
manifested inside e.g. staff may misbehave either because they are not being careful or 
because they act as criminals. Staff is a part o f our internal risk; sometimes they cooperate 
with somebody else outside the organisation to steal some money (financial fraud) ”.
This opinion supported Hitchings (1995) who indicated that most computer-related 
fraud has been undertaken by companies’ trusted employees, sometimes colluding 
with others. In terms of customers, Damiano (2008) argued that, despite banks’ best 
efforts to improve security, their defences are only as strong as their customers’ 
security habits. Unfortunately, even though customers recognise their role in keeping 
their sensitive information safe, they often do not take the necessary precautions.
On the other hand, he cited the theft or loss of customer data as his company’s most 
likely security threat over the next few years. In addition, his company would be 
concerned with customers’ awareness. He stated:
“I think the loss or theft o f customer information, and the way by which customers 
themselves behave. We are increasingly worried about customers and how they are able to 
protect themselves from different kinds o f threats. Customers are not very aware. Even 
those who are aware may not understand the technology very well. They can send e-mails 
with personal data in them, which is not protected, they do not encrypt data, and they do 
not know how to use technology very well. Because the internet technology is too mature, it 
is a big problem for us, andfor all other industries as well, it is a big threat”.
Gansler and Lycyshyn (2005) indicated that the internet continues to grow rapidly and 
has evolved into a system of systems that is complex, lacking clear boundaries and 
control. Beard and Wen (2007) also argued that the use of the internet technologies
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has substantially increased the vulnerability of IS. One of the fastest growing threats 
on the internet is the theft or leakage of sensitive financial information. Given the 
increasing number of incidents related to loss or theft of customer information, it is 
not surprising that the company will be concerned about this threat in the following 
years.
5.10.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee F stated that, most recently, they employed many technical controls such 
as client security packages, firewalls, and virus protection tools. However, he believed 
that given the complexity of systems, his company has a big gap in the monitoring 
controls. He remarked:
“I think the biggest gap is ‘to monitor’. We do not have technology to monitor everything.
We have many systems operating very fast and we have many information flows. The 
complexity o f systems is one o f our long-term big focus areas; we need to improve our 
abilities. We need to monitor all information flows, access to systems, external access to the 
internet, etc. We spend a lot o f time and effort currently on intrusion detection and 
prevention systems ”.
This opinion is consistent with a previous opinion in Section 5.10.3 in which he 
indicated that the complexity of IS and the sharing of information with an unlimited 
number of other companies are his company’s most serious security threats. Steele 
and Wargo (2007) argued that given the technological advancements, companies must 
have monitoring tools to track and monitor data and insider activities. Moreover, 
interviewee F stated that the security level within his company would be better the 
following year given the nature of the banking market that is always challenging.
To conclude, this financial services company has a structured process for maintaining 
their AIS security. However, they do not undertake a specific AIS risk assessment; 
there is a broad risk assessment program for all operational risks. The average number 
of security incidents experienced by the company between 2005 and 2007 was nearly 
50 incidents per year; however, there are standard procedures based on the CERT 
(Computer Emergency Response Team) to deal with these incidents. There is no 
separate security budget within the company, and although the interviewee is aware of 
the British Standard BS 7799, and it is used as the basis of their security processes, he 
did not believe that many average business people are aware of it. The company is not
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certified under ISO 27001, given that certification is still not mandatory; however, 
compatibility is the key benefit from complying with the standard. The complexity of 
IS and the sharing of information with an unlimited number of other companies are 
the company’s most serious threats. In addition, financial fraud such as phishing and 
spamming attacks, and data leakage are the most frequent threats. Most recently, they 
employed many technical controls such as client security packages, firewalls, and 
virus protection tools. However, given the complexity of systems, the company has a 
big gap in the monitoring controls.
5.11 Interview 7
5.11.1 General information
This interview was conducted in an entertainment company located in Maidenhead. 
The company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London 
Stock Exchange and there were approximately 6500 employees in it. The company 
had a security department, not specific for information security, including 30 
employees and reporting to the head of security. On the other hand, interviewee G 
was the chief technology officer, who had one year of experience in his current 
position.
5.11.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding the management framework of AIS security within his company.
AIS security policy: Interviewee G confirmed that they had a formal written security 
policy, which had been created nearly five years ago by the IT department; however, 
he believed that his company had never updated this policy.
Regarding the distribution of the policy, he stated that in their induction, employees 
were given either a hardcopy of the policy or the information security booklet, or they 
had to sign some information security forms. In addition, he believed that the use of 
“passwords” was considered the most important element of their security policy.
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Moreover, he claimed that his company checks employees’ compliance with the 
policy, and it is a line management function. He believed that his company’s security 
policy is effective.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee F confirmed the non­
existence of a security training and awareness program within his company. He 
believed that in their induction, employees had to read and sign some information 
security forms. In addition, despite the importance of measuring staff security 
awareness, they are not undertaking regular testing of security awareness within the 
company. Consequently, his opinions suggest that his company needs to devote more 
effort to training their staff and in making them security aware.
Risk assessment: Interviewee G confirmed that his company is undertaking security 
risk assessment once a year with the help of third parties such as external auditors, 
experts, and consultants e.g. Ernst & Young. He stated that, as the chief technology 
officer within the company, he is responsible for the risk assessment, with the help of 
some external consultants. He illustrated the risk assessment matrix used in assessing 
their risks in Figure 5.2.
Critical
Impact Major
Manageable
(Source: A report was given to the researcher during the interview)
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee G 
believed that his company had experienced some minor security incidents in the last 
two years. He considered hacking into their random number generators is their worst 
incident.
Moreover, he believed that the security department is responsible for the incident 
handling procedures. After a security incident, they have to arrange a proper team,
Figure 5.2 Risk profile
High
Low
Remote Possible Likely
Likelihood
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assess the impact, think about mitigations, communications, further threats, and react 
accordingly. He indicated that security incidents within his company are reported to the 
Gambling Commission.
In addition, the business continuity plan within the company is the responsibility of 
the head of the security department and it is updated annually.
Security budget: Interviewee G believed that his company has a separate security 
budget. This could be because the company has a security department including 30 
employees, and consequently, there is a separate security budget for this department. 
He stated that, as the chief technology officer within the company, he approves the 
security budget. He believed that they spend the main part of their security budget on 
network security, intrusion detection tools, and firewalls. He believed that security 
spending within his company is enough and there is no need for more budget.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee G stated that although he is aware 
of the British Standard BS 7799, there is no general awareness of the standard among 
the employees and the other managers, and he could not find any benefit from 
complying with this standard. In addition, he believed that they are not certified under 
ISO 27001 and have no plans of certification.
AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee G indicated that his company is measuring 
AIS security effectiveness. However, he believed that the non-occurrence of security 
incidents is the most important success indicator of security management within his 
company. He claimed that employees are his company’s main obstacle of effective 
security.
5.11.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee G addressed the problem of mobile devices such as USB sticks as his 
company’s most serious threat. O’ Hanley (2004) argued that handheld devices, which 
hold vital data, lack security controls and are more easily lost by their owners. In 
addition, removable media devices such as MP3 players, USB data sticks, and 
portable hard discs enable staff to extract large quantities of confidential data onto 
insecure and easily stolen media (BERR 2008).
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He cited people as the company’s most frequent and most common source of security 
threat. Moreover, employees are his company’s biggest threat over the next few years.
5.11.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee G indicated that, most recently, his company had improved their 
firewalls. He believed that the company’s security controls are enough, and therefore, 
no gaps exist between security threats and security controls used. However, he 
emphasised the importance of employing more security controls to protect laptops and 
data they contained.
To conclude, this entertainment company has no framework for managing their AIS 
security. The company had never updated the security policy, there is no security 
training and awareness program within the company, there is no general awareness of 
the British Standard BS 7799 among the employees and the other managers, and they 
could not find any benefit from complying with the standard. In addition, they are not 
certified under ISO 27001 and have no plans of certification. The problem of mobile 
devices such as USB sticks is the company’s most serious threat, and employees are 
the biggest threat over the next few years. Most recently, the company had improved 
the firewalls, and the interviewee emphasised the importance of employing more 
security controls to protect laptops and data they contained.
5.12 Interview 8
5.12.1 General information
This interview was conducted in a utilities company located in Bradford. The 
company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London 
Stock Exchange and there were approximately 2200 employees in it. The company 
had a security department including four employees reporting to the operations 
department. On the other hand, interviewee H was the IT architecture manager, who 
had six years of experience in his current position in the IT department within the 
company.
5.12.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding his company’s management framework of AIS security.
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AIS security policy: Interviewee H believed there is a whole policy within his 
company which security is part of. This policy had been created eight years ago by the 
security manager and was updated every four years.
In their induction, employees were given either a hardcopy of the policy or the 
information security booklet, or they had to sign their contract and the security policy 
is part of it. However, the current employees could find the policy via the intranet or 
the internal website of the company.
Moreover, interviewee H cited the user responsibility or accountability - employees 
and outsiders - as the most important element of the security policy. He stated:
“The most important part o f  the security policy is about user responsibility - employees and 
outsiders. People who get access to our data must be responsible for this data and must 
protect it; otherwise there will be a problem ”.
He believed that the audit department is running auditing activities on a yearly basis 
and are checking authorisations to check compliance with the policy.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee H indicated that there is no 
formal security training within his company; however, it is part of the induction of 
new employees. In addition, every team gets together on a monthly basis and 
discusses different security issues. His company also depends on the intranet in 
providing employees with important security issues to increase their awareness.
Risk assessment: Interviewee H confirmed that his company is undertaking security 
risk assessment every six months with the help of third parties such as external 
auditors and assessors, and they use a matrix in assessing their risks. He commented:
“We have a matrix. ISO 27001 mandates that we have to record all our IT security risks.
We record all risks and we have a matrix that illustrates the likelihood o f a risk occurring, 
the likelihood o f that causing a failure, against the impact o f the failure. For every risk we 
get in the register, we understand those aspects, we put scores and we prioritize ”.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: Interviewee H 
believed that his company experienced two major security incidents, in which a 
storage network failed, which caused a major loss of service or downtime, and a lot of
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minor incidents. Although the downtime remained for only one day, he believed that 
it was a major problem or a disaster for his company. He stated that any downtime in 
systems that run all company’s operations is a major incident. He presented the 
following opinion:
“We had 2 incidents in which one o f our storage networks failed. It is a technical 
downtime. We have a service manager who is responsible to bring the service back again, 
through back-ups, but there is no one to blame for this. We have quite good technical 
security. I cannot give an exact figure for the cost of these incidents, however, costs are not 
only financial, there are sometimes reputation costs as well”.
Moreover, he believed that embezzlement or fraud, and loss of customer data are the 
worst incidents that could happen in his company.
On the other hand, interviewee H stated that different departments are responsible for 
the security incident handling procedures, depending on the incident, such as legal 
department, physical security, and IT service management. After an incident, they 
have to arrange a team, discuss what is happening, end up with facts, and then decide 
what to do. This team has to meet on a regular basis to monitor the progress regarding 
the incident. He also believed that they are regulated by certain authorities such as the 
DWI (Drinking Water Inspectorate) and the EA (Environment Agency); however, 
they report specific incidents, not all incidents.
Interviewee H stated that there is a business continuity plan within his company, 
which is constantly updated by the disaster recovery staff to reflect new events and 
new changes.
Security budget: Interviewee H believed that they have a budget specifically for 
security; however, he remarked:
“It is part o f the IT budget, but it is specifically for security. In terms o f the overall 
company security, which is physical security and IT security, IT spend around 75 percent o f 
the whole budget. In terms o f IT budget, probably it is about 2.5 to 5 percent o f IT budget 
spent on security
He stated that the security spending decision within his company is a part of the 
normal business planning cycle, and the approval of the budget is shared between a
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number of people such as team managers, the IT architecture manager, etc. and 
ultimately the director signs it. He also stated that his company spends a lot of money 
on authorisations and on access controls and he believed that the security budget 
would be a bit higher next year.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee H stated that the overall 
awareness level of the British Standard BS 7799 is not high among managers and 
employees. On the other hand, his company was certified under ISO 27001, which 
confirmed the results shown in Table 4.53 (Chapter 4). He believed that they were 
only certified to prove to one of their clients that they take security seriously and that 
their security controls are adequate. However, he could not see more benefits from 
being certified. Interviewee H remarked:
“We do work with the Ministry o f Defence, so we have to prove that our security is 
adequate. BS 7799 and ISO 27001 only help us doing that, they support us, this is the only 
reason we got it. But I can’t see any more benefits. ISO 27001 is so vague and wide, you 
could do what you want with it. With ISO 27001, you specify the scope o f measures, and 
you can tell them exactly which parts o f your company are relevant and say ‘these 
measures or controls are secure’. The only thing you have to do is that you prove you do it.
It doesn ’t add anything technically to the play. But if  you do all what it says: you must 
record all procedures and must do risk management, that is good. However, it is not 
mandated in the UK. I don’t think it brings a great deal to the company ”.
Siponen (2006) argued that the standard is more concerned with ensuring certain 
security activities exist in companies, and is less interested in how well they are done 
or how these security processes can be accomplished in practice. However, the BERR 
Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) pointed out that all companies 
that have implemented the standards have achieved benefits from doing so.
Moreover, interviewee H believed that although there is no benefit from certification 
it is useful to have the standard in place. Thorp (2004) argued that human beings 
naturally work more efficiently in a structured framework, and this can be through 
following a certain standard like BS 7799.
AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee H cited the number of security incidents, in 
addition to penetration testing as the techniques used to measure security effectiveness 
within his company. He commented:
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“We do a couple o f things. Technically, we do like penetration testing, so we get people to 
enter or hack our system. On a more managerial level, we review how many incidents we 
have ”.
On the other hand, he believed that employees’ awareness, compliance and 
commitment to polices, and number of incidents are the most important success 
indicators of security management. He stated:
“It is probably things around compliance and audit. This is something to do with not 
having incidents, and awareness and commitment to policies through staff testing. If we 
want to test how successful we are, we could ask people, what do you know about this?, 
what makes you do this and do not do that?, etc. ”.
He also believed that the effectiveness level of security management within his 
company is reasonable, but it could be much better.
5.12.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee H stated that internal people extracting inappropriate data and doing 
wrong things are his company’s biggest threat. This opinion supported Whitman and 
Mattord (2003) who argued that not everyone wishes deliberately to violate the 
security of business information. Employees may mistakenly capture data incorrectly, 
delete sensitive information or negligently leave information vulnerable for 
unauthorised users to gain access to it.
Interviewee H also believed that downtime and people getting too much access are his 
company’s most frequently faced threats. This opinion is consistent with a previous 
opinion in Section 5.12.2 where he stated that his company experienced two major 
security incidents; namely loss of service or downtime. He believed that, although the 
downtime remained for only one day, it was a disaster for his company. Mattsson
(2007) argued that many abuses and accidents occur because people have access to 
data that they do not need to see. The Global Security Survey (DTT 2005) indicated 
that employees in many instances have unlimited access to customer data which can 
increase the release of such data.
He believed that staff having more than one job role are his company’s common 
source of security threats. Interviewee H commented:
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“Staff is the threat, people having more than one job role. There is less staff, so every role 
is making more jobs. In terms of IT, if you ask an internet person about the constant 
attacks, he will be saying spam e-mails, etc. These things are going on continuously. But I 
cannot see them as a big threat compared to the other threats ”.
Davis (1997) pointed out that the lack of segregation of duties increases the potential 
for unauthorised changes to computer programs and data going undetected.
Moreover, interviewee H believed that mobility is his company’s major threat over 
the next few years. He remarked:
“From an IT point o f view, we have to be more protective, we have to protect equipments 
such as mobiles, WiFi, laptops, etc. I think mobility is the biggest threat, so that we can be 
losing control over data ”.
The KPMG Information Security Survey (KPMG 2006) indicated that the growing 
use of mobile devices such as mobile phones and memory sticks demands companies’ 
attention. Companies face the challenge of achieving and maintaining an adequate 
level of security over these devices. Aldhizer (2008) also argued that mobile devices 
may not only enhance data availability, but may also increase the threat that trusted 
insiders could steal confidential information, customer and employee data, and 
financial information.
5.12.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee H stated that, most recently, his company created a DVD to raise 
employees’ security awareness and implemented more access controls on their 
accounting systems as well. This is encouraging given the wide agreement in the 
literature regarding the importance of the human factor in security. Wood (1995) 
argued that no matter how sophisticated the security technology is, controls will not 
be sustainable unless human element has been adequately addressed. Too many 
people look at information security as strictly a technological problem, when in reality 
it is both a technological and human problem. Schneier (2001) stated that human 
minds are the attackers, so they need to be the defenders as well. Moreover, Beznosov 
and Beznosova (2007, p.421) stated, “People who think their security problem can be 
solved with only technology, do not understand the problem and do not understand 
the technology”.
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On the other hand, interviewee H believed that given that there is too much external 
access to a company’s systems, they cannot have total control on this access and 
therefore a gap exists between their threats and controls. He commented:
“Yes, I think because more external people are using our system, that is more risky, so we 
do not have direct control over them. I think technically we are getting to the point where 
we know we have weaknesses that we need to address ”.
Von Solms (1998) indicated that as companies link their computer networks to the 
internet and to their business partners’ networks, control over their systems and users, 
and thus information security can be lost.
Interviewee H cited the importance of having single authorisation within his company 
in an attempt to avoid the problems of using several passwords. He commented:
“It will be good to get a single authorisation. I think that would help because employees 
cannot remember all these passwords and they have to write them down which is something 
wrong. If people have only one password to remember, probably they will take more care of 
it, so it will be more secure ”.
The BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) indicated that UK 
companies still depend on user IDs and passwords to check the identity of users 
attempting to access their systems. Gerard et al. (2004) argued that although 
passwords are the oldest line of defence, they still constitute the most effective 
method of controlling access. However, there have been too many security breaches 
driven by simple human error, particularly the sharing of the employees’ passwords. 
The questionnaire findings (Table 4.78 in Chapter 4) revealed the seriousness of this 
threat given that 72.9 percent of companies believed that their employees are sharing 
passwords, which highlighted the frequent occurrence of this threat in the companies 
that responded.
Moreover, interviewee H believed that his company is not planning to use biometrics, 
given that they are difficult to control. Dimitriadis (2004) argued that designing and 
deploying security architectures that incorporate biometrics is not an easy task. Joyce
(2008) also indicated that biometrics pose new challenges and risks. The challenges 
faced by companies in implementing biometrics are cost and reliability. Moreover, the 
storage of biometric data is a digital representation of the user’s identity that can be
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stolen or lost, and therefore the misuse of biometric data is a serious issue given that 
biometric information cannot be changed after it is created. Once a user’s information 
falls into the wrong hands, the user could be a victim for life. In addition, the 
company is not planning to use patch management. Patch and vulnerability 
management tools can take on scanning, detecting, assessing and protecting 
vulnerable systems (Messmer 2008). He commented:
“What we don’t have is the patch management. It is a typical security control, but we find it 
disruptive. We like to keep a very open view o f all sorts o f controls. There are things we do 
not do, but we keep watching them to see what we want to do ”.
To conclude, this utilities company has a structured process for maintaining their AIS 
security. However, there is no formal security training within the company. The 
overall awareness level of the British Standard BS 7799 is not high among managers 
and employees. They are certified under ISO 27001 to prove to one of their clients 
that they take security seriously; however, they could not see more benefits from 
being certified. On the other hand, internal people extracting inappropriate data and 
doing wrong things are the company’s biggest threat; downtime and people getting 
too much access are the most frequently faced threats, whereas, staff having more 
than one job role are the company’s common source of security threats. Most recently, 
they created a DVD to raise employees’ security awareness and implemented more 
access controls on their accounting systems as well. There is too much external access 
to the company’s systems, they cannot have total control on this access and therefore 
a gap exists between their threats and controls. They emphasised the importance of 
having single authorisation in an attempt to avoid the problems of using several 
passwords.
5.13 Interview 9
5.13.1 General information
The ninth interview was conducted in a technology company located in Reading. The 
company was established more than 20 years ago. It was registered in the London Stock 
Exchange and it had approximately 20000 employees worldwide in most of Europe and 
India. The company had an information security team of five persons, which was 
included in the IT department within the company and reported directly to CIO via the 
interviewee. On the other hand, interviewee I was an information risk & security
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manager, who had five years of experience in his current position within the company. 
The interviewee had a professional security qualification - Certified Information 
Systems Security Professionals (CISSP). In addition, he attended training sessions that 
were mainly focused on trends in security. He presented the important topics in the 
training he received as follows:
“My training is mostly on trends in security, how to manage things as opposed to technical 
security. I went to training sessions and seminars covering specific subjects, I am really 
looking at trends. My training is more about how people are trying to penetrate the 
company and steal data. Data leakage is always a big problem; the more you give people 
capabilities on having data on a P C ”.
5.13.2 The management framework of AIS security
Section 3 of the interview guide (Appendix 2) sought the interviewee’s opinions 
regarding his company’s management framework of AIS security.
AIS security policy: Interviewee I confirmed that they had a formal written security 
policy, which had been created nearly 10 years ago and was updated annually. He 
stated that he was responsible for establishing the policy; however, the ultimate 
responsibility for approving and signing the policy was with the executive board.
He believed that they could not distribute hardcopies to a large number of employees. 
Consequently, new employees were given a CD with PDF files that they had to read 
and then sign if accepted. In addition, all the employees could find parts of the policy 
on the notice board and via the intranet.
He cited the user responsibility as the most important element of their security policy. 
He expressed its importance as follows:
“I supposed that information security is everybody’s responsibility. It does not matter what 
job  you are doing in the company. At some point, information security will be relevant to 
you and therefore it is everybody’s responsibility”.
Hinde (1998) indicated that it does not matter how brilliant a policy is, without the 
active commitment of employees and management it will fail. Interviewee I had the 
same opinion and stated:
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“Without compliance the security policy could not work. I can write a policy, but I must 
enforce it, otherwise it will be o f little value, worthless
He also claimed that they have a clear desk policy where they go around and monitor 
how people are doing in order to check people’s awareness.
Moreover, he believed that the overall effectiveness of the policy is high. He indicated 
that they are checking people’s e-mail and internet access, they are running anti-virus 
software, they have two audit teams checking to see if people are doing what they 
should not be doing, and external auditors come every six months and conduct the audit 
against the ISO 27001 standard. Consequently, he believed that the security policy is 
effective.
Security training and awareness program: Interviewee I confirmed that there is no 
formal security training within the company; however, it is part of the induction of 
new employees. In addition, every team gets together on a monthly basis and 
discusses different security issues. He also confirmed that the company put some 
articles on the intranet covering different security aspects such as phishing attacks, 
identity theft, and data loss to make employees security aware. He believed that the 
most effective technique for making staff security aware is the intranet. He stated:
“The most effective technique is via the intranet. It is the only way to get the majority of 
people, because people may be working from company offices, from home, from a client 
office, travelling around, etc. People are spread and most o f them have laptops, so it is the 
most effective way o f doing it. We can spend a lot o f money, we can send out a CD to 
everybody, but we can get no feedback. There is no guarantee that they read it”.
However, his company is not measuring or monitoring staff awareness. He expressed 
the difficulty of measuring staff awareness as follows:
“In the UK, it is difficult to measure staff awareness. It is not about the number o f 
employees, it is about how spread out the employees are, and from where they are 
working".
He believed that the awareness level could be better if there was a sufficient budget for 
security. He pointed out:
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“It is satisfactory, not more than that. We have a lot we want to do, but probably there is no 
budget. We can have wonderful systems for training and awareness, but they are expensive.
If there is a legal or industry requirement, we must have this in place”.
Risk assessment: Interviewee I confirmed that his company is undertaking security 
risk assessment every six months. However, he believed that risk assessment must be 
undertaken on a continuous basis. He stated:
“Risk assessment should be done every 6 months, but people should be assessing risks all 
the time. Because new projects come up, so people will report on their risks ”.
He emphasised the importance of risk assessment in the following quotation:
“We have a risk assessment program driven from the top. The executive board is doing the 
risk assessment, and each department should have its risk assessment processes. They 
should demonstrate that they are assessing risks. The board is doing high level risk 
assessment. They are doing a sort o f Turnbull Report. After Enron, the company has to 
report the business risks they have, so that shareholders can be aware, so that there will be 
no hidden risks. The board gathers all major risks o f the departments and makes a Turnbull 
Report”.
In addition, he stated that risk assessment is the responsibility of every team or 
department in the company. He commented:
“Every team in the company should have their own risk databases and should demonstrate 
that they are assessing the risks. I have a responsibility within the IT department, and look 
after IT risk database. We also do some risk assessment training so that people can 
understand why we do it, how we do it, etc. ”.
Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan: The results 
showed that the company had had only two minor security incidents in the last two 
years, which they contained before any damage was caused. Interviewee I stated:
“There are 2 incidents, one is the theft or loss of personal laptops, and the other is a virus 
attack, but on individuals ’ laptops. We know that we have people who occasionally bring 
their laptops in, connect them when they should not do that. However, they contained the 
incidents, they do not affect anybody else, and so they were minor ones ”.
8 The Turnbull Report refers to the Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code. It 
was published by the Institute o f Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in September 1999 to 
provide guidance to assist listed companies to implement the requirements in the Code of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance relating to internal control.
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He believed that the loss of sensitive client data and a complete virus or malware 
attack that shuts down the system would be the worst incidents. He pointed out:
“The worst security incident would be either a virus or malware that shuts down absolutely 
everything, from the IT point o f view, or the loss o f client data. If we would be responsible 
for losing sensitive client data that probably would be the worst incident”.
He indicated that, as the security risk manager, he is responsible for security incident 
handling procedures within his company, which come through the help desk and are 
found on the intranet as well. He also stated that after a security incident, the incident 
has to be reported, then information about it has to be collected and recorded, and 
lessons have to be learned. He remarked:
“It needs to be reported. We need to find out why it happened and whether it has affected us 
and the clients, or the clients. We need to understand which data and systems have been 
affected, whether people are at risk, etc. We need to record the information about each 
incident, so that we can have history to look back on. We need to see the trends, which is 
very important and to learn from the incident as well”.
On the other hand, he confirmed the questionnaire finding and emphasised the 
importance of raising employees’ security awareness after any security incident. He 
expressed the following opinion:
“One of the things we do is to review the risks linked to the incident. It is also necessary to 
advise our staff. I f  many laptops had been stolen, we will need to communicate that to the 
clients, users and employees to raise their awareness. In my opinion, if  an incident 
happened, we can address the incident, look to why the incident occurs, and address the 
issues that lead to it, but I don’t think this requires reviewing the policy ”.
Moreover, interviewee I believed that although his company is reasonably prepared to 
recover from a serious incident, given that they have back-ups, disaster recovery sites, 
etc., there is no guarantee that everything will be absolutely recovered.
Security budget: Interviewee I believed that they have a budget for security; 
however, this budget is about 5 percent of the IT budget. He pointed out that security 
spending includes ongoing elements such as anti-virus software, e-mail security and 
other new elements developed by the information and security manager and his team, 
and is ultimately approved by the CIO and the CFO within the company.
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Furthermore, he cited e-mail and internet security controls, and firewalls as their top 
areas of spending. This is consistent with the BERR Information Security Breaches 
Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that preventing outages is most important in 
technology companies given that they depend heavily on system availability.
He also believed that the overall security spending level within his company is not 
enough and the budget needs to increase. However, he cannot predict next year’s 
budget.
Security standards and certification: Interviewee I stated that the overall awareness 
level of his company’s managers and employees regarding the British Standard BS 
7799 is high. This could be because his company has 27001 certification (Table 4.53 
in Chapter 4). He believed that compliance with the standard provides a framework or 
guidance to the company to ensure that it is looking seriously for all areas of security, 
and it gives security assurance to clients. He remarked:
“It provides a framework to guide us to ensure that we are looking and thinking o f all 
security areas. It is also good to demonstrate to our clients that we take information 
security seriously. It costs money to get and keep it going. We use it, we feel we are aware, 
we use it in the same way we used ISO 90019. The clients need to be happy that we 
demonstrate that we actually focus on security”.
This opinion supported Thorp (2004) who argued that this standard provides a good 
guidance and a framework within which to build an information security system. 
Myler and Broadbent (2006) also pointed out that the standard provides a framework 
to establish risk assessment methods, polices, controls, and countermeasures.
AIS security effectiveness: Interviewee I confirmed the use of internal and external 
audits to evaluate security effectiveness within the company. He commented:
“We audit, and we are audited by our external auditors and by our clients’ auditors as 
well. Some of our clients have a risk and compliance manager and their responsibility is to 
produce reports for the clients ”.
9 ISO 9001 (2000) is the Quality Management Systems -  Requirements. This standard specifies the 
requirements for a quality management system (ISO 2000).
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He also emphasised people awareness and number of security incidents such as virus 
and spam, as his company’s success indicators of security management. He 
commented:
“The most important one is ‘thepeople know about information security management’; to 
know we have got a security team, where to go to report incidents, etc. Also the indicators 
include the low level o f virus problems, low level o f spam, low level o f security incidents
On the other hand, he believed that the lack of support, awareness and commitment of 
senior management is the top obstacle of effective security within the company.
5.13.3 AIS security threats
Interviewee I believed that the loss of clients’ data is the most serious security threat 
facing the company given that it could damage its integrity. He also believed that loss 
of data, particularly data on portable laptops and memory sticks, is his company’s 
most frequent threat. Lin (2006) argued that besides being expensive, laptops often 
contain corporate data, access codes to company networks and sensitive information. 
Zambroski (2006) also stated that laptops could be lost or sold with financial and 
personal data remaining on the hard drive. In addition, O’Hanley (2004) indicated that 
handheld devices still lack adequate security controls and are more easily lost by their 
owners. Moreover, Scott (2008) argued that with all the worry about phishers and 
thieves, the biggest problem in keeping data safe is still laptops left in cars and other 
locations by employees. The biggest issue now for government agencies and private 
companies is how to maintain the security of their laptops. For example, Skipton 
Financial Services (SFS) has breached the Data Protection Act after an unencrypted 
laptop containing 14000 customer records was stolen from one of its contractors. The 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) believed the company should have had 
encryption in place to limit the damage (Anonymous 2008 c). Consequently, the UK 
government has banned laptops leaving government buildings unless their contents 
are encrypted (Golden 2008).
In addition, interviewee I cited employees as the most common security threat within 
his company, and the theft or loss of customer data as the company’s most likely 
security threat over the next few years.
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5.13.4 AIS security controls
Interviewee I stated that recently his company reviewed the remote access controls in 
place. He commented:
“We did a thorough review o f remote access that has taken place in the company i.e. 
everybody who connects in from outside the company, working from home, from other 
offices, etc. ”.
This opinion supported Healey (2008) who stated that remote employees are their 
companies’ biggest threat, among all users. In addition, this opinion is consistent with 
the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which indicated that 
UK companies open their systems to access from outside their physical network 
boundaries, which opens up their core networks to unauthorised outsiders. The survey 
also indicated that technology companies are most likely to have additional security 
over their remote access.
Furthermore, interviewee I identified data encryption as the gap between his 
company’s security threats and controls. He stated:
“Yes, encryption o f data is a gap. I don’t think we protect our data enough. We need to 
protect the data, so that if  a laptop is lost, the data in it are useless to anybody ”.
Golden (2008) pointed out that the use of laptops, often by mobile workers has 
generated many of the companies’ most serious security threats. Laptops have always 
been easy to steal and easy to lose. Today, however, the implications are much greater 
because they generally store much more data than before. Consequently, the volume 
of potential information loss has significantly increased. Moreover, given the endless 
incidents of the loss of laptops containing sensitive data, the UK government has 
banned laptops leaving government buildings unless the contents are encrypted. 
Moulds (2008) indicated that encryption is a mechanism to add a tighter layer of 
access control. By encrypting sensitive data within an application or storage 
environment, a user wishing to read information not only has to have rights to access 
the data but must also have the ability to decrypt that data.
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Moreover, interviewee I cited data encryption, protection of sensitive databases, and 
restricting users’ access to data and systems as the most important security controls. 
He stated:
“Encryption o f data and better security on sensitive database. Sometimes people have too 
much access to these data, as a part o f their job, they need it, but we must not allow too 
much access, we allow them only what they require for getting their work done. Someone 
will need to take a copy o f the whole database, he may need it, but I need to know about it, 
and I have to query him and ask why he took a copy o f i t”.
This opinion supported Swartz (2007) who argued that many companies give 
employees too much access. However, it is better to give insiders as much access as 
they need to do their jobs, but no more. Consequently, monitoring user access to 
critical information and detecting any unauthorised access are critical steps all 
companies should take to protect their information adequately. This opinion also 
supported the ‘need to know principle’ mentioned by Ward and Smith (2002) who 
suggested the necessity to provide access to systems and information based on 
employees’ defined role within the company.
On the other hand, interviewee I believed that the security level within his company 
would be the same next year given that his company was not planning to put any new 
controls in place.
To conclude, this technology company has a framework for managing their AIS 
security. However, there is no formal security training within the company, and they 
are not measuring or monitoring staff awareness. The interviewee believed that the 
awareness level could be better if there was a sufficient budget for security. The 
overall awareness level of the managers and employees regarding the British Standard 
BS 7799 is high. This could be because the company has 27001 certification. The loss 
of clients’ data, particularly data on portable laptops and memory sticks, is the most 
serious security threat and .the most frequent threat facing the company given that it 
could damage its integrity. On the other hand, most recently the company reviewed 
the remote access controls in place; however, data encryption was identified as the 
gap between the company’s security threats and controls.
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5.14 Summary of the chapter
This chapter began by presenting the selection of interviewees, how they were 
contacted, and the date, time and duration of each interview. It proceeded with 
discussing the approach used in analysing interview data, and how the qualitative data 
analysis software (NVivo) was used to support Miles and Huberman’s approach in the 
current study. The profile of the interviewees and the main characteristics of their 
companies were then discussed.
The chapter then presented the main findings of each of the nine interviews, together 
with the interviewees’ opinions concerning the elements of their companies’ AIS 
security management framework, the most common sources, types, and most frequent 
security threats facing their companies, and the different types of security controls 
implemented in their companies to reduce security threats.
A security policy is a wide ranging document for managing the business as a whole, 
managing it securely and protecting its information (Woodward 2000). Interviewees’ 
opinions confirmed the questionnaire findings regarding the existence and frequency 
of updating their security policy. The results showed that a security policy now exists 
in the majority of the companies responded regardless of the industry sector, and the 
majority are updating it every year. The results also showed that the ultimate 
responsibility of the policy is now with the management or board of directors, who 
delegate some responsibilities to other departments such as security department, risk 
assurance department, and IT department. In addition, companies’ intranet is now the 
most common cost effective means of distributing their security policy among 
employees.
Whitman (2003) indicated that the awareness programs seek to keep security on the 
minds of employees as they deal with vital information on a daily basis. Interviewees’ 
opinions confirmed the .questionnaire findings regarding security training and 
awareness programs. The results indicated that although some sectors are taking steps 
to provide their employees with security training and to raise their security awareness 
for instance the insurance & financial services sector, there is still much to be done in 
the companies in this respect. The results also suggest that despite the non-existence of 
a formal security training program in the majority of companies, there is wide
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agreement of the importance of security training for new employees, which is a part of 
their induction program. Moreover, the companies responded find it more practical and 
cost-effective to do security training and awareness online, via the intranet or through 
publishing some articles covering different security issues on their web page. The 
results are consistent with the study undertaken by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (Enisa 2007) in which companies believed that the 
benefits of the computer-based training and awareness include cost effectiveness, 
consistency of delivery, and the ability to measure the results.
Regarding risk assessment, the results are encouraging given that all interviewees 
believed that their companies are undertaking a security risk assessment, not only for 
their IS or AIS, but for the company as a whole. In addition, the majority of companies 
responded now have a certain manager or team, specifically, for undertaking risk 
assessment tasks and in some instances, they seek the support of external consultants to 
ensure compliance with regulations. Tchankova (2002) stated that risk management is a 
continuous process that depends directly on the change of a company’s internal and 
external environment. Since the nature and degree of threats to companies vary, the risk 
levels are not static, and the technological vulnerabilities are uncovered over time. The 
risk assessment is undertaken in two ways, either formally on a regular basis, at least 
once a year, or informally on an ongoing basis or when required, and the majority of 
companies use a well-developed risk assessment process, regardless of the industry 
sector. Moreover, the results suggest that although almost all companies responded 
believed that the security risk level is moderate or low, and it is predictable, risks can 
change and consequently they are not confident of the future.
As predicted, interviewees’ opinions regarding security incidents that occurred within 
their companies in the last two years were not consistent with the questionnaire 
findings in which only 17.2 percent of companies stated that they had experienced 
security incidents in the last year, whereas 82.8 percent claimed that they had not 
experienced any security incidents in the last year. The majority of interviewees stated 
that their companies had suffered from some security incidents in the last year. 
However, the majority of companies reacted, and contained the incidents very 
quickly, which prevented them from becoming major incidents. This result may be 
either because the security level had improved in the last year compared to two years
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ago, so the number of companies suffering from security incidents had decreased, or 
because many companies were reluctant to report their security incidents in a 
questionnaire to a stranger.
The results suggest that although interviewees reported different serious security 
incidents that could happen in their companies e.g. financial fraud, the failure to 
recover from a disaster, accidental damage to IS, virus or malware attacks that shut 
down the whole system, hackers, and disgruntled employees, the loss of customer 
information remains the biggest fear for the majority of companies.
On the other hand, the results confirmed the questionnaire findings regarding the 
existence of security incident handling procedures, and the existence and frequency of 
testing and updating the business continuity plan, which emphasised the importance 
of these procedures and plans in the face of any security incident.
Ryan and Ryan (2006) argued that making decisions concerning investments in 
security requires a calculation of the net benefits expected from the investment. 
However, because security is at its best when nothing happens, it is difficult to 
measure or quantify. Interviewees’ opinions confirmed the questionnaire findings that 
the majority of companies responded do not have a separate security budget, but they 
have the security budget within their IT budget, and this represents nearly 5 percent or 
less of the IT budget. The results also suggest that there is no separate budget 
specifically for AIS security. Interviewees’ opinions also confirmed the questionnaire 
findings regarding the companies’ top areas of spending on security. The results 
indicate that the majority of companies responded spend the biggest part of their 
security budget on software security controls, physical security controls and on 
security testing.
Moreover, interviewees’ opinions highlighted the fact that the overall awareness level 
of the two parts of the British Standard BS 7799 is still low among managers and 
employees in UK companies, except for those managers who have a professional 
security qualification. Interviewees’ opinions also indicated that the majority of 
companies responded are not certified under ISO 27001, and are not planning to be 
certified, and even those who are certified cannot see much benefit from this
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certification. The majority believe that it requires much time, effort and money, it is 
not mandated by any regulatory body or authority, and consequently it is not 
necessary to be certified. However, the majority emphasised the usefulness of 
complying with the standard.
Interviewees’ opinions also confirmed the questionnaire findings regarding techniques 
used to measure security effectiveness; however, they were not consistent with the 
findings concerning the most important success indicators of their companies’ 
security management. The results suggest that the majority of companies responded 
depend on the internal and external audits to evaluate their security effectiveness, 
followed by penetration testing, risk assessment, number of security incidents, and the 
security awareness level among employees. In addition, the results emphasised the 
number of security incidents and employees’ awareness as the most important success 
indicators of security management cited by the majority of companies. The results 
also revealed that the majority of companies in different sectors, except for the 
insurance & financial services sector, were not sufficiently confident about the 
effectiveness level of their security management, which was consistent with the 
questionnaire findings.
The results confirmed the questionnaire findings concerning the most common 
sources, types, and most frequent security threats facing the companies. The results 
revealed that employees are the most common security threat in terms of failing to 
follow procedures, having too much access to systems and information, misusing the 
internet, or intentionally undertaking malicious activities. Moreover, people were 
cited as the most frequent security threat facing the majority of companies through 
their unintentional errors or mistakes, data leakage, financial fraud in terms of 
phishing and spamming attacks, and downtime. In addition, the results suggest that 
employees and loss of customer information are likely to be the main concerns of the 
majority of companies responded over the next few years, while some companies are 
concerned about customers, mobile devices such as mobile phones, laptops, memory 
sticks, and the internal fraud as well.
Although the majority of companies have begun to recognise the human factor in all 
aspects of information security, interviewees’ opinions showed that they are still
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focusing on the solid security technologies alone to counter their security threats e.g. 
employees, and they underestimate the importance of security standards and their 
commitment to raising employees’ awareness. Dutta and McCrohan (2002) argued 
that if the gap between expectations and reality is large, and if the companies have not 
exercised due diligence in protecting their systems and information, they will 
encounter significant corporate, and possibly personal liability. The majority of 
companies were confident that they had enough security controls in place, believing 
there was no need for more controls, and therefore, no gap existed between their 
security threats and the controls implemented. On the other hand, a few companies 
believed that a gap existed between threats and controls, mainly due to funding 
reasons. Finally, the results showed that the majority of companies responded were 
confident that the security level would improve in the next year, which indicates that 
these companies are taking security seriously and are spending more time and effort in 
improving their security level.
The following chapter concludes the research, summarises its main findings and 
presents some recommendations drawn from these findings. The limitations of the 
study are also highlighted along with the future research possibilities.
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Chapter 6 
Summary and conclusion
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 was concerned with discussing the main findings derived from the semi­
structured interviews. It presented the selection of interviewees, and the data analysis 
methods of the interviews. It also provided the opinions of the interviewees on AIS 
security within their companies.
This chapter concludes the research, summarises its main findings and presents some 
recommendations drawn from these findings. This chapter comprises seven sections. 
Section 6.2 reviews the research aims and objectives. The data collection methods 
used in the current research are presented in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 provides a 
summary of the main findings of the research. Section 6.5 indicates the limitations of 
the research, while Section 6.6 presents the recommendations drawn from the research 
findings. Section 6.7 suggests some areas for future research, and finally Section 6.8 
concludes the research.
6.2 Aims of the research
The security issue has received considerable attention from both academics and 
professionals. IS security has become a part of core business processes in companies 
of all sizes and types, and it has become more vital than ever that companies need to 
have an organised, efficient, and proactive security approach to their IS (Booker 
2006). In the UK, the priority given to security remains high across all companies. 
According to the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), four 
fifths of companies believe that information security is a high or very high priority to 
their senior management. In addition, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ 19th Annual Top Technology Initiatives Survey (AICPA 2008) 
indicated that information security management is a key factor in doing business. For 
six consecutive years, the survey identified information security as the country’s 
number one technology concern.
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However, while the importance of AIS security is being increasingly recognised, a 
number of significant gaps exist, particularly in the academic literature. For example, 
security research is fragmented and no comprehensive framework exists. In addition, 
while a number of surveys have been conducted to investigate different security 
issues, they have been commercially oriented surveys and not formal academic 
studies. Moreover, the literature review reveals that there are different dimensions for 
security - technical and non-technical - that have to work together to create a secure 
environment. However, much research on AIS security has been focused on the 
technical aspects with limited consideration of the non-technical such as security 
policy, training and awareness, and consequently, lacks an overall view of the AIS 
security issue. Wood (1995) argued that, no matter how sophisticated the information 
security technology is, controls will not be sustainable unless the human factor has 
been adequately addressed. Chang and Yeh (2006) also indicated that effective 
information security should address both IT and non-IT related issues instead of 
simply considering IT aspects of the AIS. More recently, Kritzinger and Smith (2008) 
stated that technical and non-technical security issues should be balanced to ensure 
that the technical issues do not overshadow the non-technical issues so that the human 
side of information security is adequately addressed when developing a common body 
of knowledge for security suited to industry. Moreover, each of the previous studies 
addresses only one security dimension.
The current study is therefore an attempt to fill these gaps and to present an integrated 
view of the AIS security in UK companies by addressing both the technical and non­
technical aspects of security. More specifically, the current study intends to achieve 
the following objectives:
1. To examine the existence of an adequate management framework of AIS security 
within UK companies in different industry sectors.
2. To investigate the different types of AIS security threats facing UK companies in 
different industry sectors.
3. To investigate the security controls implemented by UK companies to prevent or 
reduce security threats.
4. To investigate the effect of the security controls implemented on the reduction of 
AIS security threats facing UK companies.
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5. To investigate the relationship between AIS security effectiveness of UK 
companies and their AIS security threats level.
6. To examine the security perception among different industry sectors in the UK.
In order to achieve these objectives, five hypotheses were developed (Section 3.2.4 in 
Chapter 3). These hypotheses addressed the different types of threats facing UK 
companies in different industry sectors, different types of controls implemented to 
prevent or reduce these threats, and the existence of AIS security management 
framework within companies in different industry sectors.
6.3 Data collection methods of the current research
In order to test the research hypotheses, the current study employed quantitative and 
qualitative approaches using a postal questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. 
The first stage involved a postal questionnaire. This method was chosen because of its 
specific relevance to the nature of this study as well as the advantages it poses 
compared to other research methods (Section 3.6.1). Moreover, it is the most popular 
method used in previous research into IS security such as Abu-Musa (2004a and b), 
Chang and Ho (2006), Henry (1997), Hitchings (1995), Hong et al. (2006), Huang et 
al. (2006), Kankanhalli et al. (2003), Kotulic and Clark (2004), Loch et al. (1992), 
Ryan and Bordoloi (1997), Whitman (2004), and Yeh and Chang (2007).
The final version of the questionnaire was sent by post to the IT managers of 800 UK 
listed companies in several industry sectors. A total of 104 responses were received. 
However, 65 questionnaires were usable for statistical analysis, resulting in a usable 
response rate of 8.1 percent (Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). As was mentioned in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.6.1), the first and most important problem of using a postal questionnaire 
is the poor response rate as identified and experienced by many IS security 
researchers (Table 3.3 in Chapter 3) particularly when dealing with very sensitive and 
intrusive security issues.
The frequency distribution tables and the cross-tabulations were used in the current 
study as the first step in data analysis. As the analysis progressed beyond the 
descriptive stage, the researcher applied the non-parametric tests for many reasons.
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First, the sample size in the current study is small. Second, the data collected are 
nominal and ordinal. Third, non-parametric techniques require no assumptions about 
the shapes of the sampled populations. Fourth, the sample in the current study was 
made up of observations from seven industry sectors. Consequently, Kruskal-Wallis 
One-Way Analysis of Variance, Chi-Square Test of Independence, and Spearman’s 
Rank Correlation were used to analyse the data of the questionnaire. Then, a series of 
stepwise regressions were run in an attempt to identify the significant effect of the 
different types of security controls implemented in UK companies and the security 
effectiveness level on the reduction of the companies’ AIS security threats (Section
4.3 in Chapter 4).
The second stage involved semi-structured interviews. Interviews have become 
increasingly recommended and utilised in IS research in general and AIS security in 
particular such as Keller et al. (2005), Mitchell et al. (1999), Straub and Welke 
(1998), and Tryfonas et al. (2001). In the current study, the main empirical base is 
made up of the questionnaire, and the qualitative phase - interviews - serves to add 
illustrative support to the questionnaire findings and to clarify some aspects that the 
quantitative data have not brought to light. As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.6.2.1), at the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to provide their 
contact details if they were willing to participate in a follow-up face-to-face interview 
to discuss some security matters in more depth. In total, nine interviews were 
conducted with managers of nine UK listed companies in different industry sectors. It 
seems that the sample size is small, but it is not surprising that only nine respondents 
were willing to participate in the study. According to Kotulic and Clark (2004), the 
security investigation research is the most intrusive type of research, and there is 
undoubtedly a general mistrust of any outsider attempting to gain data about the 
actions of the security practitioner community. The researcher believes that the 
opinions provided by the nine managers are, to a great extent, enough to confirm the 
general patterns appeared in the questionnaire results. The interviews lasted between 
one and three hours (Table 5.1 in Chapter 5). The researcher took some notes in 
addition to audio recording all the interviews. The researcher transcribed the 
interviews in full and used the qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) to support 
Miles and Huberman’s approach in analysing the interview data (Section 5.3 in 
Chapter 5).
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6.4 Main findings of the research
The findings of the current research are presented in three main sections. First, the 
management framework of AIS security within UK companies; second, AIS security 
threats facing UK companies in different industry sectors; and finally, AIS security 
controls implemented by UK companies to prevent or reduce security threats.
6.4.1 The management framework of AIS security
A review of the literature revealed that companies and their AIS are subject to 
increasing numbers and types of security threats. Consequently, the importance of an 
AIS security management framework has become evident, and companies now strive 
to establish effective security management practices. AIS security management is a 
stream of management activities that aim to protect the AIS and create a framework 
within which AIS operates as expected by the company (Eloff and Von Solms 2000). 
The security management framework in the current study includes the security policy, 
security training and awareness, risk assessment, incident handling, disaster recovery 
and business continuity plans, security budget, security standards and certification, 
and AIS security effectiveness.
Table 6.1 Results o f the existence of a management framework for AIS security
Hypotheses Questionnaire results Interview results Remarks
Hl.l:  There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
existence of an AIS 
security policy and the 
frequency of updating 
this policy.
HI. 1 cannot be 
rejected.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
Some sectors such as 
the energy & utilities 
and media & 
entertainment do not 
devote enough efforts 
to updating their 
security policy.
HI. 2: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
existence of an AIS 
security training and 
awareness program 
and the security 
awareness level.
HI.2 cannot be rejected 
regarding the existence 
of an AIS security 
training program. 
However, the results 
showed that there are 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors regarding the 
communication of 
security awareness 
issues in response to 
specific incidents.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The results suggest that 
although some sectors 
are taking steps to 
provide their 
employees with 
security training and to 
raise their awareness, 
security training is still 
the most neglected 
security practice in the 
majority of companies 
compared to other 
security practices.
HI. 3: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies
The results provide 
strong support for 
HI. 3.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The majority of 
companies are 
undertaking a broad
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in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
existence of an AIS 
risk assessment 
program and the 
frequency of 
undertaking this 
program.
risk assessment for the 
whole company and 
not just for AIS 
security in particular.
HI. 4: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
existence of security 
incident handling 
procedures, disaster 
recovery and business 
continuity plans and 
the frequency of testing 
and updating these 
plans.
HI. 4 cannot be 
rejected.
The results are not 
consistent with the 
questionnaire findings, 
given that the 
interviews revealed that 
the majority of 
companies that 
responded had 
experienced security 
incidents in the last two 
years.
The results showed that 
the only companies 
who stated that they 
had more than 15 
security incidents in the 
last year were from the 
insurance & financial 
services sector, while 
the other sectors had 
from one to five 
security incidents.
HI. 5: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
existence of a security 
budget and areas of 
spending on AIS 
security.
HI. 5 cannot be rejected 
regarding the existence 
of a security budget. 
However, the results 
showed that there are 
significant differences 
in the distribution of 
responses among 
industry sectors 
regarding the hardware 
and physical security 
controls.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The majority of 
companies that 
responded do not have 
a separate security 
budget. In addition, 
there is no separate 
budget specifically for 
AIS security.
HI.6: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
awareness level o f the 
British Standard for 
Information Security 
Management BS 7799 
and the certification 
under ISO 27001.
The results provide 
strong support for 
HI. 6.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The overall awareness 
of the British Standard 
BS 7799 in UK 
companies that 
responded is low, 
whereas the awareness 
level is somewhat 
higher among those 
managers who have a 
professional security 
qualification, and 
among some IT staff.
HI. 7: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
techniques used to 
evaluate AIS security 
effectiveness, the 
success indicators of 
AIS security 
management, and the 
effectiveness level of 
AIS security 
management.
The results provide a 
strong support to HI. 7.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
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6.4.1.1 AIS security policy
In line with the results of previous studies (BERR 2008; Fulford and Doherty 2003), 
the questionnaire findings (Table 4.10 in Chapter 4) revealed that the majority of UK 
companies that responded have a written security policy, and 58.7 percent of 
companies updated their security policy every year (Table 4.11). The interviews 
confirmed these findings; however, they revealed that some companies still do not 
have a security policy, but they have a whole policy of which security is a part. On the 
other hand, despite the importance of updating and reviewing the security policy, 
interviewee E from the utilities sector stated that the security policy had not been 
updated for nearly five years, and another interviewee (G) from an entertainment 
company believed that his company had never updated the security policy.
The results of the interviews also indicated that companies shared two common 
means for distributing the security policy, either in a hard copy in the induction of 
new employees or via the intranet or the companies’ internal website, which is 
considered the most cost-effective way of distributing the policy on current 
employees. However, the scope of security policy varies according to the objectives 
and requirements of the different companies that responded.
Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) argued that it is no use having a perfect security 
policy if it is not possible to monitor and enforce compliance to such a policy. The 
results showed that the companies use different techniques to check employee 
compliance with the policy; however, the most common techniques used are auditing 
and employee monitoring. Interestingly, the majority of interviewees believed that 
their companies’ security policy was effective, whereas one interviewee (C) from the 
property sector claimed that the policy was not effective given that people were 
always breaking the rules to get their work done.
Overall, the results (Table 6.1) indicate that AIS security policy is now available in 
the majority of UK companies that responded regardless of the industry sector. 
However, some sectors such as the energy & utilities and media & entertainment do 
not devote enough efforts to updating their security policy. Tracy (2007) argued that, 
it is not enough to establish a security policy. The rapid increase in new threats, 
frequent and extensive changes to IT environments and new requirements for
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regulatory compliance mean that companies need to be proactive and to perpetually 
update and enforce their policies.
6.4.1.2 Security training and awareness program
There is wide agreement in the literature regarding the important role of the security 
training and awareness programs in companies, given that employees are often the 
weakest link in security and the cause of many security threats (Chen et a l 2008; 
Goucher 2008; IF AC 1998; Vroom and Von Solms 2004). Peltier (2005) argued that 
an effective security program cannot be implemented without implementing an 
employee awareness and training program to address policy, procedures and tools. In 
addition, awareness of the risks and available controls is the first line of defence for IS 
security (OECD 2002).
Despite this importance, the questionnaire findings (Chapter 4) suggested that UK 
companies that responded still do not make enough effort to train their employees and 
raise their security awareness. The results (Section 4.5.2) revealed that 29 percent of 
companies provide security training for their managers (Table 4.14), 25.8 percent 
provide training for their employees (Table 4.15), whereas only 17.2 percent provide 
training for the other users such as third parties and contractors (Table 4.16). The 
results also revealed that some sectors are taking more steps to provide their managers 
and employees with security training and to raise their awareness (e.g. the insurance & 
financial services) than other sectors (e.g. the property & construction and 
manufacturing). In fact, there is a wide agreement that financial services companies are 
more concerned with security than the other companies. Goodhue and Straub (1991) 
stated that financial services companies are more likely than other companies to rely 
extensively on AIS for their operations. Consequently, they tend to have a greater 
concern for AIS security due to large potential losses that may occur from AIS security 
abuses. In addition, Holmes (2006) argued that the financial services sector must adhere 
to the most stringent information security laws, and therefore it leads other sectors in 
following proven, strategic security practices.
The interviews confirmed the questionnaire findings. Interviewee C stated:
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“I worked in banks before. In banks, they are much more aggressive about testing that 
people are aware and understand the rules, since they are regulated by the FSA (Financial 
Services Authority)
However, the results indicated that despite the non-existence of a formal security 
training program in the majority of companies for current employees, there is wide 
agreement of the importance of security training for new employees, which is a part of 
their induction program. In addition, it is not practical to have annual classroom 
training for current employees due to the time and cost constraints, and consequently, 
companies depend on computer-based training via the intranet or through publishing 
some articles covering different security issues on the companies’ web pages. However, 
some companies combine this computer-based training with other media such as 
classroom, one-to-one basis, and regular meetings.
Despite the importance of measuring staff security awareness, the questionnaire 
findings (Table 4.21) revealed that only 28.6 percent of companies agreed or strongly 
agreed that they conduct regular testing of security awareness. The interviews 
confirmed these findings and suggested that the majority of companies are not making 
enough effort to test their employees’ security awareness or to measure the effect of the 
training program on the company. This might be due to the limited time and resources 
devoted to security training and awareness, and the difficulty companies found in 
measuring their employees’ security awareness level. Given that security awareness is 
about people’s behaviours and these are always hard to measure, it is a challenging area 
for most companies (Enisa 2007). Consequently, it is not surprising that the majority of 
interviewees believed that the overall security awareness level within their companies is 
medium or just satisfactory.
Overall, the results (Table 6.1) suggest that although some sectors are taking steps to 
provide their employees with security training and to raise their awareness such as 
insurance & financial services, security training is still the most neglected security 
practice in the majority of companies compared to other security practices. 
Consequently, there is much to be done in UK companies that responded, particularly 
with the increasing number of security incidents in the press everyday.
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6.4.1.3 Risk assessment
Given that companies are exposed to unlimited security risks, there is wide agreement 
regarding the important role of risk assessment to enable risks to be identified, 
evaluated, and managed. Once a company has the ability to measure its security risks, 
it has the power to identify and implement appropriate controls based on its real 
business needs (Kleinfeld 2006). The questionnaire findings (Table 4.23 in Chapter 4) 
revealed that 64.4 percent of companies that responded have an AIS risk assessment 
program, and all interviewees believed that their companies are undertaking security 
risk assessment. This may be because the majority of companies are undertaking a 
broad risk assessment for the whole company and not just for AIS security in 
particular. Moreover, the majority of interviewees believed that the different security 
practices could be applied to all systems within companies and not specifically for 
AIS. The results (Table 6.1) also showed that the media & entertainment sector has 
become more concerned with security and is taking more steps to assess security 
risks, given that all respondents from this sector have a risk assessment program.
Moreover, there is broad agreement, not only in the literature, but also in practice 
regarding the importance of continuous security risk assessment in companies. The 
questionnaire findings (Table 4.24) revealed that 86.1 percent of companies are 
undertaking risk assessment every year or more frequently and all interviewees 
confirmed this finding and stated that risk assessment is undertaken formally at least 
once a year and informally on a continuous basis. For example, interviewees from the 
insurance & financial services sector believed that their companies undertake risk 
assessment on a quarterly basis. This is not surprising, given that insurance & 
financial services companies are regulated by the Financial Services Authority, and 
they have to undertake and report their risks regularly.
Given that threats vary over time, companies are more concerned with reassessing their 
security risks, and with reconsidering the effectiveness of their security controls. The 
results revealed that the majority of UK companies that responded have a certain 
manager or team, specifically for undertaking risk assessment tasks, such as a risk 
management team or an operational risk team and in some instances, they seek the 
support of external consultants.
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Lichtenstein (1996) argued that since each company possesses its own characteristics, 
an ideal risk assessment that would suit all companies does not exist. The results also 
showed that the majority of companies have a well developed risk management 
process. Some companies use a matrix or certain scale to assess their security risks, 
whereas other companies assess their risks against standards and baselines such as ISO 
27001. Moreover, almost all companies that responded believed that they rarely have 
high risks. They are confident that their risk level is medium to low and is predictable. 
However, since risks are changeable, they are not confident of the future.
Overall, the results suggested that these companies are devoting much time and effort to 
undertaking security risk assessment compared to other security practices. This could 
be because risk assessment and reporting have become obligatory for most UK listed 
companies.
6.4.1.4 Incident response, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
It is hard to ignore the stream of security incidents covering the daily news. For 
example, in November 2007, a UK government department, HM Revenue & 
Customs, lost two discs containing 25 million records - the whole child benefit 
database (Anonymous 2008 a), a laptop containing unencrypted information on about 
600000 potential recruits was stolen from a Royal Navy officer’s car on January 2008, 
and the bank details of about 3500 people were included on the laptop. Moreover, 
Marks & Spencer has been ordered to ensure all company hard drives are encrypted 
by April 2008. The enforcement from the ICO (Information Commissioner Office) 
came after the theft of an unencrypted laptop containing the personal information of 
26000 employees (Anonymous 2008 b). It is, therefore, vital for all types of 
companies to have security incident handling procedures to deal with these incidents 
and to react quickly to any disruption in normal business operations.
Interestingly, the results of the interviews revealed that the majority of companies that 
responded had experienced security incidents in the last two years; however, they 
believed that they were able to react and contain the incidents very quickly. This 
result is not consistent with the questionnaire findings (Table 4.31 in Chapter 4) in 
which only 17.2 percent of companies stated that they had experienced security 
incidents in the last year, whereas 82.8 percent claimed that they did not have any
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incidents in the last year. This result may be either because the security level had 
improved in the last year compared to two years before, or most probably because 
many companies were reluctant to report their security incidents in a questionnaire to 
a stranger to maintain their reputation. This opinion supports the results of previous 
studies such as BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008), Fenrich 
(2008), Whitman (2004), etc.
The results interestingly revealed that the only companies who stated that they had 
more than 15 security incidents in the last year were from the insurance & financial 
services sector, while the other sectors had from one to five security incidents (Table 
4.32). The results of the interviews are consistent with the questionnaire findings, 
given that interviewee F from the financial services sector believed that the average 
number of security incidents experienced by his company between 2005 and 2007 
was nearly 50 incidents per year. This result could be because insurance & financial 
services companies devote more time and effort to training their staff and raising their 
awareness. Consequently, employees are more aware of the security incidents they are 
suffering from. Interviewee A from the insurance sector stated:
“ There is a complex relationship between security awareness and the number o f incidents.
Once people become aware o f security, the number o f incidents recognised increases, 
because if  people have no security awareness, they are not aware that they are making 
mistakes. There is a relationship between security awareness and incident level. According 
to the classic model, security awareness will rise, and the number o f incidents also rises ”.
Moreover, the results showed that UK companies that responded suffered from 
different types of security incidents in the last year such as financial fraud, 
unauthorised access to data or system by current or former employees, virus attacks, 
data loss and internet misuse (Table 4.33). The interviews confirmed the questionnaire 
findings and cited other types of incidents as well for example the inappropriate use of 
mobile devices such as USB sticks, phishing attacks, abuse of computers, theft of 
laptops and the loss of service or downtime. Further analysis revealed that the 
majority of the industry sectors suffered from financial fraud and loss of data or 
laptops. This result is consistent with previous surveys (BERR 2008) which indicated 
that over half of large UK companies had a staff computer fraud in the last year. In 
addition, the CSI Survey (Richardson 2007) stated that financial fraud together with 
data loss account for nearly half the overall reported losses.
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Given the stream of incidents of data leakage and theft, and the loss of laptops 
containing financial and sensitive information, it is not surprising that the majority of 
interviewees considered data loss as the worst security incident that could happen to 
their companies. Consequently, UK companies that responded are beginning to 
address this problem and to implement appropriate security controls to prevent data 
from falling into the wrong hands.
The questionnaire findings revealed that the majority of companies have formal 
security incident handling procedures in place, except for the manufacturing 
companies in which only one third have formal procedures (Table 4.34). Interviewees 
confirmed these findings, and almost all interviewees believed that there are formal 
procedures within their companies to handle any security incident. These results are 
consistent with the results in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 (Chapter 4) in which nearly half 
of the manufacturing companies have a security policy and 80 percent do nothing to 
train their managers and employees on their security responsibilities. These results 
indicate that manufacturing is the sector least concerned with AIS security.
The results also indicated that the majority of UK companies that responded took just 
one day to restore normal operations after a serious security incident (Table 4.35). 
However, the only companies that spent between a week and a month to restore their 
operations after a serious incident are from the insurance & financial services and 
energy & utilities sectors. This could be because these two sectors deal with 
thousands of customer data, and therefore, if any security incident arises, it takes them 
weeks to restore normal operations. Moreover, after a security incident, the majority 
of companies improve their disaster recovery and business continuity plan, update 
their security policy, or undertake a security audit (Table 4.36). However, Table 4.37 
revealed that all the technology & telecommunications companies improve security 
awareness and training after a security incident, in contrast to the manufacturing 
companies that do not make any effort to improve security awareness. This result 
confirmed a previous result (Section 4.5.2 in Chapter 4) in which the manufacturing 
sector is the least likely to provide staff with the relevant security training. 
Interviewees confirmed these findings and reported other actions as well such as 
investigating the incident, reviewing risks, checking existing controls, improving
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procedures, amending practices and standards, reviewing the policy, communicating 
the incident to employees, and learning from incidents.
There is wide agreement in the literature that many security incidents go unreported 
because o f the fear o f negative publicity (Allen 2006; Olnes 1994; Richardson 2007; 
Willison and Backhouse 2006). The results indicated that the majority of companies 
that responded prefer to maintain their brand and to deal with security incidents 
internally even if  these incidents cost them time and money, except the insurance & 
financial services companies which are obligated to report their security incidents to 
the relevant authorities such as FSA, ICO, BBA, otherwise they will be fined.
On the other hand, the questionnaire findings (Table 4.38) and the interviews showed 
that the business continuity plan is now a common document within almost all 
companies. This could be because the severe floods that took place in July 2007 
highlighted the business continuity threats that companies could face, or companies 
have the desire to be certified under the new British Standard BS 25999 that covers 
business continuity. In addition, Table 4.39 revealed that the majority of companies 
test and review their business continuity plan every year or more frequently. 
Interviewees confirmed these findings and indicated that all companies, regardless of 
the industry sector, are formally testing their business continuity plan at least once a 
year, in addition to informal tests throughout the year, which highlights the 
importance of this plan for all types o f companies in today’s business environment.
It is encouraging also that the majority of interviewees believed that their companies 
were effective in detecting and responding to security incidents. However, a few 
companies admitted they were less confident as there is no guarantee that something 
unexpected will not happen tomorrow.
6.4.1.5 Security budget
There is wide agreement that spending the right amount on information security 
continues to challenge UK businesses (DTI 2006), since over-expenditure reduces 
profitability, while under-investment can leave the business exposed. In addition, 
security is still perceived to be an IT issue; therefore, most companies do not have a 
security budget separate from their IT budget. The questionnaire findings (Table 4.41
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in Chapter 4) and the interviews indicated that the majority of UK companies that 
responded do not have a separate security budget; however, they have the security 
budget within their IT budget, and this represents nearly 5 percent or less of the IT 
budget. The results also revealed that there is no separate budget specifically for AIS 
security (Table 6.1).
In addition, the results revealed that the security spending decision is based either on 
the requirements o f each company or is a part of the company’s annual business plan. 
Moreover, the approval o f the security budget is undertaken by different directors 
such as IT director, financial director, CIO; and the ultimate responsibility of 
approving and signing the budget is for the board of directors.
Furthermore, interviewees’ opinions regarding the top areas of spending on security 
confirmed the questionnaire findings (Table 4.46) which revealed that software 
security controls were considered the first area of spending, followed by hardware and 
physical security controls, audit activities, incident response and business continuity. 
However, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.47) did not indicate any 
statistically significant differences in the distribution of responses among sectors 
except for hardware and physical security controls, which indicates that some sectors 
such as insurance & financial services are depending on these controls and are 
spending on them more than the other sectors. In addition, some companies believe 
their security spending level is not enough and they need a higher security budget, 
while others believe that it is adequate according to the industry benchmarks. On the 
other hand, other companies believe that security spending is enough and there is no 
need for more spending. However, the results showed that senior management who 
often lacks security awareness always takes decisions concerning the appropriate level 
of security spending.
6.4.1.6 Security standards and certification
Many authors such as Brenner (2007), Dodds and Hague (2004), Karabacak and 
Sogukpinar (2006), and Kouns (2007) claimed the importance of the British Standard 
BS 7799 (now ISO 27000) and its two parts ISO 27002 (part 1: Code of Practice) and 
ISO 27001 (part 2: Certification). It gained recognition as an essential standard for 
information security.
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Despite the benefits highlighted in the literature, the results (Tables 4.48 and 4.49 in 
Chapter 4) illustrated that the respondents are not sufficiently aware of the two parts 
of the standard. One third o f respondents stated that their awareness level of part 1 is 
high, whereas only 23.8 percent had the same opinion regarding part 2. The 
interviewees confirmed these findings given that the majority believed that their 
awareness level is low. This is a surprising result given that the respondents are IT 
managers and the people responsible for all security aspects in their companies. 
Moreover, further analysis suggested that the awareness level is somewhat high in the 
insurance & financial services, and energy & utilities, whereas it is weak in 
technology & telecommunications and very weak in the manufacturing, retail 
merchandising, and property & construction sectors.
The overall awareness level o f the other managers and employees is low as well. 
Unfortunately, the questionnaire findings revealed that 73 percent of companies 
indicated that their managers’ awareness level of the standard is low, and 93.7 percent 
had the same opinion regarding the employees (Tables 4.50 and 4.51). The 
interviewees confirmed these findings, which suggested that the overall awareness of 
the British Standard BS 7799 in UK companies that responded is low, whereas the 
awareness level is somewhat higher among those managers who have a professional 
security qualification, and among some IT staff (Table 6.1).
Moreover, although the literature suggests many benefits for companies of being 
certified under ISO 27001 (Section 3.2.1.3 in Chapter 3); the questionnaire findings 
(Table 4.53) and the interviews revealed that only two companies are certified. This is 
not surprising given that more than three quarters of respondents stated that their 
awareness level o f part 2 o f the standard, against which companies seek certification, 
is moderate or low (Table 4.49). In the interviews, many reasons were given for not 
being certified. Some interviewees could not see any benefit in being certified, others 
believed that it needed much time and cost to become certified, whereas other 
interviewees believed that not being mandatory, it was not necessary to become 
certified. They believed that companies who are certified are those companies 
providing business-to-business services, in order to prove to their clients that they take 
security seriously and that their controls are adequate. These results, therefore, 
indicated that, in practice, many UK companies that responded believe that preparing
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for this certification is a comprehensive and time-consuming effort, and even some of 
the companies, which are already certified under ISO 27001, could not see enough 
benefit from being certified.
On the other hand, although the majority of interviewees could not see benefits from 
being certified under ISO 27001, they saw many benefits o f complying with the 
standard for example compliance could provide sound information security, assurance 
for customers, an excellent reference point, a framework and could facilitate 
compatibility. However, some companies in different sectors still cannot see any 
benefit from compliance. In their opinion, it takes up too much time, effort and 
money, and is still optional and not required by clients. This opinion in not consistent 
with the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey (BERR 2008) which pointed 
out that all companies that have implemented the standard have achieved benefits 
from doing so.
6.4.1.7 AIS security effectiveness
Measuring IS effectiveness has been an important research issue in previous studies 
such as DeLone and McLean (1992), Huang et a l (2006), Kankanhalli et al. (2003), 
and Wright (2006). There is a strong argument that measuring security effectiveness 
ensures that security actually works as expected, eases the process of monitoring the 
effectiveness o f security management, reduces the number o f security incidents, and 
provides evidence to auditors and assurance to senior management that a company is 
in control (Fumell and Papadaki 2008; Wright 2006).
The results (Table 4.54 in Chapter 4) indicated that the majority o f UK companies that 
responded depend on an external and internal security audit and on penetration testing 
to evaluate AIS security effectiveness whereas the least common technique used is 
“vulnerability scanners” . The interviewees confirmed these findings and stated other 
techniques as well such as risk assessment, number of security incidents, and security 
awareness level among employees. The results revealed again that the insurance & 
financial services companies put more effort into training their staff and raising their 
security awareness than the other sectors, given that they were the only companies 
who emphasised the use o f employees’ security awareness as a major technique in 
evaluating security effectiveness.
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Moreover, the results (Table 4.60) revealed that the companies’ most common success 
indicators of AIS security management are the successful defences against security 
attacks, information security assurance, and the increased ability to recover from 
disasters, whereas an increased AIS security budget is the least common success 
indicator. These results could be because most UK companies that responded (Table 
4.41) do not have a separate security budget, and those who have, do not allocate a 
specific amount of this budget for AIS security. However, interviews did not confirm 
the above results. The majority believed that the non-occurrence of security incidents 
is their companies’ most important success indicator of security management, in 
addition to employees’ security awareness, commitment to policies, vulnerability 
level and compliance.
In addition, the majority o f interviewees mentioned two main obstacles to effective 
security, namely, people using systems and lack of management support, awareness 
and commitment. These results supported previous studies such as Chen et al. (2008), 
Fenrich (2008), Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005), and Hagen et al. (2008), which 
indicated that people are the weakest link in security, and lack o f management 
awareness and support is a major concern for companies attempting to defend their IS 
(Briney 2001; Kwok and Longley 1999).
Regarding the effectiveness level o f AIS security management, the questionnaire 
findings (Table 4.62) revealed that 60 percent of companies believed that their AIS 
security management was somewhat effective, whereas 23.3 percent believed that it 
was extremely effective. Interviewees’ opinions confirmed these findings, and only 
one third of interviewees believed that their security effectiveness level was very high, 
whereas the other interviewees from different sectors believed that the effectiveness 
level of security management was moderate or reasonable. Further analysis showed 
that some companies from all sectors except the technology & telecommunications 
believed that their AIS security management was extremely effective. However, in the 
interviews, the two interviewees from the insurance & financial services sector 
believed that their security management was very effective. This could be because 
insurance & financial services companies are more concerned with security than other 
sectors and therefore they have all the relevant controls in place, which give them 
more confidence. In addition, given that all the technology & telecommunications
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companies believed that they improved security training and awareness after security 
incidents (Table 4.37), these companies could be more aware of the different types of 
threats facing their systems, and therefore they are not fully confident that they have 
an extremely effective security management.
6.4.2 AIS security threats
The review of the literature revealed that companies and their AIS are subject to 
increasing numbers and types of security threats. However, due to resource 
constraints, companies cannot implement unlimited controls to protect their systems. 
Instead, they should first understand the major threats, and then implement effective 
controls accordingly (Lin 2006). However, despite the progress made by companies in 
protecting their systems and information stored in them from outside threats, many 
studies such as Magklaras et al. (2006), Mouratidis et al. (2008), Olnes (1994), 
Swartz (2007), and Wood and Banks (1993) showed that security threats are mainly 
from staff within companies rather than from outsiders.
The questionnaire findings supported the previous studies and revealed that 
employees are now the most common source of AIS security threats facing UK 
companies that responded. The results (Table 4.67 in Chapter 4) showed that 
authorised employees are the companies’ first common source o f threats, followed by 
former employees (second source), and computer hackers (third source). Interviewees 
confirmed these findings (Table 6.2) and they believed that people or employees are 
their companies’ most common source o f threats in terms of not following procedures 
and polices, having too much access to systems and information, misusing the 
internet, misbehaving either unintentionally or through ignorance or acting as 
criminals and having more than one job role. However, the results o f the Kruskal- 
Wallis test (Table 4.68) implied that there are significant differences in the 
distribution of responses among the different sectors regarding the authorised users or 
employees, whereas there are no significant differences among the different sectors 
regarding the other sources o f security threats. These results suggest that users or 
employees have different effects on different sectors, given that only one third of 
respondents from the energy & utilities sector considered employees their first 
common source o f threats.
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T a b le  6 .2  R e s u l t s  o f  th e  s o u r c e s  a n d  ty p e s  o f  A I S  s e c u r i ty  th r e a ts
Hypotheses Questionnaire results Interview results Remarks
H2\ There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
sources and types o f  
AIS security threats.
The results showed that 
there are significant 
differences in the 
distribution o f  
responses among the 
different sectors 
regarding the 
authorised users or 
employees as a source 
of security threats, and 
the unauthorised access 
to data or systems by 
disgruntled employees, 
and employees’ sharing 
of passwords as types 
o f security threats.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The results revealed 
that employees are now 
the most common 
source o f AIS security 
threats facing UK 
companies that 
responded.
The results indicated 
the frequent occurrence 
o f employees’ errors 
(unintentional 
destruction of data by 
employees), spamming 
and malware attacks, 
and employees’ sharing 
o f passwords.
Moreover, the questionnaire findings (Table 4.69) indicated the infrequent occurrence 
of some types o f security threats such as intentional destruction of data by employees, 
theft of physical information, theft o f software, sabotage, and natural disasters. 
However, the results indicate the frequent occurrence o f employees’ errors i.e. 
unintentional destruction o f data by employees, spamming and malware attacks, and 
employees’ sharing o f passwords.
Table 4.70 revealed that the unauthorised access to data or systems by disgruntled 
employees rarely occurred in the property & construction, and energy & utilities 
sectors, but could happen in the other sectors. The property & construction companies 
that responded are also rarely faced with unauthorised access to data or systems by 
hackers, whereas the most likely sector to suffer from this threat is the manufacturing 
sector (Table 4.71).
It is not surprising that the unintentional destruction o f data by employees occurred in
63.3 percent o f companies that responded (Table 4.72), given that employees’ 
accidental actions were recognised in many previous studies such as Davis (1997), 
Loch et al. (1992), and Steele and Wargo (2007). However, the results indicated the 
infrequent occurrence o f the intentional destruction of data by employees (Table 
4.73). These results supported Im and Baskerville (2005) who argued that the major 
source of unmanaged risks to IS continues to be accidental in nature.
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The results (Table 4.75) also suggested that viruses are no longer a big issue for UK 
companies. This could be because the media attention given to viruses has increased 
the awareness level o f this threat or because anti-virus defences have significantly 
improved. However, the results (Table 4.76) indicated the frequent occurrence per day 
of spamming or e-mail attacks.
The results also suggested the frequent occurrence o f malware attacks in UK 
companies that responded, despite the increasing use of malware detection tools. 
Moreover, further analysis (Table 4.77) indicated that manufacturing companies are 
the least affected by malware attacks, while energy & utilities and technology & 
telecommunications are the most affected companies. This could be because 
manufacturing companies have a lower level o f computerisation compared to other 
sectors, and therefore they are the least affected companies by malware attacks (Yeh 
and Chang 2007), whereas energy companies are least likely to be protected against 
spyware (BERR 2008).
On the other hand, 72.9 percent of companies that responded reported that employees 
shared their passwords in the last year, which indicates its frequent occurrence, 
particularly in the retail merchandising companies, where they believed that it 
happens several times per day (Table 4.78).
Interestingly, one respondent only, from technology & telecommunications believed 
software theft occurred several times per day (Table 4.79), which indicated the low 
level of occurrence o f software theft in UK companies that responded. On the other 
hand, the results gave an indication that software failures are happening in most 
companies, since few companies claimed their non-occurrence (Table 4.80).
The results also indicated the rare occurrence of sabotage in media & entertainment, 
property & construction and retail merchandising, its infrequent occurrence in the 
other sectors (Table 4.81), and the low level of occurrence of natural disasters in UK 
companies that responded (Table 4.82).
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.83) revealed that there are statistically 
significant differences in the distribution o f responses among the different industry
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sectors regarding the unauthorised access to data or systems by disgruntled 
employees, and employees’ sharing of passwords, which suggested their high level of 
occurrence in some sectors compared to the other sectors. On the other hand, there are 
no significant differences in the distribution of responses among the different industry 
sectors regarding types and frequency of occurrence for the other AIS security threats.
The interviewees’ opinions confirmed the questionnaire findings. Interestingly, people 
or employees were cited by interviewees from all industry sectors that responded as 
one of their companies’ most serious and frequent security threats or as their only 
serious threat, in terms of misusing the systems, getting too much access, and their 
unintentional errors and mistakes. Interviewees cited other security threats as well 
such as loss or leakage o f data, identity theft and financial fraud in terms of phishing 
and spamming attacks, complexity of IS, sharing o f information, poor configuration, 
mobile devices such as USB memory sticks, and downtime. In addition, the majority 
of interviewees believed that their companies will be more concerned about 
employees and loss or theft o f confidential data over the next two years. This is not 
surprising given that these threats were emphasised in many previous studies such as 
Beard and Wen (2007), Fumell and Papadaki (2008), and Mitnick (2003). 
Consequently, UK companies should consider employee security training and 
awareness seriously, given that employees are their weakest link and their first line of 
defence as well. In addition, interviewees cited other concerns such as customers, 
mobile devices (mobile phones, laptops, USB memory sticks), and financial fraud, 
which must be considered by companies as well.
6.4.3 AIS security controls
Having identified the most common sources and types of AIS security threats facing 
UK companies that responded, the next step was to investigate the different types of 
AIS security controls that these companies are currently using, or are planning to use 
to reduce their threats. These security controls were grouped under seven sub-titles.
Regarding organisational security controls, the results (Table 4.85 in Chapter 4) 
indicated that the majority o f UK companies that responded are not concerned with 
reorganising their security functions, except for retail merchandising given that two 
thirds of companies reported the existence of reorganised AIS security functions. On
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the other hand, the majority of companies undertake continuous auditing, except for 
the manufacturing companies that need to be more concerned with these auditing 
techniques (Table 4.86). The results (Table 4.87) also indicated that manufacturing 
companies are less concerned about real time security awareness, which is consistent 
with the results in Section 6.4.1.2 where these companies appeared to devote less 
effort to raising security awareness compared to other sectors. Moreover, the majority 
of companies are aware o f the importance of having a current disaster recovery and 
business continuity plan (Table 4.88). Overall, it can be concluded that manufacturing 
companies are the least likely to be concerned with organisational security controls 
compared to the other companies and consequently, they should pay more attention to 
this type of control.
Regarding personnel security controls, the results (Table 4.89) revealed that the 
majority of UK companies undertake background checks for their employees; they 
pay great attention to segregation of duties, and their employees sign a confidentiality 
agreement before joining. On the other hand, more attention must be given to security 
training and awareness, and to mandatory vacations. Table 4.90 indicated that media 
& entertainment is the sector most concerned with undertaking reference checks for 
employees, while manufacturing is the sector least concerned. The media & 
entertainment and technology & telecommunications sectors are more concerned with 
the employees’ confidentiality agreement than other sectors (Table 4.91). Moreover, 
the insurance & financial services sector is most concerned with training and 
awareness programs (Table 4.92) as shown in Section 6.4.1.2. On the other hand, the 
retail merchandising sector is paying a great deal o f attention to the segregation of 
duties (Table 4.93), while the majority o f companies do not consider a mandatory 
vacation as an important control (Table 4.94).
With respect to software security controls, the results (Table 4.95) revealed that 
almost all companies emphasised the importance o f certain controls such as anti-virus 
software, cancellation o f passwords for terminated employees, testing software before 
use, and safeguards against unauthorised access to software. On the other hand, more 
attention should be paid to the insurance coverage for software, and software audit 
alert tools. This could be because the majority of companies did not have a sufficient 
security budget, and therefore they could not justify the spending on insurance
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coverage. However, Table 4.96 suggested that media & entertainment and insurance 
& financial services companies were more concerned about their software, and were 
storing it off-site. Media & entertainment companies were more concerned about 
software audit alert tools and the intrusion prevention or detection software as well 
(Tables 4.97 and 4.98).
Regarding hardware and physical security controls, the results (Table 4.100) indicated 
that all companies made back-ups for their hard disks and used firewalls. The majority 
restricted access to main computing facilities, had security alarm systems, placed their 
accounting servers in secure locations, and protected their computers from natural 
disasters as well. On the other hand, the majority did not use biometrics and were not 
planning at all to use it. Table 4.101 revealed that all media & entertainment 
companies claimed the use o f penetration testing. Moreover, Table 4.103 indicated 
that insurance & financial services companies were more concerned about their 
laptops, given the sensitive nature of financial data stored in them, and 90 percent of 
companies stored unused laptops in secured cabinets. Although nearly two fifths of 
companies had insurance coverage for their software, Table 4.104 showed that 77.8 
percent reported the existence o f insurance coverage for hardware and computer 
devices, with all insurance & financial services companies reporting its existence.
With respect to the input or data security controls, the results (Table 4.105) suggested 
that UK companies that responded gave much attention to access controls and to data 
back-ups. However, more attention must be given to data encryption, except for the 
media & entertainment companies, which are more concerned about encrypting their 
data than other sectors (Table 4.106). This is a surprising result, given that recent 
security incidents have highlighted how confidential data can become exposed when 
laptops and other mobile devices are stolen or lost.
Moreover, the results (Table 4.107) revealed that UK companies that responded pay 
much attention to output security controls, given that the majority restrict access to 
their sensitive information, and store it in secured cabinets.
Given the increasing use o f the internet and email in all companies’ operations, it is 
not surprising to find them more concerned about the network security controls than
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ever before. The results revealed that the majority of companies have content and e- 
mail filtering software, malware (spyware and adware) detection tools, and spam 
filtering software, while half the companies have implemented network encryption. 
Table 4.109 indicated that retail merchandising was the sector most concerned with 
network encryption, whereas manufacturing companies were more concerned with the 
content and e-mail filtering software than the other controls.
Overall, the results (Table 6.3) indicate that the majority of companies that responded 
are paying more attention to software and hardware security controls, and input and 
output controls; however, more effort should be devoted to the organisational and 
personnel controls, namely, reorganised AIS security functions, incident response, 
training and awareness, and mandatory vacations. Regarding the other categories of 
controls, more attention must be given to the insurance coverage for software, 
biometrics, data and network encryption as well. Interviewees confirmed these 
findings and reported the existence of most of these controls, in addition to other 
recently employed controls relevant to their companies. Moreover, the results 
suggested that the majority o f companies are now addressing the human factor in 
security, through additional controls over internet activities, access to systems and 
information, the use o f mobile devices such as USBs, and the creation of DVDs to 
raise security awareness. This is not surprising, given that people are seen as the 
companies’ most common source of threat. Consequently, companies’ security should 
start with their own staff given that employees are their first line of defence (Green 
2003).
Interestingly, the majority o f interviewees are confident that they have enough 
security controls in place, and there is no need for more controls. However, some 
companies believed that a gap exists between their threats and controls in terms of a 
limited security budget and consequently a low level of monitoring controls over 
systems and internet usage, and a low level of data protection controls. This is not 
surprising, given that, the majority o f companies do not have a separate security 
budget and the budget is just a part of their IT budget. Moreover, although the 
majority of companies believed that there were no gaps between their threats and 
controls, they reported some important security controls; namely, controls for 
protecting confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, monitoring
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controls, single authorisation, risk registers, access controls, and data encryption. The 
results suggested that companies keep a watch on the emerging security controls 
around them and select the most relevant ones. In addition, interviewees cited some 
new security controls their companies were planning to use, namely, biometrics, 
intrusion detection and prevention systems, access controls on systems and networks, 
internet reporting system, and provisioning tools.
The majority of interviewees were confident that the security level within their 
companies would be better in the next year; however, they believed that there is 
nothing called ‘absolute security’ or ‘Zero Risk’.
Table 6.3 Results o f the types o f AIS security controls
Hypotheses Questionnaire results Interview results Remarks
H3: There are no 
significant differences 
among UK companies 
in different industry 
sectors concerning the 
types o f controls 
implemented to prevent 
or reduce security 
threats.
The results provide no 
evidence o f any 
statistically significant 
association between the 
industry sectors and the 
different types o f AIS 
security controls except 
for the background 
investigations or 
reference checks.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings.
The majority of 
companies that 
responded are paying 
more attention to 
software and hardware 
security controls, and 
input and output 
controls; however, 
more effort should be 
devoted to the 
organisational and 
personnel controls.
Despite the differences noticed among industry sectors, the results of the chi-square 
test (Table 4.110) provided no evidence o f any statistically significant association 
between the industry sectors and the different types of AIS security controls, except 
for the background investigations (Hypothesis 3 in Section 3.2.4). This result 
indicated that some sectors are concerned about these checks more than the others.
Overall, the results suggested that although the majority of companies that responded 
had begun to address the human factor in security and to realise that people are their 
most common source o f security threat, they still counter this threat using technology 
alone. However, it can be recognised from the literature that the key to successful 
security depends more on policies and procedures that companies put in place and on 
their commitment to raising employees’ awareness levels than on implementing 
technology for its own sake (Golden 2008).
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T a b le  6 .4  R e s u l ts  o f  t h e  S p e a r m a n ’s r a n k  c o r re la t io n  a n d  th e  r e g r e s s io n  a n a ly s is
Hypotheses Questionnaire results Interview results Remarks
H4\ There is no 
significant relationship 
between the different 
types of security 
controls and the 
reduction o f AIS 
security threats facing 
UK companies.
The results showed the 
relative importance of 
some types o f controls 
such as penetration 
testing, and biometrics, 
compared to other 
controls, given that 
these controls have a 
significant effect on 
many types o f threats.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings
The results provided no 
evidence o f any effect 
of some controls on 
any type o f security 
threats such as software 
audit alert tools, back­
up for hard disks, 
security alarm systems, 
users access controls, 
network encryption, 
spam filtering software, 
etc.
H5: There are no 
significant relationship 
between AIS security 
effectiveness and the 
AIS security threat 
level in UK companies.
The results provide a 
strong support to H5.
The interviews 
confirmed these 
findings
The results suggested 
that irrespective of 
their security 
effectiveness level, 
companies still face 
new types o f security 
threats.
On the other hand, the results o f the Spearman’s rank correlation (Table 4.111) and 
the regression analysis (Table 4.113) showed the relative importance of some types of 
controls such as penetration testing, and biometrics, compared to other controls, given 
that these controls have a significant effect on many types o f threats. However, the 
results provided no evidence o f any effect of some controls on any type of security 
threats such as software audit alert tools, back-up for hard disks, security alarm 
systems, users access controls, network encryption, spam filtering software, etc. 
Despite these results, every company should select the relevant mix of controls 
according to its requirements, given that no single control can protect AIS from all 
possible threats.
On the other hand, the results (Table 4.112) provided no evidence of any statistically 
significant correlations between the effectiveness level o f AIS security in UK 
companies that responded and each type of threats. This result suggested that 
irrespective of their security effectiveness level, companies still face new types of 
security threats.
6.5 Limitations of the research
As with all previous studies, the current study has its limitations. The first and most 
obvious is the low response rate. As mentioned in Section 3.6.1 (Chapter 3), the most 
serious problem with the postal questionnaire was the poor response rate particularly
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when dealing with very sensitive and intrusive security issues. Although, the response 
rate is comparable with many previous security studies (Table 3.3), it demands 
caution in the interpretation of the results and may hinder the generalisability of 
findings on all large UK listed companies. Moreover, the questionnaire was directed 
to the IT managers of UK listed companies. It can be assumed that the internal 
auditors and finance directors within the same companies might have different 
opinions regarding different security practices. In addition to these limitations, the 
postal questionnaire has other drawbacks as mentioned before in Section 3.6.1.
Another limitation relates to the small number of interviews conducted. Although all 
the managers who were willing and able to participate further in the study were 
interviewed and they provided rich and detailed answers, the interview findings may 
not be generalisable to the population of IT managers in UK listed companies, given 
that the number o f interviews conducted was only nine interviews. In addition, it can 
be assumed that those who were willing to be interviewed had more interest in 
security. Other managers could have different attitudes to security practices within 
their companies. There is also a possibility of the interviewer’s personal influence and 
bias directing the discussion towards confirming or finding justifications for the 
questionnaire results. Other limitations of the interviews were mentioned in Section 
3.6.2.
A further limitation is that the results may not be generalisable beyond UK listed 
companies, given that only listed companies were investigated due to time and cost 
constraints. There is, therefore, a possibility that managers o f unlisted companies 
could have different opinions and could have provided a clearer picture regarding AIS 
security level within UK companies.
Moreover, although the questionnaire was directed to IT managers in many industry 
sectors in the UK, the managers who responded were from a limited number of 
sectors, which hindered the researcher from investigating security practices in the 
other industry sectors not participating in the study. On the other hand, the current 
study did not focus on certain industry sectors. Ma et al. (2008) argued that studies 
that focused on a specific industry sector would be able to identify specific objectives 
and practices that are more relevant to that specific sector.
4 0 8
Although the current study attempted to provide an overall and comprehensive view 
of the AIS security issue, it did not cover all the important issues in this field such as 
the nature and type o f AIS used, and the outsourcing of AIS security services within 
companies, due to some considerations regarding the length o f the questionnaire.
Despite the above limitations, the consistency between the majority of the 
questionnaire and interview results provides an assurance o f the validity of the 
research findings. In addition, the results may provide a useful guide to show common 
AIS security trends within different industry sectors in the UK.
6.6 Recommendations
Based on the research findings, the researcher recommends the following:
1. The study showed that security is still recognised as an IT issue, and therefore, 
security management is often left to the IT department, not to the accounting or 
finance department. Dutta and McCrohan (2002) argued that if  there is no structural 
unit that is specifically responsible for security, the implementation of security 
initiatives will be fragmented and may therefore be ineffective. Consequently, it is 
important for UK companies to have a separate security department and security 
personnel who receive special training and are able to spend all their time on 
improving security, instead o f having security as an additional task. In addition, if 
there is a separate security budget for this department, it becomes easier to justify the 
extra security spending to the board o f directors.
2. Although security policy now exists in the majority of UK companies regardless of 
the industry sector, some companies do not devote much time or effort to updating their 
security policy and checking employees’ compliance with the policy. Consequently, 
companies should make much more effort in reviewing their security policy on a 
regular basis to keep pace with any changes in business, regulatory, technological and 
personnel environments. In addition, more effort is needed in monitoring and enforcing 
the compliance to such policies, given that there is no motivation to comply, if 
management is not checking upon employees.
3. Although employees are often the weakest link in security and the cause of many 
security threats, the study reported that UK companies still do not expend enough
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energy in training their employees and raising their security awareness, particularly 
property & construction and manufacturing companies. In addition, companies are not 
making enough effort to test their employees’ awareness or to measure the effect of a 
training and awareness program on the company. It is important, therefore, for all 
companies and particularly for property & construction and manufacturing companies 
to provide their employees with sufficient security training and to raise their awareness 
level, given that employees are the first line of defence in security.
4. Although the majority o f UK companies have formal security incident handling 
procedures in place, manufacturing companies need to be more concerned with 
security and to have formal procedures to deal with any security incident.
5. In line with previous studies, many security incidents go unreported since the 
majority of companies prefer to maintain their brand and to deal with security 
incidents internally except for the insurance & financial services companies, which 
are obligated by law to report their security incidents to the relevant authorities. 
Consequently, it is important to have a specific authority for every industry sector to 
assist companies if  they need help and to deal with security incidents with full 
confidentiality in order to encourage them to report all their incidents.
6. The study reported that the overall awareness o f the British Standard BS 7799 (now 
ISO 27000) in UK companies is low, except among those managers who have a 
professional security qualification. Given the importance o f complying with this 
standard, companies must devote more time and effort to increase their staff 
awareness of it through different means such as arranging seminars, publishing 
relevant sections of it on companies’ intranet, e-mail messages, security awareness 
newsletters, and periodic briefings.
7. The study has shown that people or employees are the most serious and frequent 
security threat facing UK companies and they will be their main security concern over 
the coming years as well. Companies, therefore, face a human threat. Consequently, 
they must put more effort into non-technical solutions for example security policy, 
training and awareness, and risk assessment instead of focusing only on technical 
solutions.
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8. The study reported the frequent occurrence of employees’ errors i.e. unintentional 
destruction of data by employees, phishing, spamming and malware attacks, sharing 
of passwords, data loss or leakage, identity theft, and inappropriate use of mobile 
devices such as USB memory sticks. Consequently, UK companies must address 
these threats and must implement the appropriate security controls in an attempt to 
reduce their occurrence.
9. The study reported that the majority of UK companies are now paying, relatively, 
more attention to software and hardware security controls, and input and output 
controls than the organisational and personnel security controls, despite their 
importance. It is important, therefore, to devote more effort to some controls, namely, 
security training and awareness, mandatory vacations, insurance coverage for 
software, biometrics, and encryption of sensitive data and network.
6.7 Suggestions for future research
Based on the limitations of the current study, the following suggestions may provide 
opportunities for future research:
1. The questionnaire was directed to the IT managers of UK listed companies. It is 
important to broaden the research and to investigate unlisted companies as well. In 
addition, a comparative study could be carried out to investigate the differences 
between UK listed and unlisted companies regarding their security threats, security 
controls, and their AIS security management framework.
2. The questionnaire could be directed to other managers e.g. internal auditors, and 
finance directors within the same companies and to the external auditors as well, in 
order to investigate the differences in their opinions regarding security practices.
3. It may be possible to also investigate the security threats, security controls, and AIS 
security management framework within small companies in the UK.
4. Although this study aimed to investigate the security level in UK companies, it 
could also be possible to use the same questionnaire to investigate the AIS security 
level in other countries.
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5. Although the study aimed to investigate the differences among UK companies in 
different industry sectors, future studies are needed to focus on one sector such as the 
financial services sector given that studies that focused on a specific industry sector 
would be able to identify specific practices more relevant to that sector.
6. Although the questionnaire was directed to IT managers in many industry sectors, 
the respondents came from a limited number of sectors. Future studies therefore are 
needed to investigate the security practices in the other sectors that did not participate 
in this study such as education, health care and government.
7. Given the low response rate to the questionnaire and the small number of 
interviews conducted, a large scale study could be undertaken to investigate the 
possibility of generalising the findings of the current research on large UK listed 
companies.
8. Given the low response rate to the questionnaire and the small number of 
interviews conducted, a future study could be undertaken using the case study method 
for data collection in order to investigate the security practices of one or more 
companies in more depth.
9. Although the study is an attempt to present an integrated view of the AIS security 
in UK companies, future studies are needed to investigate certain security issues in 
more depth, namely, security training and awareness, and the British Standard BS 
7799, given that they are the most neglected areas compared to the other security 
issues.
10. Due to some considerations related to the questionnaire length, certain important 
security topics are not covered such as the nature and type of AIS used, and 
outsourcing of AIS security services within companies. Future studies, therefore, will 
be necessary to investigate these topics.
11. It would be useful to compare the results of the current study with those obtained 
from similar future studies in order to investigate the new threats facing UK
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companies, and the more advanced security controls implemented to reduce these 
threats.
6.8 Conclusion of research
Overall, this study has attempted to fill the gaps in the literature on AIS security. First, 
most of the previous studies have dealt with IS security or information security in 
general without particular attention to AIS security. Second, security research is 
fragmented and most o f the previous studies lack an overall view of the AIS security 
issue. Third, much research on IS security has been focused on the technical aspects 
with limited consideration given to non-technical issues. Fourth, much security 
research focused on one o f the activities forming the management framework for the 
AIS security rather than the full range of activities underpinning this framework.
In an attempt to extend this area of research, the current study presented an integrated 
view of the AIS security in UK companies by addressing both the technical and non­
technical aspects o f security, and by investigating the different sources and types of 
AIS security threat, the types o f AIS security controls, and the existence of a 
management framework for AIS security within UK companies in the different 
industry sectors.
The current study achieved its objectives (Section 6.2) using a postal questionnaire 
and semi-structured interviews. The study reported the existence of a management 
framework o f AIS security within UK companies in different industry sectors 
(Objective 1). However, some practices forming the framework are well known and 
undertaken by the majority o f UK companies such as an AIS security policy, risk 
assessment, incident handling procedures and business continuity plans, while other 
practices are neglected such as security training and awareness programs, a security 
budget, and the British Standard BS 7799. It is therefore important to draw the 
managers’ attention to the importance o f these neglected practices in forming an 
adequate management framework o f AIS security.
In addition, the current study showed that employees are now the most common 
source of AIS security threat facing UK companies in terms of not following 
procedures and policies, having too much access to systems and information,
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misusing the internet, misbehaving either unintentionally or through ignorance or 
acting as criminals and having more than one task. Moreover, the study highlighted 
the infrequent occurrence of some types of security threats such as intentional 
destruction of data by employees, theft of physical information, theft of software, 
sabotage, and natural disasters. However, UK companies faced the frequent 
occurrence of employees’ errors (unintentional destruction of data), spamming and 
malware attacks, and employees’ sharing of passwords. UK companies are also 
concerned about loss or leakage of customer data, identity theft, and financial fraud, 
complexity of IS, sharing o f information, mobile devices, and downtime (Objective 
2). The results o f the current study should increase managers’ awareness in the 
different industry sectors of the common sources and types of security threat facing 
their systems so that they can take the appropriate precautions.
The current study also showed that the majority of companies are paying more 
attention to the software, hardware, input, and output security controls compared to 
the organisational and personnel controls such as incident response, security training 
and awareness, and mandatory vacations (Objective 3). The study suggested that more 
attention should be given to other security controls such as the insurance coverage for 
software, biometrics, and data and network encryption. Additionally, it appeared that 
the majority o f UK companies are now addressing the human factor in security 
through additional controls over internet activities, access to systems and information, 
and the use of mobile devices. However, they still counter their most common source 
of security threats (people) using technology alone. The current study therefore 
provides the managers o f UK companies with the different types of security controls 
implemented in the different industry sectors to help them select the most appropriate 
controls according to their companies’ needs.
Moreover, the current study reported the relative importance o f some types of controls 
such as penetration testing and biometrics compared to other controls given their 
significant effect on many types of threats. However, the results provided no evidence 
of any effect of some controls such as audit alert tools, back up o f hard disks, alarm 
systems, network encryption, and spam filtering software (Objective 4).
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Regarding the security perception among different industry sectors, the current study 
reported that some sectors such as the insurance & financial services are more 
concerned about security than other sectors such as manufacturing (Objective 6). It is 
important therefore to draw their attention to the importance of security in order to be 
able to take all security aspects seriously and to spend more time and effort in 
improving their security level.
In fact, although the study aimed to investigate the security of AIS in UK companies, 
the results showed that the different security practices could be applied to all systems 
within companies and not specifically for AIS. In addition, the study showed that 
security is still perceived to be an IT issue, and therefore, security management is 
often left to the IT department, not to the accounting or finance department.
To conclude, the current study has successfully filled some of the major gaps in the 
literature on IS security since it specially focused on AIS security. This study could be 
an important source o f information to the accountants and IT managers in UK 
companies since it has addressed the different aspects of the AIS security. Moreover, 
this study should help managers to identify security weaknesses in their companies’ 
AIS and to take the appropriate precautions according to their industry sectors in order 
to reduce the security threats facing their companies.
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Date
The IT Manager
Dear Sir / Madam
I am a full-time PhD student in the Accounting and Finance Section at Cardiff 
Business School, Cardiff University. I am currently conducting a research for my PhD 
thesis under the supervision o f Professors Roy Chandler and Maurice Pendlebury.
The objective of my research is to evaluate the nature of accounting information 
systems currently used in UK firms and to investigate the security threats facing these 
systems and the security controls employed by firms to reduce such threats.
You have been selected to be one of the respondents o f the attached questionnaire 
since your firm is listed on the London Stock Exchange. The questionnaire aims to 
obtain your opinions regarding the security o f the accounting information system in 
your firm, the security threats facing this system and the security controls employed to 
reduce security threats. I would be extremely grateful if  you could please spare me a 
few minutes of your valuable time by completing the questionnaire. Your opinions are 
extremely important to me.
I confirm that the information and opinions provided in the questionnaire will be 
treated as strictly confidential and will be used only for the purpose of academic 
research. Under no circumstances will any information be disclosed that will identify 
respondents and their firms.
Thank you very much for your co-operation, time and support. Please kindly return 
your completed questionnaire in the “Free Post” envelope provided.
Yours faithfully
Nancy Ibrahim Riad 
PhD Student 
Cardiff Business School 
Aberconway Building 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff CF10 3EU 
E-mail: RiadNI@cardiff.ac.uk 
or riadnancv@vahoo.com 
Telephone: 078 94 54 93 24
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Questionnaire on the Security of Accounting 
Information Systems
Conducted by 
Nancy Ibrahim Riad 
PhD Student in Accounting
Under the Supervision of 
Professor Roy Chandler and 
Professor Maurice Pendlebury 
Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University 
UK
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This questionnaire consists o f 4 sections. Please answer all questions 
in all sections by ticking the appropriate box or bracket, or by providing 
other relevant information.
Section 1: The management framework of the accounting information 
system (AIS) security
This section aims to collect your opinions concerning the management framework of the AIS security 
within your company i.e. security policy, training and awareness program, risk assessment, incident 
handling, standards and certification, and the AIS security effectiveness.
1.1 The AIS security policy:
l . I . I Does your company have a written security policy covering its AIS?
Yes No Don’t know
1.1.2 If yes, approximately how often is this policy updated?
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years
Every 3 years Every 2 years Every year Every 6 months
Don’t
know
Other, please specify
1.2 Training and awareness program:
1.2.1 Does your company have a formal AIS security awareness and training program for its
Yes No Don’t know
Managers
Employees
Other users
1.2.2 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Statements Stronglydisagree Disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
Your company communicates security 
awareness issues to its managers and employees 
regularly
Your company communicates security 
awareness issues to its managers and employees 
in response to specific incidents
Your company supplies its managers and 
employees with security awareness materials 
e.g. staff handbook, brochures, posters, intranet 
pages
Your company conducts regular testing of the 
security awareness
1.3 Risk assessment:
1.3.1 Does your company have an AIS risk assessment program?
Yes No Don’t know
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1.3.2 If yes, approximately how often does your company undertake this risk assessment for its AIS 
security?
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years
Every 3 years Every 2 years Every year Every 6 months
Don’t
know
Other, please specify
1.3.3 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding 
the risk assessment activities within your company:________ ________ _________ _________ ________
Statements Stronglydisagree Disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
Risks are assessed and threats to the AIS 
security are identified regularly
Controls are defined and provide sufficient 
protection against threats
Assets are identified and ranked by their value, 
sensitivity and criticality to the company
The company undertakes risk assessment when 
a significant change in the company’s 
environment occurs
1.4 Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan:
l.4 .1 Has your company experienced any AIS security incidents in the last year?
Yes No Don’t know
1.4.2 If yes, what is the average num ber o f  security incidents your company experienced in the last year?
1-5 6-10 11-15 More than 15 Don’t know
1.4.3 If yes, what was the worst security incident faced by your company in the last year? 
Please specify..................................................................................................................................
1.4.4 Does your company have formal security incident handling procedures?
Yes No Don’t know
1.4.5 How long did it take to restore normal business operations after the worst security incident?
A day Between a day and a week
Between a week 
and a month
More than a 
month Don’t know
1.4.6 After a security incident, what actions are undertaken by the company to reduce future incidents?
■ Updating the security policy
■ Improving security awareness and training at all levels [ ]
■ Improving the back-up system
■ Improving the disaster recovery and business continuity plan [ ]
■ Updating the detection software [ ]
■ Undertaking security audit [ ]
■ Allocating sufficient budget and resources to security [ ]
■ No actions were undertaken [ J
■ Other, please specify [ ]
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1.4.7 Does your company have a formal business continuity plan?
Yes No Don’t know
1.4.8 If yes, approximately how often does your company test and review the business continuity plan?
Less frequently 
than every 3 
years
Every 3 years Every 2 years Every year Every 6 months
Don’t
know
Other, please specify
1.5 Security budget:
1.5.1 Does your company have a separate budget for security?
Yes No Don’t know
1.5.2 If yes, approximately what percentage of your company’s overall security budget was spent on 
AIS security in the last year? _______________________________________________________________
None Less than 1% l%-5% 6%-I0% 11%-15% 16%-20%
More 
than 20%
Don’t
know
1.5.3 Please rank your company’s top 3 areas of spending on AIS security where 1 represents the most 
important:
Spending Areas Rank
Security staffing
Security consultants/outsourcing
Employees’ awareness and training
Software security controls
Hardware and physical security controls
Incident response and business continuity
Audit activities, compliance and certification costs
Other, please specify.................................................................................................................
1.6 Security standards and certification:
1.6.1 In terms of its content, please indicate your awareness level o f the British Standard for 
Information Security Management BS 7799:_________________________________ _________________
The British Standard BS 7799 Low Moderate High
Part 1: Code of Practice for Information Security Management i.e. BS 
7799-1: 2005 or ISO/IEC 17799
Part 2: Security Techniques: Information Security Management Systems 
i.e. BS 7799-2: 2005 or ISO/IEC 27001
1.6.2 In your opinion, what is the overall awareness level o f your company’s managers and employees 
regarding the British Standard BS 7799?
Low Moderate High
Managers
Employees
1.6.3 Has your company become certified under the ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management 
Systems Standard? _________________ _____ ______________________ ______________________
Yes No, but plans to No, and no plans to Don’t know
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1.7 AIS security effectiveness:
1.7.1 Please indicate the techniques used by your company to evaluate the effectiveness of the AIS 
security:
■ External security audits [ ]
■ Internal audits o f security procedures [ ]
■ Penetration testing [ ]
■ Network monitoring software [ ]
■ Vulnerability scanners [ ]
■ Other, please specify  [ ]
1.7.2 Please rank the top 3 critical success indicators of the AIS security management within your 
company where 1 represents the most important:
Success indicators Rank
Information security assurance
Reduction in internal policy breaking
Reduction in frequency of AIS security incidents
Increased ability to recover from disasters
Successful defences against AIS security attacks
Increased budget for AIS security
Other, please specify.................................................................................................................
1.7.3 In your opinion, how effective is the AIS security management in your company?
Not effective at 
all
Somewhat
ineffective
Neither 
ineffective nor 
effective
Somewhat
effective
Extremely
effective
Section 2: Security threats to the company's AIS
This section aims to investigate the most common types o f security threats that are currently facing the 
company’s AIS and the sources of those threats.
2.1 Please rank the top 3 users who in your opinion represent the common sources of security threats to 
your company’s AIS where 1 represents the most common source:________________________________
Sources of security threats Rank
Authorised users/employees
Former employees
Suppliers of goods or services
Customers
Competitors
Computer hackers
Other, please specify................................................................
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2.2 Please indicate the frequency with which your company has faced each type of the following 
threats in the last year:______________________________________________________________________
Security Threats None Once a year
Once a 
month
Once
a
week
Once 
a day
More 
than 
once a 
day
Unauthorised access to the data/systems by disgruntled 
employees
Unauthorised access to the data/systems by hackers
Unintentional destruction of data by employees
Intentional destruction of data by employees
Theft of physical information e.g. printed output, 
computer disks, tapes
Introduction of computer viruses, bombs or worms to the 
system
Spamming attacks
Malware (spyware, adware) programs
Sharing of passwords
Theft of software
Technical software failures or errors
Sabotage or intentional destruction of computing 
equipment e.g. PCs and laptops
Natural disasters e.g. fire, floods, earthquakes, etc.
Other, please specify.....................................................
Section 3: Security controls o f the company’s AIS
This section aims to investigate the security controls of the company’s AIS that are currently 
implemented and employed to reduce security threats.
3.1 For each of the following security controls please indicate whether your company is currently using 
it, is planning to use it, or there are no plans to use it:_______________________ ________________i____
Security Controls Yes No, but plans to
No, 
and no 
plans 
to
Administrative/Organisation Security Controls:
Reorganised AIS security functions
Continuous auditing techniques
Real time security awareness/incident response
Disaster recovery and business continuity plan
Personnel Security Controls:
Background investigations/reference checks
Signing of confidentiality agreement by employees
Security training and awareness programs
Segregation of duties
Mandatory vacations
Software Security Controls:
Testing software before use
Off-site storage o f original software
Safeguards against unauthorised access to software
Software audit alert tools
Virus protection software
Cancelling passwords for terminated employees
Intrusion prevention/detection software
Insurance coverage for software
Hardware/Physical Security Controls:
Back-up for hard disks
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Firewalls
Penetration testing
Restricting access to the main computing facilities
Security alarm system
Biometric techniques
Storing unused laptops in secure/locked cabinets
Placement of authorisation/database/accounting servers in secure location
Protecting computers from natural disasters e.g. air conditioners, fireproof 
installations, waterproof installations, smoke detectors, etc.
Insurance coverage for hardware and computer devices
InDut/Data Security Controls:
Off-site storage of data back-ups
Encryption of sensitive data
User access controls/authorisation
Output Security Controls:
Restricting access to sensitive information for authorised users
Storing sensitive output in secure/locked cabinets
Network Security Controls:
Network encryption
Content and e-mail filtering software
Malware (spyware, adware) detection tools
Spam filtering software
Other, please specify.................................................................................................
Section 4: General and Background Information
This section aims to collect general information about yourself and the company that you represent.
4.1 Please state your job title :...............................................................................................................................
4.2 Please state the number of years of experience in your current job in this company:................ year (s)
4.3 Please state the most recent educational qualification you have obtained:............................................
4.4 Please state the academic field o f study o f your most recent educational qualification:
4.5 Do you have any professional security qualification?
Y E S [ ] NO
If yes, please specify.................................................................. .
Education Health care Pharmaceuticals Telecommunications
Energy & 
Utilities Insurance
Property & 
Construction Travel
Financial
Services
Manufacturing RetailMerchandising
Wholesale
Merchandising
Government Media & Entertainment Technology
Other
Other, please specify
Less than 5 years 5-10 11-20 More than 20 years
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4.8 How many employees are in your company?
Less than 100 100-500 501-1000 1001-5000 5001-10000 More than 10000
Finally, if you have any further comments or suggestions you think relevant to the issues addressed in 
this questionnaire, please use the space below:
Are you willing to spare me a few more minutes of your valuable time in a follow-up face-to-face 
interview concerning your views on the security of the accounting information system in the UK in 
general and in your company in particular?
Y E S ( ] N O [ 1
If yes, please provide your title, name, address, telephone number and e-mail address in the box below:
Title:........................
Name:.......................
Address:...................
Telephone number: 
E-mail address:......
Do you wish to receive a copy of the results of this research?
YES [ 1  NO I ]
If yes, please provide your name and address in the above space
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE 
YOUR CONTRIBUTION IS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED
Please kindly return this completed questionnaire in the FREE PO ST envelope provided.
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Appendix 2
Covering Letter and the Semi-Structured 
Interview Schedule
466
Ca r d if f
U N I V E R S I T Y  
PRI  F Y S G O L
CAERDV[§)
The IT Manager 
Company Name 
Address
Date
Dear Sir/Madam
Thank you very much for your time and effort in completing the questionnaire 
regarding the security of accounting information systems. I really do appreciate your 
response a great deal. Thank you again for your agreeing to allow me to interview 
you concerning your views on the security o f accounting information systems in the 
UK in general and in your company in particular. I attach an interview guide to give 
you notice of the indicative questions that I would like to discuss with you. Please 
note that, of course, I will not press you if you choose not to answer a particular 
question.
You may recall that I am a full-time PhD student in the Accounting and Finance 
Section at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University. I am currently conducting 
research for my PhD thesis under the supervision of Professors Roy Chandler and 
Maurice Pendlebury.
The objective of my research is to evaluate the nature o f accounting information 
systems currently used in UK firms and to investigate the security threats facing these 
systems and the security controls employed by firms to reduce such threats.
I confirm that the information and opinions provided in the interview will be treated 
as strictly confidential and will be used only for the purpose o f academic research. 
Under no circumstances, will I disclose any information that will identify respondents 
or their companies.
Thank you very much for your cooperation, time and support.
Yours faithfully
Nancy Ibrahim Riad 
Cardiff Business School 
E-mail: RiadNI@cardiff.ac.uk 
Telephone: 078 94 54 93 24
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions
Section 1: Introductory discussion
Introducing the researcher
- Thanking the interviewee for participation in the research 
Explaining the aims and importance of the current study
- Assuring interviewee of absolute confidentiality
Section 2: General and background information
Company name
Industry group
Number of employees
Position of interviewee
Years of experience in the current position
Professional security qualification (if any)
Is there a separate department for security in the company? If yes, for how long 
has this department been established? How many employees are in this 
department? To whom do they report?
Section 3: The management framework of AIS security 
3.1 AIS security policy
Does your company have a written security policy covering its AIS? If yes, how 
old is it? Who is responsible for establishing this policy? How often is this policy 
updated? How is this policy distributed among employees?
In your opinion, what is the most important element of your company’s AIS 
security policy? Why?
How often does your company check compliance with the security policy? How is 
compliance checked? Are consequences of non-compliance with AIS security 
policy clearly communicated and enforced?
How do you rate the overall effectiveness of this policy?
3.2 Training and awareness program
- Does your company have a formal AIS security training and awareness program 
for its managers, employees and other users?
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- Have you received formal security training? If yes, please state the most important 
topics covered in the training you received.
- In your opinion, what are the most common media for security training and 
awareness in your company?
- In your opinion, what are the most effective techniques used in your company to 
make staff aware of AIS security issues?
- Does your company undertake annual testing of security awareness? How does 
your company measure and monitor staff security awareness?
In your opinion, what is the overall security awareness level in your company?
3.3 Risk assessment
- Does your company have an AIS risk assessment program? If yes, how often does 
your company undertake this risk assessment?
Do you remember the last time your company undertook this risk assessment?
Who is responsible for undertaking this risk assessment? How do you assess AIS 
risk in your company?
In your opinion, what is the overall risk level of AIS security in your company?
3.4 Incident handling, disaster recovery and business continuity plan
- Has your company experienced any AIS security incidents in the last 2 years? If 
yes, can you remember the average number of these incidents?
Can you remember the last security incident that occurred in your company? How 
was the incident discovered? Was the cause of this incident internal or external? 
What were the costs o f this security incident to your company?
What is the worst security incident that you could possibly imagine happening in 
your company?
Does your company have formal security incident handling procedures?
- If a serious security incident happened in an area in which you have some 
responsibility, what are the steps you think would have to be taken to deal with 
this situation?
Does your company report security incidents to external authorities? If yes, to 
whom does your company report these incidents? If no, what are the reasons for 
not reporting these incidents?
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- In your opinion, is your company prepared to recover from a serious security 
incident?
- After a security incident, what changes were made by the company to reduce 
future incidents?
- Does your company have a formal business continuity plan? If yes, how often 
does your company tested and updated this plan? Do you remember the last time 
your company tested and updated this plan? Who is responsible for establishing 
this business continuity plan?
- How would you rate your company’s effectiveness in detecting and responding to 
security incidents from insiders and outsiders?
3.5 Security budget
Does your company have a separate budget for security? If yes, approximately 
what percentage of your company’s security budget was spent on AIS security in 
the last year?
How does your company decide what to spend on AIS security? Who approves 
this budget?
What are the top areas of spending on AIS security in your company?
How would you characterise your company’s overall spending on AIS security?
- What do you expect your AIS security budget will be in the next year?
3.6 Security standards and certification
- In your opinion, what is the overall awareness level of your company’s managers 
and employees regarding British Standard BS 7799?
- Where does your company stand in formally adopting or becoming certified under 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Standard?
- In your opinion, what are the benefits of complying with this standard?
3.7 AIS security effectiveness
Does your company evaluate or measure the effectiveness of AIS security? If yes, 
what techniques are used for this evaluation?
- In your opinion, what are the most important success indicators of AIS security 
management within your company?
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In your opinion, what are the top obstacles to effective AIS security in your 
company?
In your opinion, how effective is AIS security management within your company?
Section 4: Security threats to the company’s AIS
Security threats have become much more sophisticated in the last few years. Can 
you explain your point of view?
- In your opinion, what are the most serious security threats to AIS in general and 
AIS in your company in particular? What is the most frequent threat facing your 
company’s AIS?
In your opinion, what are the most common sources of security threats to your 
company’s AIS?
In your opinion, what are the most likely AIS security threats your company will 
be concerned about over the next two years?
Section 5: Security controls of the company’s AIS
- Do you think your company is more secure today than a year ago?
What are the most recent AIS security controls employed by your company?
From your point of view, are there any gaps that exist between AIS security 
threats in your company and the scope of controls actually used?
If you are asked to plan for some new AIS security controls in your company, 
what are the controls you feel are important and must be employed?
- What are the AIS security controls your company is planning to use in the next 
year?
- What are the AIS security controls your company is not using and is not planning 
to use? Why?
- Do you think AIS security will be much better next year than it is today?
Section 6: Uncovered issues
Would you like to add other issues not covered but you feel are important for the 
current study?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION
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Appendix 3
Consent Forms - Confidential and Anonymous
Data
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CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
RESEARCH ETHICS
Consent Form - Confidential Data
I understand that my participation in this project will involve providing my opinions 
and views concerning some AIS security issues regarding the UK in general and my 
company in particular in an interview which will require approximately 90 minutes of 
my time.
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and without loss of 
payment (or course credit).
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I 
experience discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or 
discuss my concerns with Professor Roy Chandler.
I understand that the information provided by me will be held confidentially, such that 
only the researcher - Nancy Ibrahim Riad - can trace this information back to me 
individually. The information will be retained for up to 2 years (or until finishing the 
current research) when it will be deleted/destroyed. I understand that I can ask for the 
information I provide to be deleted/destroyed at any time and, in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act, I can have access to the information at any time.
I also understand that at the end of the study I will be provided with additional 
information and feedback about the purpose of the study.
I , ___________________________________ _ (NAME) consent to participate in the
study conducted by Nancy Ibrahim Riad of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff 
University with the supervision of Professor Roy Chandler.
Signed:
Date:
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CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
RESEARCH ETHICS
Consent Form - Anonymous Data
I understand that my participation in this project will involve providing my opinions 
and views concerning some AIS security issues regarding the UK in general and my 
company in particular in an interview which will require approximately 90 minutes of 
my time.
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and without loss of 
payment (or course credit).
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I 
experience discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or 
discuss my concerns with Professor Roy Chandler.
I understand that the information provided by me will be held totally anonymously, so 
that it is impossible to trace this information back to me individually. I understand 
that, in accordance with the Data Protection Act, this information may be retained 
indefinitely.
I also understand that at the end of the study I will be provided with additional 
information and feedback about the purpose of the study.
I, ____________________________________  {NAME) consent to participate in the
study conducted by Nancy Ibrahim Riad of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff 
University with the supervision of Professor Roy Chandler.
Signed:
Date:
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